



UNIVERSITY OF NIŠ  
FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY

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**EUPHEMISMS IN ENGLISH AND SERBIAN  
PUBLIC DISCOURSE**

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

Niš, 2016



УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У НИШУ  
ФИЛОЗОФСКИ ФАКУЛТЕТ



**Милица (Милан) Радуловић**

**ЕУФЕМИЗМИ У ЈАВНОМ ДИСКУРСУ НА  
ЕНГЛЕСКОМ И СРПСКОМ ЈЕЗИКУ**

ДОКТОРСКА ДИСЕРТАЦИЈА

Ниш, 2016.

## Data on Doctoral Dissertation

Doctoral Supervisor: PhD, Biljana Mišić Ilić, full professor, University of Niš, Faculty of Philosophy

Title: Euphemisms in English and Serbian Public Discourse

Abstract: The topic of the thesis is the analysis of the use of concealing euphemisms (Luchtenberg 1985: 24) in English and Serbian public discourse. Concealing euphemisms reduce the negative expressive force of the utterance/sentence, avoid dispreferred and impose preferred constructions of reality. The thesis shows that it is possible to expose a concealing euphemism by identifying a non-euphemistic alternative that can be used in the same context. In relation to this, the main aim of thesis is to show that the recognition of concealing euphemisms includes both the structural (lexico-semantic) and the interpersonal (lexico-pragmatic, epistemic and discursive) levels of analysis.

The theoretical background that unifies all the levels of analysis is relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995 et al.). We use the corpus-assisted qualitative analysis; the corpus is based on American, British and Serbian concealing euphemisms taken from political speeches and newspaper articles. The analysis includes the lexico-semantic analysis, the lexico-pragmatic analysis and the analysis of discursive strategies. The results of the lexico-semantic analysis show that, in political speeches, rhetorical effects are preferred, and newspaper articles strive for more precision. The lexico-pragmatic analysis is based on the proposed pragmatic algorithm which shows that an epistemically vigilant hearer can identify a concealing euphemism by analyzing interpretive hypotheses in accordance with the information given in a specific context and type of discourse. Concealing euphemisms are also viewed as discursive strategies (Van Leeuwen 2008: 23–74). The examples of the analyzed strategies were found in all corpora; they show that the issue of responsibility and even the issue of morality of actions can be ignored. The thesis integrates cognitive, communicative, epistemic and social aspects of verbal manipulation, by means of which we provide an account of meaning construction that can be used in the interpretative stage of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 1989 et al.), which studies representations of the world taken as common knowledge, which are actually socially instilled beliefs reproduced and perpetuated in language.

Scientific Field: Humanities  
Scientific Discipline: Linguistics

Key Words:

Concealing euphemism, non-euphemistic equivalent, political speeches, newspaper articles, relevance theory, lexico-semantic analysis, lexico-pragmatic analysis, pragmatic algorithm, epistemic vigilance, discursive strategies, interpretive stage of critical discourse analysis

UDC:

811.163.41: 811.111' 373.49

CERIF  
Classification:

H 350

Creative  
Commons  
License Type:

Selected License Type: **CC BY-NC-ND**

## Подаци о докторској дисертацији

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Наслов: Еуфемизми у јавном дискурсу на енглеском и српском језику

Резиме:

Тема ове тезе је анализа употребе еуфемизама скривања (Luchtenberg 1985: 24) у јавном дискурсу на енглеском и српском језику. Еуфемизми скривања се користе ради смањивања негативне експресивне снаге исказа/реченице, избегавања непожељних и наметања пожељних конструкција реалности. Анализа показује да је могуће препознати еуфемизам скривања на основу довођења истог у везу са не-еуфемистичним еквивалентом који се може употребити у истом контексту. С тим у вези, основни циљ тезе је показати да препознавање еуфемизама скривања обухвата и структурни (лексичко-семантички) и интерперсонални (лексичко-прагматички, епистемички и дискурзивни) ниво анализе.

Теоријски оквир који уједињује све нивое анализе је теорија релеванције (Sperber and Wilson 1995 et al.). У тези се примењује метода квалитативне анализе примера америчких, британских и српских еуфемизама преузетих из новинских чланака и политичких говора. Анализа обухвата лексичко-семантичку анализу, лексичко-прагматичку анализу и анализу дискурзивних стратегија. Резултати показују да су у политичким говорима реторички ефекти пожељнији, док се у новинским чланцима тежи ка прецизнијем значењу. Лексичко-прагматичка анализа се заснива на понуђеном прагматичком алгоритму који показује да епистемички будан слушалац може идентификовати еуфемизам скривања у току процеса тестирања интерпретативних хипотеза у складу са информацијама које су дате у одређеном контексту и у одређеном дискурсу. Еуфемизми скривања су и примери дискурзивних стратегија (Van Leeuwen 2008: 23–74). Примери анализираних стратегија пронађени су у свим корпусима; они показују да се проблем одговорности, а чак и проблем морала могу игнорисати. У тези се интегришу когнитивни, комуникативни, епистемички и друштвени аспекти вербалне манипулације, а понуђено објашњење начина конструисања значења може се применити и у интерпретативној фази критичке анализе дискурса (Fairclough 1989 et al.), која се иначе бави проучавањем представа света које се сматрају општим знањем, а која су у ствари наметнута веровања која се језиком репродукују и перпетуирају.

Научна област: Хуманистичке науке

Научна  
дисциплина: Лингвистика

Кључне речи:

Еуфемизам скривања, не-еуфемистични еквивалент, политички говори, новински чланци, теорија релеванције, лексичко-семантичка анализа, лексичко-прагматичка анализа, прагматички алгоритам, епистемичка будност, дискурзивне стратегије, интерпретативна фаза критичке анализе дискурса

УДК:

811.163.41: 811.111' 373.49

CERIF  
класификација:

H 350

Тип лиценце  
Креативне  
заједнице:

Одабрани тип лиценце: **CC BY-NC-ND**

## TYPOGRAPHIC CONVENTIONS

TYPOGRAPHIC CONVENTION	MEANING	EXAMPLE
ITALIC TYPE	key terms names of discursive strategies phrases titles of books titles of newspapers	<i>rhetoricity</i> <i>impersonalization</i> <i>ipso facto</i> <i>A Handbook of Rhetorical Terms</i> <i>The Independent</i>
UPPERCASE →	CONCEALING EUPHEMISM → NON-EUPHEMISTIC EQUIVALENT	TAKE → STEAL
BRACKETS with lowercase letters	translation equivalents; translated texts	POMAGAČ [helper] adjustment [razrešenje]
BRACKETS with UPPERCASE letters	descriptive features	[MILITARY]
ABBREVIATIONS	American corpus British corpus Serbian corpus	AC BC SC

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

## 1.1. Research topic

If the topic of this thesis could be summarized in one proverb, it would be “a well-tinted lie counts as the truth (Arnott 2007: 67)”<sup>1</sup>. Unfortunately, many media moguls, spin doctors, and public figures can abuse this folk wisdom in propaganda campaigns aimed at keeping public opinion under media control. Media manipulation comes in all shapes and sizes, and this thesis focuses on one such use/abuse of language, concealing euphemisms in English and Serbian public discourse.

In the most general sense, euphemisms are a tool used to change the expressive force of the utterance, motivated by a conviction that a more direct word, phrase or sentence can be disturbing or damaging for interlocutors. Euphemisms, therefore, are a form of censorship, and, as such, they are common in discourses where it is essential to keep a good public image. Euphemistic meanings can be conveyed by sentences, words or phrases, so, along these lines, there are two subtypes of euphemisms, syntactic (sentential level) and lexical (subsentential level) (Burkhardt 2010: 358). In accordance with their discursive functions, euphemisms can be divided into the ones whose aim is to veil and the ones whose aim is to conceal (Luchtenberg 1985: 24). The first group of euphemisms belongs to religious and social taboos, i.e. language expressions by means of which invocation of danger, embarrassment or social disgrace is avoided. These expressions are used as alternatives for the language considered to possess magical powers (the power of evil, disease, death), and for the language which breaks the norms of common decency, and is basic to creating a positive public image (such as, for example, words/expressions related to sexuality, bodily fluids). The second group of euphemisms change not only the expressive force of the sentence/utterance, but also affect the referential and interpersonal dimensions of language, by means of which it is possible to shape perceptions of events relevant in social and political life.

Specifically, this research deals with lexical euphemisms whose aim is to conceal, rather than reveal events, scandals, catastrophes, incriminating behaviour. This means that we

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<sup>1</sup> A Swedish proverb, taken from *Peculiar Proverbs: Weird Words of Wisdom from around the World*, the collection made by Stephen Arnott (2007).

define concealing euphemisms not only as the speaker's <sup>2</sup> vehicle for achieving the effect of moderating or erasing negative force of the utterance/sentence, but also as the speaker's vehicle for achieving the effect of hiding dispreferred and/or imposing preferred constructions of reality. Concealing euphemisms are taken from Serbian and English public discourse, and the corpus consists of three subcorpora, 100 American concealing euphemisms, 100 British concealing euphemisms and 100 Serbian concealing euphemisms. The analyzed euphemisms are related to the topics which, in a broad sense, address phenomena which might have a destructive potential for a society: conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis, and surveillance. A detailed description of the corpus is given in Section 1.4.

## 1.2. Definitions of euphemisms

### 1.2.1. Euphemisms and concealing euphemisms

In his book *A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, Lanham (1991: 78) reminds us of Erasmus's statement that every definition is a misfortune. Definitions always seem to miss out on something important, and they can be confusing rather than enlightening. However, an overview of the definitions of euphemisms is a good starting point for a further discussion on concealing euphemisms.

To begin with, the term euphemism comes from Greek, from *eu*, which means "well", or "sounding good", and *phêmê*, which means "speech", so euphemisms are mild, roundabout words used instead of painful or offensive terms (Rawson 1981: 1). Many authors, including Rawson (1981) have defined, classified and analyzed the mechanisms underlying the use of euphemisms. They include both the ancient authors (Aristotle 2000, [Cicero] 1954/1964, Quintilianus 2001) and those from modern times (to name some of them, Allan and Burrige 2006, Alm-Arvius 2003, Burkhardt 2010, Burrige 2005, Dešić 1990, Gorčević 2011, Habinek 2005, Kovačević 2000, 2006, Kuna 2007, Lanham 1991, Luchtenberg 1985, Lutz 1989, Mišić Ilić and Radulović 2014, Mišković-Luković 1993, Moritz 2015, Penelope 1981, Radulović 2012, Ristić 2004, Strozier 1966, Sytnyk 2014, Warren 1992).

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<sup>2</sup> In the thesis, the term *speaker* includes the terms *author*, *editor*, *speaker*, *writer*. The term *hearer* includes the terms *hearer*, *decoder*, *reader*.

Burkhardt's (2010: 355–356) list of definitions proposed by authors from different periods of time (from Antiquity until roughly the pre-Enlightenment period) is a good overview of different approaches to defining euphemisms:

1. Aristotle (Rhet. III) saw euphemisms as a subtype of metaphor;
2. Quintilian (VIII) mentioned them as special forms of allegory;
3. Cicero used the words *verecundia* (*reservedness, discretion*) and *verba tecta* (*covered words*);
4. Bede (1975: 163) called euphemisms *Charientismos* (*good behaviour, decency*);
5. In the English Renaissance, *euphemism* was used in the sense of 'prognostication of good';
6. German Baroque rhetoricians used *euphemism* in its present-day sense; it denoted 'a figure that designates odious things or things said with reluctance by pleasant words' (Vossius: 1630, IV, ix, 186–929).
7. According to Dubois et al. (1974: 227), a euphemism is an expression 'which erases semes which seem disturbing or superfluous from an assertion counting as objective and substitutes new semes for them'.

These definitions are followed by our comments whose aim is to find elements that could be used as common denominators for the classification of euphemisms. Also, these comments try to show that regardless of how old they are, these definitions still raise questions relevant for the study of euphemisms.

The list begins with two definitions provided by Aristotle and Quintilian, two of the most prominent figures of Ancient Greece and Rome respectively. Aristotle (2000: III, 2, 199–200) saw euphemisms as a subtype of metaphor, and Quintilian (2001: VIII, 6, 57) mentioned them as special forms of allegory. Broadly speaking, according to these two definitions, euphemisms are stylistic figures, terms used to describe any striking or unusual configuration of words or phrases (Lanham 1991: 78). Figures can be divided into two subgroups, figures of words and figures of thought; metaphor is a figure of words, and allegory is a figure of thought (Lanham 1991: 178).

In his famous treatise on rhetoric, Aristotle (2000: 199–200) refers to metaphors as devices that give clearness, charm and distinction to style. For example, pirates can call themselves "purveyors", a crime can be called a "mistake", a mistake a "crime", a thief can "take" a thing (even nowadays TAKE is a concealing euphemism for STEAL), or "plunder" its

victim. Here it is obvious that Aristotle was well-aware of the possibility of adjusting speech in accordance with the effect we want to achieve, and the given examples suggest that euphemisms rely on metaphorical meaning extension. Today, the view that was brought into focus by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) and hotly discussed in cognitive linguistics is that “metaphor is a conceptual rather than a purely linguistic phenomenon (Evans and Green 2006: 43–44)”. Metaphorization relies on the possibility of meaning extension, where a conceptual domain is formed by means of another one.

Quintilian had a similar idea about the nature of euphemisms; he saw them as a form of allegory. In his *Handlist of Rhetorical Terms*, Lanham (1991: 4) defines allegory as a metaphor extended through an entire speech. This would, *ipso facto*, mean that allegories are not only stylistic devices; to say that euphemisms are figures used only as speech blandishments is not enough. Aristotle’s and Quintilian’s views of euphemisms show that making clear-cut divisions between figures of speech is not that easy (euphemisms can be seen both as metaphors and allegories). Classical rhetoricians were all aware of these fuzzy boundaries, so these overlapping cases are found in many classical manuals. Also, as they are all revisions of classical taxonomies, modern rhetorical/stylistic handbooks do not offer sharply divided classifications either. For example, according to Lanham’s (1991: 181–196) own alphabetical list of rhetorical terms, euphemisms belong to two types of rhetorical devices. They belong to the group of terms used to achieve a specific type of emotional appeal, achieved by means of prognostication of something good, or by means of circumlocution to palliate something unpleasant (Lanham 1991: 187). This definition stresses the perlocutionary function of euphemisms. Also, euphemisms belong to what Lanham (1991: 189) categorizes as metaphorical substitutions and puns. Assuming that, in Lanham’s opinion, euphemisms are metaphorical substitutions, this is another definition that makes the relation between metaphors and concealing euphemisms well worth the effort of further analysis. However, euphemisms can also be treated as puns whose intention is to achieve a specific perlocutionary effect. For example, speaking about the communicative function of puns, Alm-Arvius (2003: 148–149) explains that euphemisms can be a type of puns, whose function is to achieve a humorous effect. In another classification offered by Habinek (2005: 105–107), metaphors are listed as tropes, but euphemisms are not mentioned explicitly. In his classification, litotes, another type of deliberate understatement is given. Litotes are close in communicative function to euphemisms, as both euphemisms and litotes achieve the effect of understating meaning.

The next two definitions in Burkhardt's (2010: 355–356) list, Cicero's and Bede's definitions, focus on the social function of euphemisms. Cicero used the words *verecundia* (reservedness, discretion) and *verba tecta* (covered words), and Bede (1975: 163) called euphemisms *Charientismos* (good behaviour, decency). Cicero's terms *verecundia*, or politeness of respect, refers to the use of language appropriate in a particular social context. The Roman society was hierarchical, as is today's society, so learning how to communicate respectfully was vital for proper social functioning. One cannot help relating the term *verecundia* with the logical fallacy *ad verecundiam* mentioned by Locke (1690/1999: 682), the appeal to authority or expertise (Tindale 2007: 127), or awe-directed argument (Van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 2009:7). *Verecundia* means 'shame', 'shyness', 'modesty', and the argument *ad verecundiam* is an argument based on respect for authority (Hamblin 1970: 42–43). In other words, we believe something not because we have reasons to do so, but because we rely on someone's authority, be it knowledge, status, political power.

The relation between *verecundia*, authority and power is the key relation in Brown and Levinson's (1978/1987) theory of politeness. Though at first sight the relationship between the principle of politeness and concealing euphemisms may look far-fetched, aspects of politeness prove to be highly important for explaining the motivation behind the use of concealing euphemisms.

Cicero used the words *verecundia* and *verba tecta*, which emphasize the social function of euphemisms, but he also discussed stylistic figures that are used for the purpose of euphemizing. In the classification of stylistic figures given in *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* (Cicero was thought to have written this Latin book of rhetoric), which was highly influential in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, stylistic devices closely associated with euphemisms are mentioned. For example, metaphor and allegory are seen as tropes which, among other things, can be used for the purpose of *minifying* ([Cicero] 1954/ 1964: 343–345), which is a function associated with euphemisms. Another trope in this classification that can be brought into relation with euphemisms is periphrasis, a device used to express an idea by means of circumlocution. If words are replaced with euphemistic periphrases for the purpose of being vague, then the connection between euphemisms and periphrasis is obvious. In relation to this, Kovačević (2000: 166) suggests that euphemistic periphrases are periphrases that have the function related to euphemisms. Finally, there are similarities between catachresis and euphemisms. Catachresis is the inexact use of a word instead of the proper word. Quinn (1982: 55) explains that catachresis (the equivalent Latin term *abusio*) is a deliberate abuse of a word or phrase.



The fifth definition concentrates on the communicative function of euphemisms. Namely, in the English Renaissance, euphemism was used in the sense of “prognostication of good”. This is a definition that does not say much about euphemisms, apart from stating its general communicative function. However, the Renaissance period was much more fruitful regarding the questions of rhetoric and especially style than this definition would suggest. It is the period of rediscovering the ancient authorities on rhetoric, and questioning the relation between philosophy and rhetoric. For many Renaissance thinkers, the study of rhetoric was more important than the study of philosophy. Rhetoric was seen as a method of achieving both personal and political power; rhetoric led to personal refinement, provided instructions how to think deeply and helped in winning political battles through arguments (Herrick 2005: 153). Owing to Gutenberg’s printing press, such rhetorical education was available to a larger number of people. And, indeed, the Renaissance was the period of publishing an enormous number of books on rhetoric and style manuals.

In his book *On Copia of Words and Ideas* (1512/1999), Erasmus discusses the issue of the importance of expressing thoughts using the right words. *Copia* means abundance, and although abundance in speech can be a mark of great oratory, there is always a risk of making the mistake of redundancy, or saying little without saying what is necessary. Erasmus lists different ways of varying speech (such as, for example, synonymy, periphrasis, metaphor, allegory). He mentions *diminution* (Erasmus 1512/1999: 35); for example, instead of saying “one has struck another”, we can say “one has touched him”. Concealing euphemisms can also be related to periphrasis, or *circuitio*, a method of varying speech where many words are used instead of a single word (Erasmus 1512/1999: 27). It has already been said that different stylistic figures can overlap in terms of their communicative function, so a word or a phrase can be identified to perform more than one stylistic and communicative role. In his analysis of Erasmus’s book, Cummings (2007: 229–230) says that Erasmus, like many ancient authorities, was aware of “a continuous flux of different figures which slide into one another”.

Rhetoric even makes it possible to present vices as virtues. For example, Peacham (1593/1996: 163) defines *paradiastole*, a term of speech that is closely related to concealing euphemisms, as the use of language where the truth is opposed by false terms and names, for example, in using GOOD FELLOWSHIP instead of DRUNKENESS. Puttenham (1589/ 1968: 154) defines *paradiastole* as an ornament employed to make the best of a bad thing, to moderate and abate the force by craft. Skinner (2007: 149–163) speaks about *paradiastole* as a rhetorical redescribing of vices as virtues. It goes without saying that this rhetorical device is

basically a concealing euphemism. Skinner (2007: 157) even adds that classical writers on the *ars rhetorica* took pride in the ability of powerful orators to make us change our minds about the way we see certain things. He gives the example of Cicero's *De Oratore*, in which Crassus expresses the view that this might be the greatest rhetorical skills, the skill to argue *in utramque partem*, on either side of the case. This type of rhetorical expertise reminds us irresistibly of doubletalk, the type of concealing euphemisms where meaning is completely inverted by means of antonyms. Doubletalk, or "dishonest euphemism", where circumlocution is practised consciously (Rawson 1981: 3), is synonymous with the term Orwellian language, as this type of language came to prominence in Orwell's works. Concealing euphemisms are based on the idea that "if thought corrupts language, language can also corrupt thought (Orwell 1968: 127–140)". In his novel *1984*, Orwell (1949/1973) writes about the creation of Newspeak, the language aimed at narrowing the range of thought, and, eventually, destroying thought as it will not be necessary any longer.

One of the most famous style manuals from the Renaissance period is Henry Peacham's handbook *The Garden of Eloquence* (1593/1996), where a long list of stylistic terms is given, including tropes of words, tropes of sentences, figures of repetition, omission, conjunction, separation, figures of sentences, exclamation, moderation, consultation, permission. According to Peacham (1593/1996: 87–92), euphemisms belong to figures of *moderation*, which are figures of "more milde affections, and do require a more moderate forme of pronuntiation and vtterance [...], which are proper to vehement affectons and mightie possessions." Euphemisms prognosticate good, and they are forms of speech "by which the Orator either interpreteth an vncertaine thing to the better part, or else declareth before that some good thing shall come to passe afterward". He explains that this figure is used to give consolation, hope and encouragement. However, besides the ideal use of figures, Peacham was aware of the possibilities of manipulation. Therefore, after defining and explaining the use of each figure, he cautions the reader about how figures can be abused. Euphemisms, for instance, can turn into deceitful flattery or malicious fraud. If euphemisms prognosticate felicity, but what follows is destruction, then the audience is manipulated and deceived by not being warned about the impending danger.

The last two of Burkhardt's definitions focus on the general communicative function of avoiding directness, which, as it has been explained, can be motivated by a desire to show good manners, but also by a desire to conceal meaning. Namely, German Baroque rhetoricians used euphemism in its present-day sense; it denoted "a figure that designates

odious things or things said with reluctance by pleasant words” (Vossius: 1630, IV, ix, 186–929). According to Dubois et al. (1974: 227), a euphemism is an expression “which erases semes which seem disturbing or superfluous from an assertion counting as objective and substitutes new semes for them”. The definition proposed by Dubois et al. (1974: 227) also introduces the idea that euphemisms can be studied within the domain of lexical decomposition, which views lexical meanings as bundles of semantic components. These semantic components are called semes, “semantic units which serve to distinguish members of a particular lexical field from one another (Cruse 2006: 162)”. A detailed discussion of lexical decomposition is beyond the confines of this research; however, it is briefly addressed when lexico-semantic relations are discussed (see Section 4.3).

To summarize, Burkhard’s (2010: 355–356) list shows that, broadly speaking, definitions of euphemisms can be classified into two groups: those that define euphemisms as a specific type of rhetorical/stylistic figures, and those that focus on functional aspects of euphemisms. The analysis shows that it is not always easy to draw clear dividing lines between euphemisms and other stylistic figures or tropes, and that euphemisms can be realized as different types of figures. The analysis also suggests that the study of euphemisms should bring into focus the functional aspect of euphemisms. Identifying euphemisms is very often a matter of identifying the euphemistic function of words or phrases in larger contexts/discourses, and in this research specifically, in public discourse. Therefore, in this research, the functional aspect is essential to defining and identifying concealing euphemisms as words and expressions with weaker or no negative connotations, and as words and expressions which hide the speaker’s dispreferred and impose preferred constructions of reality.

### 1.2.2. Political correctness and euphemisms

It is important to address the debate about political correctness<sup>3</sup>, as politically correct language is frequently related, even identified with euphemisms in general and concealing euphemisms in particular, especially if we use the term political correctness loosely (and the term euphemism as well). This research deals with concealing euphemisms only, so it is necessary to compare and contrast this subtype of euphemisms with both euphemisms in general and with political correctness in order to understand why these terms sometimes

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<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed account of political correctness see Allan and Burridge (2006), Cameron (1995), Dunant (ed.) (1994), Hughes (2010), Lakoff (2000).

overlap. The final aim is to emphasize the differences between political correctness and concealing euphemisms.

According to Stubbs (2001: 63), adjectives in syntagmatic modifications help bring semantic content into the headword (e.g. POLITICAL WILL), by means of which the meaning of the adjective becomes crucial in our understanding of the semantic content of such structures. Even this short analysis of form and content points out the importance of political concerns regarding the term political correctness (just like the adjective *concealing* defines the type and quality of euphemisms in concealing euphemisms). Indeed, the primary idealistic goal of PC was to help eradicate stereotypes in social relations; however, due to many changes this term has undergone, it has become a misnomer “being concerned with neither politics nor correctness as those terms are generally understood” (Hughes 2010: 3).

Sytnyk (2014: 96) draws attention to Cameron’s (1995) and Lakoff’s (2000) observation that there are different attitudes towards politically correct language, from the ones that see political correctness as an insult to the ones who sincerely believe that the proper choice of words in discourse is a moral and ethical issue. This diversity of opinions is a response to political correctness seen as a practice of enforcing “a set of orthodox (“politically correct”) views on class, race, gender and other forms of sociocultural diversity” (Cameron 1995: 124).

At this juncture, we will just briefly refer to Cameron’s (1995: 1) term “verbal hygiene” and “verbal hygienists” that refer to practices (and practitioners) “born of an urge to improve or ‘clean up’ language”. Political correctness and euphemisms are not the only manifestations of these practices (prescriptivism is the most prominent example). In her introductory exposition about verbal hygiene, Cameron (1995: 1–23) notices that we take it for granted in our everyday communication that language is a social, public act that has to adhere to certain norms, and although norms are debatable, they cannot disappear. Norms are related to authority and power; here, we do not only speak about institutional authority and power, but also about our own power to label language as right or wrong, good or bad, offensive, appropriate, and, in this regard, we are all “verbal hygienists” (Cameron 1995). With this critical mind, we can question norms, where they come from, how they are internalized, naturalized, negotiated or resisted (Cameron 1995: 17). This exposure to criticism is exactly what has happened to politically correct language and euphemisms as well. The good intentions behind political correctness, and the ensuing onslaught of criticism are all there when PC is brought up. Despite all its good intentions, there are cases when PC terms do not realize their goals; changing nominations does not necessarily follow or lead to

actual changes in society, and for that reason they can be strongly criticized. In some cases, PC is even equated with concealing euphemisms, and that terminological confusion triggers all kinds of reactions. However, despite these contradictory reactions, and the speaker's resistance to being told how to change their linguistic behavior, miraculously enough, political correctness has still been extremely successful in achieving its aims (Allan and Burrige 2006: 90).

As far as euphemisms are concerned, similar conclusions that are drawn regarding political correctness could be made both in relation to euphemisms in general and concealing euphemisms in particular: they have a lot to do with political, moral and ethical views as well. Political views towards euphemisms also range from positive to negative ones, the most negative being, obviously, towards concealing euphemisms. So, this overarching similarity that draws attention to political, moral and ethical implications between euphemisms and politically correct language may be the source of confusion and lack of perception regarding differences between PC and euphemisms. Communication requires awareness of political, moral and social issues, of people's needs and wants, especially the needs and wants of those perceived as oppressed and different from ourselves (Allan and Burrige 2006: 110–111) Both PC and euphemisms, though contaminated with negative connotations, illustrate this inherent need.

Let us now focus on the differences between politically correct language use, euphemisms and concealing euphemisms. Allan and Burrige's (2006: 96–98) discussion on contemporary handbooks of non-discriminatory language can help make distinctions. First of all, these handbooks consider PC usage as a more accurate use of language than that of euphemisms. This difference can be accepted because these two types of language use seem to be guided by the opposite vectors: euphemisms are generally aimed at avoiding insult, but they are only cover-up positive terms (the euphemistic effect is still present, and the looming direct word, which has negative connotations, is the true description), whereas PC aims to right the wrong of discriminatory practices materialized in the use of words that cause offence, and, for that matter, should drive the offensive word out of use. Another dimension of this difference is that PC implies social change, and that certainly means that people should be named in the way they prefer. This point is also accepted in this thesis; euphemisms are only a remedy, and as far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, the motivation is completely different, it aims to modulate attitudes towards issues, but often only in order to preserve the status quo in society. This naturally leads to the second difference, which stresses that PC is a form of public action, unlike euphemisms which are

not necessarily the product of conscious public action. Point taken again, as euphemisms are, we can say, a force in language that could exist even without PC (although the motives can coincide), and PC has more specific social implications. It is a truism that PC and concealing euphemisms are in stark contrast when it comes to public action; the former is to do justice, and the latter is used for concealing things. Thirdly, political correctness cannot be interchangeable with euphemisms since PC means more than politeness, but PC should never be provocative, which euphemisms sometimes are. The fourth reason for separating PC from euphemism is that the notion of euphemism has become more saturated with negative connotations, and negative connotations are what PC tries to avoid. This saturation of euphemisms may be the consequence of the identification of euphemisms with its subtype, concealing euphemisms.

Another aspect that needs to be brought up in this discussion of the differences between PC, euphemisms and concealing euphemisms is the importance of context in which an expression is uttered. Allan and Burrige (2006: 98) claim that orthophemism (proper expressions), euphemism (sweet-talking) and dysphemism (offensive language) are determined by the context of use, which specifically refers to a set of social attitudes or conventions that are different for different groups of people. The never-to-be-neglected role of context that reminds us, as Allan and Burrige (2006: 99) put it, how vague, indeterminate, variable, ambiguous, fuzzy language can be, is definitely a force to reckon with in the struggle of exposing the language of concealing euphemisms.

Sytnyk (2014: 118) relies on another useful distinction relevant for our classificatory purposes. Namely, in accordance with Abrantes (2005) and Attardo's (1997) research into different types of cooperation in discourse, he makes a distinction between cooperative euphemisms, where both sides have equal access to information, and uncooperative argumentative euphemisms or *doublespeak*, where speakers hide or distort perceptions following certain aims. The hearer does not have direct access to information, so s/he depends on the speaker in identifying the referent/denotation. Relying on Carston (1999), he speaks about three reasons why the speaker can use wrong form-meaning pairings (i.e. concealing euphemisms), and these are: the wrong concept-form mapping in the lexicon, a slip of the tongue and the existence of a specific purpose in mind. To briefly comment, only a slip of the tongue can be redeemed; the wrong concept-form mapping can lead to the establishment of euphemisms, and the existence of a specific purpose in mind is equal to an intention to manipulate. As for the difference between euphemisms and PC, Sytnyk (2014: 163) argues that the main function of euphemisms is to frame some denotation positively

through linguistic means. Conversely, we resort to PC not when denotation is in need of more positive connotations, but when the wording needs rephrasing. In addition to this, PC should not be regarded as a form of euphemism because euphemisms presuppose the speaker's position of power and the inferiority of the hearer (Sytnyk 2014: 167). But, taking into account that PC already has a huge problem of negative connotations that negatively affect its *raison d'être*, there is always a possibility for PC to be branded as a brainwashing strategy.

This short presentation of the relations between euphemisms, concealing euphemisms and PC ends with Hughes' (2010: 18) generalization that euphemism is the closest semantic relation to political correctness as they both imply avoidance of direct reference. Also, this author makes a clear distinction between natural types of euphemisms which are part of our history, and more recent, institutional, "Orwellian" types, which hide violence and ugliness of war through the use of abstract terms. If we take into account that concealing euphemisms are related to the universal topics of social and global disintegration (global as well because the topics include both internal and international affairs), this vagueness obstructs identifying the issues society must address. Political correctness at least targets these areas explicitly.

### 1.3. Methods

In this part of the thesis, the basic methods regarding identification, description, classification and analysis of the corpus of concealing euphemisms are presented. The methodological framework is elaborated in Section 3, which follows the theoretical background of the research. The methods include:

- Collecting concealing euphemisms: setting the time frame for the newspaper articles and political speeches from which concealing euphemisms are taken; choosing the topics of newspaper articles and political speeches from which concealing euphemisms are taken; these are the topics of conflict, corruption and crime, economic crisis, and surveillance, the negatively connoted topics of public interest;
- Identifying concealing euphemisms with regard to their functional role of reducing negative illocutionary force, and the functional role of hiding dispreferred and imposing preferred constructions of reality;

- Making a formal description and classification of lexical concealing euphemisms; as the research deals with lexical euphemisms, this, first of all includes the classification into two subgroups, single lexemes and phrases, and, secondly, the classification of single lexemes into monomorphemic and polymorphemic lexemes;
- Analyzing concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents in terms of lexico-semantic relations (synonymy, polysemy, hyperonymy/hyponymy, meronymy, homonymy and antonymy). To do this, we rely on the discussion and definitions of lexico-semantic relations in Section 4.3. In addition, the online lexical database WordNet Search 3.1 <sup>4</sup> is used in the analysis of the examples from the American and British corpora, and *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990) is used in the analysis of the examples from the Serbian corpus;
- Integrating the lexico-semantic and the lexico-pragmatic analysis by means of the pragmatic algorithm proposed in Section 4.4.2;
- Analyzing lexical pragmatic processes related to the identification and construction of concealing euphemisms and identifying their non-euphemistic equivalents: the analysis of the lexical pragmatic processes in accordance with the pragmatic algorithm based on relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) (Section 2.5.7.);
- Analyzing the relation between concealing euphemisms and the strategies of social actor and social action representation provided by Van Leeuwen (2008: 23–74);
- Integrating the lexico-semantic, lexico pragmatic and discursive analyses into an interpretive account of meaning construction in public discourse.

## 1.4. Description of the corpus

As already mentioned in Section 1.1., the corpus consists of three subcorpora, 100 American concealing euphemisms, 100 British concealing euphemisms and 100 Serbian

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<sup>4</sup> WordNet Search 3.1. is available online:

Princeton University “About WordNet.” WordNet. Princeton University. 2010. <http://wordnet.princeton.edu>  
<http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn>



concealing euphemisms. As this is a qualitative corpus-assisted analysis (discussed in more detail in Section 3), the subcorpus which consists of 100 concealing euphemisms is large enough to do a qualitative analysis of the use of concealing euphemisms in the three subcorpora. The corpus of concealing euphemisms in English public discourse has been divided into two subcorpora, American and British subcorpora, as it is expected that the results of the analyses of the lexico-semantic relations, the lexico-pragmatic relations and discursive strategies based on the American and British corpora will repeat in the analysis of the Serbian corpus. This is in accordance with one of the aims of the research, which is to show that the construction of concealing euphemisms relies on the same mechanisms in English and Serbian public discourse.

Each subcorpus (American, British and Serbian) is further subdivided into the subcorpora of concealing euphemisms taken from online newspaper articles and online political speeches made by leading figures in politics, 50 concealing euphemisms from both the former and the latter. The research relies on these two sources of concealing euphemisms as one of the aims is to show that the construction of concealing euphemisms relies on the same mechanisms in both newspaper articles and political speeches.

The corpus of concealing euphemisms in English consists of the examples taken from the American dailies *The (New York) Daily News*, *The New York Times*, *the Wall Street Journal* and *the Washington Post*, and the British dailies *The Independent*, *The Telegraph*, *The Times* and *The Sun*. The speeches given by leading political figures are taken from the American online archive RealClearPolitics (RCP): [http://www.realclearpolitics.com/transcripts\\_and\\_speeches/](http://www.realclearpolitics.com/transcripts_and_speeches/) and the online archive of British political speeches: <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm>, as well as the sites of political parties. The Serbian corpus of concealing euphemisms consists of the examples taken from the newspapers *Blic*, *Kurir*, *Politika* and *Večernje novosti*, whereas the speeches are taken from the official sites of the political parties (as no online archive of Serbian political speeches has been found).

The topics of newspaper articles in which concealing euphemisms are identified are conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis, and surveillance. The political speeches include transcripts or parts of transcripts of all types of speeches and public expressions of political viewpoints in relation to the topics of conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis and surveillance. Therefore, this subcorpus consists of concealing euphemisms taken from transcripts of speeches in different settings such as conventions, working sessions,

Parliamentary sessions, interviews, leaders' speeches, parts of campaigns<sup>5</sup>. The similar timescales, given in Table 1, provide similar temporal context in the analysis of concealing euphemisms. The ideological orientations of the newspapers and politicians whose articles/speeches are the sources of concealing euphemisms are not taken into account; these two genres are considered as types of institutional power that enable their authors/representatives to address and/or try to influence mass audiences. Table 1 presents the basic information relevant for the corpus:

TABLE 1: PRESENTATION OF THE CORPUS

TOPICS: conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis, and surveillance		
AMERICAN CORPUS (AC)	BRITISH CORPUS (BC)	SERBIAN CORPUS (SC)
<p>SOURCES</p> <p>a) online articles: 50 examples timescale: 2008 – 2015 <i>The (New York) Daily News</i> <i>The New York Times</i> <i>The Wall Street Journal</i> <i>The Washington Post</i></p> <p>b) online political speeches: 50 examples timescale: 2008 - 2015</p>	<p>SOURCES</p> <p>a) online articles: 50 examples timescale: 2005 – 2014 <i>The Independent</i> <i>The Telegraph</i> <i>The Times</i> <i>The Sun</i></p> <p>b) online political speeches 50 examples timescale: 2004 – 2014</p>	<p>SOURCES</p> <p>a) online articles: 50 examples timescale: 2008 – 2015 <i>Blic</i> <i>Kurir</i> <i>Politika</i> <i>Večernje novosti</i></p> <p>b) online political speeches 50 examples timescale: 2010 – 2014</p>

## 1.5. Aims

With regard to the functional roles of concealing euphemisms which consist in achieving the effect of reducing negative illocutionary force and the effect of hiding dispreferred and imposing preferred constructions of reality, the hypothesis is that their identification relies on the possibilities of identifying the relation between concealing

<sup>5</sup> Mišić Ilić and Radulović (2015: 28) also rely on these different manifestations of political discourse in their analysis of commissive and expressive illocutionary acts.

euphemisms and non-euphemistic equivalents that can replace these concealing euphemisms in the same context. In relation to this, the following aims are identified:

- One of the aims is to classify concealing euphemisms and, in that way, show that concealing euphemisms can be all content words, i.e. nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and the corresponding noun phrases, verb phrases, adjective and adverb phrases. This is important, as it re-emphasizes the role of the functional aspect of concealing euphemisms (the effects they should achieve), which means that the recognition of concealing euphemisms must include both the structural (lexico-semantic) and the interpersonal (lexico-pragmatic and discursive) levels of analysis.
- Another aim of the thesis is to show that the lexico-semantic analysis is important for the recognition of the relation between the concealing euphemism and the non-euphemistic equivalent, since understanding words, among other things, implies understanding lexico-semantic relations. A selection of particular words is a specific way of encoding meaning, so lexico-semantic relations can indicate alternative ways of encoding meaning, which is highly important in exposing concealing euphemisms.
- The research aims to show that the relation between concealing euphemisms and non-euphemistic equivalents is not only the relation of synonymy, which implies that concealing euphemisms and non-euphemistic equivalents denote the same entity. As the topic of the research is the analysis of concealing euphemisms, we analyze other lexico-semantic relations that can be employed for the purpose of concealing: hyperonymy/hyponymy, meronymy, polysemy, even antonymy and homonymy.
- Also, the aim of the lexico-pragmatic analysis is to show that different positions of the speaker and the hearer/interpreter in communication generally, and in public discourse specifically, allow a possibility for the speaker to manipulate the interpreter. This is explained by means of the pragmatic algorithm (see Section 4.4.2.) which shows that the speaker manipulates the degree of explicitness in such a way as to lead the hearer to a desired, or even multiple interpretations. This is discursive manipulation, which consists in manipulating the hearer's beliefs that the speaker may not be competent enough to provide specific information, but, there is no way to prove that the speaker is not benevolent, or, in other words, that the speaker is manipulative.

- The lexico-pragmatic analysis is based on the pragmatic algorithm, which explains that the speaker can transfer the responsibility for the concept construction and the derivation of full propositions to the hearer/interpreter.
- The research will highlight the role of context (the notion of context is explained by relevance theory in Section 2.5.7.7.) in the construction and identification of concealing euphemisms.
- Contrary to *the euphemism treadmill* (Pinker 2002: 212–213), which implies that, in time, euphemisms become saturated with negative connotations, and are replaced with another euphemism, this research will show that a concealing euphemism does not necessarily have to undergo the process of *the euphemism treadmill*, i.e. it is not necessarily ousted from use.
- The research will investigate the relation between concealing euphemisms and the strategies for social actor and social action representation (Van Leeuwen 2008: 23–74), which emphasizes the functional role of achieving the effect of hiding dispreferred and imposing preferred constructions of reality.
- The research will compare the lexico-semantic and lexico pragmatic mechanisms underlying the construction of concealing euphemisms in American, British and Serbian public discourse.
- As the analysis includes concealing euphemisms from both newspaper articles and political speeches, the aim is to compare the use of concealing euphemisms in these two genres. The analysis of the use of concealing euphemisms in specific genres sheds light on the use of language in those genres in general.
- Taking into account that the main aim of critical discourse analysis is to examine and expose unequal relations of power reflected in language use, the aim of this thesis is to give an interpretive account of meaning construction in public discourse, which will show that the interpretative stage of critical discourse analysis can benefit from insights given by relevance theory.

## 1.6. Overview of the thesis

The introductory part of the thesis forms the foundation of the research that will follow. After introducing the research topic in Section 1.1, concealing euphemisms in English and Serbian public discourse, different definitions of concealing euphemisms are provided in Section 1.2. Special emphasis is placed on making a distinction between euphemisms and concealing euphemisms in Section 1.2.1, and on making a difference between political correctness, euphemisms and concealing euphemisms in 1.2.2. The basic methods are given in Section 1.3., and they will be elaborated in Section 3.3. as part of Section 3, where the methodological framework is presented. The corpus for the analysis is described in Section 1.4., and the aims of the research are presented in Section 1.5. Section 1.6. is the Overview of the thesis.

The theoretical background of the thesis is presented in Section 2. In view of the complexity of the research topic, the theoretical background is composed of several parts, briefly summarized in Section 2.1. After that, in Section 2.2., we give a brief review of research into euphemisms and concealing euphemisms so far. The broader theoretical background that includes rhetoric, stylistics and rhetoricality is presented in Section 2.3, as concealing euphemisms, in accordance with the way they are defined in Sections 1.2.1. are, first of all, regarded as rhetorical and stylistic devices. The linguistic background given in Section 2.4. discusses the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, on the grounds of which verbal manipulation in general can be explained as inherent to language. The pragmatic focus on communication is given in Section 2.5, where the principles of cooperative and latent strategic/manipulative communication are examined. In this part of the theoretical background, Subsection 2.5.7., relevance theory is presented in detail as the theory that provides the main theoretical foundation of the research. Finally, as the topic of the thesis is the use of concealing euphemisms in *public discourse*, Section 2.6. discusses discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. The lexico-semantic, lexico pragmatic and discursive analyses are integrated into an account of meaning construction in public discourse, which is linked with the interpretive stage of critical discourse analysis.

Section 3 is the Methodological framework of the research. After the introductory Section 3.1., general methodological approaches are given in Section 3.2. and we return to the methods (introduced in Section 1.3.) in Section 3.3. WordNet 3.1., the basic tool for the analysis of the lexico-semantic relations in the American and British corpora is presented in Section 3.3.1.

The results of the Corpus analysis are shown in Section 4. In the introductory section 4.1. we explain which sections are included in the corpus analysis. The first part of the analysis is Formal classification, Section 4.2. , in which concealing euphemisms are classified according to formal criteria, single lexemes (words), and multi-word units. In Tables 4, 5 and 6, one hundred concealing euphemisms in each subcorpus, American, British and Serbian, are given, and in Section 4.2.3., the formal similarities between the three subcorpora are identified. The second part of the analysis, Section 4.3., is the lexico-semantic analysis, and here, the lexico-semantic relations are first defined and examined in more detail. These are the relations of hyponymy/hyperonymy, synonymy, meronymy, polysemy, antonymy and homonymy. In Section 4.3.3. the results of the lexico-semantic relations between the concealing euphemisms identified in the corpus and the non-euphemistic equivalents are given. American, British and Serbian corpora are further subdivided into two subcorpora, so the analysis includes lexico-semantic relations related to the corpus of concealing euphemisms taken from newspaper articles (Table 7, 9 and 11), and the corpus of concealing euphemisms taken from political speeches (Table 8, 10 and 12). Section 4.4. is devoted to the analysis of concealing euphemisms on the basis of the proposed pragmatic algorithm, and Section 4.5. discusses the use of concealing euphemisms as discursive strategies. Section 4.6. is the summary of the results of the corpus analysis. The thesis ends with Section 5, the Conclusion, which consists of two subsections, 5.1., where the results of the corpus analysis are summarized, and subsection 5.2., where implications for future research are examined.

## 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

### 2.1. Introduction

The theoretical background consists of several subsections. First of all, in Section 2.2. we give a review of research into euphemisms done so far. As euphemisms and concealing euphemisms can, first of all, be seen as rhetorical figures, a broader theoretical background including rhetoric, stylistics and rhetoricality is given in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4., concealing euphemisms are related to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, which explains the relation between the referential, expressive and interpersonal dimensions of language, all relevant in the analysis of concealing euphemisms. In Section 2.5., we turn to pragmatic considerations of communication principles, which include Grice's Cooperation principle, Neo-Gricean redefinition of Grice's principles, concealing euphemisms seen as "off-record" face-threatening acts, Habermas's validity claims and, finally, and for this thesis, most importantly, relevance-theoretic principles of communication. At the end of Section 2, we present the basic assumptions of discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis, and give a list of discursive strategies analyzed in the corpus analysis in relation to concealing euphemisms.

### 2.2. A review of research into euphemisms

#### 2.2.1. Introduction

It would be hard to make a comprehensive list of sources which discuss euphemisms and concealing euphemisms, so the idea is to give a brief overview of the topics addressed so far. Needless to say, each of the articles/papers/ books mentioned in this review has its own reference list with more books and articles that deal with the same topic and the related subtopics, and many of them also suggest further research that could be done. First of all, this review includes dictionaries of euphemisms<sup>6</sup>, which can be used as sources for corpus-based and corpus-assisted research. Also, the review includes research into euphemisms that primarily deals with communicative/functional aspects of euphemisms (the reasons for their use, i.e. social or religious pressures), and, in addition, the type of research that primarily deals with mechanisms underlying the use of euphemism, together with research that

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<sup>6</sup> Pasini (2005: 60) draws attention to two types of dictionaries: specialized dictionaries of euphemisms (Holder 2002, Rawson 1981), and general dictionaries where euphemisms are marked by means of stylistic devices.

examines concealing euphemisms within specific theoretical frameworks. However, as it frequently happens that a study can combine both these aspects, in this thesis, the review also includes research that deals with both aspects, the mechanisms behind the use of euphemisms and the discussion of the functional aspects of euphemisms. Even dictionaries can, at least briefly, address these two aspects of euphemization, and the review starts with one such example.

### 2.2.2. Research into euphemisms

Rawson's (1981: 1–11) "Introduction" to his dictionary of euphemisms *A Dictionary of Euphemisms & Other Doubletalk* discusses both the reasons why euphemisms are used and the mechanisms underlying the use of euphemisms. With regard to the first question, the author proposes two classifications that discuss the motivation for the use of euphemisms. The first classification includes positive and negative euphemisms, and the second classification includes euphemisms used unconsciously and euphemisms used consciously. As far as the second question is concerned, Rawson (1981: 8–11) puts forward a list of mechanisms basic to creating and exposing euphemisms.

In Rawson's (1981: 1–3) first classification, there are two types of euphemisms – positive and negative euphemisms, which answer the question why euphemisms and concealing euphemisms are used. This classification relies on the terms *positive* and *negative*, so it is a value-laden classification. Positive euphemisms include euphemisms which make euphemized referents look more important than they are. These are occupational titles, personal honorifics, institutional euphemisms. Politically correct language can be regarded as positive euphemisms, as it is based on "the principle of avoiding language and behaviour that may offend particular groups of people" (online *Oxford Learner's Dictionaries*). Negative euphemisms are defensive, they delete from the language aspects of meaning which people (or some people) would rather avoid. These are two types of taboos, taboos against names (the names are avoided as they are taken to be extensions of the thing) and taboos against words, particularly swearwords (Rawson 1981: 2). Concealing euphemisms are regarded as negative euphemisms as they are also used to avoid stigmatization of faces, though not for religious, but for social, political or moral reasons.

The second classification of euphemisms includes euphemisms used unconsciously and euphemisms used consciously. Unconscious euphemisms are words no longer recognized as euphemisms, and these are euphemisms whose positive values have increased (but these



euphemisms may once have been products of a conscious mind only to become unconscious through repeated use). These euphemisms, therefore, resist the process of *x-phemistic recycling* (Allan and Burrige 2006: 243), or *euphemism treadmill* (Pinker 2002: 212–213), the process of replacing a euphemistic term with another euphemistic term due to the deterioration of meaning. Conscious euphemisms imply avoiding direct terms for social reasons, and these are euphemisms whose purpose is to consciously avoid the effects that can be caused by using a direct non-euphemistic term. Rawson (1981: 3–4) argues that conscious euphemisms lead to social double-thinking and *doubletalk*, which is not used so much to avoid offence, but to deceive the audience. *Doubletalk* is synonymous with the term *Orwellian language*, as this type of language came to prominence in George Orwell's works. In his novel 1984, Orwell (1949/1973) writes about the creation of *Newspeak*, the language aimed at narrowing the range of thought, and, eventually, destroying thought as it will not be necessary any longer.

In addition to the two previously mentioned classifications, Rawson (1981: 8–10) also addresses the mechanisms which are basic to the construction of euphemisms: he lists foreign words and expressions, abbreviations, abstractions, indirection, understatement, use of expressions longer than the word that is replaced. Although this is only a general classification of mechanisms, it can provide the basis for a further research into more specific mechanisms for the construction of euphemisms.

Holder's (2002) dictionary *How Not to Say What You Mean: A Dictionary of Euphemisms* briefly addresses the mechanisms for the construction of euphemisms; these are, for example, association, borrowing, rhyming slang. Both Holder's and Rawson's dictionaries explain the meaning and the context of use of the euphemisms listed in the dictionaries, and, in addition to that, Holder's dictionary gives a thematic index, a classification of euphemisms in relation to the given topics. Other dictionaries that explain the meaning and the context of use of the euphemisms given in the dictionaries are Bertram's (1998) *NTC's Dictionary of Euphemisms, The Most Practical Guide to Unraveling Euphemisms*, Neumann and Silver's (1991) *Kind Words: A Thesaurus of Euphemisms*.

The paper "Expressing Values in Positive and Negative Euphemisms" (Radulović 2012) is a small-scale research that uses Rawson's (1981: 1–3) classification into positive and negative euphemisms in the analysis of twenty euphemisms that increase positive values of their equivalent non-euphemistic terms, and twenty euphemisms that decrease negative values of their non-euphemistic equivalents. The paper includes the analysis of the lexico-

semantic relations between euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents, and then discusses the results in the light of the lexico-pragmatic mechanisms of meaning adjustment provided by Prčić (2008a: 293–298). The results of the lexico-semantic analysis show that, as far as positive euphemisms are concerned, the two most frequent types of change are the replacement of a non-euphemistic hyponym with a euphemistic hyperonym (six examples), and the replacement of a non-euphemistic hyperonym with a euphemistic hyponym (five examples). As far as negative euphemisms are concerned, the most frequent type of change is the replacement of a non-euphemistic hyponym with a euphemistic hyperonym (eleven examples). From the point of view of lexical pragmatics, this means that broadening (which means generalizing) underlies the process of creating hyperonyms in both groups, though generalizing is more frequent among negative euphemisms. This small-scale study into the use of euphemisms, and small-scale studies in general, is an example of preliminary research, essential to choosing and making a suitable research design that addresses a specific problem.

Allan and Burrige's (2006) book *Forbidden Words: Taboo and the Censoring of Language* is a detailed study of the communicative aspects of forbidden words. It deals with the origins of taboos and the topics they are associated with, the related notion of censorship, and motivations for restrictions on language. Moreover, the authors discuss the notions of politeness and impoliteness, and in relation to these notions, the discussion of the terms *euphemism* (sweet talking from Greek *eu*, which means “well”, and *phêmê*, which means “speech”), *dysphemism* (from Greek *dys-* “bad, unfavourable”) and *orthophemism* (Greek *ortho-* “proper, normal”). Allan and Burrige (2006: 243) introduce the above-mentioned term *x-phemistic recycling*, which refers to the deterioration of meaning of a euphemistic term, which finally results in the change of vocabulary for taboo concepts. In his book *The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature*, Pinker (2002: 212–213) uses another term, *euphemism treadmill*, for that type of vocabulary change.

The authors discuss different taboo topics, such as sex and bodily effluvia, food and smell and, disease, death and killing. In their discussion of the last topic, disease, death and killing, Allan and Burrige (2006: 228–236) discuss the term *militarese*, the language of warfare, the type of euphemisms used for the purpose of deception. The book also discusses political correctness in detail, its origins, differences and similarities with euphemisms and the reasons why politically correct language is used. Finally, the authors examine the evidence provided by research in psychology, physiology and neurology for the hypothesis that taboo language is processed differently from ordinary language. By doing this, the

authors make a link between communicative/functional/social and psychological/physiological/neurological approaches to the study of euphemisms.

In his paper “O tipovima i stilskim osobinama disfemizama i eufemizama” [On Types and Styles of Dysphemisms and Euphemisms], Kovačević (2006) also analyzes both dysphemisms and euphemisms, primarily from the point of view of stylistics. The author highlights the functional and the stylistic difference between dysphemisms and euphemisms; the former refers to taboo, or forbidden words, and the latter refers to emotionally neutral expressions that substitute dysphemisms. Here, the criterion of emotionality, or, to be precise, the emotionality of dysphemisms and lack of emotionality of euphemisms is underlined. As emotionality underlies expressiveness, dysphemisms are both emotional and expressive language units. On the other hand, although euphemisms are characterized by a lack of emotionality, they are not necessarily deprived of expressiveness.

Kovačević (2006: 196–197) argues that dysphemisms and euphemisms are necessarily stylistically marked language units. But stylistically marked units must be analyzed in opposition to stylistically unmarked language units, which implies that both dysphemisms and euphemisms are related to stylistically neutral language units, to a normative value that is taken as a departure point, or a criterion for figurative meaning. However, it is not easy to identify such units, so stylistic markedness of both dysphemisms and euphemisms must then be analyzed on the basis of the mutual relation between marked and unmarked units. Kovačević’s (2006) analysis of the types and stylistic features of dysphemisms and euphemisms is based on the corpus made from the examples taken from newspapers and literature. One of the results of the research relevant for this thesis is that dysphemisms are primarily lexemes, whereas euphemisms can include both lexemes and periphrases, and, whereas dysphemisms are stylistically marked units, euphemisms are both stylistically marked and stylistically neutral units. Another important conclusion is that euphemisms are characterized by the causal relationship between the functional role of concealing and the functional role of moderating (euphemizing), which means that the purpose of euphemisms is not to conceal, but to reveal things in a euphemized manner. Following this, concealing euphemisms can be regarded as devices used for both concealing and revealing, which agrees with the definition of concealing euphemisms given in this thesis, which states that concealing euphemisms hide dispreferred constructions of reality, and impose and, thus reveal, preferred constructions of reality.

Kovačević (2006: 196) suggests that both expressive and euphemistic language are based on evaluations of positivity and negativity. In her book *Ekspresivna leksika u srpskom*

*jeziku* [Expressive Lexis in Serbian Language], Ristić (2004: 197) suggests that, on a scale between the two polar opposites of negativity and positivity, expressive language occupies the endpoints of the scale, and euphemistic language is located at a point leaning towards the positive end of the scale. Ristić (2004: 213) argues that euphemisms and expressive lexis are mutually related, and that euphemisms can be interpreted as expressive lexis in certain contexts. Also, she suggests that euphemisms have a functional and a stylistic potential for conscious or unconscious manipulation, and in that sense, it is more complex than the process of expressivization. This brings us back to Rawson's (1981: 3–4) conscious and unconscious euphemisms, to *doubletalk* and to euphemisms that resist *euphemism treadmill*.

In his article “The Euphemism”, Strozier (1966) highlights “the prevalence of the euphemisms in the history of languages”, which suggests that the tendency to euphemize is related to our basic need to symbolize by means of language and re-symbolize/re-abstract an idea which is already symbolized. The tendency to euphemize can also be brought into relation with the tendency to metaphorize. After a discussion of the notion of *symbol*, he concludes that euphemization is a refinement of the process of symbolizing (conceptualizing), because the euphemism refines the mere symbol. A need for refinement is an inward need prompted by pressures to create an illusion of reality. The author explains that the outer pressures linked with the inner euphemistic urge, are, on the one hand, moral or religious pressures, and, on the other hand, social pressures.

Burkhardt's (2010: 355–372) paper “Euphemism and Truth” discusses different topics. The introduction provides different types of definitions and views on euphemisms throughout history, and, in the following sections, Burkhardt (2010: 356) discusses 1) different subfunctions of euphemisms, 2) different linguistic subtypes of euphemisms, 3) euphemisms and semantic change, 4) euphemisms and speech acts, 5) and the question of truth and falsity in relation to euphemisms. As regards subfunctions, he goes back to Luchtenberg's (1985: 24) distinction of euphemisms between the ones whose function is veiling and the ones whose function is concealing. As for the second section, distinction between syntactic and lexical euphemisms is made. Syntactic euphemisms include the subtype called *referential vagueness*, which refers to avoiding the mention of the author of a certain deed, the use of the passive voice instead of the active voice. Lexical euphemisms include *abstracting* and *positivising*, and the second type includes *doubletalk*. The author also discusses euphemisms as a source of semantic change, the phenomenon of *euphemism treadmill*, as well as political correctness. Burkhardt (2010: 363) even identifies political correctness with euphemisms:

[...], in other words, under the pressure of social taboos former orthophemisms become dysphemisms which are replaced by euphemisms which become orthophemisms and then dysphemisms which must be replaced by euphemisms and so on [...] This explains why political correctness can never be successful over a longer period of time (as long as the old taboos, prejudices and superstitions survive).

In this thesis, we argue that distinctions must be made between political correctness and euphemisms, and also, between political correctness and concealing euphemisms (see Section 1.2.2.). In the fourth section, the author argues that euphemisms are not indirect speech acts; they are weak forms of lying, and, therefore, direct assertions which are partly untrue. In the fifth section, the author argues that truth-conditionality of a euphemistic proposition can only be judged when we take into account shared knowledge, and a background of a certain norm of expectation. Also, as euphemisms are only partly true and partly false, they should be examined not only from the point of view of epistemology, but also, from the point of view of moral viewpoint, which is closely related to ideological issues. To conclude, this paper shows how far the discussion of euphemisms can go in the sense that different subtopics lead to further topics and further research.

The book *Fair of Speech: the Uses of Euphemism*, edited by Enright (1986) is a collection of papers that discuss different aspects of euphemisms: history of euphemisms, euphemisms in certain historical periods, euphemisms and dysphemisms, euphemisms in other public spheres. Enright (ed.) (1986: 3) notices that euphemisms are also present in the public sphere, where they can have a more negative effect than elsewhere; euphemisms in public sphere can turn into *doubletalk*.

In her paper “Language and Communication: Syntactic Euphemism”, Penelope (1981) discusses the use of syntactic euphemisms, the speaker’s devices for downplaying more realistic aspects of some events, by means of which the speaker presents information in a way that protects the speaker’s belief system. She discusses the processes of topicalization and argues that information packaging can be used for the purpose of suppressing and distorting information, or, for what the author calls, *the construction of bias*.

In their paper “Marginalizing Commitment: Syntactic Euphemisms in Political speeches”, Mišić Ilić and Radulović (2014) analyze the use of syntactic euphemisms for similar purposes, or, to be precise, for the purpose of marginalizing commitment. The authors analyze various types of syntactic structures used to marginalize commitment to the

expressed proposition, by means of which responsibility for whatever is proposed is also marginalized. The paper illustrates the strategy of marginalizing commitment with the examples of syntactic euphemisms taken from two American and two Serbian presidential candidates' speeches. The results of the analysis show that politicians use similar strategies for marginalizing commitment, and in that sense, tendencies to euphemize were discovered in the speeches delivered by the politicians from two different countries. The results of this small-scale research suggest that further research based on larger corpora can give more insight into the similarities and differences in the use of euphemisms in different languages.

Mišić Ilić (2010) addresses the problem of concealing identity in her paper "Grammatical Devices for Encoding and Concealing Identity", where she gives an overview of grammatical devices for encoding identity: these are the grammatical categories of gender, number and person, and these are also devices based on the combination of syntactic functions and semantic roles. As for grammatical devices of concealing identity, they include syntactic constructions such as passivization, impersonal constructions, ergative constructions, and nominalization. The author suggests that the use of these devices in particular discourses can lead to various problems. Though not explicitly stated, all these devices can be considered as different types of syntactic euphemisms.<sup>7</sup>

One of the most cited articles that proposes a classification of the main devices for constructing euphemisms is Warren's (1992: 134) article "What Euphemisms Tell Us about the Interpretation of Words". It is an extended version of the classifications provided by Cederschiold (1900: 59–85), Greenough and Kittredge (1902: 300–309), Wellander (1923:19–21), Stern (1931: 330–332), and Williams (1975: 198–203), repeated in Neaman and Silver (1983: 9–12). Warren distinguishes between two major classes, formal innovation and semantic innovations, and these two major classes have different subtypes:

- Formal innovation:
  - word-formation devices: compounding, derivation, blends, acronyms,  
onomatopoeia
  - phonemic modification: back slang, rhyming slang, phoneme replacement,  
abbreviation

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<sup>7</sup> In her paper "Sintaksa u kritičkoj analizi diskursa: o nekim konstrukcijama za iskazivanje i skrivanje identiteta" [Syntax in Critical Discourse Analysis: Certain Constructions for Encoding and Concealing Identity], Mišić Ilić (2011) also discusses how different constructions can achieve the aim of concealing identity in relation to critical discourse analysis.

loan words

- Semantic innovation: particularizations, implications, metaphors, metonyms, reversals, understatements, overstatements

Warren's (1992: 134–135) analysis focuses on identifying the number of occurrences of different types of semantic innovation based on a corpus of 100 euphemisms consisting of the examples taken from two dictionaries. She relies on the following definition in identifying euphemisms: "We have a euphemism if the interpreter perceives the use of some word or expression as evidence of a wish on the part of the speaker to denote some sensitive phenomenon in a tactful and/or veiled manner". According to the author, this implies that the referent is seen as a sensitive phenomenon, that the referring expression is considered to be less harsh and less direct than an alternative expression, and that it is the interpreter's perception that the speaker's choice of an expression is based on evaluations of embarrassment that determines an expression as a euphemism. In this research, we rely on Warren's definition in identifying euphemisms, as concealing euphemisms are related to the topics that can be classified as "sensitive phenomena".

After a discussion of the devices for the construction of euphemisms (accompanied with the examples from the corpus), Warren (1992: 159–162) makes several theoretical suggestions: first, the meanings attached to words in our mental lexicon and the meanings in context are not the same thing. Secondly, all word meanings are automatically contextualized and the proper meaning of a word in a context can be a non-coded meaning derived by one of the interpretive mechanisms. Another conclusion is that to have a meaning means that a word has a class of referents; when a word is connected with a new category of entities, a new meaning of a word is created. Fourthly, the author suggests that a distinction should be made between polysemy and redefinition, and that novel contextual meaning does not necessarily mean a new dictionary sense. Finally, different interpretative mechanisms can be involved in the production of one new meaning. These are all important suggestions as they indicate that the analysis of euphemisms does not only shed light on the construction of euphemistic meanings, but also on the nature of meaning construction in general.

In the paper "Identifikacija eufemizama i njihova tvorba u hrvatskom jeziku" [Identification and Word-formation of Euphemisms in Croatian Language], Kuna (2007) also discusses the issue of identifying words and phrases as euphemisms. The author argues that the recognition of euphemisms relies on the following factors: the speaker, the hearer and the circumstances in which a euphemism is used. He also proposes a classification of euphemisms in accordance with their functional roles: the functional role of substitution for

the terms that cause fear, discomfort, embarrassment, the functional role of substitution for offensive terms, the functional role of hiding the truth value, especially in public discourse, and the functional role of substitution for the names of certain professions. Lastly, the author provides a list of mechanisms for the construction of euphemisms: phonetic and syllabic changes, derivation, lexical changes, semantic changes. This is not the end, the author suggests that euphemisms can also be analyzed in relation to paralinguistic devices: intonation, voice, gesture, mimic, spatial and temporal coordinates of a speech act. In his further research, in the article “Eufemizmi i gospodarstvo” [Euphemisms and Economy], Kuna (2008) analyzes euphemization as a face-saving strategy, the strategy of employing linguistic forms in public communication for the purpose of making unpopular proposals, talking about mistakes and economic problems.

Gómez’s (2009) paper *Towards a New Approach to the Linguistic Definition of Euphemism* analyzes the fundamental mechanisms behind the use of euphemisms. The author insists on the difference between euphemization as a process and the euphemism as a lexical unit or substitute. Also, there is a difference between *word taboo* (or linguistic taboo), which can generally be analyzed as the process of euphemistic substitution, and *concept taboo*, or conceptual interdiction, which is not restricted only to the lexical level. This even means that the forbidden term may not exist, although forbidden concept or reality may exist, which leads to another question, and that is, whether we should, instead of relying on the term *a vocabulary interdiction* (a base for substitutions), refer to *a conceptual interdiction* which gives rise to the euphemistic and dysphemistic terms. In that sense, euphemism cannot only be conceived semantically as a lexical substitute; the author proposes to define euphemism or dysphemism as the cognitive process of conceptualization of a forbidden reality, which, manifested in discourse by means of linguistic mechanisms such as lexical substitution, phonetic alternation, morphological modification, syntagmatic grouping, verbal modulation or textual description, allows the speaker to moderate (euphemism) or emphasize (dysphemism) a certain forbidden concept or a forbidden reality. This hypothesis emphasizes the need to study the fundamental mechanisms that lead to euphemization, those that lead to many different specific mechanisms, such as those mentioned in the previous works.

Mišković-Luković’s (1999) paper “Delimitacija eufemizama i njihova funkcija u književnim delima” [The Delimitation of Euphemisms and Their Function in Literature] points out that euphemisms were not given enough attention as far as linguistic research in the English language area is concerned. In this paper, she deals with the problems of associative and referential meanings, pejorative changes in language, use of euphemisms in



jargon. The author suggests that euphemisms were studied in connection with standard language, but not in connection with, for example, spoken language, dialectal variations, slang and jargon, which is why more research should be done.

In his doctoral thesis *Eufemizmi i disfemizmi u engleskom jeziku [Euphemisms and Dysphemisms in English]*, Gorčević (2011) examines euphemisms and dysphemisms from the point of view of linguistics and sociolinguistics. The corpus of euphemisms and dysphemisms consists of examples taken from newspapers, films, series and animated films, and the main aim is to give linguistic and sociolinguistic explanations for the use of euphemisms and dysphemisms. Some of the main results of the research are the following: the same euphemisms and dysphemisms exist in English and Serbian languages, and the most important mechanisms for the creation of euphemisms and dysphemisms are stylistic figures, phonemic modifications, acronyms, abbreviations; metaphors and metonymies are also frequent occurrences. For our thesis, the existence of the same euphemisms in English and Serbian languages is relevant, as our thesis analyzes the use of concealing euphemisms in English and Serbian public discourse.

The review ends with two doctoral thesis that examine the mechanisms for euphemism construction within specific theoretical frameworks. The first one is Sytnyk's (2014) doctoral thesis *Argumentative Euphemisms, Political Correctness and Relevance* that relies on relevance theory and Neo-Gricean pragmatics. His central claim is that "the cognitive processing of utterances containing novel euphemistic/politically correct locutions involves meta-representations of saliently unexpressed dispreferred alternatives (Sytnyk (2014: 3)". As further elaborated, the hearer is invited to infer the dispreferred non-euphemistic equivalents in the process of explicature derivation. This would mean that the hearer can make connections between the euphemistic/politically correct and non-euphemistic items on the basis of the existing relations between concepts that give information about logical content, encyclopaedic knowledge and lexical properties. Such inferencing that leads to explicature derivation can become default processing which leads to the conventionalization of euphemisms, which then become "contaminated" with negative connotations and become "victims" of *euphemism treadmill*. To put it in other words, negative connotations associated with direct expressions "poison" the euphemistic/politically correct term. The thesis also suggests that the *euphemism treadmill* is increased in cases of narrowing, whereas it is less likely in cases of conceptual broadening.

In her doctoral thesis *Kognitivna analiza eufemizama u političkom diskursu na engleskom jeziku [Cognitive Analysis of Euphemisms in English Political Discourse]*, Moritz

(2015) analyzes cognitive mechanisms that form the basis for the construction of political euphemisms, i.e. conceptual metaphor and metonymy. The corpus includes examples from political speeches dealing with the topic of war, delivered by George W. Bush and Barack Obama. She concludes that conceptual metonymy dominates the construction of euphemisms in the political speeches.

To sum up, the purpose of this short review is to give directions for further research into euphemisms and concealing euphemisms. In the following section, we give a broader theoretical background of our thesis; as concealing euphemisms are defined as words used for imposing preferred constructions of reality, we rely on the theoretical postulates that can explain the mechanisms that can explain manipulation by means of imposing preferred constructions of reality, and the relation between preferred and dispreferred constructions of reality.

## 2.3. Broader theoretical background

### 2.3.1. Rhetoric and stylistics

Rhetoric, broadly defined as “the art of persuasion” (Lanham 1991: 131), from Greek *rhetorike technē* - “art of an orator”, was originally seen as a craft of speechmaking, a study of the methods of persuasion by orators. Rhetoric teaches us that one of the most important communicative functions of language is the function of persuasion. When the primary function of language is persuasion, the speaker is focused on the audience and on the strategies that can bring about the “adherence of the minds (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 4)”.

The five phases of rhetoric summarized by Quintilian (Lanham 1991: 165), *invention*, *arrangement*, *expression/style*, *memory* and *delivery/action*, show that preparing a speech is a structured process, and the speech itself is a construct, not a random use of words and sentences without premeditation. The classification of the stages of rhetoric also discovers the roots of stylistics, today’s sub-discipline of linguistics. In this sense, the phase of *elocution*, or *style*, has a very important role, as it refers to the use of specific language devices suited to achieve specific oratorical goals.

However, the notion of style was well-known even before Quintilian; in his treatise on rhetoric, Aristotle (2000: 191) speaks about three points to study in making a speech: sources from which methods of persuasion are drawn, the style of expression, and the arrangement of the parts of the speech. He points out that it is not only important to know what should be

said, but it is also important to produce the right impression in speech. Similarly to Aristotle, according to the traditional division of labour within rhetoric, stylistics is concerned with the way arguments are presented, suggesting that arguments can be expressed in different manners, and should be related to invention and arrangement in such a way as to achieve the right effect on the audience.

Though it is acknowledged that the notion of style stems from ancient rhetoric, stylistics is also seen to originate from the formalist school of literary criticism in Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century (Jeffries and McIntyre 2010: 1). Jeffries and McIntyre (2010: 1) explain that the aim of the formalist school was to isolate the properties and characteristics of literary language, but the idea that it is possible to describe the formal features that exist in literary as opposed to non-literary language has been abandoned. The purpose of stylistics is not to make inventories of formal features in literary and non-literary language, but to “explore creativity in language use” (Simpson 2004: 3). This implies the change of focus from the question “What can stylistics tell us about literature?” to the question “What can stylistics tell us about language? (Simpson 2004: 3)”.

Finally, it can be concluded that rhetoric and stylistics can be viewed as the foundation for the study of language manipulation. In this research, the practice of using concealing euphemisms is seen as a specific type of language manipulation. Identifying concealing euphemisms can be notoriously difficult because concealing euphemisms are intended to pass unnoticed, and, therefore, the relation between concealing euphemisms and rhetoric is essential. The next section of the theoretical background introduces a new paradigm seen as the return and reinvention of rhetoric, coined as *rhetoricality* (Bender and Wellbury 1990: 25).

### 2.3.2. Rhetoricality

Richards (2008: 115–116) explains that, due to the failure of the attempt to establish a science of language, rhetoric returned, but it was not the return of classical rhetoric. Classical rhetoric had to be abandoned because, as Bender and Wellbury (1990: 25) explain, it “rarified speech and fixed it within a gridwork of limitations.” The principles of rhetoric, the authors further explain, were conditioned by the institutions that led interaction in traditional European society. On the other hand, rhetoricality is not limited by any set of institutions; rhetoricality is not a set of strategies used in the language of persuasion, it becomes “something like the condition of our existence (Bender and Wellbury 1990: 25)”.

This conception of language reconciles with the idea that meaning in language is not a stable sign-signifier relationship. Language is understood as profoundly and persuasively figurative; tropes and figures cannot be rationalized and their use cannot be controlled. Such a view of rhetoric where language in its totality is viewed as rhetorical is known as rhetoricality (Bender and Wellbery 1990: 25).

In order to give more insight into the transition from rhetoric to rhetoricality, Bender and Wellbery (1990: 23–24) explain that rhetoricality was grounded in several cultural presuppositions. First of all, modernism is characterized by the loss of faith in the neutrality of scientific and practical discourse. Bender and Wellbery (1990: 23) explain that in modernism, even so-called observation sentences are recognized as theory-laden, and the history of science is a series of constructions governed by specific conceptual paradigms. Likewise, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 133) explain that outside of a pure formalism, notions can be clear and univocal only in relation to a field of application that is known and determined. The necessity to use the univocal language, which dominates the scientific thought, loses sight that this clarity may stand in the way of other functions of language. If language is then used for purposes other than those science is interested in (such as, for example, the purpose of persuasion and manipulation), it is not surprising that univocality gives way to ambiguity and plurality of meaning. This condition of language can be dangerous, because ambiguity of meaning can lead to moral ambiguity. Richards (2008: 73) writes that many authors anticipated this modernist approach to language meaning. For example, she speaks about Hobbes' aversion to this kind of "linguistic slipperiness" which creates a "world in which there will be no possibility of reaching any rational agreement about the application of evaluative terms, and no prospect in consequence of avoiding a state of unending confusion and mutual hostility".

However, plurality of meaning is not the same as randomness of meaning, which means that interpretations are based on certain principles that can be discovered and used to resolve instability of meaning, or at least become aware of this problem. Following this, the aim of this research is to discover the mechanisms guiding the construction and interpretation of concealing euphemisms, and to show that even when language is used to obscure meaning, there are ways to explain how obscurity is achieved and how it can be exposed.

The second presupposition refers to dismantling the values of individual authorship and creativity. Classical rhetoric saw language as a tool for structuring argumentation according to what the orator intends to achieve. However, modernism abandons the idea that we are fully creative or free in creating meaning in accordance with our intentions. Derrida

(2002: 111), the French philosopher whose ideas had a strong influence on rhetorical thinking, holds that our being is an inheritance, and that the language we speak is an inheritance. He emphasizes that it is not the inheritance that we possess, but the inheritance that we are. Because we think only in signs, and when we think about meaning we think about signs (Derrida 1976: 50) which are inherited, it is impossible for us to be completely free creators of meaning.

His seminal work *Of Grammatology* (1976) is devoted to writing, the concept that will deconstruct Western metaphysics, its privileging of logos as speech, presence, the proper, and “it will become for him the first of a long series of quasi-transcendental and ever-changing place-holding terms that are all, in essence, saying and doing the same thing” (Syrotinski: 2011: 6). The meaning of meaning could be infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier to signifier (Derrida 2001: 27). Language, according to Derrida is “a system of relations and oppositions” that must be continually defined. Traditional notions like “structure”, “opposition” and “meaning” force stability on concepts that are fundamentally unstable, and obfuscate the operations by means of which the appearance of stability is created (Herrick 2005: 256). This is so because a signifier carries with itself the possibility of its own repetition, of its own image or resemblance. When the sign appears, it is not possible to encounter anywhere the purity of “reality,” “unicity,” “singularity” (Derrida 1976: 91). Herrick (2005: 257), for example, illustrates Derrida’s idea with the instability of the meaning of the term WAR. Although we can say that this is a stable term, it is only defined in contrast to its opposite, PEACE. If we argue about a possibility of war, at the same time, we argue about the opposite concept, PEACE.

Thirdly, modernism developed together with the mass consumption of ideas where rhetorical manipulation is a rule. Marketing, propaganda and public relations create public opinion. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969: 4) name the 20th century the century of advertising and propaganda, and argumentation depends on the audience we address. This is especially valid for the study of concealing euphemisms, which are used when the public is addressed, and are by default associated with discourses of mass communication.

The fourth presupposition mentioned in Bender and Wellbery’s (1990: 24) discussion of the relation between rhetoricality and modernism is the dethroning of print. The authors think that in modernism, film and television dominate mass communications. This change is a change in the nature of communication; mass media enter our lives, and these types of public discourse become important areas of research.

Lastly, in modernism, the idea of national uniqueness and national language is abandoned. Dialects, sociolects and idiolects multiply, new disciplines and their new jargons are created. In this regard, it is necessary to relate concealing euphemisms as a specific type of language used within a specific type of discourse.

To sum up, rhetoricality, the new modernist paradigm, sheds more light on how concealing euphemisms should be studied. Language is not a system of representation whose signs have a fixed value, so it is important to devote time to analyzing the mechanisms underlying this inherent instability of meaning in order to understand the process(es) of producing concealing euphemisms. Secondly, bearing in mind that concealing euphemisms appear in specific types of discourses, such as public discourse, discourses where the speaker/writer uses language to persuade the audience into accepting a set of beliefs or practices, it is also important to study the relation between concealing euphemisms and a particular type of discourse where they are used, larger structural units that control the production and interpretation of meaning. This connection can also be related to the shift from the centrality of spoken discourse of classical rhetoric and the dominant role of orators, who prepared their speeches according to the rules prescribed by rhetoricians (who provided long lists of rhetorical/stylistic devices for making speeches more suited to the purpose) to the insistence on the introduction of written discourse which, in addition to public speech-making, becomes another important way to address and influence public opinion (e.g. newspaper discourse).

### 2.3.3. Recapitulation

Rhetoric and stylistics are important for the study of concealing euphemisms because they highlight the communicative function of persuasion. This implies the relation of language use with a particular social setting and a particular audience. In that sense, language is a social institution, and is, therefore, always socially conditioned. Also, this part of the theoretical background emphasizes that it is important to make differences between epistemological paradigms and different types of discourses where concealing euphemisms should or should not be used. Rhetoric, the first paradigm within which concealing euphemisms are analyzed, gives insight into the motives for the use of concealing euphemisms. However, at the same time, it is faced with a problem: as it has already been discussed, it is the problem of a lack of precision in classifications of stylistic devices, and in that sense, of defining concealing

euphemisms. Another paradigm discussed in this review, rhetoricality, abandons the idea of the stability of meaning (and this is the paradigm that can explain this lack of precision), and accepts the position that concealing euphemisms thrive on the possibility to mislead our interpretation of meaning.

## 2.4. Linguistic background: linguistic relativity

The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity postulates that language creates a specific way of thinking. The idea has often been considered wildly adventurous or even ridiculous (Gumperz and Levinson 1996b: 23), but, at the same time, as Gumperz and Levinson (1996a: 1–5) remind us, the idea of linguistic relativity, or the hypothesis that culture, through language, influences the way we think, has a long line of descendants in the history of ideas, and is, at the same time, part of the never-ending debate about the two opposing lines of thought, namely, universalism and relativism.<sup>8</sup> Criticisms leveled at the relativity hypothesis depend on how relativity is understood: as the strong version of linguistic relativity, linguistic determinism, or as the weak version of linguistic relativity. Gumperz and Levinson (1996b: 23) make it clear that under the strong version, linguistically uncoded concepts would be impossible, and under the weak version, concepts which are linguistically coded would be more accessible, or the default coding for non-linguistic

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<sup>8</sup> These authors point out that what we today attribute to Sapir and Whorf is only the tip of the iceberg. The idea of linguistic relativity itself became famous thanks to Whorf, but his views can be said to be based on the teachings of Edward Sapir and Franz Boas, or, if an alternative line of thought is followed, on Whitney and other early American linguists, and, finally, Wilhelm von Humboldt. If the idea is followed further, it can be related to Herder and the German romantics, and then to Leibniz, as opposed to the ideas of Universal Grammar and words as mere labels for pre-existing concepts. However, this is not the end of the story. Humboldt, for example, relied on French eighteenth century ideas. Also, another important contribution to the development of the idea of linguistic relativity is twentieth century structuralism, which views language as a system of mutually defining signs, and as such, emphasizes the essential role of the system in making distinctions in language meaning. Tracing the history of the idea of linguistic relativity may be challenging, but it goes outside of the scope of this research. However, this very brief historical overview underscores the importance of the issue of relativity vs. universalism, and the fact that the hypothesis of relativity must not be rejected as a hypothesis of no consequence.

cognition. This research accepts the weaker position, and as the topic of the research is the analysis of the processes of constructing concealing euphemisms aimed at manipulating public opinion, the connection between the hypothesis that language influences thought and that concealing euphemisms are used for the purpose of influencing thought becomes more visible.

Language is a means of expression, and the referential function must always be considered in relation to patterns of expression. The ideal of pure reference is only possible in scientific discourse (Sapir 1949: 12) and in other discourses, reference always depends on the context. At the same time, language is a social institution coding, conditioning and constraining our way of thinking by imposing certain referential relations. This means that we are, at the same time, in control of and in the clutches of language (as a social and cultural product) to such an extent that “it becomes almost impossible for the normal individual to observe or to conceive of functionally similar types of behavior” in other societies and cultures without projecting the forms that s/he is familiar with (Sapir 1949: 549). Applied to the vocabulary of concealing euphemisms, this idea means that language users can be actively involved in creating culture and social relations. In relation to this, the crucial concern is: who are the ones that impose the usage of specific symbols of reference?

Similarly to Sapir, Whorf (1956: 221–222) also has something to say about the expressive dimension in language; he insists that expressiveness in language is constrained by patterns specific for each language, and, therefore, it is not as independent as it is sometimes imagined to be. Talking, for him, is not as free and spontaneous as we think; on the contrary, we are all controlled by the automatic, involuntary patterns of language. Different grammars lead to different types of observations and evaluations, and unconscious acceptance of linguistic backgrounds can lead to erroneous thinking. Here it can be implied that because language is a social institution, acquiring a specific language at the same time means acquiring the world view of a specific society.

To sum up, the relativity hypothesis explains that referentiality in language is not a matter of one-to-one correspondence, which can be found in mathematical symbolism. Referentiality often depends on context and is closely related to expressiveness, and, when concealing euphemisms are used, expressiveness can change reference. Second, language is discussed in close connection with society and culture. Language not only pre-exists us and influences our thinking from the moment we start acquiring our mother tongue, but it also co-exists with us, so the way language affects us can be tested. In this thesis, this is done by analyzing the use of concealing euphemisms in public discourse.



## 2.5. Pragmatic perspectives

### 2.5.1. Introduction

In this section, we focus on the universal principles of communication put forward by Grice (1975, 1989), Horn (1984) and Levinson (2000), Brown and Levinson (1978/1987), and Habermas (1998), who are all interested in giving a universal set of principles that can account for the way communication functions prior to the influence of context. In addition, Brown and Levinson (1978/1987), and Habermas (1998) focus on the social aspects of communication. This type of introduction is aimed at making a difference between theoretical models that primarily deal with generalized implicatures, and relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), which insists on the fundamental role of context in communication.

### 2.5.2. Grice: Cooperative principle

According to Grice (1989: 26), communication is cooperation where participants are expected to follow “a rough general principle”, the Cooperative Principle:

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Without this “rough general principle” of cooperation, communication would be a series of disconnected turn-takings, and as Grice (1989: 26) remarks, communication would not be rational if it consisted of disconnected talk exchanges. In order to explain how these exchanges are connected, Grice (2001: 5–8) assumes that reasoning “consists in the entertainment (and often acceptance) in thought or in speech of a set of initial ideas (propositions), together with a sequence of ideas each of which is derivable by an acceptable principle of inference from its predecessors in the set.” Reasoning is “incomplete”, “not fully explicit” and “(for example) enthymematic.<sup>9</sup>” Therefore, Grice (1975: 48) states that it is reasonable to follow the standard type of conversational practice, although it does not necessarily mean that we sometimes do not abandon such reasoning. The two rational conspecifics, according to the standard pragmatic model (Grice 1975), first compute literal

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<sup>9</sup> Here Grice draws on Aristotle’s (2000: 39–40) view of enthymemes, which Aristotle calls rhetorical syllogisms. Enthymemes have fewer propositions than the normal syllogism because if a proposition is a familiar fact, it should not be mentioned, it should be the hearer’s task to add it.

meaning, and then, if it is recognized that a maxim is violated, the intended meaning is derived by means of implicatures. In the pragmatic approaches that follow later, this view, the standard pragmatic model, is abandoned as it cannot explain on-line processing. As Noveck and Spoltono (2013) argue, Grice's model is a normative theoretical account which describes the computational level of analysis (which makes explicit the input and output of the process), and not the algorithmic level of analysis (which describes how we get from input to output, which representations and processes have to be used to manipulate and build representations). The algorithmic level of processing is considered from the point of view of relevance theory (see Section 2.5.7.).

When concealing euphemisms are used, the CP itself is manipulated. Given that the goal of using concealing euphemisms is swaying public opinion to one's own benefit, the speaker can reroute the auditor's inferential trajectory (by avoiding direct words and phrases) while the hearer assumes the CP is observed. To understand what this means, it is necessary to elaborate Grice's (1989: 26–27) notion of the CP by introducing four conversational maxims (CM) of the CP:

The maxim of Quantity:

Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange);

Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

The maxim of Quality:

Try to make your contribution one that is true.

This maxim has two more specific sub-maxims:

Do not say what you believe to be false;

Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

The maxim of Relation:

Be relevant.

The maxim of Manner:

Avoid obscurity of expression.

Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

Be orderly.

The CP and CM on one hand, and conversational implicature, ways of inferring meaning on the basis of what is explicitly said, on the other, are connected in the following ways (Grice 1989: 30):

- The participant can violate a maxim (for example, when the speaker lies, s/he violates the maxim of Quality);
- The participants may be faced with a clash (when adhering to a maxim at the same time means violating another maxim);
- A maxim can be flouted (in such cases, unlike in cases of maxim violation, the speaker wants the hearer to know that a maxim is flouted).
- The participant can opt out from a maxim and the Cooperative principle. This is the case when the speaker indicates that he does not want to follow the maxims. As it deals with indicating that one is unwilling to cooperate (Grice 1989: 30), rather than ways of misleading, it is not discussed.

Firstly, when maxims are flouted, the speaker expects the audience to recognize that the maxims are exploited, which means that the speaker does not intend to lie or hide something. In other words, when maxims are flouted, the speaker observes the Cooperative Principle and relies on the addressee's ability to generate certain conversational implicatures. If we say that concealing euphemisms are examples of maxim flouting, then they would no longer be concealing euphemisms (the emphasis is on the modifier concealing); however, at the same time, concealing euphemisms would no longer be concealing euphemisms (the emphasis is on the head word euphemisms), if it was impossible to inferentially relate them to their non-euphemistic counterparts. This shows that the relation between maxim flouting and concealing euphemisms is not straightforward. Secondly, concealing euphemisms can be the result of a maxim clash; for example, if the Maxim of Quality is followed in the sense that one cannot say something for which one does not have evidence (Quality 2), s/he may violate the Quantity 1 Maxim of not being informative as required. This may be the justification for using indirect words or expressions, as using indirect euphemistic words may be due to the lack of evidence to name something in a direct way. In this regard, communication is always open to manipulation, as the maxim of Quality stands on the infirm ground. One can always say that there is no evidence for making particular claims.

As already pointed out, the maxim of Quality is closely related to the maxim of Quantity. Grice's maxims are not mutually independent, and the insistence on the mutual interrelatedness of all maxims can make manipulation by means of concealing euphemisms more easy to disentangle. For example, when concealing euphemisms are used, the Maxims of Quantity (which state that the contribution should be as informative as required but not more than that) are violated because the speaker under-informs or over-informs the audience, and in that way, leads to a desired inferential path. The trouble is that the speaker can always pretend to flout or be in a clash with the maxim of Quantity, because s/he can only claim what s/he believes is true, and s/he can only claim that for which s/he has evidence.

Why the audience is under-informed or over-informed can be explained by means of the maxim of Relation. This maxim relies on the need to contribute to communication in such a way as to make it "appropriate to the immediate needs at each stage of the transaction (Grice 1989: 28)". Grice (1989: 35) remarks that the violation of the maxim of Relation is rare, and it does seem that it is impossible to violate this maxim, as whatever we say has to be relevant in accordance with the effects we want to achieve<sup>10</sup>. This shakes the ground of the maxim of Quality, because, if we should not say what we believe is false, and falsity and truth are related to our *belief*<sup>11</sup>, then the maxim of Relation affects our belief and, ipso facto, the maxim of Quality. Also, we are not supposed to speak about things for which we have no evidence, but the notion of evidence is relative and dependent on the maxim of Relation. This conflict between the maxim of Quality and the maxim of Relation is fundamentally related to different functions of communication. As it is concerned with truth/falsity, the maxim of Quality is concerned with the communicative function of representation, whereas the maxim of Relation is more closely related with the appellative communicative function. In the language of concealing euphemisms, the effect on the audience is the most important goal in

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<sup>10</sup> This idea is examined later when relevance theory is introduced as a theory of contextualized implicatures. To only give a general idea of why this idea needs to be evaluated, when the goal of communication is not coordination, but manipulation, concealing euphemisms are used instead of non-euphemistic terms to impose their relevances on the hearer.

<sup>11</sup> The relation between truth, falsity, belief and knowledge has been discussed by both ancient and modern philosophers. In his discussion of knowledge and belief, Rott (2005: 327) states that "there is still little agreement among philosophers what knowledge is", and whether a belief is a piece of knowledge or not. In our study of concealing euphemisms, drawing attention to this distinction is important because, for once more, it insists that communication between the speaker and the audience involves much more than what a simple encoding-decoding theory would imply. The notion of belief, as already highlighted, is important in relevance theory.

communication, so the maxim of Relation is prior to the maxim of Quality. In addition, in the language of concealing euphemisms, the maxim of Relation seriously challenges the status of greatest importance of the maxim of Quality because the primary goal of concealing euphemisms is to make direct words and expressions less relevant, or completely irrelevant, and, finally, make the audience accept euphemistic labels as the only possible labels for things.

The fourth maxim of Manner can expose concealing euphemisms. This is so because concealing euphemisms are textbook examples of obscurity and, in some cases, prolixity (when a direct word is replaced with a euphemistic phrase). However, the maxim of Relation can come to rescue to the maxim of Manner by justifying obscurity as a proper measure of relevance to a particular communicative act. In other words, the degree of transparency is determined by the maxim of Relation, which then, makes the maxim of Manner redundant.

### 2.5.3. Neo-Griceans: Horn's principles

In his model, Horn (1984: 11) relies on George Kingsley Zipf's (1949) Principle of Least Effort that applies to all of natural language. According to Zipf (1949: 19–22)<sup>12</sup>, there are two opposing forces in communication:

- the Force of Unification (Speaker's Economy), and
- the Force of Diversification (Auditor's Economy).

For Zipf (1949: 20-22), words are tools combined with meanings for the purpose of achieving objectives. He further explains that combining words with meaning (which are used as tools for certain objectives) can be done in a more or less economical way from two points of view, from the point of view of the speaker (the speaker's economy) and the point of view of the auditor (the auditor's economy). The existence of two points of view instantaneously suggests that there is a conflict of interests between the speaker and the

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<sup>12</sup> Horn (1984: 11) adds that these two opposing forces are also discussed by Martinet (1962) and allied functionalists. Vicentini (2003) argues that the 'economy principle in language' existed before Martinet and Zipf. Various authors discuss this principle at various levels, such as sound level, the level of lexicon and grammar. Interestingly enough, Carston (2005) suggests that some aspects of Horn's neo-Gricean account actually clearly diverge from Grice's assumptions.

auditor that must be resolved in order to communicate successfully. The first type of economy, or the Force of Unification, means that economy tends to make language vocabulary as simple as possible by assigning as many different meanings to a single word as possible. Horn (1984: 11) suggests that if this Force of Unification operated without limits, that would result in “the evolution of exactly one totally unmarked infinitely ambiguous vocable”. However, this Force is counterbalanced by the auditor’s economy, which would find the single-word vocabulary too laborious. As the task of the auditor is to determine what the speaker means to say, it would be highly useful for the auditor to have available as many different words expressing different meanings as possible, with the ideal of having one meaning per one word.

Following Zipf, Horn (1984: 12–13) develops his own bipartite conversational model. Similarly to Grice, Horn has it that the Maxim of Quality has its special place, because if this maxim is not observed, any conversation collapses. However, Horn changes the Gricean model by reducing other maxims to two principles. Firstly, for Horn, Grice’s first Quantity maxim (Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange), Quantity 1 or Quantity, as Horn calls it, is Zipf’s Auditor’s Economy. Horn (1984: 12) then takes care of other maxims by saying that “most if not all of the remaining Gricean rules respond to the Speaker’s Economy”. What he finally gets is:

The Q Principle (Hearer-based):

Make your contribution sufficient (cf. Quantity 1)

Say as much as you can (given R)

Lower bounding principle, inducing upper-bounding implicata.

The R Principle (Speaker Based):

Make your contribution necessary (cf. Relation, Quantity 2, Manner)

Say no more than you must (given Q)

Upper-bounding principle, inducing lower-bounding implicata.

The conflict between the two principles arises when the hearer’s wish to get sufficient information, which makes it obligatory for the speaker to say as much as s/he can, collides with the speaker’s wish to give necessary information and say no more than s/he must. Horn

(1984: 22) overcomes this conflict by explaining that the use of a marked (relatively complex and/or prolix) expression when an unmarked expression (simpler, less “effortful”) is available leads to the interpretation of the expression as conveying a marked message (one which the unmarked expression would not or could not have conveyed). Grice (1989: 47–48) himself proposes a principle that might be called Modified Occam’s Razor, Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. Words should have less restrictive (or unmarked meanings) rather than more restrictive meanings (or marked meanings), and the more restrictive meanings can be derived by means of implicature.

The notion of markedness and unmarkedness is one of the most frequently discussed terms in linguistics.<sup>13</sup> Here, the definition of markedness relies on Horn (1984: 22), as already discussed. As it will be later discussed, Horn’s definition of markedness can be brought into relation with Haspelmath’s (2006: 4–14) semantic markedness (markedness as a structural notion), conceptual/cognitive markedness (markedness related to mental effort), and markedness as a multidimensional correlation (markedness as a combination of different types of markedness). The first type, semantic markedness, refers to the difference between the marked, semantically more specific member, and the unmarked member. According to Haspelmath (2006: 5), this type of markedness should be described with semantic concepts like hyponymy and polysemy, and generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs), whose conventionalization is necessary to understand asymmetries between unmarked and marked terms. This view is in line with the general idea of Haspelmath’s paper that the notion of markedness is too abstract and should be replaced with more concrete terms. In this research, however, the unmarkedness/markedness distinction is not abandoned, but the idea that unmarkedness/markedness should be related to hyponymy, polysemy and GCIs is well embraced. The second type, conceptual/cognitive markedness, points out that marked categories are more difficult to process than unmarked categories. Yet another level of markedness, markedness as a multidimensional correlation allows different types of markedness to be combined and correlated. In this particular discussion, this means that semantic and cognitive markedness will be correlated in the sense that semantically more specific terms require more processing effort. As Horn (1984: 22) defines unmarked

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<sup>13</sup> Haspelmath (2006) lists twelve senses of the term *markedness*, four major types classified into twelve subtypes: markedness as complexity (phonological, semantic and formal markedness), markedness as difficulty (phonetic, morphological and conceptual/cognitive markedness), markedness as abnormality (markedness as rarity in text, markedness as rarity in the world, typological markedness, distributional markedness and deviational markedness) and markedness as a multidimensional correlation.

expressions as simpler and less effortful, the connection to Haspelmath's definition is obvious.

As far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, the notion of markedness and unmarkedness helps explain how it is possible to manipulate the auditor. To explain this, all euphemisms in general, and their subgroup, concealing euphemisms in particular, should first be viewed as words/expressions with marked meanings, as they are words/expressions used for specific purposes in specific contexts (in that way they are more complex and more informative than their direct counterparts). If Zipfo-Hornian heuristic is followed, euphemisms should be products of the Force of Diversification, or they should follow the Q Hearer-Based Principle. However, the problem with concealing euphemisms is that they tend to behave as unmarked terms, following the Force of Unification and the R Speaker-Based Principle

Let's use the lexeme TAKE as a concealing euphemisms for the lexeme STEAL in order to explain away this concealed markedness. In order to hide the real meaning STEAL, the superordinate or the unmarked TAKE is used, the word that does not have negative connotations and is more general in meaning. STEAL is a subordinate lexeme because it refers to a subtype of the term TAKE. In accordance with the Hornian dialectic, the speaker relies on (or manipulates) the R Principle and says no more than he must; the Force of Unification, which reduces the number of distinct meanings, is at work. The speaker's intention is to block the recognition of the marked euphemistic reading by imposing the unmarked meaning. The reader, therefore, has to invest more effort to come to the concealed sense of the lexeme TAKE, which means that pragmatic processing mechanisms will require more effort. This makes the role of context more important, and concealing euphemisms cannot then be GCI's, which are independent of context and are generated unless they are explicitly cancelled; they must be but PCI's <sup>14</sup>. TAKE is not necessarily a concealing euphemism for STEAL; that the auditor must have adequate benefit to invest his/her inferential effort.

#### 2.5.4. Neo-Griceans: Levinson's generalized conversational implicatures

Levinson proposes another way to remodel Grice's conversational paradigm. As he also discusses the coordination between the speaker and the auditor in communication, his

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<sup>14</sup> Cruse (2006: 71) defines an implicature as generalized if it is a default reading. In that sense, it is independent of context, but it can be cancelled explicitly. Therefore, it is not an entailment. Particularized implicatures are dependent on context, they are not default readings.



ideas will further help understand the language potential for manipulative communication as a divergence from the view of communication as coordinated action.

First of all, Levinson (2000: 1) explains that his model is in accordance with the general aim to explore utterance-type meaning (not sentence-meaning or utterance-token meaning), or the structure of utterances, which sheds light on the structure of language, and, more importantly for this discussion, the structural possibilities for the manipulative use of language. He puts forward a heuristic of preferred interpretations, without taking into consideration specific contextual cues and “without too much calculation of such matters as speakers’ intentions, encyclopedic knowledge of the domain being talked about, or calculations of others’ mental processes (Levinson 2000: 4).” The expression ‘preferred interpretations’ means that interpretation always happens in accordance with interpretative presumptions that are prior to any further considerations of context. Levinson (2000: 6), thus, proposes three heuristics:

- If the utterance is constructed using simple, brief, unmarked forms, this signals business as usual, that the described situation has all the expected, stereotypical properties;
- If, in contrast, the utterance is constructed using marked, prolix, or unusual forms, this signals that the described situation is itself unusual or unexpected or has special properties;
- Where an utterance contains an expression drawn from a set of contrasting expressions, assume that the chosen expressions describe a world that itself contrasts with those rival worlds that would have been described by the contrasting expressions.

These three heuristics reintroduce the unmarkedness/markedness distinction. In Levinson’s theory of generalized conversational implicatures (GCIs), this distinction is valid and it triggers directly the M-Principle, one of Levinson’s three GCIs, and is also the underlying force behind all three GCIs. Before all three GCIs are presented, it is necessary to first stop and say what explanatory potential GCIs have within a theory of implicature. GCIs are introduced by Grice (1989: 37) as types of implicatures that we necessarily rely on regardless of the specificities of the context (though they can be supplemented or overridden during the inference), unlike particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs), whose generation depends on the features of the context.

Levinson’s theory of GCIs is an abridged version of Grice’s conversational paradigm. First, Levinson (2000: 74) assumes that the Quality Maxim “plays only a background role in

the generation of GCIs". This adjustment of the view of the Quality maxim is the adjustment of the epistemic status of the Quality maxim. In other words, Grice's overarching maxim is modified to mean that truth and falsity are not categories independent of belief and commitment, which can be stronger or weaker. It is, however, important to say that Grice's two Quality submaxims do introduce the idea that we cannot say what we believe is false and that we cannot say that for which we lack evidence, which means that he was aware of the importance of belief and commitment. Another maxim that is present in Grice's theory and is absent from Levinson's, is the Maxim of Relation or Relevance, which is responsible for generating particularized conversational implicatures, not general ones, ergo, this Maxim is not part of Levinson's paradigm. And now Levinson's (2000: 31–39) threefold classification of GCIs is presented, which subsumes the Maxim of Quantity and the Maxim of Manner:

#### Q-implicatures

What isn't said, isn't.

This type of inference is related to Grice's Quantity (1) maxim (Make your contribution as informative as required). Levinson (2000: 35–36) explains that the central idea behind this type of inference is the notion of a contrast set, which means that the speaker chooses an expression of a different degree of informativeness or strength, while being aware that there are other in absentia expressions in the set s/he could have chosen to use. The auditor relies on the speaker to provide the most informative and the most salient expression. This, however, implies that the speaker is in the ideal position to specify a degree of informativeness that the auditor needs. This is important for exposing concealing euphemisms, because, by pointing out that speakers make a selection of words/expressions from a given set of alternatives, this can raise an important question of why a certain expression was chosen, and not another one.

Nevertheless, this implicature is not problem-free as speakers often choose more general terms simply because they are not in a position to use a more specific term (Levinson 2000: 101). In addition, more specific marked euphemistic senses can sometimes only be inferred as ad hoc meanings on the basis of the context. This is an important conclusion because it means that concealing euphemisms can be driven by both GCI's and PCIs.

#### I-implicatures

What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified.

I-implicatures are related to Grice's Quantity (2) maxim (Do not make your contribution more informative than is required). This type of inferencing means that the speaker expects the auditor to do the job of enrichment. Levinson (2000:114) also calls this principle the Maxim of Minimization, which relies on the Enrichment Rule, or the auditor's amplification of the informational content, which leads to the appropriate specific interpretation. When a concealing euphemism is used, this type of inference can be manipulated by the speaker by changing the inferential process towards the type of enrichment other than that a non-euphemistic expression would require.

#### M-implicatures

What's said in an abnormal way, isn't normal; or marked message indicates marked situation.

This inference is related to Grice's maxim of Manner (Be perspicuous), and more specifically, to the first submaxim avoid obscurity of expression and the fourth submaxim avoid prolixity. M-Implicatures explain the existence of marked forms, "which are more morphologically complex and less lexicalized, more prolix or periphrastic, less frequent or usual, and less neutral in register (Levinson 2000: 137)". The M-Implicatures are better understood if they are contrasted with I-Implicatures. The former suggests that when a marked expression is used, the stereotypical interpretation is invalid, and the latter suggests that unmarked expressions lead to stereotypical interpretations (Levinson 2000: 38).

For example, M-Implicatures (more specifically avoid prolixity) and I-Implicatures can explain the use of concealing euphemisms which take the form of litotes, or the use of the negation of a lexeme (eg. not GOOD) instead of the opposite of lexeme BAD. Levinson (2000: 128) explains that in these cases the negative gradable adjective (not GOOD), which is a weak contradictory including the middle ground (not GOOD is the weak contradictory of BAD that includes the meaning that something can be in-between good and bad), actually implicates the contrary, its antonym (BAD), excluding the middle ground (see Section 4.3.2.6. that discusses polar antonymy). According to Levinson (2000: 128), such a use is motivated by the polite avoidance of disparaging antonyms or by euphemisms. In the corpus of concealing euphemisms, NOT GOOD ENOUGH has been found. The addition of enough reinforces "the middle ground" component of meaning, and therefore raises the euphemistic force, but the expression NOT GOOD ENOUGH still implicates its antonym BAD, excluding the middle ground. To sum up, the use of litotes as concealing euphemisms can be explained on the grounds of the interplay of M-Implicatures and I-Implicatures. The M-Implicatures suggest

that the use of a more prolix term instead of a simple one makes one conclude that the marked expression must have been used for a particular purpose (there must always be a reason why a periphrastic form is used instead of a single lexeme). At the same time, by means of I-Implicatures, these litotes obtain a specialized euphemistic meaning which becomes a stereotypical conventional euphemistic meaning.

Levinson (2000: 138) explains that I-implicatures can explain the existence of lexical doublets. For instance, DRINK is synonymous with BEVERAGE, but they belong to different registers. The former is the neutral word, and the latter is used in written language. But, as it has already been analyzed, DRINK is no longer neutral; it is an autohyponymous word with the more neutral and the more specific sense. The more specific sense ALCOHOLIC DRINK is the result of the work of I-implicature which leads to the stereotypical meaning extension, prompted by euphemistic meaning.

Finally, one could rush into the simple conclusion that concealing euphemisms are driven by M-Implicatures. But this is only partly true. On the one hand, it is true to the extent that concealing euphemisms can be conventionalized marked terms whose use is different from the use of their non-euphemistic counterparts in the sense that they have an additional component of meaning. This conventionalization of concealing euphemisms (and, therefore, the exposure of such euphemisms) is the result of I-Implicature, which is a stereotyping force (examples with DRINK, COLLATERAL DAMAGE and litotes). Needless to say, this additional component of meaning actually means reducing negative connotations in a word. And, in addition to this type of conventionalized euphemisms, which are the least concealing type of euphemisms, another type of concealing euphemisms exists. Euphemisms of that other ilk are very well hidden behind unmarked terms, and their use resists conventionalization. This resistance, however, can be attributed to the constraint related to Levinson's Q-Inference, the constraint that states that sometimes we are not in a position to use a more specific term. But at the same time, as discussed previously, concealing euphemisms can be ad hoc, one-off euphemisms; they are PCIs (which will be considered later), not GCIs, and, if this is so, the auditor's inference becomes even more complicated.

#### 2.5.5. Concealing euphemisms as “off-record” face threatening acts

Brown and Levinson (1978/1987: 95) suggest that the reason why it is impossible to observe Grice's Maxims (as universal principles of cooperative communication) to the letter is that the speaker and the hearer are motivated by the desire to satisfy face wants. Grice

(1989: 28) himself was aware that, in addition to CP, there are other types of maxims, such as, for example, “Be polite” maxim, which may influence the generation of non-conventional implicatures (cf. Cicero’s view of euphemisms as *verecundia* and *verba tecta*, using the appropriate language in a specific social context, Section 1.2.1.). Grainger (2011: 169) and Kádár and Haugh (2013: 13–16) argue that, being “the definitive work on politeness, Brown and Levinson’s framework belongs to the earliest models of politeness, the so-called first-wave or Gricean theories of politeness, together with Lakoff’s (1973, 1977) and Leech’s (1983) models.”<sup>15</sup>

Most generally speaking, Brown and Levinson’s study of politeness deals with the face-preserving principles of communication. Brown and Levinson (1978/1987) build a theory around the notion of “face”, which is taken from Goffman (1967: 5), who defines face as the positive social value a person claims for himself. Based on Goffman, but more succinctly stated, Brown and Levinson define face as “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself (Brown and Levinson 1978/1987: 61)”. “Face” consists of two ‘face-wants’ that participants in communication have, negative face, freedom from imposition and positive face, the desire to be appreciated and approved.

According to Brown and Levinson (1978/1987: 68–71), when a face threatening act (FTA) is performed (a speaker may choose not to do the FTA if it is possible), it can be classified as an “on-record” or an “off-record” face threatening act. The “on-record” FTA is the act whose communicative intention is clear and unambiguous. Conversely, when an ‘off-record’ FTA is performed, communicative intention is equivocal, which means that the actor/speaker cannot be said to have committed to one particular intention (Brown and Levinson 1978/1987: 69). In that way, the speaker wants to avoid the responsibility for doing an FTA, and leave it up to the hearer to interpret the act as a threatening or a non-threatening one (Brown and Levinson 1978/1987: 211), which in itself, can be language manipulation. ‘Off-record’ FTAs can be credited for tactfulness, non-coercion; the speaker can avoid the responsibility for face-damaging interpretations.

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<sup>15</sup> There are three models of politeness research: Gricean approaches, the post-modern approach/discursive politeness and sociological/interactional approaches. For a full discussion of the three approaches see Grainger (2011: 169–172).

Concealing euphemisms, as instances of indirect, equivocal communication, can be classified as ‘off-record’ FTAs. The speaker who uses concealing euphemisms can be accused of being manipulative, but the payoff is that the speaker can avoid the responsibility for face-damaging interpretations. In addition, the speaker can also avoid the accusation that s/he is manipulative, because “every blatant indirectness may be defensible as innocent (Brown and Levinson 1978/1987: 212)”.

Brown and Levinson (1978/1987: 213–214) speak about fifteen strategies (ways to reach certain goals in communication) the speaker can use to lead the hearer to a specific inference. They all rely on violating Gricean maxims of communication:

Violate Relevance Maxim: 1) give hints, 2) give association clues, 3) presuppose;

Violate Quantity Maxim: 4) understate, 5) overstate, 6) use tautologies;

Violate Quality Maxim: 7) use contradictions, 8) be ironic, 9) use metaphors, 10) use rhetorical questions;

Violate Manner Maxim: 11) be ambiguous, 12) be vague, 13) over-generalize, 14) displace H, 15) be incomplete, use ellipsis;

Brown and Levinson (1978/1987: 216, 226) suggest that euphemisms can be violations of the Maxim of Relevance (Strategy 2: Give association clues; Brown and Levinson, though, remark that some euphemisms are of the associative kind, and some are metaphorical, and metaphors themselves are listed as the violation of the Quality maxim, Strategy 9 (use metaphors), the Maxim of Manner (Strategy 12, Be vague).

### 2.5.6. Habermas: validity claims

Habermas’s validity claims remind us of Grice’s Cooperative principle, but they are different in the sense that they are more closely related to political and social issues. Habermas (1998: 21–25) argues that speech actions are a specific form of communicative action that relies on general presuppositions for using sentences in utterances aimed at reaching understanding. Habermas’s (1998: 26–27) idea of the universality of validity claims as general presuppositions in communication rests on the assumption that the pragmatic dimension of language, very frequently considered to be beyond formal analysis, can actually be logically analyzed and conclusions about the general structure of speech and action can be made. Abstracting universal principles of communication is the starting point for analyzing

the process of reaching understanding, and also, it is the starting point for the analysis of the processes of misunderstanding, lack of understanding, untruthfulness, discord (open and concealed), and all cases when the presupposed principles of communication are breached (Habermas 1998: 25). Habermas (1998: 93) puts forward a classification of different types of social action (speech acts are a specific type of social action):

Social Action:

a) Communicative action

Action oriented toward reaching understanding

Consensual action (action and discourse)

b) Strategic action

Openly strategic action

Latently strategic action (manipulation and systematically distorted communication)

Concealing euphemisms are a type of latent strategic action, in which, as Habermas (1998: 93) explains, only an indirect mutual understanding by means of determinative indicators is possible. To put it in other words, manipulation by concealing euphemisms is a type of communication where “the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about her own strategic attitude, in which she deliberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner (Habermas 1998: 93)”. There are four validity claims (Habermas 1998: 22; 49) that can be prone to manipulation:

1. Understandability – the speaker must use intelligible expressions;
2. Truth – the speaker must have the intention to communicate a true proposition, a true representation of the world;
3. Truthfulness, sincerity – the intentions must be truthful so that the hearer believes the speaker (the hearer can trust the speaker); this is the function of expressing intention;
4. Rightness – the speaker must choose the utterance that accords with the norms and values; this is the function of establishing interpersonal relations.

Verbal communication relies on the intersubjective relation based on symbol formation seen in the process of encoding and decoding meaning. A communicative experience is not the same as direct observation of objects, and the epistemic positions

between the observer and the interpreter are different; the interpreter relies not on direct but a symbol-mediated experience. It should never be forgotten that the speaker represents and explicates reality through symbol formation, and that can be the starting point for manipulation. The auditor interprets meaning, first of all, by relying on the semantic content of symbol formation, which, to put it differently, means that, because s/he does not have a direct access to reality, the auditor understands words and expressions by turning to semantic meaning relations within the lexicon of a language (Habermas 1998: 29–32). In this research, analyzing lexico-semantic relations is an important stage in the interpretation of concealing euphemisms.

However, universal pragmatic principles are not only semantically conditioned. All four validity claims are essential to meaning interpretation because verbal communication is not a simple matter of the sender's encoding and the receiver's decoding meaning (this is the basic assumption in relevance theory, see Section 2.5.7.2). Reaching understanding is not only a matter of finding meaning relations within lexicon. Therefore, three more validity claims need to be introduced in the analysis of utterance meaning so that an utterance can be understood. This is what Habermas (1998: 50) calls "communicative competence," or the competence of a speaker to relate a well-formed sentence (a sentence which satisfies the comprehensibility claim) to reality.

As already mentioned, the first validity claim, understandability, can help disclose concealing euphemisms by analyzing lexico-semantic relations and this will be part of the corpus analysis of concealing euphemisms. The second validity claim, truth, is related to representation and it focuses on the propositional component of speech acts; as far as this component is concerned, the hearer decides whether a proposition is true or false. When concealing euphemisms are used, the auditor must be aware of the fact that the speaker can use manipulate the representational function of language. Habermas (1998: 63) explains that the third validity claim, truthfulness, is suspended in strategic communication. Lastly, the validity claim of rightness establishes the relation between the speaker and the auditor. It is the validity claim that speaks about the right given by the status of a speaker to perform a specific illocutionary act (Chilton and Schäffner 2002: 15). When concealing euphemisms are used, the right to perform a specific illocutionary act is abused.



## 2.5.7. Relevance theory (RT)

### 2.5.7.1. Introduction

Unlike all previous pragmatic theories, which all rely on more than one principle/force/maxim/validity claim of communication, relevance theory is a mono-principled approach to communication based on another cognitive principle, which finally, explicitly, from the outset means that RT insists on the relation of communication and cognition. Sperber and Wilson's (1995) relevance theory is a research programme that studies cognition, primarily aimed at giving an account of communication both psychologically realistic and empirically plausible (Allott 2011: 1) <sup>16</sup>.

### 2.5.7.2. Basic assumptions

In his considerations of the relation between relevance theory and the making and understanding of rhetorical arguments, Campbell (1992) suggests that relevance theory can explain how the rationalistic version of the communication of rhetorical arguments can be undermined, bearing in mind that RT sees rational relevances as only one type of relevances, in addition to strategic and worldly ones (cf. validity claims, Section 2.5.6.). Seen in that way, we avoid the "rationalistic bias", as communication is not only about implying and inferring that utterances can prove certain claims, but it also includes people's awareness of how

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<sup>16</sup> The range of topics this theoretical framework addresses is wide. To illustrate this, we present Allott's (2011: 1) list of authors and topics: scalar implicatures (Breheny, Katsos and Williams 2006, Carston 1998, Noveck and Sperber 2007), bridging (Matsui 2000, Wilson and Matsui 1998), speech acts and mood (Jary 2007, Jary 2010, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson and Sperber 1988), disambiguation (Sperber and Wilson 1995), discourse particles (Blakemore 1987 Blakemore 2000, Blakemore 2002, Iten 2005, Mišković-Luković 2006b), evidentials (Ifantidou 2001), loose talk (Carston 1996, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson and Sperber 2002), literary language (Clark 1996, Pilkington 2000, Sperber and Wilson, 1995, Sperber and Wilson 2008) genre (Unger 2006), translation (Gutt 1991), the referential/attributional distinction (Bezuidenhout 1997, Powell 2001, Powell 2010, Rouchota 1992,) and rhetorical tropes such as metaphor (Carston 1996, Carston 2010, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Sperber and Wilson 2008, Vega Moreno 2007) irony (Sperber and Wilson 1981, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Wilson 2006, Wilson and Sperber 1992, Sperber and Wilson 1998b). In addition to these topics, Sytnyk's (2014) doctoral thesis *Argumentative euphemisms, Political Correctness and Relevance* deals with theoretical aspects of political correctness and euphemisms with a special focus on the notion of metarepresentation, one of the main topics in relevance theory. The role of representation and metarepresentation in public discourse is also discussed by Mišković-Luković (2008). In her master's thesis, Radulović (2011) analyzes the language of headlines in British quality press in the light of relevance theory.

arguments can achieve ends. This is a fundamental difference between Grice and RT. Unlike theories with the “rationalistic bias” whose aim is to study discourse free from strategic and ideological aspects, and whose rationality means understanding reasons as reasons (Campbell 1992: 146), relevance theory takes into account that language is a means of achieving goals in communication, and therefore this “rationalistic bias” is avoided. In this way, relevance theory is close to rhetoric and rhetoricality discussed in Section 2.3., which stress the probabilistic nature of discourse.

To understand this basic position, this discussion of relevance theory starts with its two main principles. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 260-261) claim that:

Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance;

Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its optimal relevance.

As Sperber and Wilson explain, the second principle was primarily used as the one which is contrasted with other pragmatic “principles” put forward by other authors, especially the Co-operative Principle proposed by Grice. As some readers mistakenly understood the first claim as the Principle of Relevance, Sperber and Wilson decided to talk about two Principles of Relevance: the First (Cognitive) Principle, given in 1), and the Second (Communicative) Principle given in 2). At the same time, for the sake of precision, it should be emphasized that it is the Second, Communicative Principle of Relevance that the term “Principle of Relevance” primarily refers to.

By adopting the Principle of Relevance as the only general maxim in communication, unlike Grice’s Co-operative principle that has its four maxims, we can already see that this theory has a completely different vantage point regarding communication from the one put forward by Grice. The Principle of Relevance is contrasted with Grice’s Co-operative Principle and its overarching Quality maxim. First of all, Grice’s Co-operative Principle differs from the Relevance Principle, as the former focuses on coordination viewed as connectedness of talk exchanges relying on four maxims (without which talking would not be considered rational, and the emphasis is on the word “rational”), and the latter focuses on a presumption of optimal relevance (Quality, Quantity and Manner maxims are excluded).

In addition to contrasting the Principle of Relevance with the Co-operative Principle, the Principle of Relevance can be contrasted with the Quality maxim. In Grice’s theory, the violation of the Quality maxim, or lying, is the end of communication, because if this maxim were not observed, communication in general would not be possible. The Quality maxim,

however, is not an independent maxim even in Grice's proposal. Grice introduces three more maxims, and the interdependence of these three maxims and the Quality maxim suggests that the truth/lying distinction is related to the aspects of communication described in the Quantity, Manner and Relevance maxims as well. When it comes to concealing euphemisms, there are many problems arising from the relation between concealing euphemisms and the four maxims: first, concealing euphemisms can be viewed as a violation of the Quality Maxim; second, they can be viewed as emerging from flouting the Maxim of Manner; finally, they can arise from a clash between the Quality and Quantity Maxim (the Quality 1 or 2 and the Quantity 1 Maxims). It has already been concluded that concealing euphemisms can hide behind the Quality submaxims 1 and 2, and we can never prove that concealing euphemisms are the result of violating the Quality maxim. The same goes for the Maxim of Manner; if we relate this maxim to the Quality submaxims, we cannot know if concealing euphemisms are the violations or floutings of the Manner Maxim. Finally, concealing euphemisms can be justified on the grounds that there is a clash between the Quality 1 or 2 and the Quantity 1 Maxims. These difficulties lead us to the reexamination of the relationship between the Maxim of Relation and the Maxim of Quality. In relevance theory, it is this Relation maxim, or the Principle of Relevance, that assumes the status of greatest importance, the point of departure in explaining the principles behind communication, and, in this research, behind the use of concealing euphemisms.

#### 2.5.7.2.1. The First (Cognitive) Principle of Relevance

Relevance of an input means that:

- a) Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
- b) Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 609).

The maximization of relevance means that cognitive mechanisms, which constitute the cognitive system, tend towards cost-benefit optimization, or towards reaching the highest benefit at the lowest possible cost (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 261–263). This, we might as well say “economy principle” in communication, reminds us of Zipf's (1949) Principle of Least Effort, discussed in relation to Horn's (1984) two forces, the Force of Unification (Speaker's Economy) and the Force of Diversification (Auditor's Economy). According to

Sperber and Wilson (1995: 263), the Second, (Communicative) Principle of Relevance is grounded in this First Principle, and in the assumption that the First Principle makes the cognitive behaviour of the interlocutor predictable enough to make communication possible. Compared to Grice's Co-operative Principle and his conversational maxims, which, first and foremost, explain the grounds for cooperative communication and prioritise evaluations of truth/falsity in communication, the First Principle of Relevance, the cost-effect analysis that it implies, is related to the truth/falsity issue in a completely different way. This is the guiding assumption in this research, as concealing euphemisms are also analyzed as words/expressions used by the speaker who is not in pursuit of the truth, but in the business of analysing what effects can be achieved by using particular words/expressions in public discourse, or, even worse, imposing a view of the world as the one that is cognitively salient for the speaker, and, hopefully, for the hearer as well.

The relegation of the status of the Maxim of Quality in Grice's theory as the most important maxim to the status of its inherent relation to the Relevance Maxim, the most important maxim in relevance theory, is a truly fundamental epistemological change, and, therefore, it deserves its due attention. In relevance theory, truth still matters, but it is liable to the Principle of Relevance, or to cognitive efficiency. To start with, as Sperber and Wilson explain (1995: 263–264), cognitive efficiency, expressed in the First (Cognitive) Principle of Relevance, cannot be separated from truth, because the function of our cognitive system is to produce knowledge, not false beliefs. However, there is no other way to distinguish true from false assumptions than by means of processing inputs in our cognitive system, which always runs the risk of accepting false assumptions. Even if we suppose that the truth of inputs is a necessary condition of relevance, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 264), this position is still problematic. For example, when we say that an utterance is true, we actually mean that its interpretation is true, which is not the input, but the output of the process of comprehension. Also, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 264) assume that the truth of the conclusions is more vital to relevance than the truth of the premises. To support this, they give the example of fiction, for which we can say that, if only true inputs, not outputs, were relevant, fiction would be irrelevant. Finally, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 265) conclude that an input is relevant not in itself, but if its processing leads to cognitive gains, cognitive effects that lead to the realization of cognitive functions or goals. This is different from Grice's Quality Maxim, because, when the submaxims stipulate that we cannot say that which we believe is false and we cannot say that for which we do not have evidence, we speak about inputs to talk-exchanges, not outputs. In relevance theory, inputs are not separated from

outputs, and they are relevant only if, when they are processed in a context of assumptions, lead to a positive cognitive effect (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 608).

The emphasis on the attribution positive is important, as not all cognitive effects are positive; false conclusions are rejected as irrelevant. There are different types of positive cognitive effects, such as the strengthening, revision or abandonment of available assumptions, and the most important of all are contextual implications, deducible from the input and context (Wilson and Sperber 2004: 608). The first type of cognitive effect contributes to raising or strengthening our belief in an assumption, as Allott (2011: 6) says, from probable to almost certain. The second type of effect contributes to our abandoning an assumption, which means, not believing in the assumption any more. The third type of cognitive effect leads to deducing conclusions from new assumptions and existing assumptions/premises. What this means is that new information that cannot be brought into connection with the existing ones cannot bring cognitive effects; there has to be an interaction between the novel/old assumptions.

Finally, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 93–108) name this deductive processing of assumptions a deductive device, a device they see as “an automaton with a memory and the ability to read, write and erase logical forms, compare their formal properties, store them in memory, and access the deductive rules contained in the logical entries for concepts”. There are two types of deductive rules we can access, analytic (which take only a single assumption) and synthetic (which takes two separate assumptions as inputs). As we have a huge number of assumptions stored in memory, we can compute a huge number of synthetic implications, and it is these synthetic implications that are involved in improving our representation of the world; conversely, analytic implications are recovered only to become the material for the recovery of other synthetic implications. This short description of non-demonstrative reasoning brought about by the deductive device is later brought into relation with the discussion on the three entries of concepts (logical, encyclopaedic and lexical) vital for a proper understanding of concept construction.

#### 2.5.7.2.2. The Second (Communicative) Principle of Relevance

Sperber and Wilson (1995: 271) explain that the Second (Communicative) Principle is not a normative, but a descriptive claim about ostensive communication, and this is different from Grice, whose maxims are rules to be followed. On the other hand, similarly to what Grice’s Cooperative Principle stipulates (the maxims are to be followed to achieve successful

communication), the speaker and the hearer are expected to achieve a maximum relevance in relation to a common goal (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 268–271). Unlike Grice, in relevance theory, it is assumed that the existence of a common goal need not be built into pragmatic principles. The presumption of relevance is the starting point for a probabilistic inferencing, “including both what an utterer can be attributed to have intended to mean and what an audience can become aware of having been disclosed or revealed (Campbell 1992: 149)”. Obviously, this view is accepted in this research, as concealing euphemisms are a type of covert communication where the speaker and the hearer only appear to strive towards a common goal, in fact, the speaker’s interests diverge from the hearer’s interests and expectations. Nevertheless, there must be something shared in communication (otherwise, there would be no reason to communicate), and, according to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 268), it is the common goal of understanding. Understanding, however, is not the same as believing in what the speaker would want us to believe. This is the basis for the presumption of relevance, which implies the following (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 270):

The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the hearer’s effort to process it.

The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the speaker’s abilities and preferences.

The second formulation discovers that the speaker has preferences regarding the choice of utterances for conveying thoughts; as regards concealing euphemisms, this means that, in utterances, the speaker chooses euphemistic words and expressions, e.g. relies on broadening or narrowing, or both. Manipulation by means of concealing euphemisms lies in manipulating the hearer’s rational presumption that the speaker cannot give information that he does not have, and, therefore, an utterance which contains a concealing euphemism is given as the most relevant ostensive stimulus.

Generally speaking, relevance theory deals with ostensive stimuli, i.e. linguistic utterances, and these are stimuli by means of which the speaker intends (the notion of intention must be emphasized, because there are other types of communication, such as, for example, accidental transmission of information) to make a set of assumptions manifest (Carston 2002: 378). *Intention* is related to expressing propositional attitudes, and the road to exposing the use of concealing euphemisms can start with the position that communicative intention is not the same thing as informative intention. The former refers to informing the audience of one’s own informative intention, or as Allott (2011: 12) puts it, the presence of

communicative intention proves that the speaker wants to communicate in a deliberative, purposive way, and the latter refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30). It may happen that a communicative intention can be fulfilled without the informative intention being fulfilled, or, to be more precise, without producing a response in an audience, the appropriate behavioural or cognitive response (Sperber et al. 2010: 365–366). In other words, the success of the informative intention is not a criterion for successful communication, because believing in what the speaker communicates is not the same thing as understanding, so we can understand the speaker, but we do not necessarily have to believe him/her (Allott 2011: 12). Another possible outcome in communication is that the presumption of optimal relevance is not accepted by the hearer.

Sperber et al. (2010: 367) explain the speaker may not know what is relevant to the hearer, or may not care about what is relevant to the hearer. As far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, the speaker may know what is relevant to the hearer, but chooses to impose utterances with concealing euphemisms as the ones that carry the presumption of optimal relevance as the presumption of relevance is enough to start and guide the interpretation process. On the other side, in order for the interpretation to start, the hearer must have “a tentative and labile stance of trust” (the emphasis is on the words tentative and labile), which means that the hearer is ready “to adjust one’s own beliefs to a relevance-guided interpretation of the speaker’s meaning, as opposed to adjusting one’s interpretation of the speaker’s meaning to one’s own beliefs (Sperber et al. 2010: 368).” Finally, epistemic trust does not mean that we will eventually accept an utterance, and believe in it. Acceptance comes only if epistemic vigilance does not lead us to doubt an utterance.

### 2.5.7.3. Epistemic vigilance

Fricker (2010: 51) suggests that we are all fundamentally epistemically interdependent. As she puts it insightfully, “The social relations in which epistemic subjects are conceived as standing are relations between finite knowers and enquirers conceived as bearers of reasons, producers of evidence, seekers of information, conveyors of knowledge, and soon”. In this research, the use of concealing euphemisms is discussed vis-à-vis the idea that communication is epistemic interaction that we decide to participate in if we believe that the speaker is trustworthy as a source of knowledge. The notions related to the epistemic aspects of communication are taken from Mazzarella (2013), Padilla Cruz (2012), Sperber (2001), Sperber et al. (2010), Sperber (2013) Wilson (1999).

Sperber et al. (2010: 361) state that trust is an essential component in communication, and that speakers are mistrustful only when circumstances call for such a stance. In cases when we are not sure we should trust the interlocutor, we exercise “epistemic vigilance” (Sperber et al. 2010, Sperber 2013), an ability to modulate our trust in the speaker’s honesty related to the communicated information, in view of the fact that the speaker’s and the hearer’s interests in communication do not always overlap, i.e. that coordination is not always the final goal. Our epistemic vigilance is “a verifier of the reliability and credibility of both speakers and information exchanged (Padilla Cruz 2012: 366)”. In that sense, epistemic vigilance can be targeted at the source of information and the content of information (Sperber et al. 2010: 369–376). Compared to Grice’s Co-operative principle, where a set of maxims is prescribed for the speaker to follow so that communication/cooperation can be successful, epistemic vigilance is the term that draws attention to the hearer’s role in communication.

As stated, there are two types of epistemic vigilance, vigilance towards the source of information, or who to believe, and vigilance towards the content, or what to believe (Sperber et al. 2010: 369–371; 374–376). Sperber et al. further explain that the first type of vigilance implies that the speaker must satisfy two criteria in order to earn the hearer’s trust: the criterion of competence and the criterion of benevolence. Competence means that the speaker should be in possession of true information, and benevolence refers to the speaker’s readiness to share the information s/he possesses (it goes without saying that, when a concealing euphemism is used, the speaker is not ready to share the information s/he possesses). Obviously, we are not competent for all topics, and we are differently benevolent towards the audience when we share information. In other words, our trust is given to speakers who are competent and benevolent only in relation to certain topics, audiences and circumstances. In terms of the cost-effect analysis, identifying the precise measure of trust is costly, which is why we are prone to relying on “general impressions of competence, benevolence and overall trustworthiness (Sperber et al. 2010: 369)”. Besides competence and benevolence, Sperber et al. (2010: 371) speak about the motivation for communicating as a criterion for judging the speaker’s trustworthiness, and, this is important, as concealing euphemisms are most closely related to the notion of motivation in communication. When a concealing euphemism is used, the speaker wants to preserve the image of a competent and benevolent speaker, while at the same time s/he chooses to represent a state of affairs in accordance with one’s own agenda.

Sperber et al. (2010: 374–376) explain that the second type of vigilance, vigilance towards the content, includes two types of content. The first type refers to the content intrinsically believable such as “tautologies, logical proofs, truisms, and contents whose truth



is sufficiently evidenced by the act of communication itself (Sperber et al. 2010: 374)”. As opposed to these, some types of content are intrinsically unbelievable (such as obvious lies). The second type of content involves checking the communicated content against the background of the already existing knowledge, of the background beliefs that are activated when we assess a new piece of information. In relevance theory, this comprehension procedure is most succinctly explained as the merging of new information with the old information, which can lead to three types of effects: acceptance of new beliefs, modification of beliefs or revision of beliefs (Carston 2002: 44–45, Sperber and Wilson 1995: 109, Sperber et al. 2010: 374–375).

Now, before epistemic vigilance is further considered, it is necessary to clarify the notion of knowledge, which is used in relation to the processing of communicated information and deriving cognitive effects. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 38) suggest that mutual knowledge (knowledge that humans share) is “a philosopher’s construct with no close counterpart in reality”. Therefore, instead of this evasive notion, Sperber and Wilson (1995: 38–39) introduce the notion of a cognitive environment and the notion of mutual manifestness:

A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true.

A cognitive environment of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him.

When we communicate, it is our cognitive environment that can be changed. When a concealing euphemism is used, the speaker avoids making certain assumptions more manifest, and therefore, leads the hearer to a desired inferential path.

The interplay between two types of vigilance (the vigilance toward the source of information and the vigilance toward the content) in relation to words/expressions suspected as concealing euphemisms can lead to the following cognitive effects:

If we accept the source of information as competent and benevolent, and, therefore, accept the word/expression (that can be read as a concealing euphemism) at its face value (i.e. we do not resymbolize, or metarepresent words/expressions, which is necessary to recognize concealing euphemisms), we may face two types of cognitive dissonance. First, if, in our minds, the word/expression used by the speaker (for example, DISAPPEAR used instead of STEAL) is not the lexeme we use to denote the same concept (we use STEAL for the concept STEAL, and the concept DISAPPEAR in our minds is not related to the concept STEAL), we may

choose to resolve this incoherence by accepting the speaker's view/ the speaker's use of DISAPPEAR and, in that way, modify our existing beliefs, i.e. STEAL is not the only word used in relation to the concept STEAL. Secondly, if we decide to stick to our existing knowledge about the words/expressions and their relation to concepts, we may either revise our own opinion about the source of information (this is critical thinking related to the source of information), or about both the source of information and our own beliefs (this is critical thinking related to the source and to our own set of assumptions).

We may immediately reject the source of information either on the grounds of incompetence, or on the grounds of the lack of benevolence, which comes as a result of identifying the speaker's motivation in communication (which may well be pretence and deception). In this case, the communicated word/expression is irrelevant from the start, or we may say, the communicated word/expression is false.

Sperber et al. (2010: 379–384) also speak about epistemic vigilance on a population scale, and, in relation to this type of vigilance, it is important to mention their notion of reputation. As the authors explain, epistemic vigilance can rely on the general reputation of the speaker, the opinion that is generally accepted through repeated transmission. Following this idea, public discourse is a type of discourse prone to epistemic evaluation. In public discourse, the speaker's motivation is to persuade the audience into accepting their argumentation and their worldview as the one that is true, so it is important to be epistemically suspicious. In general, public discourse is the discourse of imposing ideologies, narratives, representations, which should not go unchecked (even scientific discourse, where the pursuit of the truth is the ultimate ideal, is subject to epistemic evaluations, let alone public discourse).

Epistemology cannot do without “the interpersonal and institutional contexts in which most knowledge endeavors are actually undertaken (Sperber 2001: 401)”. This leads us back to Fricker (2010: 51), who also holds the view that we cannot lose sight of the interdependence of epistemic subjects engaging in social dialogues. As Sperber (2001) continues to explain, individual cognition can provide us with true beliefs, but it is beliefs related to communication, language and culture that should also be examined. In this regard, Sperber views communication as “cognition by proxy”, as an extension to individual cognition, in which the speaker not only relies on the information based on one's own perceptions and inferences, but also on the perceptions and inferences of others. The general goal of communication is the production of cognitive effects; ideally, the speaker should never be dishonest, and neither should the hearer be distrustful, because speakers cannot

benefit from being accused of lying, nor can the hearer gain cognitive effects if s/he is distrustful.

Sperber (2001: 405) argues that success in communication from the point of view of the speaker depends not on the speaker's truthfulness or untruthfulness (gainfully exploited in concealing euphemisms), but on the hearer's trust or distrust, and from the point of view of the hearer, the success of communication depends on the hearer's trust and the speaker's truthfulness. Speakers do not normally want to be accused of lying and it is in their interest to avoid such practice. That is why their choice is not usually between truthfulness and untruthfulness, but between expressing and withholding information. This is very important, because if we accept that the fundamental principle of communication is the principle of relevance, achieving desired cognitive effects (which leads us to our measure of expressing/withholding information) becomes more important than being absolutely truthful. It is this relation between trust, truthfulness and relevance that is fundamental to explaining how we recognize/fail to recognize concealing euphemisms. First, we can be trustful of the speaker, and it can lead us to modifying our assumptions about the world (see the foregoing discussion about the interplay between two types of vigilance). When concealing euphemisms are accepted and established as non-euphemistic words/expressions (e.g. COLLATERAL DAMAGE), we can say that the final goal of the concealing euphemism has succeeded. But, it is possible that, although we are trustful towards the speaker, we still do not want to abandon our own beliefs, in which case we can revise our opinion about the speaker, or about both the speaker and our own beliefs. This is not a radical rejection of the source of information. It is also possible that we can be distrustful, and, in this case, we reject the information provided by the interlocutor as irrelevant. This means that we consider the source of communication as incompetent and not benevolent, which equals to regarding the speaker as deceptive, and this is a radical rejection of the source of information. Applied to the language of concealing euphemisms, this means that we are epistemically vigilant to such a degree that we know words/expressions can be used as concealing euphemisms by certain speakers.

Epistemic vigilance allows the comprehension module to shift from the interpretation strategy labeled as naïve optimism to either cautious optimism or sophisticated understanding (Sperber 1994b: 9–16, Wilson 1999: 137–139, Padilla Cruz 2012: 366, Mazzarella 2013). Padilla Cruz (2012: 366) elaborates the two criteria of benevolence and competence proposed by Sperber et al. (2010: 369–371; 374–376) into three strategies related to epistemic evaluation. It is suggested that we accommodate these strategies if a) our interlocutors are not

competent language users, b) we make interpretive mistakes at either the explicit or implicit level, and c) our interlocutors are either not benevolent and they intentionally try to deceive us or they play with us by leading us to an interpretation that can be first accepted, but must later be rejected. The first strategy, naïve optimism (Sperber1994b: 9–10) implies that the speaker trusts the hearer is both competent and benevolent and that communication is cooperation where the speaker's and the hearer's shared goal is to produce cognitive effects (which means that the information we get is relevant), by investing the minimum mental effort. The hearer decodes and enriches meaning relying on the comprehension procedure that Wilson and Sperber (2004: 613) call the least-effort strategy:

Follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility.

Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned).

Here, it is important to note that, as Sperber (1994b: 10) explains, from the logical point of view, relevance and ease of access have nothing to do with the truth, but what he discusses is the psychological point of view, from which it is important to understand that the information the speaker conveys is relevant (not true), and that the hearer's interpretation is accessed with the minimum possible effort. If we rely on this strategy, “a naively optimistic hearer need not metarepresent the speaker's thoughts at all in identifying the speaker's meaning (Wilson 1999: 139)”. This means, when the word DISAPPEAR is used as a concealing euphemisms, we may not recognize it as a concealing euphemism if our internal representation of DISAPPEAR is not in any sense related to the concept STEALING.

The second interpretation strategy, cautious optimism, is, as the name suggests it, another strategy of optimism. It is the strategy where the speaker is benevolent, but not always competent (Sperber 1994b: 10–13), which is why it requires a higher degree of metarepresentation. In this case, the speaker may fail to produce relevant information, or may fail to make the relevant information easily accessible. In this case, as Sperber explains, interpretation is more complicated, because the hearer does not stop at the first relevant interpretation following the least-effort strategy, but at the first interpretation the speaker might have thought would be relevant enough. Whether the interpretation is relevant is tested if it is brought into connection with the speaker and the two questions: “Could she have expected this interpretation to occur to him? Would she have seen it as relevant enough to him (Sperber 1994b: 11)?” If the answer to both questions is yes, the interpretation is the one

that is relevant enough. In other words, it may be the case that the speaker is not competent enough to know what is relevant for the hearer in a given communicative setting. As far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, cautious optimism may help us recognize concealing euphemisms. This means that the hearer does not accept the first interpretation as optimally relevant, and may still believe the speaker is benevolent, and it is only the speaker's competence that is questionable. If the hearer gives the speaker the benefit of the doubt, concealing euphemism is exposed, but the speaker is safe from accusations that concealing euphemisms are intentionally used.

The third strategy Sperber (1994b: 13–17) speaks about is sophisticated understanding. He suggests that the speaker is not always benevolent, but sometimes only seems (the emphasis is on the verb seem) to be benevolent, even though s/he may be competent. This means that, following the least-effort strategy, the hearer should stop at the interpretation that the speaker might have thought would only seem, not is, relevant enough in communication. As far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, the speaker wants to deceive us intentionally by imposing a presumption of optimal relevance and a path of computing cognitive effects. What is relevant for the speaker is not what we would consider relevant (and that is why we test interpretive hypotheses until we reach the relevant interpretation), but that is exactly what the speaker wants, to lead the hearer astray and impose the interpretation that the speaker believes is the most relevant one. Similarly to what was said in relation to the second interpretive strategy, concealing euphemisms can be disclosed because alternative interpretations are possible. Here, however, the speaker is not given the benefit of the doubt; the initial lack of benevolence may even be reinforced while we test our interpretive hypothesis.

#### 2.5.7.4. The underdeterminacy thesis

So far, more attention has been given to language-independent criteria for activating epistemic vigilance, the criteria of competence and benevolence. At this point the discussion turns to language-dependent reasons that make it vital for us to be epistemically vigilant. We begin with Carston's (2002: 19–30) underdeterminacy thesis that explains and sums up all the loopholes of language that make it possible to be more or less explicit/implicit, and, apropos the discussion of concealing euphemisms, to withhold/give information under the guise of offering a proper measure of relevance. Carston (2002: 29) holds the view that linguistic underdeterminacy is an essential feature of the relation between linguistic expressions and propositions they express. There are weaker and stronger versions of this view:

Underdeterminacy is widespread, but there are some (few) sentences which do fully encode the propositions they are used to express.

Underdeterminacy is universal and no sentence ever fully encodes the thought or proposition it is used to express (Carston 2002: 29)

Carston (2002: 30) even suggests that the stronger version is more plausible because public language systems were grounded in an already developed cognitive capacity to form hypothesis about thoughts and intentions of other people based on their behavior (metarepresentational capacity). To illustrate what underdeterminacy means, Carston (2002: 21–28) gives a short classification of the ways in which linguistic meaning underdetermines the thought it expresses:

1. multiple encodings (i.e. ambiguities, both lexical and syntactic);
2. indexical references;
3. missing constituents;
4. unspecified scope of elements;
5. underspecificity or weakness of encoded conceptual content;
6. overspecificity or narrowness of encoded conceptual content.

As far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, the main hypothesis of the research is that they are possible as a type of underdeterminacy that results from the unspecified scope of elements, and as a type of underdeterminacy that results from underspecificity/weakness of encoded conceptual content. For example, unspecified scope of elements is illustrated in the corpus with comparatives such as SAFER, FAIRER, LESS SECURE, LESS LIQUID. These are scalar comparatives that have positive/less negative connotations, and because these comparatives are used in public discourse, they may well be treated as concealing euphemisms for direct words/expressions (adjectives/adjective phrases) that have negative or more negative connotations: not safe enough, not fair enough, more dangerous, bankrupt. In addition to being unspecified, the content can be underspecified, and underspecificity is common in the language of concealing euphemisms. For example, hyperonyms are very often used instead of hyponyms (eg. INTERVENTION/ENGAGEMENT/CONFLICT for WAR). More will be said about different types of concealing euphemisms in the empirical part of the research.

To make matters even more complicated, Sperber and Wilson (1998a: 189) argue that the fact that a public word exists does not mean that it encodes the same concept for all users;

also, the concept communicated will only occasionally be the same as the one encoded. A concept is a mental structure that can play different inferential roles depending on the circumstances. We may, for example, have different non-lexicalised concepts pertaining only to our own experience, concepts that are not linguistically encoded, but can be related to other concepts that are linguistically encoded. What makes communication successful is the possibility for a word to point the hearer in the direction the speaker wanted him/her to go.

Carston (2002: 321–322), following Fodor (1998), holds the view that concepts encoded by (monomorphemic) lexical items are atomic and are not decompositional<sup>17</sup>. There are two types of concepts, atomic and complex concepts: atomic concepts are unstructured entities, and complex concepts are structured strings of atomic concepts. Complex concepts, if they are linguistically encoded, are phrases and the concept is determined compositionally. In the language of concealing euphemisms, the atomic concept linguistically encoded as a monomorphemic lexical item (e.g. WAR) can be replaced with a phrase (military intervention); this may suggest that the speaker changes the concept WAR by replacing it with a complex concept, a structured conceptual string MILITARY INTERVENTION, the meaning of which is more abstract, and therefore, in need of a more costly processing.

Carston (2002: 321–323) defines atomic concepts as nodes in our memory which give three kinds of information: lexical properties, logical content, encyclopaedic knowledge and lexical properties. The lexical entry refers to the properties such as the phonetic form, phonological and syntactic properties of the linguistic form that encodes the given concept. The logical content refers to a set of inference rules, and analytic implications of the concept (for example, the relation of inclusion). The encyclopaedic entry includes all knowledge related to the concept, assumptions, culture-specific beliefs, our own experiences. This content is structured in terms of the degree of accessibility of its constituent elements. Differences in the frequency and recency of use in processing affect the accessibility hierarchy. This is important in the analysis of concealing euphemisms; when a concealing euphemism is used, a set of assumptions and the degree of accessibility of assumptions is changed in relation to specific concepts. The more we use the concealing euphemism instead of the direct word with negative connotations, the more detached negative connotations are.

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<sup>17</sup> This is debatable, but is outside the scope of the research. For a discussion of atomism vs decompositionalism, see Hall (2011).

#### 2.5.7.5. Ad hoc concepts

Atomic concepts can be used in communication as the basis for creating ad hoc concepts, or the pragmatically derived (non-lexicalised) concepts, the meaning of which can be inferred on the basis of the encoded (lexicalized) concept (Carston 2002: 322). Carston (2002) and a long line of relevance-theoretic researchers (to name some of them, Allott and Textor 2012, Carston 2002, 2012, 2013, Daham 2011, Hall 2011, Ifantidou 2009, Mišković-Luković 2006a, Vega Moreno 2007, Wilson 2004, Wilson and Sperber 2002, Wilson and Carston 2007, Walaszewska 2011) discuss the topic of ad hoc concepts. Barsalou (1983) introduced the category of ad hoc concepts as the category that includes highly specialized items that refer to (non-lexicalized) concepts present in everyday life.<sup>18</sup> As Barsalou (1983: 213–214) argues, the basic difference between common and ad hoc categories is that the former refers to well-established representations in memory, whereas the latter does not, which makes it difficult for ad hoc categories to strengthen associations between nodes in our memory. Sometimes ad hoc categories are processed so frequently that they become well-established, and they become more stable representations in memory, and are more similar to common categories (Barsalou 1983: 224). For example, VULNERABLE can be used as an ad hoc category that has its ad hoc use depending on the context of use. If this adjective develops a separate sense that is synonymous with the adjective POOR, we may finally store it as one of the established senses of VULNERABLE (similar to POOR), rather than an ad hoc concept. However, the speaker can manipulate ad hoc meaning construction; for example, instead of the adjective POOR, other adjectives/synonyms can be understood as POOR, but, their full specification depends on the context (DISADVANTAGED, INADEQUATE, UNDERFUNDED, VULNERABLE). As far as synonymy is concerned, Dragičević (2007: 248) discusses whether it is a blessing or a curse. Synonyms can point to the richness of a

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<sup>18</sup> In their recent paper, “All Concepts are Ad Hoc Concepts”, Casasanto and Lupyan (2015) posit a hypothesis that all concepts, categories and word meanings are ad hoc. This would mean that in line with the *ad hoc cognition* (AHC), all words are infinitely polysemous. Sperber and Wilson (1998a: 185) have a similar idea that “quite commonly, all words behave *as if* they encoded pro-concepts”, and whether or not a word encodes a full concept, the concept conveyed has to be contextually derived. Carston (2002: 15) has the same line of reasoning when she considers the idea that “conceptual encodings” are not full-fledged concepts, but are concept schemas, or pointers to a conceptual space, which serves as the background during the process of the construction of the pragmatically inferred concept. If the AHC hypothesis is true, the authors come to the conclusion that the most important goal of language and cognition research is to explain neurocognitive representations used for thinking and communicating, and how the seeming stability comes out of instability.



vocabulary, which can be a tendency to be precise in expressing meaning, but the principle of economy is another tendency that exists in language that proves highly useful as it facilitates learning new words (that arise only when it is necessary to encode a new meaning, a new concept). Ullmann (1957) has a radical opinion about the excessive use of synonyms – it is a sign of pathology (Dragičević 2007: 249).

That the line between common concepts and ad hoc concepts can be thin can also be concluded from Sperber and Wilson's (1998a: 184–200) discussion of the mental and the public lexicon. First of all, the existence of one-to-one correlation between words, which belong to language, and concepts, which exist in our minds, is rejected<sup>19</sup>. If there was such a thing as one-to-one correspondence between public words and mental concepts, a natural language, such as, for example, Swahili would be the sole medium of thought (Sperber and Wilson 1998a: 184). In other words, mental concepts are not only internationalizations of public words, and “the kind and degree of correspondence between concepts and words is a genuine and interesting empirical issue (Sperber and Wilson 1998a: 184–185)”. As further explained, some concepts are encoded by words (e.g. UNCLE), some are encoded by phrases (SIBLINGS OF PARENTS), and some do not encode concepts at all (e.g. MY is a pro-concept, rather than a full concept). Also, the mapping between words and concepts may be one-to-one (UNCLE), one-to-many (this is polysemy, e.g. OPEN can denote different concepts, or homonymy, e.g. BANK), many-to-one (CONFLICT and WAR can denote the same concept, and in specific contexts, they can be synonyms), or a combination of these combinations (CONFLICT can denote different concepts, and also, CONFLICT and WAR can denote the same concept).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Sperber and Wilson (1998a: 184) define mental concepts as “relatively stable and distinct structures in the mind, comparable to entries in an encyclopaedia or to permanent files in a data-base [...] The occurrence of a concept in a mental representation may play a causal role in the derivation of further representations, and may also contribute to the justification of this derivation”.

<sup>20</sup> Another interesting case is NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres] (Đilas: 17.03.2013), taken from the Serbian corpus. To explain the relation between this phrase and the concept that it encodes, we rely on Sperber and Wilson's (1998a: 185) hypothesis that “quite commonly, all words behave *as if* they encoded pro-concepts: that is, whether or not a word encodes a full concept, the concept it is used to convey in a given utterance has to be contextually worked out”. We only add that the above-mentioned phrase (not the word) can behave *as if* it encoded a pro-concept. A full semantic specification of the phrase depends on the context.

Ad hoc concepts and polysemy are related, and it is good to try to draw the line between polysemy and ad hoc concepts. Both these phenomena are related to the context of use; the difference is, as Steen (2007) states, following Cuyckens and Zawada 2001, Kilgariff and Palmer 2000, Ravin and Leacock 2002, that polysemy is “the phenomenon where one language form has two distinct but related conventionalized meanings”, whereas ad hoc concepts do not have their corresponding well-established linguistic expressions. When meanings are established, they become part of lexico-grammar, part of “the socio-culturally conventionalized and cognitively entrenched part of the many concrete events of usage that occur in reality” (Steen 2007: 5). But even polysemy poses a problem for researchers. Falkum (2009: 28) identifies a range of issues, such as: are all the different senses of a polysemous word lexically stored, are only some senses stored, or is a single representation stored and the others pragmatically derived? Are sense relations represented in the lexicon, and if so, how are they represented? Falkum argues that polysemy can be addressed from the point of view of pragmatic inference, which means that polysemy depends on our inferential capacity to understand the speaker’s meaning on the basis of the encoded content and contextual cues.

#### 2.5.7.6. Lexical pragmatic processes

There are two basic types of lexical pragmatic processes leading to the construction of concepts (Allot and Textor 2012, Carston 2002, Wilson 2004, Wilson and Carston 2007):

- Lexical narrowing (cf. Zipf’s Force of Unification and Horn’s R-Principle, Speaker Based, Section 2.5.3.) refers to the use of a word to convey a more specific sense than the encoded one, with a more specific denotation (if we speak about lexical words). For example, ACTION can have a narrower meaning MILITARY ACTION (the fine-tuning/narrowing of the concept is closely related to context). On the basis of their experiment, Noveck and Spotorno (2013) argue that the prime examples of voluntary narrowing are scalar inferences, which imply a more informative reading related to extra effort; on the other hand, metaphors are prime examples of imposed narrowing, where there is no obvious relation between the encoded meaning and the intended one (to be reanalyzed later).
- Lexical broadening refers to the use of a word to convey a more general sense than the encoded one. The subtypes of this type of concept construction are approximation, hyperbole and metaphor (Wilson and Carston 2007: 5–15); they are, in other words, instances of the loose use of language. Romero and Soria (2010: 2) discuss Carston’s

(1996, 2000, 2002) view that “the comprehension of loose and metaphorical uses should be construed as involving the same kind of free pragmatic process as cases of content enrichment and thus as playing a role in shaping the explicit content communicated by the speaker”. As further explained, this idea is an important change in the way loose use and metaphor are analyzed by Sperber and Wilson (1995: 231–237), where the proposition conveyed by the utterance served only as a vehicle for deriving implicatures (Sperber and Wilson’s full definitions of the notions of implicature and explicature are given in Section 2.5.7.7, which deals with the notion of context). At the same time, the notion of interpretive resemblance is still the key to explaining the relation between lexical concepts and communicated concepts (Carston 1996: 11).

To be more precise, Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) idea was that the speaker aims at optimal relevance not at literal truth and, generally speaking, a degree of looseness is always expected. Here, another idea is important (the one that has not been abandoned), that there is no discontinuity between loose uses of language, approximation, hyperbole, metonymy and metaphor, as in all these cases the propositional the form of the utterance is different from that of the thought that is represented (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 235–237) .<sup>21</sup> What makes

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<sup>21</sup> The view of metaphor in relevance theory can be compared and contrasted with the view held in cognitive linguistics. Although this topic by far exceeds the domain of our research, at least it deserves a mention. A good starting point could be Wilson’s (2011) discussion of the parallels and differences in the treatment of metaphor in these two approaches. First of all, both approaches abandon the traditional view of metaphor as a departure from the norm of literalness. Second, they both reject the Conduit metaphor, and adopt the inferential approach to communication. But cognitive linguistics sees the pervasiveness of metaphor as a result of pervasiveness in thought, or pre-existing domain mappings, and, therefore, metaphors are taken to have roots primarily in cognition, rather than communication. According to relevance theory, metaphors arise primarily in linguistic communication, and they are the result of the property of language relevance theorists call *loose use*. There is a continuum of cases between literal talk, loose talk, hyperbole and metaphor, none of which is by all means a reflection of conceptual mapping. Thoughts themselves need not be metaphorical, and domain mappings may be the result of repeated use of linguistic metaphors, not the essential basis for the production of metaphors. Finally, in relevance theory, understanding utterances relies on special-purpose inferential procedures that are applicable only in communication. This research relies on relevance theory as concealing euphemisms are seen as the result of the mapping between conceptual domains into a pattern where the connection between the two domains is difficult to recognize to various degrees (bearing in mind that the network of connections among concepts can be very complex). For a cognitive analysis of euphemisms in political discourse, see Moritz (2015), whose research led to the conclusion that conceptual metonymy is the cognitive mechanism prevailing in the topics related to *war*, *army*, *soldiers* and *death* in political discourse in English language (in the speeches

the speaker decide on a more or less literal use are logical and contextual (weak or strong) implications s/he wants to communicate. The more implicatures we can derive, the more creative the metaphor and the greater the hearer's responsibility in deriving implicatures, and sometimes the relevance of the utterance consists only in deriving weak implicatures. And, it is possible to derive many implicatures as loose use by default means that the original lexical concept offers more information than needed (Carston 1996: 9).

Carston (1996) criticizes the asymmetrical approach to two local pragmatic processes of enrichment and loosening, where the former contributes to the truth-conditional content and the latter does not affect truth-conditions, but is only in relation of interpretive resemblance with the encoded concept. As Yus (1999: 493), following Carston (1996), suggests, several pragmatic approaches are necessary to come to a proposition which can be communicated as an explicature or be used to derive implicatures: reference assignment, disambiguation, both enrichment and loosening. However, the explicature (the proposition expressed) may not give us information that agrees with the principle of relevance (Yus 1999: 489), or, in other words, the relevant interpretation may not be the development of the logical form. Carston (1996: 13) even wonders if pragmatics really needs the notion of the truth-conditional content of the utterance, as the proper domain of a truth-conditional semantic theory are thoughts/assumptions (or their propositional forms). For example, when we use the metaphor in "*We have the best hammer*" (Obama: 28 May 2014), we may say that this is true or not true, or loosely true; but what seems to be an even more plausible interpretation is that there is simply no complete proposition that the hearer should recover, and that only a propositional schema with reference "*We have the best...*" is formed, which is the basis for deriving implicatures. Explicatures are then indeterminate because we do not know which concept exactly the hearer will construct by using the lexical concept (Carston 1996: 28), and, in the case of concealing euphemisms, this is obvious. The construction of the concept is the hearer's responsibility, and, because concepts are less strongly communicated, explicatures, just like implicatures have different degrees of indeterminacy (Carston 1996: 28).

To contribute to the discussion of the treatment of the complementary pragmatic processes of enrichment and loosening, we present Noveck and Spotorno's (2013) view of metaphors as combining both broadening and narrowing. Namely, Noveck and Spotorno (2013: 18–20) begin with the relevance theoretic position that metaphors are not violations of

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delivered by two American presidents, George W. Bush and Barack Obama), and the second most prevailing cognitive mechanism is conceptual metaphor.

literalness, but are based on the inferential process that includes combining the input with the contextual information in order to come to a relevant interpretation, and ad hoc concept construction is the important part of this processing. Noveck and Spotorno do say that metaphors can be understood as instances of concept broadening, because we do add new descriptive features to the concept that is processed (for example, when we say that LEAKING is a metaphor for STEALING by relating the features such as “losing contents”, “unintentional”, and we create a metaphorical concept LEAKING\* (different from the concept LEAKING) that is broader because it now includes descriptive features of STEALING. However, narrowing occurs at the same time, because the concept LEAKING is narrowed in the sense that it retains the relevant features of LEAKING and abandons the irrelevant ones (this process, as the authors explain, can be understood as related to a set of propositions). To sum up, metaphors can be considered as instances of broadening because they subsume the categories that have shared diagnostic features; on the other hand, narrowing implies separating relevant features from irrelevant ones in relation to the concept.

Lexical broadening also includes metonymies. Wilson and Carston (2007: 37) conclude that generally, metonymies are cases of lexical broadening based on ad hoc concept construction, but there may be cases which are not easily classified as narrowings or broadenings (they can be classified as a combination of narrowing and broadening). This dilemma whether to relate metonymies to narrowing or broadening is similar too to the dilemma about different views regarding metaphor as cases of narrowing or cases of broadening.

A possible solution to the dilemma regarding whether metaphors should be regarded as cases of narrowing or broadening may be found in Prčić's (2008a: 293–298) more elaborate classification of the types of lexical meaning adjustment (the original term for adjustment is [razrešenje]). Here, metaphors and metonymies are a specific type of polysemy.

According to the author, pragmatic meaning specification begins with a) reference assignment (when a word/expression is paired with an extra-linguistic entity); and b) local adjustment, which involves inference (based on linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts). There are two types of local adjustment, basic adjustment (conventionalized and non-conventionalized form-meaning pairings) and additional adjustment (modulation and modification). Basic adjustment includes reconstruction and construction:

a) Reconstruction

- motivated (polysemy)
  - linear polysemy (narrowing and broadening)
  - metaphor and metonymy
- unmotivated (homonymy)
  - complete homonymy
  - partial homonymy

b) Construction

Furthermore, additional adjustment includes modulation and modification:

a) Modulation

- Osvetljavanje [Highlighting]
- Uoštravanje [Foregrounding]

b) Modification

- Pojačavanje [Strengthening]
- Slabljenje [Weakening]
- Obrtanje [Reversing]

Reconstruction, the first type of basic meaning adjustment, refers to conventionalized, well-established senses. This inferential process contributes to the reconstruction of the intended meaning by eliminating inappropriate semantic features, and by selecting pragmatically/contextually appropriate features.<sup>22</sup> In relation to this, Prčić (2008b: 50–68) argues that the sense of a lexeme is determined on the basis of descriptive features, which can be defined as distinctive features of extralinguistic entities relevant in making semantic contrasts between lexemes. However, there is a difference between semantically relevant features, or *diagnostic features*, and semantically less relevant features, or *non-diagnostic features*. This means that, in communication, using a specific lexeme equals to using a specific set of diagnostic features.

Motivated linear polysemy includes narrowing/specifying a more restricted meaning (from a superordinate to a subordinate concept/denotation; for example, the word CONFLICT is already a conventionalized euphemism for WAR), or broadening/extending meaning from a

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<sup>22</sup> Likewise, Eco (1979: 23) suggests that readers *blow up* certain properties and *narcotize* some others in the process of semantic disclosure related to lexemes stored in our mental encyclopedia.

more restricted to a more inclusive meaning. Also, polysemy includes metaphorical meanings (metaphorical mappings involve similarities between two unrelated conceptual domains, for example TO GREASE for TO BRIBE) and metonymical meanings (which involve contiguity of two entities belonging to the same conceptual domain, such as STATE for GOVERNMENT/CABINET/CABINET MEMBERS). As previously stated, Wilson and Carston (2007: 5–15) classify metaphor and metonymy as instances of concept broadening, and in Prčić's classification, metaphors and metonymies are treated as a separate (but closely related to linear polysemy) class of motivated meaning reconstruction.

Unmotivated reconstruction refers to i) complete homonymy, which is the case when two different unrelated meanings have the same phonological and graphological realizations, and to ii) partial homonymy, when different unrelated meanings are realized by either phonologically (homophony) or graphologically (homography) identical forms. In the corpus, cases of complete homonymy have been identified: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE is a concealing euphemism for MILITARY ACTION in the British corpus, and, in all three corpora VANISH/DISAPPEAR is used for STEAL (also, this can be interpreted as a cause-effect metonymy, and this is examined in the corpus analysis).

Unlike reconstruction, which refers to conventionalized well-established senses (different types of polysemy and homonymy), construction is the second type of the basic meaning adjustment the inferential process of meaning derivation which, as the name suggests, results in the construction of concepts which have not yet become conventionalized senses. These are the senses that, if they are used frequently and systematically, can in time become conventionalized, otherwise they can be treated as only occasion-specific, ad hoc senses. Prčić uses examples from the register related to cutting edge technologies, but, it is not only the language of high technologies that develops new senses. Concealing euphemisms related to social actor and social action representation can also go a long way from ad hoc constructions to well-established categories.

Additional adjustment, the second type of local adjustment, refers to non-conventionalized, pragmatically inferred meanings, where certain parts of the referent are (metaphorically) brought into focus. There are two types of additional adjustment: a) modulation – highlighting (the original term is [osvetljavanje]) and foregrounding (the original term is [uoštavanje]); also, b) modification – strengthening, weakening and reversing (the original terms are [pojačavanje], [slabljenje] and [obrtnje]). Highlighting, the first type of modulation, involves directing inference towards certain descriptive features of the referent, thus leaving other descriptive features less conspicuous. For example, COUNTRY

can be used to denote all citizens, the government, the party, the prime minister, leaders, and in all likelihood, here it denotes the Tories (and the prime minister), as Ed Miliband is a member of the Labour Party:

(1) Strip away all of the sound and fury and what people across Scotland, England and Wales, across nation of the United Kingdom are saying is that this country doesn't care about me. Politics doesn't listen. The economy doesn't work. And they're right. But this Labour Party has a plan to put it right.

(Ed Miliband: Leader's speech, Manchester, 23 September 2014)<sup>23</sup>

Foregrounding, the second type of modulation involves a similar case of directing inference towards an aspect of meaning that becomes more prominent, foregrounded. In collocations, for example, different parts of the referent are foregrounded. Finally, these two types of modulation can be defined as non-conventionalized metonymies.

Modification, the second type of additional adjustment can be realized as strengthening, weakening and reversing. The first type of modification is strengthening, which refers to adding descriptive features, so the meaning becomes more specified. The second type of modification, weakening, involves deducing descriptive features, so the meaning is weaker/looser. Finally, the third type, reversing, implies replacing descriptive features with the ones that are opposite in meaning.

Both the relevance theoretic treatment of concept construction and Prčić's elaborate taxonomy of pragmatic meaning adjustment account for the possibilities in which concealing euphemisms can remain concealed. To avoid directness, it is safe to use words/expressions whose meaning specification is pragmatically inferred and contextually-bound, and although concealing euphemisms can be exposed and in time become conventionalized, this does not have to happen. Besides, concealing euphemisms can move from ad hoc construction to conventionalization without precise denotation. For example, in the Serbian corpus, concealing euphemisms related to social actors KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman], and NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres] are already well-known, but they still lack precise denotation. Also, a conventionalized euphemism, e.g.

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<sup>23</sup> The speech is a criticism of the Tory leadership led by David Cameron, which, according to the speaker, did not result in an economy that benefits all citizens, but in a Tory economy, an economy that benefits only the few (THE FEW as a concealing euphemism is included in the corpus analysis). Therefore, the word COUNTRY does not denote all citizens, but only those criticized for bad leadership, i.e. the government and the prime minister.



COLLATERAL DAMAGE, can be used as a euphemism, but it can also be used in a context which does not have to have extremely negative connotations. The parallel existence of different senses sometimes makes it difficult to prove that a concealing euphemism is a concealing euphemism as it equals to showing what mental representation the speaker has when he uses/utters a word/expression.

#### 2.5.7.7. Context

As relevance theory is a theory of particularized conversational implicatures emphasizing the all-important role of context in deriving implicatures, the notion of context deserves more attention. Language is a tool for gaining information, and only if we rely on the context of the existing assumptions used in processing the inputs can we accept or reject a word/expression as euphemistic. Generally speaking, context refers to “the relevant elements of the surrounding linguistic and nonlinguistic structures in relation to an uttered expression under consideration” (Quasthoff 2001: 218). In a specific sense, the role of context cannot be properly understood without introducing context for the notion of context. Here, the specific sense of the notion of context is based on relevance theory.

Sperber and Wilson (1995: 15–16) define context as the set of premises we use in the interpretation of an utterance. Context is closely related to the notion of cognitive environment, discussed in Section 2.5.7.3. and defined as a set of facts manifest to an individual (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 38–39). Relevance theory puts forward a psychologically realistic account of communication (Allott 2011: 1), so context as well is a psychological construct, and it refers to a subset of assumptions the hearer uses to make sense of the speaker’s utterances. The word subset means that context is based on cognitive environment, selected and constructed dynamically on and for a specific occasion. It is not confined to the information about the immediate environment, and the immediate co-text, but it also includes all the information stored in our minds, such as scientific hypothesis, religious beliefs, memories, cultural assumptions.

The central question related to context selection is how we create an appropriate context out of this repository of diverse information and experiences. As Sperber and Wilson (1995: 16) point out, if we belong to the same linguistic community, we rely on the same language in addition to relying on the same inferential abilities, but we do not rely on the same assumptions about the world: grammar is a force which neutralizes differences in storing experiences but cognition works in the opposite direction, it stores inevitable

differences in our experiences. For that reason, the speaker takes into consideration that the hearer is in a position to construct such a context that will lead him/her to the intended interpretation. The logical conclusion is that this leaves the speaker in a position to control and manipulate context selection, which is exactly what s/he does when concealing euphemisms are used. To use the relevance-theoretic notion of mutual cognitive environment, where every manifest (mentally accessible) assumption is mutually manifest, the control of context selection would refer to avoiding mutually manifest assumptions. The hearer then, in order to disclose the manipulation, has a different inferential path to follow, as the less accessible contextual assumptions are, the more effort is needed to retrieve the information the speaker would prefer to hide.

To illustrate what this means, we introduce the notion of explicature:

A proposition communicated by an utterance is an explicature if and only if it is a development of a logical form encoded by the utterance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 182, Sperber and Wilson 2005: 366).

The degree of explicitness is in the speaker's hands. It is up to the speaker to make an utterance more or less explicit, and when a concealing euphemism is used instead of a direct word/expression which carries more negative connotations, the inferential path is obviously influenced:

Degrees of explicitness: the greater the relative contribution of decoding, and the smaller the relative contribution of pragmatic inference, the more explicit an explicature will be (and inversely). (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 182, Sperber and Wilson 2005: 367).

On the other end of the spectrum, the lower the degree of explicitness, the greater the responsibility of the hearer for interpreting the utterance. But this does not have to be a problem at all, because, as Campbell (1992: 149–150) argues, there are no limits to context, and only the principle of relevance guides us in our inferencing towards whatever conclusions we can make, and conclusions are contextual effects, or synthetic inferences that change our cognitive environment. The processing leads to the multiplication effect, and the greater the multiplication effect, the greater the relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 48). In rhetorical theory, multiple interpretations are a common occurrence, as they provide multiple responses (Campbell 1992: 150).

Explicatures are constructed by means of both decoding and inferencing, and in deciphering words/expressions as euphemistic, inferencing, decoding and context selection

happen simultaneously. For instance, the euphemism INTERVENTION is an expression whose denotation depends on specifying descriptive features relevant for a specific context (the more abstract the word/expression, the more descriptive features we need to specify its denotation). There can be a variety of interventions, and the context, which includes the co-text and all the assumptions related to all the contextual and co-textual cues join together in recovering the meaning of the uttered word/expression. This can imply a lot of inferencing, a lot of deduction which leads us to analytic (related to the logical content of the word) and synthetic implications (related to the encyclopaedic information).

The notion of explicature is closely related to the notion of implicature. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 194–195) define implicature in the following way:

An implicature is a contextual assumption or implication which a speaker, intending her utterance to be manifestly relevant, manifestly intended to make manifest to the hearer.

The authors further suggest that there are two types of implicatures, *implicated premises* and *implicated conclusions*. The former must be supplied by the hearer, either from the hearer's memory, or by means of the hearer's constructions of implicated premises on the basis of assumption schemas retrieved from memory. The latter, *implicated conclusions*, are deduced from explicatures and the context.

According to Sperber and Wilson (1995: 197–199), implicatures can vary in strength; this means that some implicatures are so strongly manifest that the hearer cannot avoid them, but some are weakly manifest, so the derivation of implicatures is the hearer's, rather than the speaker's responsibility. Implicatures, therefore, can be broadly classified into strong implicatures, which the hearer is strongly encouraged to derive, and weak implicatures, which are not made manifest. The more implicatures the hearer can derive, the weaker the implicature. Sperber and Wilson (1995: 199) argue that it is possible for the hearer to receive no encouragement in deriving any premises or conclusions, which means that it is the hearer's responsibility only to derive implicatures.

#### 2.5.7.8. Irony

The reason for discussing irony in this research is simple. Some of the words/expressions that can be identified as concealing euphemisms can be treated as ironical uses of language. For example, GIFT can be interpreted as the ironical use of the concealing

euphemisms for BRIBE, where the intended effect is criticism, and the possibility to treat GIFT as the ironical concealing euphemism is explained in the following section:

(2) Mr. McDonnell can dodge accountability, but his damage-control campaign speaks louder than his words. On Tuesday he announced that he would return a number of gifts which, though he failed to specify them, presumably will cover goodies that he and his wife received from businessman Jonnie R. Williams Sr. Those include a \$6,500 Rolex; \$15,000 to cover part of a catering bill for the wedding of his daughter; and another \$15,000 run up by Mrs. McDonnell, on Mr Williams's tab, at Bergdorf Goodman, the New York luxury department store.

(The Post's view, Editorial Board: The evasive Mr. McDonnell, *The Washington Post*, 31 July 2013)

Irony is one of the pet topics in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1981, Sperber and Wilson 1995, Sperber and Wilson 1998b, Wilson 2006, Wilson 2014, Wilson and Sperber 1992, Wilson and Sperber 2012). Traditionally, an ironical utterance is analyzed as literally saying one thing and figuratively meaning the opposite (Sperber and Wilson 1981: 295, Wilson and Sperber 1992: 53). Colston and Gibbs (2007: 4) speak about two types of irony that need to be reanalyzed: verbal irony, saying something opposite to what is meant, and situational irony, where a situation in the world is contradictory. As they explain, the problem with verbal irony is that it is rarely clear what the opposite of literal meaning is, and what literal meaning is (though it is true that irony in some cases implies the oppositeness in meaning). As far as situational irony is concerned, there are many cases of situational irony that do not fit the definition of a contradiction (e.g. hypocrisy, counterfactuals).

Relevance theory abandons the traditional approach to irony in favour of an approach where irony is thought as “echoing a thought (e.g. a belief, an intention, a norm-based expectation), attributed to an individual, a group, or to people in general, and expressing a mocking, skeptical or critical attitude to this thought (Wilson and Sperber 2012: 4–5)”. Wilson and Sperber (1992: 296–297) avoid explaining irony as figurative meaning, and as a substitution mechanism, either pragmatic (Grice's analysis of irony in relation to conversational implicatures), or semantic (traditional account). They argue that there is a semantic condition for an utterance to be ironical, and, that ironical utterances include not only propositions, but also attitudes. In contrast, metaphors do not express such attitudes (Wilson and Sperber 2012: 7–10), and metaphors, unlike irony, does not have a special characteristic voice (this research does not rely on audio sources, so voice is not taken into

account). So, irony can imply that the speaker believes the opposite of what was said, but this is not the meaning and neither is it the point of the utterance (Wilson and Sperber 2012: 5). Wilson and Sperber (2012: 8) speak about the notion of normative bias, which is the assumption that irony emphasizes that situations, events, and performances do not live up to certain norm-based expectations. Irony is used to criticize, and it is used to praise and indicate that a proposition is false only under special circumstances. In the quoted example, this would mean that behind GIFT, the replacement of the word with negative connotations with the concealing euphemism with neutral connotations is a type of oppositeness, but what matters is the author's attitude towards the proposition expressed.

Wilson and Sperber (2012: 10–11) see irony as a type of echoic use of language, and echoic use is defined as “a subtype of attributive use in which the speaker's primary intention is not to provide information about the content of an attributed thought, but to convey her own attitude or reaction to that thought”. To put it simply, verbal irony involves the expression of attitude to the attributed thought. The concealing euphemism GIFT can be understood as echoic use language, and this is corroborated by the fact that the euphemism is used in-between quotation marks:

(3) The governor said he did not know about ‘some of the gifts’ at the time they were given.

(Not, presumably, the Rolex on his wrist.) He said he would return whatever ‘I have received.’ ”

(The Post's view, Editorial Board: The evasive Mr. McDonnell, *The Washington Post*, 31 July 2013)

This is indirect reported speech which informs us about the content of an attributed thought. The setting off of some of the gifts and I have received with inverted commas indicates the speaker's (the journalist's) attitude towards the attributed thought, i.e. the parts of the proposition that is separated with inverted commas (this will be reanalyzed in relation to the use/mention distinction). In relation to this, Wilson and Sperber (2012: 12) explain that the most easily identified instances of echoic use are the ones that express the speaker's attitude to a thought explicitly expressed in the preceding utterance. However, it is important to say that an indirect report does not have to be identical in content to the attributed utterance; echoic utterances, in that way, only resemble the original utterance/thought, which is enough to inform the reader about the relevant aspects of the content (Wilson and Sperber 2012: 15).

Now, what sets verbal irony apart from other types of echoic use is that the attitudes are based on the *dissociative range*, i.e. the speaker rejects the attributed thought as completely false/inadequate; at the same time, dissociative attitudes can differ along the range of intensity, from resignation to outrage, (in other types of echoic use, the speaker can accept the proposition) (Wilson and Sperber 2012: 13–16). In this case, the dissociative attitude can be interpreted as the rejection of the use of GIFT and the negative attitude towards the governor’s positive attitude to receiving bribe and naming it as a GIFT. As bribery illegal, it is a clear case of breaking norms existing in the society. It is thus not surprising to use irony as a strategy for criticizing and complaining since norms, as Wilson and Sperber (2012: 35) explain, are always prone to being ironically echoed when they are not respected.

The notion of *echoic use* of language is related to the distinction drawn in philosophy between the *use* and *mention* of an expression. *Use* of an expression is reference to what the expression refers to; *mention* is the self-referential use of words or other linguistic expressions (Sperber and Wilson 1981: 303, Wilson and Sperber 1992: 57). In natural languages, mentions can have many forms, some of which fall between use and mention. For example, in the previous section, the expression “some of the gifts” was analyzed as *echoic* use of language, and as announced, this example is reanalyzed. The expression is used as part of reported speech (the above-mentioned example). The quotation marks (here the ones separating “*some of the gifts*”) are used to differentiate mention from use (Wilson and Sperber 1992: 58), so the expression “some of the gifts” is an example of *mention*. When we compare the original content with the reported speech, we can say that the proposition is the *mention* in the reported speech, but not the reported speech itself. In that sense, there is a difference between the *mention* of the sentence and the *mention* of the proposition (Wilson and Sperber 1992: 59). As further explained, indirect quotations can be used for two purposes, reporting and echoing. The former refers to providing the content of the speech, and the latter to expressing the speaker’s attitude towards the content. The focus on “some of the gifts” may be interpreted as the speaker’s ironical focus, a way of distancing from the governor’s original words. The original words “some of the gifts” are echoic.

Wilson and Sperber (1992: 64–65) later replace the notion of *mention* with the notion of interpretive resemblance (sharing of logical and contextual implications), which explains that an object can represent another object it resembles, and even literal representations are types of interpretive resemblance. Such resemblances can be used for two things: to inform the audience of the properties of the original and to express an attitude.

Finally, it is suggested that there is no norm of literal truthfulness and any utterance can be understood in two ways: to express the speaker's opinion, and to echo or report an opinion attributed to someone else, and it is up to the hearer to decide which one is more plausible (Wilson and Sperber 1992: 62). Of course, there is always a possibility for the hearer to fail to recognize irony, or read irony into the text, and this is so because communication involves inference, which is non-demonstrative. However, if the principle of relevance is the principle that guides our inference, irony may as well be the most relevant interpretation when a concealing euphemism is used.

#### 2.5.7.9. Problems with explicature and implicature derivation

After all the main theoretical notions in relevance theory are discussed, it is good to summarize the problems that can appear in explicature and implicature derivation in general, and in relation to concealing euphemisms in particular. First, Yus (1999: 502–510) speaks about four types of possible problems in explicature derivation, and this is relevant for our research as concealing euphemisms realized as words are part of the logical form that should be developed into an explicature:

1a) *non-understanding*: cases of noise in communication and any similar problems that hinder intelligibility, as well as lack of linguistic competence; this type is not relevant for the research as these are cases of *non-understanding*, rather than misunderstanding;

1b) *non-understanding*: lack of required encyclopaedic knowledge, specific jargon, for example, in conversations between experts and layman; this second subtype of *non-understanding* may appear relevant in our analysis, as the speaker may excuse himself/herself for using concealing euphemisms on the grounds of ignorance regarding the circumstances which lead to the use of a proper expression.

2) The second possible source of misunderstanding is *puzzled understanding*, which involves cases where a strongly believed contextual assumption obstructs the optimal processing of explicature. This type of misunderstanding points out that contextual assumptions strongly influence the derivation of explicatures.

3) The third type is *alternative understanding*. The third type involves cases when, after going through the processes of reference assignment, disambiguation, etc. a wrong (or maybe just different) set of contextual assumptions and logical implications leads the hearer to

predict that the speaker wants to communicate an alternative explicature. This arises from different contextual and logical implications of the words and sentences that we are using. There are two subtypes to this third case of misunderstanding:

a) The mapping between the public and mental lexicons is different for different people, which, for one more time brings to the fore the problem of the fuzziness of concepts; concealing euphemisms can always rely on this alleged difference;

b) Clash existing between the fact that sentences can have different semantic readings/ logical implications/cases of contextual underdeterminacy. This may be related to polysemy, and the problem may be resolved by relying on more accessible assumptions.

4) The fourth type is another type of alternative understanding, and this type also carries a lot of explanatory potential in this research. It describes cases when the hearer is not satisfied with the information that the proposition expressed provides, and searches for extra contextual assumptions in order to reach a more relevant interpretation. In other words, the hearer understands the *intended explicature* as an *unintended implicature*. This includes cases such as criticism and irony.

As far as implicatures are concerned, the classification is similar to the one related to explicatures (Yus 1999: 510–513):

1) The first type refers to cases of *non-understanding* arising from the problems already discussed in connection with the cases of explicature.

2) The second type, *puzzled understanding*, differs from the same type of misunderstanding regarding explicatures. Here, the hearer may not be in a position to reach the implicature of the utterance as s/he cannot access the contextual assumption/s without which it is not possible to recover the implicit interpretation, and the result is *missing implicature*. This means that the speaker can make certain assumptions “mutually manifest” in implicit communication (Yus 1999: 511), but that can fail when the hearer’s encyclopaedic knowledge does not lead us to the proper contextual assumption, or we simply do not have the required assumptions. As far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, the speaker uses words/expressions for naming entities and situations in a way that can lead the hearer to wrong contextual assumptions, or wrong premisses which may, eventually, lead to wrong



contextual implications and effects. All in all, there is always a possibility to miss implicatures when vague language is used.

3) The third subtype refers to cases when erroneous assumptions lead us to alternative understanding. This is common in metaphors, whose weak implicatures are up to the hearer to construct.

4) Finally, the fourth type is the type of alternative understanding which refers to cases when the hearer stops the interpretation at the level of explicature, as s/he may be satisfied with its relevance. A further search for the contextual assumptions that will lead to implicatures is stopped. Irony belongs to this group of alternative understanding, where the recovery of (implicit) irony requires the identification of the incompatibility among contextual assumptions. As opposed to the corresponding problem related to explicatures, here, the hearer will turn the *intended implicature* into an *unintended explicature*. For example, the ironical use of GIFT (meaning BRIBE) can actually be understood as belonging to the level of explicature and, therefore, the hearer may fail to understand it as irony.

## 2.6. Discourse analysis

### 2.6.1. Introduction

In this thesis, concealing euphemisms are related to strategies for social actor and social action representation provided by Van Leeuwen (2008: 23–74). The analysis of concealing euphemisms in relation with these discursive strategies is important as it shows that particular ways of constructing and representing social actors can be used to hide the identity and the actions talked about. Before these strategies are presented, the notions of discourse, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis are briefly examined.

### 2.6.2. Discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis

To start with, discourse analysis refers to a range of interdisciplinary approaches which study discourse, roughly defined as a “particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 1). Formally speaking, discourse analysis studies suprasentential structural units, but, it is much more than that:

Discourse analytical approaches take as their starting point the claim of structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic philosophy, that our access to reality is always through language. With language, we create representations of reality that are never mere reflections of a pre-existing reality but contribute to constructing reality. That does not mean that reality itself does not exist. Meanings and representations are real. Physical objects also exist, but they only gain meaning through discourse.

(Jorgensen and Phillips 2002: 8–9).

Viewed in such a comprehensive way, no wonder there have been so many different types of discourse analyses. However, Jorgensen and Phillips (2002: 3–4) insist that discourse analysis cannot be used with all theoretical frameworks as it cannot be separated from its theoretical and methodological foundations. In their approaches, they argue that discourse analysis is not just a method for data analysis, but a theoretical and methodological whole, which they metaphorically label as a “package”. The authors suggest that such a package is the one that has, first of all, philosophical (ontological and epistemological) positions, theoretical models, methodological guidelines and specific techniques for analysis.

So, in order to make a “package” for this research where the key notions are *concealing euphemisms* and *public discourse*, we also need to take a proper theoretical/methodological position. By saying that “many disciplines in the humanities and social sciences have witnessed a *critical turn*”, Kubota (2012: 90) draws attention to the qualification “critical”. Fairclough (1995: 28) distinguishes critical from descriptive goals in discourse analysis in his attempt to show how the orderliness (i.e. that things are as one would expect them normally to be) of communication relies on taken-for-granted “background knowledge” (cf. relevance-theoretic term “cognitive environment”) and how background knowledge absorbs “naturalized” ideological representations which are seen as non-ideological “common sense”. The transition from a purely descriptive way to a critical turn means “connecting the word with the world, [...] recognizing language as ideology, not just a system” (Kumaravadivelu 2006: 70, from Kubota 2012: 90) and taking into account social, political and cultural aspects of communication.

The failure to make this transition from a purely descriptive to a critical level may have been the reason for Harris’s (1952) ‘Discourse Analysis’ to be called “disappointing (Coulthard 1985: 3)”. However, the descriptive level of analysis should not be deserted. That description is important, and it is implied in the relation of CDA to critical linguistics (CL). CL, frequently used interchangeably with CDA (Wodak 2011b: 50), may be the nomination

that more strongly suggests the link that CDA has with linguistics. This is important in general and for this thesis in particular, because it invites the question: “what kind of linguistics is best adapted to its claim to seriously describe linguistic material and link it with the domain of the social (Chilton and Wodak 2005: xiv)?” To this question, Chilton and Wodak (2005: xiv) reply that Hallidayan systemic-functional grammar is preferred to generative linguistics, which is a useful tool for description. In addition, it is suggested that it is necessary to rely on other approaches which deal with aspects of human and social cognition, as well as on new developments in pragmatics, including relevance theory and discourse processing model. Needless to say, this research accepts this suggestion in its attempt to make a research project that unites relevance theory, discourse analysis and CDA (based on Hallidayan systemic-functional grammar).

Critical linguistics (Fowler et al. 1979, eds.) relies on systemic-functional grammar, a model of linguistic description aimed at providing an account of how language is used in communication (Baker and Ellece 2011: 146). Halliday and Matthiessen’s (1999: 3–4) grammar is systemic, which is one of the class of functional grammars, which are semantically motivated, contrary to formal grammars that are autonomous and semantically arbitrary. Semantic, not only formal and lexicogrammatical dimensions are important. This is the basic assumption in our research; the study of concealing euphemisms as a theoretical concept is possible only if such an approach is accepted. This is because formal aspects of language can be studied formally; when we enter deep waters of multidimensional aspects of meaning (which are definitely present in concealing euphemisms, as they include lexico-semantic, lexical pragmatic, and discursive issues), there is no way we can get round the complexity of concealing euphemisms unless we replace the one-dimensional structural methodology with the three-dimensional methodology that takes into account different metafunctions of language/grammar. Everything that goes beyond the level of structural issues (we can always remember Harris’s (1952) failure to study discourse due to the wrong methodology) must have its adequate methodology and its adequate metalanguage.

Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 7–8, 511–512) explain that there are three functions of the linguistic system, and they are called metafunctions (and they are both grammatical and semantic): ideational (experiential and logical), interpersonal and textual. The ideational metafunction refers to interpreting and construing our experience (the experiential metafunction refers to the representation of processes, and the logical is the one that represents the relation between one process and another). The interpersonal metafunction sees grammar as a construction of interpersonal/social relations. Finally, the textual metafunction

deals with organizing ideational and interpersonal meaning. It is the basis and the materialization of the working of the other two metafunctions; the textual metafunction construes reality, becomes a world in its own right, and, at the same time, becomes part of the reality it construes.

The textual metafunction is important when concealing euphemisms are examined. Critical discourse analysis (CDA, or CDS, critical discourse studies) is a type of discourse analysis that studies “the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context (Van Dijk 2001: 352–353)”. On the other hand, power does not always have to be negative, and there is a branch of CDA (Martin and Rose 2003, Martin 2004) that stresses the fact that CDA does not always deal with exposing hidden unequal power relations (Baker and Ellece 2011: 94). This contrast makes it clear which type of power this research analyzes.

What sets CDA apart from other approaches is that it offers another perspective of theorizing and analyzing, a perspective where the researcher is aware of his/her social role. The basic principles behind CDA are (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271–80):

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action

CDA begins with a set of questions to be examined and, therefore, it cannot rely on one theoretical framework. CDA has many different realizations, but, what is common to all of them is that it is “a problem-oriented interdisciplinary research programme, subsuming a variety of approaches, each with different theoretical models, research methods and agendas. What unites them is a shared interest in the semiotic dimensions of power, identity politics and political-economic or cultural change in society (Wodak 2011a: 38) ”.

Critical discourse analysis recognizes the potential of the idea that grammar has its role in the ideological, context-dependent analyses. For example, the use of passive structures and nominalizations, metaphors, argumentative strategies, can be ideologically motivated.

Consequently, CDA assumes the position that the formal level of description cannot be deserted, so it develops a three-dimensional approach of discourse study (Fairclough 1989: 26):

- Description, the analysis of the formal properties;
- Interpretation, where the text is seen as the product of a process of production and a resource for interpretation;
- Explanation, the relationship between interaction and social context.<sup>24</sup>

In this analysis of concealing euphemisms in public discourse, we rely on the first two stages of CDA, description and interpretation, in order to secure transparency and retrodution of the analysis (Wodak 2011a: 52). The third level of analysis, explanation, is not included in our research as the relationship between “the discursive processes and the social processes (Fairclough 1995: 97)” is far more from what is encompassed by this research. But, what matters is that critical discourse analysis recognizes the potential of the idea that grammar has its role in the ideological, context-dependent analyses. For example, the use of passive structures and nominalization, metaphors, argumentative fallacies, rhetorical devices, presuppositions can have their ideological grounds (Wodak 2011a: 42). In other words, it is important to realize “that in the production of the utterance there is something that ‘does not go by itself’, that is not automatic or transparent in the language” (Johansson and Suomela-Salmi 2011: 92). In this research, description refers to the formal classification of concealing euphemisms. It is followed by the analysis of lexico-semantic and lexical pragmatic mechanisms that can be involved in the construction of concealing euphemisms, which can then answer the questions such as: why is a specific concealing euphemism used?

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<sup>24</sup> In addition to Fairclough’s (1989) three-partite model of CDA sometimes referred to as textually oriented discourse analysis or TODA (Baker and Ellece 2011: 167), Baker and Ellece (2011: 26) give a list of many other approaches to CDA: discourse-historical approach/discourse based social research (based on argumentation theory) (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44–45), the approach that focuses on social actor representation (Van Leeuwen 1996, 1997, 2008), the one that focuses on socio-cognitive approach (Van Dijk 1998, 2001), the one put forward by Jäger (2001), who uses theoretical and methodological aspects of Foucauldian (1972, 1984) critical discourse analysis with dispositive analysis, the approach that integrates cognitive linguistics and CDA (Hart and Luke 2007), the model of the interpretation stage of CDA that combines connectionism, cognitive linguistics, inferencing and relevance theory (O’Halloran 2003), and, lastly, CDA combined with corpus linguistics methods, or corpus-assisted discourse studies (Baker 2006, Partington 2004).

### 2.6.3. Discursive strategies

In their discourse analysis of discriminatory practices, Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 44)<sup>25</sup> define discursive strategies as systematic ways of using language, or “a more or less accurate and more or less intentional plan of practices (including discursive practices) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim”. There is a difference between argumentation ready for rational negotiation and argumentation as its strategical perversion, i.e. manipulation (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 70). In order to understand why discursive strategies are used, we can rely on the relevance-theoretic notion of “effect”, i.e. from the question “What effects can I achieve by saying this?” This is in line with Van Leeuwen’s (2008: 3) discussion of Weber’s (1977) term “rationalization”, a form of social organization where social action is not about meaning, values and beliefs, but about effects and purposes. Therefore, as Van Leeuwen explains, no wonder social action is proceduralized; there is no consensual representation that is a force of cohesion in society, but there are procedures through which we interact.

When used in argumentation, concealing euphemisms can be seen as belonging to the group of fallacies of linguistic confusion (Damer 2009: 54). These are the fallacies characterized by some lack of clarity in the meaning of a key word or phrase used in the premise of an argument.<sup>26</sup> More precisely, concealing euphemisms can be viewed as cases of *misuse of a vague expression* and *distinction without a difference*. *Misuse of a vague expression* is defined as “attempting to establish a position by means of a vague expression or

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<sup>25</sup> Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001: 44–45) classification includes five types of discursive strategies. The first type includes intensifying/mitigation strategies which help modify the epistemic status of a proposition by intensifying or reducing the illocutionary force of utterances. The second type includes referential strategies (nomination strategies), which are used to construct and represent social actors. The third type includes predicational strategies (strategies for assigning qualities), which include attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates, aimed at labeling social actors more or less positively or negatively. The fourth type includes argumentation strategies and a set of *topoi* which justify positive and negative attributions. *Topoi*, or *loci*, are parts of argumentation belonging to explicit or inferable premises (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 74–75), such as *topos* of responsibility, *topos* of authority, *topos* of justice, *topos* of power. Finally, Reisigl and Wodak’s (2001: 44–45) classification includes perspectivation, framing or discourse representation, which is the way speakers express their involvement in discourse and position their view in the reporting, description, narration or quotation.

<sup>26</sup> These are the following fallacies: equivocation, ambiguity, misleading accent, illicit contrast, argument by innuendo, misuse of a vague expression, distinction without a difference (Aristotle 1955: 17–47, Damer 2009: 121–135, Tindale 2007: 67).

drawing an unjustified conclusion as a result of assigning a precise meaning to another's word or phrase that is imprecise in its meaning or range of application (Damer 2009: 131)". *Distinction without a difference* is defined as "attempting to defend an action or position as different from another one, with which it might be confused, by means of a careful distinction of language, when the action or position defended is no different in substance from the one from which it is linguistically distinguished (Damer 2009: 134)".

The next subsection is devoted to different types of social actor and social action representations, which are all regarded as examples of the fallacies of *misuse of a vague expression* (concealing euphemisms are vague expressions) and *distinction without a difference* (concealing euphemisms and non-euphemistic equivalents denote the same entity). The types of social actor and social action representation are taken from Van Leeuwen (2008: 23-74)<sup>27</sup>. Table 2 shows which types of social actor representation are analyzed, and Table 3 shows which types of social action representation are analyzed.

#### 2.6.3.1. Social actor representation

In Table 2, we give a list of the types of social actor representation analyzed in Section 4.5 (based on Van Leeuwen 2008: 23-74):

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<sup>27</sup> Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 54–55) put forward a broad classification of referential (nominational) and predicational strategies. Referential strategies refer to membership categorization devices, including tropes, metaphors, metonymies (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 57–64). Predicational strategies are mostly realized by specific form of reference (explicit denotation and more or less implicit connotation), by attributes (adjectives, appositions, prepositional phrases, relative clauses, conjunctive clauses, infinitive clauses and participial clauses), by predicates or predicative nouns/adjectives/pronouns, by collocations, by explicit comparisons, similes, metaphors and other rhetorical figures (including metonymies, hyperboles, litotes and euphemisms), and implicit allusions, evocations and presuppositions/implications (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 54–55). These classifications are too broad to be encompassed in one research only, and, therefore, we rely on Van Leeuwen's (2008: 23-74) strategies of social actor and social action representation.

TABLE 2: SOCIAL ACTOR REPRESENTATION

<b>Impersonalization</b>
<p>Abstraction</p> <p>Objectivation (four types):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spatialization</li> <li>• Utterance autonomization</li> <li>• Instrumentalization</li> <li>• Somatization</li> </ul>
<b>Personalization</b>
<p>Indetermination</p> <p>Determination (four types):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Differentiation</li> <li>• Categorization (three types): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Functionalization</li> <li>Identification (three types): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Classification</li> <li>Relational identification</li> <li>Physical identification</li> </ul> </li> <li>Appraisalment</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Association</li> </ul>

As far as social actor representation is concerned, this research includes two types of strategies: *impersonalization* and *personalization*. *Impersonalization* is a strategy where social actors are represented by abstract or concrete nouns whose meanings do not have the descriptive feature “human” (Van Leeuwen 2008: 46–47). There are two such strategies: *abstraction* and *objectivation* (*objectivation* has four substrategies). *Abstraction* refers to representing social actors by means of a quality. *Objectivation* is a strategy where social actors are represented by means of a place or a thing associated with that person, or with the action in which the person is involved. *Objectivation* can be realized in four different ways: as *spatialization*, *instrumentalization*, *somatization* and *utterance autonomization*. The first is a common metonymy where a place is used to denote social actors, e.g. COUNTRY (BC). Instrumentalization is a representation by means of the instrument that is used to carry out an action, fore example, “We have the best HAMMER” (Obama, 28 May 2014). In the Serbian corpus, an example of somatization has been found in: Stići će vas naša RUKA [Our



HAND/ARM will get you] (SC: Raković, *Kurir*, 17 November 2012). Van Leeuwen (2008: 47) suggests that this strategy “adds a touch of alienation”, a way to make a distance from the involvement in an activity. *Utterance autonomization* is representation by means of reference to one’s utterance. Van Leeuwen (2008: 46) illustrates this strategy with the nouns such as “the report” (in “the report notes...”), or “the survey” (in “the survey states...”), used instead of nouns that denote specific people. Here, DISINFORMATION (AC) is an illustration of this strategy (this is discussed in the corpus analysis).

*Personalization* can be realized in two ways, as *indetermination* and *determination* (*determination* has four substrategies). The former is a type of strategy where social actors are anonymous, so this type of representation is perfect for concealing. This is, for example, OTHERS (BC). *Determination* is a strategy where social actors are identified (as belonging to different groups), and, in this thesis, three different subtypes of this strategy are analyzed: *differentiation*, *categorization*, and *association*.

First of all, in case of *differentiation*, a social actor or a social group is identified in terms of the difference from another social actor or social group, e.g. THE FEW (AC and BC), ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots] (SC). The second type of *determination* is *categorization*. There are three subtypes of *categorization*: *functionalization*, *identification* (which has three subtypes) and *appraisement*. *Functionalization* refers to cases when actors are identified in terms of what they do, e.g. POMAGAČ [helper] (SC: the concealing euphemism for an ACCOMPLICE), KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman]. *Identification* refers to defining social actors not in terms of what they do, but in terms of what/who they are. *Identification* can further be realized as *classification*, *relational identification* and *physical identification*. *Classification* is the identification of people in terms of the major categories that a society relies on in making differences between classes of people: age, gender, race, wealth, religion, ethnicity, class. For example, THE MANY (BC), also an example of *differentiation*, is a class distinction, though concealed. *Relational identification* is the representation of social actors in terms of personal, working or kinship relations. For example, THE TOP/THE MANY (BC) can be a concealing euphemism for THE RICH and THE POOR. Here, this is a relation where one social group is in a subordinate relation to another in terms of wealth. *Physical identification*, as the name suggests, represents people in terms of physical appearance. In this corpus, the euphemism THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS (BC), could be classified as an example of *physical identification*, but it is a metaphor for THE RICH, and is, therefore, a better example of *differentiation* and *classification*.

*Appraisal* is the third subtype of *categorization*. It is a strategy where social actors are referred to in terms of evaluations such as good/bad, loved/hated, admired/pitied. In this research, this type of representation reverses the bad for the good, the hated for the less hated, the negative for the positive, for example, MANGUP [rascal], a concealing euphemism for a CRIMINAL (SC), or (NOT A) PATRIOT, a concealing euphemism for (NOT A) TRAITOR (AC).

*Association*, the third type of *determination*, refers to “groups formed by social actors and/or groups of social actors (Van Leeuwen 2008: 38)”. The most common example of this type of representation is parataxis. In this corpus, it is, for example, ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots] (the SC) (also an example of *differentiation*). Antonymic relations point to such associations, e.g. THE FEW/THE TOP, THE MANY (BC).

### 2.6.3.2. Social action representation

In Table 3, we give a list of the types of social action representation analyzed in Section 4.5 (based on Van Leeuwen 2008: 55–74):

TABLE 3: SOCIAL ACTION REPRESENTATION

<p><b>Deactivation:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Objectivation</li> <li>• Descriptivization</li> </ul>
<p><b>Deagentialization:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Eventuation</li> <li>• Naturalization</li> </ul>
<p><b>Abstraction:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Generalization</li> <li>• Distillation</li> </ul>

The first type suggests that there is a difference between actions and reactions which can be represented as dynamic/activated, and static/deactivated. There are two types of *deactivated representations*, *objectivated* and *descriptivized actions*. This type of representation is aimed at downgrading an action or reaction so that priority can be given to something else (Van Leeuwen 2008: 64). For example, spatialization (e.g. BC: TAX HAVEN) is used for the purpose of substituting a place associated with an action for the action itself

(Van Leeuwen 2008: 64). *Descriptivized actions* are those represented as having more or less permanent qualities (e.g. CHEAP LABOUR, BC and SC).

The second type implies the difference between *agentialization/deagentialization*; this is a difference between actions represented as caused by humans, and actions caused by other types of agents. In this research, two types of *deagentialization* are included: *eventuation* and *naturalization*. *Eventuation* describes actions and reactions represented as disconnected from human agency. The paradigm verb of this type of representation is the verb LOSE, which denotes involuntary action, e.g. LOSE LIFE, LOSE A JOB (AC). *Naturalization* is an action or a reaction represented as a natural process. For example the verb lexeme VANISH (AC) may be seen as describing an action that happens naturally.

The third type implies the difference between *abstraction* and *concretization*; this is the difference between different degrees of specificity. In this research, two types of abstraction are observed, *generalization* and *distillation*. Generalization can be used to describe an action that consists of a sequence of micro-actions. For example, MILITARY ENGAGEMENT (AC) can be an action that is related to a sequence of micro-actions (that can have negative or extremely negative connotations). Also, ALL THE OPTIONS and ALL NECESSARY MEASURES (BC) can, in the context of warmongering, conceal BOMBING, SHOOTING, IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. *Distillation* is another type of abstraction where the same qualities (that can be peripheral) are distilled from heterogeneous practices, and so, we end up highlighting a quality of an action, rather than representing the action itself (Van Leeuwen 2008: 71). For example, INTERVENTION, INVOLVEMENT, ENGAGEMENT (also examples of generalization) are used as the words that have positive/less negative connotations, and as such, they are used as concealing euphemisms for WAR, the word that has strong negative connotations. In other words, the negative connotative value can become “circumstantial (Van Leeuwen 2008: 50)”.

To conclude, as it has already been illustrated, concealing euphemisms can be associated with more than one type of social actor or social action representation. For example, the concealing euphemism VANISH (AC)/DISAPPEAR (BC)/ NESTATI [disappear] (SC) can be associated with *naturalization* and *eventuation*. This is discussed in more detail in the corpus analysis.

## 2.7. Conclusion

The previous theoretical background consists of several subsections as it is necessary to show that euphemisms in general and concealing euphemisms in particular have been studied extensively, and that many theoretical frameworks can contribute to giving insight into how and why concealing euphemisms are used. The underlying axiom of all these theories is that communication, both cooperative and manipulative, is not all about encoding and decoding meaning, so concealing euphemisms, as a type of manipulative communication, is also more than the encoding/decoding type of meaning transfer. This thesis aims to explain how concealing euphemisms are encoded and interpreted, and, to do that, it gives an integrated approach combining lexico-semantic, lexico-pragmatic and discursive aspects of meaning construction. In the following section, the methodological framework for the integrated analysis of meaning construction in concealing euphemisms is presented.

## 3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

### 3.1. Introduction

In Section 1.3. the basic methods for the corpus analysis are presented, and these are the methods regarding identification, description, classification and analysis of the corpus. Now that the theoretical background has been given, we present the complete methodological framework, which includes the general methodological approaches and the specific methods employed in the corpus analysis that follows in Section 4.

### 3.2. General methodological approaches

In our thesis, the following methodological approaches are adopted:

- As we investigate the use of concealing euphemisms in public discourse, this is a corpus-assisted analysis.
- As the analysis focuses on a specific performative aspect of discourse, on concealing euphemisms used as a rhetorical device, we adopt a qualitative corpus-assisted approach.
- The corpus includes three subcorpora, American, British and Serbian, and two different genres where concealing euphemisms are used, so we combine qualitative and comparative analyses. The comparison is made between the use of concealing euphemisms in the American, British and Serbian corpora and between the use of concealing euphemisms in newspaper articles and political speeches.
- We integrate the lexico-semantic and the lexico-pragmatic analyses to give insight into the mechanisms underlying the construction and reconstruction of concealing euphemisms. The two analyses are integrated in the pragmatic algorithm, which is based on the explanatory potential of relevance theory to account for manipulative verbal communication.
- We integrate the lexico-semantic and the lexico-pragmatic analyses with the analysis of the discursive strategies of social actor and social action representation provided by Van Leeuwen (2008: 23–74).

- By integrating the lexico-semantic and the lexico-pragmatic analyses with the analysis of the discursive strategies, we provide an integrated account of dispreferred and preferred construction of meaning that can be employed in the interpretative stage of critical discourse analysis.

### 3.3. Methods

In accordance with the previous methodological approaches, the following methods are employed in the analysis:

- The first method refers to setting the time frame for the newspaper articles and political speeches from which concealing euphemisms are taken; this is done for the purpose of providing similar temporal contexts in the analysis of concealing euphemisms:

American corpus: newspaper articles, 2008–2015; political speeches, 2008–2015;

British corpus: newspaper articles, 2005–2014; political speeches, 2004–2014;

Serbian corpus: newspaper articles, 2008–2015; online political speeches, 2010–2014.

This roughly covers the period of the global financial crisis, characterized by the deterioration in the standard of living and the economic gap between the rich and the poor on a global scale, which calls for responsibility and the examination of causes of failed politics and policies at both national and international levels.

- Setting the time frame is closely related to choosing the topics of the newspaper articles and political speeches from which concealing euphemisms are taken. Choosing the same topics is important as it provides the same topical context for the analysis; these are the topics of conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis, and surveillance. The topics are either given in the newspaper article headlines and the titles of political speeches, or they can be developed in the article or the political speech as subtopics. In general, all of them are topics of public interest analyzed in public discourse, and all of them are topics associated with utterances/sentences which have negative illocutionary force.
- As this is a qualitative corpus-assisted analysis, the quantitative analysis is not included, such as the average number of occurrences of concealing euphemisms/ the number of tokens in newspaper articles and political speeches per word count/per sentence count.

The qualitative analysis is aimed at providing an integrated account of meaning construction which can be applied to all concealing euphemisms.

- As we combine qualitative and comparative analyses, each subcorpus (American, British and Serbian) consists of 100 examples. As stated in Section 1.4, this number is large enough to allow the possibility of comparing the results of the lexico-semantic and lexico-pragmatic analyses as well as the analysis of the use of discursive strategies.
- Each subcorpus (American, British, and Serbian) is further subdivided into 50 examples taken from newspaper articles and political speeches. This method is important as it emphasizes the awareness that concealing euphemisms are associated with these two genres.
- We apply the method of identifying concealing euphemisms with regard to their functional roles of reducing negative connotations, hiding dispreferred and imposing preferred constructions of reality. In other words, identifying is based on the assumption that the use of specific words and expressions in a specific context is a preferred way of encoding meaning by means of which other dispreferred encodings producing different kinds of effects are avoided. This is especially relevant in relation to public discourse, and the topics of conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis, and surveillance, the topics which could be classified as “sensitive phenomena (Warren 1992: 135)” for both the speaker and the public. This is in agreement with Fairclough’s (1995: 6) view of texts as “social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social interaction”. Language is a social interaction in which the speaker represents certain aspects of reality in accordance with the effect s/he wants to achieve; different constructions achieve different effects.
- A formal description and classification of the units identified as lexical concealing euphemisms is made. The research deals with lexical euphemisms, so this, first of all, includes the classification of concealing euphemisms into two subgroups, single lexemes and phrases. Details related to the formal classification are given in Section 4.2.
- A classification of lexico-semantic relations between concealing euphemisms and the corresponding non-euphemistic/direct words is made. These are relations of synonymy, polysemy, hyperonymy/hyponymy, meronymy, homonymy and antonymy. Non-euphemistic/direct words are identified and interpreted as alternative dispreferred ways of

encoding meaning. These are dispreferred encodings in the sense that they can achieve more negative reactions in relation to sensitive topics such as conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis and surveillance.

- The lexico-semantic analysis relies on the definitions and discussion given in Section 4.3;
- In addition, the analysis of the lexico-semantic relations from the American and British corpora is facilitated by means of the online lexical database WordNet Search 3.1.<sup>28</sup> This database is a semantic network which links words and groups of words by means of lexical and conceptual relations (Fellbaum 2006: 665–670). The organization of lexical relations in WordNet database is given in Section 3.3.1. For the lexico-semantic analysis of the Serbian corpus of concealing euphemisms, *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990) is consulted. It is a general monolingual dictionary which does not provide information about lexical relations (it only marks euphemistic senses of specific words; for example, one of the senses of the word CHEERFUL is its opposite sense CHEERLESS, which means that CHEERFUL can be a euphemism for CHEERLESS). However, as a monolingual dictionary, it informs us about different senses of the same word.<sup>29</sup>
- The lexico-semantic analysis is followed by the lexico-pragmatic analysis of meaning reconstruction and construction. We propose a pragmatic algorithm (see Section 4.4.2) which accounts for the speaker's encoding mechanisms aimed at concealing meaning, and the hearer's/reader's decoding and inference mechanisms related to exposing concealing euphemisms. The pragmatic algorithm brings to prominence the notions of *communicative* and *informative intentions*, the notion of epistemic vigilance, and the notion of trust, closely related to the notion of credibility, highly important in public discourse.
- As concealing euphemisms are used for the purpose of hiding dispreferred and/or imposing preferred constructions of reality, they are treated as illustrations of the strategies of social actor and social action representation. The former includes various

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<sup>28</sup> WordNet Search 3.1. is available online:

Princeton University "About WordNet." WordNet. Princeton University. 2010. <http://wordnet.princeton.edu>  
<http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn>

<sup>29</sup> *Tematski rečnik srpskog rečnika 1-6* (Otašević's 2011–2014 ) is a dictionary of Serbian words linked by means of lexical relations, but it has not been finished. It consists of six volumes, which include words beginning with the letters A and B.



subtypes of *impersonalization* and *personalization* (see Table 2), and the latter includes the subtypes of *deactivation*, *deagentialization* and *abstracton* (see Table 3).

### 3.3.1. WordNet

The description of the WordNet(s) (more than one version exists, e.g. WordNet 2.1, WordNet 3.1) is based on Fellbaum (2006: 665–670). We focus on the lexical relations analyzed in this thesis: synonymy, polysemy, hyperonymy and hyponymy, meronymy, antonymy and homonymy (e.g. derivationally related forms and sentence frames are also given in WordNet 3.1, but this information is not relevant for our analysis). WordNet includes open-class words: nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, organized around synonym sets (synsets). Each synset expresses the same concept, but not all synset members are interchangeable in all contexts (absolute synonymy is rare.) All synsets have a definition and a sentence which illustrates the usage of the synonym set. For example, the word ACTION can have different noun and verb synsets, and, here, for the sake of illustration, we only give two noun synsets and only one verb synset (for a full map see the online database <sup>30</sup>):

Word: ACTION

NOUN

S (synset): (n) action (something done (usually as opposed to something said)) “*There were stories of murders and other unnatural actions*”

S (synset): (n) military action, action (a military engagement) “*He saw action in Korea*”.

VERB

S (synset): (v) action sue, litigate, process (institute legal proceedings against; file a suit against) “*He was warned that the district attorney would process him*”; “*She actioned the company for racial discrimination*”

These synsets illustrate two things: joint membership of words in a synset illustrate synonymy, and membership of a word in multiple synonyms reflects polysemy/multiplicity

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<sup>30</sup> All the examples are taken from WordNet Search 3.1:

Princeton University “About WordNet.” WordNet. Princeton University. 2010. <http://wordnet.princeton.edu>  
<http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn>

of meaning. Miller et al. (1993) suggest that mappings between form and meanings are complex: some forms have different meanings (polysemy), and some meanings can be expressed by means of different forms (synonymy). The authors, therefore, conclude that a listener/reader must cope with the polysemy of a form, and a speaker/writer selects one form out of many synonyms (this is also discussed in Section 2.5.7.5.)

In addition to providing information about synonymy and polysemy, the database contains homonyms, which are easy to recognize; for example, it is easy to distinguish between BANK as a financial institution and BANK as a river bank. Also, the database provides antonyms, hyperonyms (or hyponyms) for particular synsets, and verbs can also include troponyms (a particular manner of doing something). Moreover, WordNet includes two more components: inheritance and reversability. As for the former, it means that if X is a hyponym of Y, and Y is a hyponym of Z, then X is a hyponym of Z. As for the latter, it means that if X is a hyponym of Y, then Y is automatically a hyperonym of X. For example, the verb STABILISE has three synsets. One of those three synsets includes direct and full troponymy, direct and inherited hyperonymy (in this case this is the same word) and antonymy:

#### VERB: STABILISE

S (synset): (v) stabilise, stabilize (become stable or more stable) “*The economy stabilized*”

*direct troponym/ full troponym*

*direct troponym:*

S: (v) settle, root, take root, steady down, settle down (become settled or established and stable in one's residence or life style) “*He finally settled down*”

S: (v) steady, calm, becalm (make steady) “*steady yourself*”

*full troponym:*

S: (v) settle, root, take root, steady down, settle down (become settled or established and stable in one's residence or life style) “*He finally settled down*”

S: (v) roost (settle down or stay, as if on a roost)

*direct hypernym/ inherited hypernym:*

S: (v) change (undergo a change; become different in essence; losing one's or its original nature) “*She changed completely as she grew older*”; “*The weather changed last night*”

*antonym:*

W(ord): (v) destabilize [Opposed to: stabilize] (become unstable) “*The economy destabilized rapidly*”

W(ord): (v) destabilise [Opposed to: stabilize] (become unstable) “*The economy destabilized rapidly*”

The following synset of the word BATTLE illustrates meronymy and its related holonym:

NOUN: BATTLE

S: (n) battle, conflict, fight, engagement (a hostile meeting of opposing military forces in the course of a war) “*Grant won a decisive victory in the battle of Chickamauga*”; “*he lost his romantic ideas about war when he got into a real engagement*”

*part holonym*

S: (n) war, warfare (the waging of armed conflict against an enemy) “*thousands of people were killed in the war*”

Finally, this short presentation includes Fellbaum’s (2006: 668) discussion of the limitations of Wordnet. WordNet does not consider syntagmatic relations; in other words, thematic and semantic roles of nouns which function as arguments of verbs are not encoded. In addition, although illustrative sentences are based on web data, Wordnet is not a corpus-induced dictionary. However, WordNet is an important tool used in the lexico-semantic analysis, as the analysis of lexico-semantic relations shows where a word is situated in the network of relations, which is part of knowing the word’s meaning (Miller et al. 1993: 8).

Now that the methodological framework is presented in detail, we can present the results of the corpus analysis. The corpus analysis begins with the formal classification of concealing euphemisms, which is followed by the lexico-semantic analysis, the lexico-pragmatic analysis and the analysis of discursive strategies.

## 4. CORPUS ANALYSIS

### 4.1. Introduction

This section of the thesis is divided into several subsections. Section 4.2. provides a formal classification of concealing euphemisms for each subcorpus, American, British and Serbian. Section 4.3 analyzes the lexico-semantic relations between, on the one hand, words and phrases identified as concealing euphemisms, and, on the other hand, their non-euphemistic counterparts. Section 4.4., the lexico-pragmatic analysis, is the analysis of different types of lexical pragmatic processes based on the proposed pragmatic algorithm. Lastly, Section 4.5. analyzes concealing euphemisms as strategies of social actor and social action representation.

### 4.2. Formal classification

#### 4.2.1. Introduction

As stated, each subcorpus consists of 100 concealing euphemisms found in newspaper articles and political speeches. Before Tables 4 (AC), 5 (BC) and 6 (SC) are presented, it is necessary to explain the basic principles used in classifying the concealing euphemisms.

#### 4.2.2. Classification

The formal classification includes three groups of concealing euphemisms hierarchically separated according to the criterion of the complexity of structure. It is based on the general distinction in terms of the potential size or extensibility of units: sentences, which consist of one or more clauses; clauses, which consist of one or more phrases; phrases, which consist of one or more words, and words, which consist of one or more morphemes (Quirk et al: 1985: 42–43). In this thesis we analyze concealing euphemisms realized as words and phrases. Words are further subdivided into monomorphemic and polymorphemic words. As far as the term phrase is concerned, we replace it with the term multi-word unit, which, in addition to the grammatical term phrase, includes the terms collocation, idiom, neologism, used in lexicology and semantics. Collocations can generally be identified as “grammatically well-formed sequence of words that go together without oddness, such as *an excellent performance*”, or a sequence of words that has a semantic unity, such as *a high opinion of* (Cruse: 2006: 27). Idioms are multi-word phrases, which are non-compositional and syntactically frozen (Cruse 2006: 82–84). Neologisms are words, terms or phrases

recently created for the purpose of naming new concepts (Jovanović: 2008: 286). So, although concealing euphemisms can be collocations, idioms and neologisms, in this research, it is not necessary to analyze and make differences between these three terms. Therefore, all units larger than words are all labelled as multi-word units<sup>31</sup>, which, grammatically speaking, can be realized as different types of phrases.

### 4.2.3. Results

In the following section, Tables 4, 5 and 6 present all concealing euphemisms analyzed in this research. Table 4 includes the concealing euphemisms found in the American newspaper articles and political speeches, Table 5 includes the concealing euphemisms found in the British newspaper articles and political speeches, and Table 6 includes the concealing euphemisms found in the Serbian newspaper articles and political speeches.

In each Table, the first two groups, Groups A and B, are lexemes formally realized as words, and Group C consists of multi-word units. Group A includes monomorphemic lexemes (grammatical morphemes are not counted) (e.g. USE) and polymorphemic lexemes with class-changing affixes (e.g. AC and BC: ACTION)<sup>32</sup>. Group B includes polymorphemic lexemes with class-maintaining affixes (e.g. AC: MISSPEAK) and compounds (e.g. BC: AIRSTRIKE). The difference between the two types of polymorphemic lexemes is made as the class-maintaining affixes (prefixes, Group B) provide a stronger semantic import<sup>33</sup> than class-changing affixes (Group A), which is why polymorphemic lexemes with class-maintaining affixes belong together with compounds (whose structure is also more complex than the

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<sup>31</sup> To briefly illustrate some difficulties in addressing this problem, there can be no clear-cut classifications between collocations and idioms. It is better to speak about a continuum of cases, and in that sense, there are overlapping cases, like idiomatic collocations. These can be considered as units that have undergone the process of consolidation, when, after they have been created, lexemes are accepted, and are on their way to becoming fully idiomatic, less transparent, and more compact structures (Prčić 2008b: 89–90).

<sup>32</sup> The base, not the root is taken into consideration, for example, DECONSECRATE/ DECONSECRATION, INCORRUPTIBLE/ INCORRUPTIBILITY (the examples are taken from Carstairs-McCarthy (2002: 132-133). Some words have both class-maintaining and class-changing affixes, but, in this research, it is not necessary to make a full morphological analysis and further subclassifications. Those words will only be marked by asterisks in Tables 4–6, which include all concealing euphemisms in the corpus.

<sup>33</sup> Jovanović (2008: 128–129) lists the following groups of prefixes according to semantic criteria: negative, reversative, number, degree and size, locative, time and order, attitude, pejorative, conversion prefixes, repetition prefix, and the group labeled as miscellaneous prefixes.

meaning of monomorphemic lexemes). Group A, B and C are further broken down into subgroups, according to the part-of-speech criterion, or the class of headwords in the compounds and the multi-word units .

As stated, Group C includes units grammatically realized as phrases, e.g. ALL NECESSARY MEASURES (BC). This group is labelled as the group of multi-word units, and is further classified into those whose heads are nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. When these phrases have a semantic unity, they become collocations, e.g. EMPTY PROMISE (AC), idioms, e.g. MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE (AC) or neologisms, e.g. SPIN DOCTOR (BC), but the classification into phrases, collocations, idioms and neologisms is not given in the Tables. As far as adjectives and adverbs are concerned, all periphrastic comparative forms (e.g. AC: MORE PEACEFUL, LESS TRANSPARENTLY) are included in Group C, as multi-word units. In addition, all negated forms, e.g. AC: NOT EASY, NOT A PATRIOT, and words that have undergone the process of conversion, eg. AC and BC: THE FEW are also included in Group C, as multi-word units.

Concealing euphemisms in each of the three groups are in alphabetical order. Tables 4, 5 and 6 do not provide non-euphemistic counterparts (they are given in Tables 7–12), and Serbian concealing euphemisms in Table 6 have been translated into English (the translations are given in brackets):

TABLE 4: FORMAL CLASSIFICATION: AMERICAN CORPUS

<b>FORM OF CONCEALING EUPHEMISMS</b>	
<b>A) SINGLE LEXEMES/WORDS</b>	
<b>a) MONOMORPHEMIC</b>	
<b>b) POLYMORPHEMIC: derived lexemes with class-changing affixes</b>	
NOUNS	ACTION, BATTLE, CONDUCT, CONFLICT, CONSTRUCT, DISINFORMATION <sup>34</sup> , FIB, FICTION, FIGHT, GIFT, HAMMER, MEMORY, NAIL, PRETENSE, PROBLEM, SEQUESTRATION, SURGE, SURVEILLANCE, USE (19)
VERBS	FIGHT, FURLOUGH, LIBERATE, MONITOR, PACIFY, SERVE, TAKE, THREATEN, VANISH (9)
ADJECTIVES	CERTAIN, FALLEN, FORTUNATE, FREER, LOWER, SAFER, STRICTER, TRUSTING, WEAKENED, UNDERFUNDED*, WRONGFUL (11)
ADVERBS	<i>not found</i>
<b>B) SINGLE LEXEMES /WORDS):</b>	
<b>a) POLYMORPHEMIC: derived lexemes with class-maintaining affixes</b>	
<b>b) COMPOUNDS</b>	
NOUNS	HALF-TRUTH, LEADERSHIP (2)
VERBS	MISINFORM, MISLEAD, MISREPRESENT, MISSPEAK, WITHHOLD (5)
ADJECTIVES	INACCURATE, INCONSISTENT, UNREPORTED ILL-SERVED, UNTRUE (5)
ADVERBS	<i>not found</i>
<b>C) MULTI-WORD UNITS</b>	
HEADWORD: NOUN	BACKROOM DIPLOMACY, BLACK SITE PRISON, DEFENSE SPENDING, DOMESTIC SERVITUDE, ECONOMIC CHALLENGE, EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAM, EMPTY PROMISE, ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE, INTERROGATION POLICIES, HOME MORTGAGE CRISIS, HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, INNOCENT SHADINGS, MILITARY ACTION, MILITARY CAMPAIGN, MILITARY CONFLICT, MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, NOT A PATRIOT, NOT A PROPONENT , OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY, POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION (OBJECTIVES, ISSUE, WILL), POLITICAL HAND, PRIVACY ABUSE, RACIAL PROFILING, RHETORICAL COTTON CANDY, SACRIFICE ONE’S LIFE, LIFE SLIPPERY FACTS, SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES, SECURITY FORCES, THE FEW (30)
HEADWORD: VERB	GIVE LIFE, LOSE LIVES, LOSE A JOB, MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE , NOT COME HOME, OPEN THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM, STRETCH THE TRUTH (7)
HEADWORD: ADJECTIVE	LESS DIRECT, LESS ACCOUNTABLE, MORE MODERATE, MORE PEACEFUL, MORE SECURE, NOT EASY, NOT FRIENDLY, NOT PARTICULARLY FAIR , NOT PRETTY, NOT RELIABLY TRUTHFUL (10)
HEADWORD: ADVERB	NOT INADVERTENTLY , LESS TRANSPARENTLY (2)

<sup>34</sup> Asterisks are used with words that have both class-changing and class-maintaining affixes (Group A and Group B).

TABLE 5: FORMAL CLASSIFICATION: BRITISH CORPUS

<b>FORM OF CONCEALING EUPHEMISMS</b>	
<b>A) SINGLE LEXEMES (WORDS)</b>	
<b>a) MONOMORPHEMIC</b>	
<b>b) POLYMORPHEMIC: derived lexemes with class-changing affixes</b>	
NOUNS	ACTION, AUSTERITY, COMBAT, CONFLICT, COUNTRY, CRISIS, DANGER, ENGAGEMENT, EXPERIENCE, FEE, FORCE, IMPACT, INFLUENCE, INTERVENTION, LEVEL, MANAGEMENT, MISINFORMATION*, MISSION, MORALITY, PAYMENT, OTHERS , PERKS, POLITICS, REALITIES, RESPONSE, SQUEEZE, STATE, SURVEILLANCE (28)
VERBS	DETAIN, PAY, POCKET, SPIN, SPEND, STABILISE, TAKE, TELL, WATCH (9)
ADJECTIVES	BETTER, DISADVANTAGED* , DYSFUNCTIONAL*, FAIRER, MISSING, POORER, STABLE, VULNERABLE (8)
ADVERBS	<i>not found</i>
<b>B) SINGLE LEXEMES (WORDS)</b>	
<b>a) POLYMORPHEMIC: derived lexemes with class-maintaining affixes</b>	
<b>b) COMPOUNDS</b>	
NOUNS	AIRSTRIKE, BLACK MARKET, TALL TALE, TAX HAVEN (4)
VERBS	DISAPPEAR, MISREPORT, MIS-SELL (3)
ADJECTIVES	INADEQUATE, INSOLVENT, UNACCEPTABLE*, UNCONSTRUCTIVE* UNDIPLOMATIC*, UNENVIABLE*, UNPATRIOTIC* (7)
ADVERBS	<i>not found</i>
<b>C) MULTI-WORD UNITS</b>	
HEADWORD: NOUN	ALL NECESSARY MEASURES, ALL THE OPTIONS, ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, ARMED STRUGGLE, CHEAP LABOUR, CONTROVERSIAL INTERROGATION PROGRAMME, ETHNIC PROFILING, FAR-FETCHED FIBS, FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES, HUMAN LIFE, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, MILITARY INVOLVEMENT, NARROWER HORIZONS, POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICAL VALUES, POWERFUL INTERESTS, SOCIAL EXCLUSION, SOFT JUSTICE, SPIN DOCTOR, STEADY EROSION OF RESPONSIBILITY, STRONGER ECONOMY (WEAKER ECONOMY), THE ARAB SPRING, THE BETTER-OFF (LEAST WELL-OFF), THE ELITE FEW, THE MANY, THE NEXT GREECE, THE TOP/THE FEW, THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS (28)
HEADWORD: VERB	BE MILES AWAY FROM THE TRUTH, GIVE LIFE, MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE , SET THE ENTIRE REGION ABLAZE, SIPHON OFF, STAY AFLOAT, TAKE LIVES (7)
HEADWORD: ADJECTIVE	LESS AFFORDABLE, LESS SECURE, MORE RESPONSIBLE, NOT GOOD ENOUGH , POORLY CONTROLLED (5)



TABLE 6: FORMAL CLASSIFICATION: SERBIAN CORPUS

FORM OF CONCEALING EUPHEMISMS	
<b>A) SINGLE LEXEMES (WORDS)</b> <b>a) MONOMORPHEMIC</b> <b>b) POLYMORPHEMIC: derived lexemes with class-changing affixes</b>	
NOUNS	BEZBEDNOST [safety], DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation] <sup>35</sup> DUGOVANJE [debt, owing money], HIGIJENA [hygiene], INCIDENT [incident], KORIŠĆENJE [using], KRIZA [crisis], KVALIFIKOVANOST [competence], MANGUP [rascal], MOGUĆNOSTI [possibilities], NEISKRENOST* [insincerity], NEREGULARNOSTI* [irregularities], POKLON [gift], POMAGAČ, [helper], PONAŠANJE [behaviour], POZICIJA [position], PREPISIVANJE [copying], REGULARNOST [regularity], RUKA [hand/arm], RUKOVODENJE [managing], RUPA [hole], STRANKA [party], SUKOB [conflict], VLAST [authorities], ZADOVOLJSTVO [satisfaction], ZAOSTAJANJE [lagging], ŽRTVA [victim] (27)
VERBS	CURITI [leak], GUBITI [lose], HRANITI [feed], IZLAZITI [get out], NESTATI [disappear], OŠTETITI [damage], PRATITI [follow, watch], SPINOVATI [spin], TROŠITI [spend], ZARAĐIVATI [earn] ŽIVETI [live] (11)
ADJECTIVES	BOGATIJA [richer], DIVLJI [wild/ illegal], GENIJALNO [ingenious], NEISTINIT* [untrue], OSIROMAŠEN [impoverished], OZBILJAN [serious], RASKUĆEN* [squandered], SREĆNIJI [happier], TUĐI [someone else's], USPEŠAN [successful], ZADOVOLJAN [satisfied], ZAPOSTAVLJEN [neglected], ZAVISAN [dependent], ZLOUPOTREBLJEN* [abused] (14)
ADVERBS	PRAVEDNIJE [more just], SNAŽN IJE [stronger] (2)
<b>B) SINGLE LEXEMES (WORDS)</b> <b>a) POLYMORPHEMIC: derived lexemes with class-maintaining affixes</b> <b>b) COMPOUNDS</b>	
NOUNS	ETNIČKO ČIŠĆENJE [ethnic cleansing], SIVA EKONOMIJA [grey economy] (2)
VERBS	ISCURITI [leak out], ISISATI [suck out, siphon off], ISPUMPATI *[pump out], IŠČEZNUTI [vanish], IZMISLITI* [make up], IZOSTAVITI [miss out], PODMAZATI [grease], PRELITI SE [spill over] (8)
ADJECTIVES	NESLAVAN [inglorious] (1)
ADVERBS	POLUJAVNO [half-publicly] (1)

<sup>35</sup> This is a loanword, therefore, it belongs to Group A (it is not analysed into its constituent morphemes).

<b>C) MULTI-WORD UNITS</b>	
HEADWORD: NOUN	ČVRSTA RUKA [firm hand], FISKALNA KONSOLIDACIJA [fiscal consolidation], GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers], JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA (NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA) [cheap labour force, somewhat cheaper labour force], KOLEKTIVNA ŽRTVA [collective sacrifice], KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman], LOŠE MATERIJALNO STANJE [bad financial position], MEHANIZMI UBEDIVANJA [persuasion mechanisms], MUZIČKI DINAR [music dinar], NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centers], NEGATIVNA EUFORIJA [negative euphoria], NOTORNA NEISTINA [notorious untruth], NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work/activity], ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots], ORUŽANI SUKOB [armed conflict], POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors], POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will], PRAZNA OBEĆANJA [empty promise], SLEGANJE RAMENIMA [shrugging your shoulders] (19)
HEADWORD: VERB	FABRIKOVATI ČINJENICE [fabricate facts], IZBEGAVATI ISTINU [avoid the truth], IZVRŠITI MOBILIZACIJU [call for mobilization], IZMAKNUTI KONTROLI [avoid control], KORIGOVATI CENE [correct prices], KORISTITI MIMO NAMENE [use inadequately], NEMATI DOVOLJNO [not have enough], NEOVLAŠĆENO SE POSLUŽITI [use without authorization], NE TRAJATI PREDUGO [not last long], ZAHVALITI SE NA SARADNJI [say thank you for the cooperation], ZAMAZIVATI OČI [pull the wool over someone's eyes], ZAIBILAZITI ZAKON [go round the law], ZAUSTAVITI FIZIČKI [physically stop someone] (13)
HEADWORD: ADJECTIVE	SOCIJALNO UGROŽENI [socially endangered], TEŠKO DOSTUPAN [hardly accessible] (2)

The concealing euphemisms given in the Tables are the words/multi-word units used by the speaker/author of the article, or the speaker of meaning. The classifications of concealing euphemisms given in Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the following similarities in encoding meaning in terms of form:

- Group A: Some concealing euphemisms have been identified in both English (either AC or BC) and Serbian corpora. For example, in English, these are DISINFORMATION, GIFT, CONDUCT, WATCH, SPIN, CONFLICT. In Serbian, these are: DEZINFORMACIJA, POKLON, PONAŠANJE, PRATITI, SPINOVATI, SUKOB. This leads to the conclusion that concealing euphemisms can be lexicalized in the same way in both English and Serbian; therefore, these concealing euphemisms can be used as translation equivalents.
- Group A: Comparative forms of adjectives have been identified in all three subcorpora (e.g. AC: LOWER, BC: FAIRER; SC: SREĆNIJI [happier], BOGATIJA [richer]). American and

British corpora have both inflected and periphrastic forms of adjectives (AC: MORE PEACEFUL, BC: MORE RESPONSIBLE). The conclusion is that in all three corpora, comparative forms of adjectives can be used as concealing euphemisms. This suggests that the category of comparison is used for the purpose of euphemization.

- Group A: Comparative forms of adverbs used as concealing euphemisms have also been identified in the Serbian and American corpora: *pravednije* [more just], *snažnije* [more strongly] (SC: inflected forms), and LESS TRANSPARENTLY (AC: periphrastic form).
- Group B: The prefix *mis-* (negative meaning, badly, wrongly) is used with verbs with a more general meaning than the one carried by the non-euphemistic equivalent, such as MISINFORM, MISLEAD (AC) and MISREPORT (BC). These polymorphemic concealing euphemisms can be used to avoid the monomorphemic verb LIE. In addition to being used as a replacement for the verb LIE, *mis-*verbs are used as concealing euphemisms in relation to other topics as well: the polymorphemic verb MISLEAD (AC) can be used instead of the monomorphemic verb LIE, and the polymorphemic verb MIS-SELL (BC) can replace the monomorphemic verb DECEIVE. The prefix *dis-* (meaning *not*) in DISINFORMATION from Group A (AC) can be used in the same way, i.e. this polymorphemic concealing euphemism can replace the monomorphemic direct word LIE.
- Group B: In Serbian, prefixes in words identified as concealing euphemisms express the perfective aspect, for example, *IŠČEZNUTI* [vanish], *ISISATI* [suck out, siphon off], *ISCURITI* [leak out]. In this corpus, they are most frequently used to avoid the more direct, more negatively connoted verb STEAL. One of them, the verb *IZMISLITI* [make up] has the prefix *iz-*, and the verb can be used as a replacement for the verb LIE. The conclusion is that, in all three corpora, prefixed polymorphemic words can be used as concealing euphemisms, which replace monomorphemic words.
- Group B: Negative prefixes are used with adjectives in all three corpora, for example INACCURATE, INCONSISTENT (AC), UNACCEPTABLE, UNCONSTRUCTIVE (BC), NESLAVAN [inglorious] (SC). They replace adjectives that have more negative meaning, such as, for example, INACCURATE can replace FALSE, UNCONSTRUCTIVE can replace DESTRUCTIVE, NESLAVAN [inglorious] can replace EMBARRASSING. This can also mean that a concealing euphemism can be a more complex structure than a more negatively connoted word (e.g. INACCURATE can replace the monomorphemic adjective FALSE).

- Group B: In the American and Serbian corpora, HALF is used as a modifier in the compounds, in HALF-TRUTH (AC), and POLUJAVNO [half-publicly] (SC).
- Group C: Some concealing euphemisms have been identified in both English (either AC or BC) and Serbian corpora. For example, in English, these are EMPTY PROMISE (AC), ILLEGAL ACTIVITY (AC), ARMED STRUGGLE (BC), CHEAP LABOUR (BC), and in Serbian, these are PRAZNA OBEĆANJA, NEZAKONITI RAD, ORUŽANI SUKOB, JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA. These concealing euphemisms can be used as translation equivalents.
- Group C: The same modifier can appear in the noun phrases in all three corpora: POLITICAL SYSTEM, (DYSFUNCTION OBJECTIVES, ISSUE, WILL) (AC), POLITICAL SYSTEM, VALUES (BC), POLITIČKI FAKTORI, VOLJA [political factors, will] (SC).
- Group C: In both American and British corpora, partial conversions are present: THE FEW (AC and BC), THE MANY, THE BETTER-OFF (BC).
- Group C: In the American and Serbian corpora, modifiers in the concealing euphemism can be replaced: INTERROGATION POLICIES/ ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE (AC), and JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force]/ NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force] (SC).

To sum up, the formal classification of concealing euphemisms shows that concealing euphemisms given in all three corpora can be encoded in the same way: the same concealing euphemisms have been identified in Group A and Group C, and these concealing can be used as translation equivalents. Also, the same modifier (POLITICAL) can be used in different multi-word units in all three corpora. Secondly, the comparative forms of adjectives and adverbs can be used as concealing euphemisms in all three corpora: in Serbian, the inflected comparative form, and in the American and British English, both the inflected and periphrastic forms. Thirdly, Group B shows that morphologically more complex units (those that have more constituent morphemes) can be used as concealing euphemisms that replace, less complex or monomorphemic non-euphemistic units.

The formal classification shows the similarities in euphemism encodings in the analyzed corpora. The next section of the corpus analysis is the analysis of the lexico-semantic relations between encoded euphemistic forms and their non-euphemistic equivalents.

## 4.3. Lexico-semantic analysis

### 4.3.1. Introduction

This is the part of the corpus analysis where the concealing euphemisms are related to non-euphemistic counterparts by means of lexico-semantic relations. The analysis includes the following subsections: in Section 4.3.2. we define and discuss the lexico-semantic relations, and in Section 4.3.3., Tables 7–12 show the lexico-semantic relations between concealing euphemisms and their direct non-euphemistic equivalents, based on the lexical database WordNet 3.1.

### 4.3.2. Theoretical considerations

#### 4.3.2.1. Introduction

Lexico-semantic relations/paradigmatic sense relations are discussed by many authors (Allan 2001, Atkins and Rundell 2008, Cann 2011, Cruse 1986, 2004, Dragičević 2007, Geeraerts 2010, Jones 2002, Kempson 1977, Leech 1974, Lyons 1977, 1995, Griffiths 2006, Murphy 2003, Palmer 1981, Prčić 2008b, Saeed 2003, Stubbs 2001, Šipka 1998). According to Atkins and Rundell (2008: 131–132), there are two categories of relationships: a) the relationship of similarities: hyponymy (inclusion), synonymy (identity), meronymy (part-whole relationship) and regular polysemy (sense extensions), and b) the relationship of differences: antonymy (oppositeness, exclusion). Polysemy and homonymy can be treated as a separate group of relations as they do not structure the lexicon in the systematic way (Cann 2011: 468).

Lexico-semantic relations, or, as Lyons (1995: 124) calls them, substitutional relations, are the ones found between intersubstitutable members of the same grammatical category. However, this sameness of grammatical categories is not without exceptions. Saeed (2003: 59) notes that a string of words can correspond to a single semantic unit, just like a word does; therefore, paradigmatic relations can be found between structurally different units. This position is useful because many words do not denote classes of referents in a clear way (e.g. abstract entities), so it is better to study lexical relations in terms of meaning, and examine the lexical items that have identical structural positions in sentences (Cruse 1986: 87–88). The existence of such a relation is found in the type of inclusion regarding compounds and one-word lexemes (Lyons 1977: 538): for example, the non-euphemistic lexeme WAR can be related to the euphemistic expression MILITARY CONFLICT. To be more

precise, the headword of the compound, the noun CONFLICT, is the word which has a more general meaning than the corresponding non-euphemistic word WAR (the modifier MILITARY contributes to meaning modulation, but the direct word is still avoided). Another example of the difference in the type of grammatical category regarding lexico-semantic relations is the one termed *quasi-hyponymy* by Lyons (1977), which denotes different syntactic categories intensionally related, such as adjectives that have a nominal superordinate (Murphy 2003: 218). As far as synonyms are concerned, Murphy (2003: 152–153) proposes that synonymy relates syntactic/semantic portions of lexical entries, rather than grammatical categories (which basically means parts-of speech), but not all syntactic information needs to match and neither does all semantic information. The degree of matching is pragmatically conditioned. Dragičević (2007: 249) accepts the position that synonyms that do not belong to the same word class can be labeled as *quasi-synonyms*.

Another clarification is important regarding the question of what it is that sense relations relate in this research. Murphy (2003: 216), for example, states that although inclusion and part-whole relations are studied in lexico-semantic texts, they are almost always relations among concepts or things, not relations among words; synonymy and antonymy, on the other hand, are relations among word-concepts. Jones (2002: 11), however, following Justeson and Katz (1991), states that antonymy should be seen as a relationship between words, not concepts, but this view also has its limitations. For example, Fellbaum (1995) notices that antonymy is found in pairs not only belonging to the same word class, but is also present across word classes. To reconcile different views, antonymy can be seen as both lexical and semantic. In other words, antonyms need to be opposite in meaning, and there has to exist an established lexical relationship between the two antonyms. Those that satisfy both criteria are prototypical or canonical antonyms, and those that agree only with the first criterion are peripheral/non-canonical (Jones 2002: 11). In this thesis, we follow Cruse's (2004: 145) position that meanings are conceptual in nature, and that sense relations are relations between concepts<sup>36</sup>.

The following section defines and discusses the lexico-semantic relations. First, the relations of similarities are discussed, and these are hyperonymy/hyponymy, synonymy, meronymy and regular polysemy. In addition to regular polysemy, we also include two more

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<sup>36</sup> Concepts are fundamental unit of knowledge, also known as representation. They are essential to categorization (Evans 2007: 31).

types of polysemy, metaphor and metonymy. The discussion then focuses on the relation of antonymy, and ends with homonymy.

#### 4.3.2.2. Hyponymy/hyperonymy

Hyponymy is the relation of the superordinate (hypernym, hyperonym, genus expression) <sup>37</sup> and the hyponym. It is the type-token/the token-type/genus-differentiae relation that can be defined as the relationship of unilateral entailment: X is a Y, but Y is not only an X; hyponyms and hyperonyms are anti-symmetrical, but they are symmetrical in relation to one another (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 132–134, Murphy 2003: 216, 223)<sup>38</sup>. If the relation were not unidirectional, then it would be synonymy, not inclusion. Also, two words can be hyponyms if they have the same superordinate term, and one is not a hyponym of the other. In this research, another hyponymy-like relation is included, that of troponymy, “specific ways of doing an action (Geeraerts 2010: 160)” (eg. SPY is a hyponym or troponym of WATCH).

Hyperonymy/hyponymy is found mostly in nouns, quite a number of verbs and in some adjectives, and that is why adjectives and verbs are less prototypical cases of hyponymy (all this is confirmed in the research) (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 132, Griffiths 2006: 46, Murphy 2003: 221). There are two subtypes of hyponymy, taxonomic, IS-A-KIND-OF relation (e.g. WAR is a kind of CONFLICT), and functional, IS-USED-AS-A-KIND-OF relation (BAD MEMORY is used as a kind of MEMORY); the former is the analytic type of relation, whereas the latter is not a logically necessary relation (Murphy 2003: 220). With unnominalized verbs or adjectives, it is better to use the formula *To (be) X is to (be) Y in a certain way* (e.g. POORER is a hyponym of POOR); it is suggested that adjectives should be regarded as a subtype of hyponymy expressing a degree of something (Murphy 2003: 222). As far as adjectives are concerned, the corpus analysis shows that, in public discourse, adjectives are often used in the comparative form. In addition to being analyzed as hyponyms of the base

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<sup>37</sup>Atkins and Rundell (2008: 132) prefer the term *superordinate* because of the similarity of the term *hypernym* with the term *hyponym*. Cann (2011: 459) states that the term *hypernym* is dispreferred to the term *hyperonym* because in some dialects of English it is homophonic with *hyponym*.

<sup>38</sup> The extended version of the formula that defines hyponymy is: X is a hyponym of Y if it is the case that if anything is such that it has the property expressed by X then it also has the property expressed by Y (Cann 2011: 459). This version is, as Cann (2011: 459) calls it, a “universally quantified implication statement” in that it implies that even if something did not exist, it would be applicable if it had a particular property.

form of the adjective, comparative forms of adjectives can be analyzed in terms of their potential to be related to their antonyms. In that sense, these comparative forms of adjectives can be concealing euphemisms and this is discussed in Section 4.3.2.6. that deals with antonymy.

The most straightforward cases of inclusion are the ones examined extensionally, where a subclass of a particular class can be easily identified. But Atkins and Rundell (2008: 133) draw attention to a very important point: there are many words (the emphasis is on the quantifier *many*) which do not have their precise genus expression. The most precise genus expressions are found in taxonomies, a subtype of hyponymy, where the meaning of a subordinate term is a precise subspecification of a superordinate term. At the same time, this type of sense relation is rarely found in adjectives and, therefore, there is a lack of superordinate terms for adjectives (for example, it would be difficult to find the hyperonym for UNREPORTED and SECRET). Cann (2011: 460) explains that these gaps in the lexicon may be a consequence of socio-cultural norms, and many are random; all in all, it is not necessary for languages to lexicalize all hierarchical terms. Still, it does not mean that it is not possible to label a concept that is not lexicalized.

In the language of concealing euphemisms, the lack of precise genus expression and the existence of lexical gaps in general leaves the door open for creating superordinate terms as concealing euphemisms that are used instead of the corresponding non-euphemistic subordinate terms. For instance, the semantically empty verb TAKE or the verbal noun TAKING can be used as a concealing euphemism for STEAL/STEALING, as stealing is an act of illegal taking, and illegal taking is taking. Murphy (2003: 222) puts forward a similar example: STEALING is a way of GETTING, and then, if we follow the same line, GETTING is a kind of DOING. As explained, the higher up in the taxonomy we go, the less clear the superordinate term is, and this is a problem for inclusion in general, for both nouns and other word classes, as we cannot agree on the nature of *unique beginners* in nominal hierarchies. If the rule *X is a Y, but Y is not only an X* is followed, then it becomes clear why it is not easy to identify this type of a concealing euphemism: TAKING has a very broad meaning. This difficulty, however, can be overcome if we examine meanings intensionally, and if we make inferences in relation to meaning, which the properties of hyponymy allow us to do. The properties are: a) it is transitive, b) it has intermediate levels of hierarchy, which allows it to rely on deduction and the classical syllogism (Griffiths 2006: 48, Murphy 2003: 223):



STEALING is ILLEGAL TAKING	STEALING <ILLEGAL TAKING
ILLEGAL TAKING is TAKING	ILLEGAL TAKING < TAKING
<hr/>	
STEALING is TAKING	STEALING < TAKING

Cruse (2004: 148) explains that the meaning of subordinate items may be considered as richer than the superordinate item, which includes the meaning of the superordinate item. So, the meaning of STEALING includes the meaning of TAKING (this is the relation of entailment, *It's stealing* entails *It's taking*) but, in addition, it includes other descriptive features. This type of concealing euphemisms can, consequently, be identified as the process of making meaning less rich and less specified. The higher the word is, the more general its meaning, and the consequence is that words come to denote many different entities (Griffiths 2006: 49). This explanation is in agreement with Stubbs' (2001: 32–34) discussion of delexicalization/desemanticization, which refers to the existence of words which carry little meaning (such as the verbs TAKE, MAKE, HAVE used in N-VP structures).

The modification ILLEGAL in ILLEGAL TAKING need not worry us, as the creation of hyponyms by means of modification can also be a pattern recognized in the construction of euphemisms. If we take that into account, ILLEGAL TAKING is a hyponym of TAKING. Furthermore, syntagmatic modifications can lead to multiple interpretations of concealing euphemisms. For example, the euphemism COLLATERAL DAMAGE is a hyponym of DAMAGE; the form of the euphemism COLLATERAL DAMAGE, *premodifier + noun*, suggests that it is a specific type of damage. COLLATERAL DAMAGE also has a general meaning (but less general than *damage*), which is *accompanying damage*, and this general meaning has already been analyzed as having a more specific non-euphemistic meaning KILLING CIVILIANS. When concepts are labeled by collocations, such as COLLATERAL DAMAGE, Stubbs (2001: 63) explains that what happens is desemanticization or “delexicalization” (the term is borrowed from Sinclair 1991: 113, Bublitz 1996) of the words in the syntagm/collocation, wherewith we focus on the adjective that describes the noun. In this case, we focus on COLLATERAL, and interpret DAMAGE as COLLATERAL. It does not take much effort to conclude that the emphasis on the feature COLLATERAL is the *de-emphasis* on the cause of DAMAGE, or any other feature that could be associated with responsibility for damage. Eventually, this does not mean that the cause or responsibility for damage as types of features are excluded, but they are backgrounded.

#### 4.3.2.3. Synonymy

Synonymy is the relation of identity – it follows the rule if X is a Y then Y is an X. (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 134–136). Synonymy is also associated with the word *similarity*, so in order not to confuse the two terms, *identity* and *similarity*, a terminological clarification is needed. Murphy (2003: 139) explains that *identity* and *similarity* are interconnected notions; two items are the same (identical) in certain aspects, but if not all properties/aspects of an item are considered, two items can only be similar, not identical. Of course, the crucial question regarding synonyms is their *raison d’etre*, and why there are so many of them in relation to certain topics. For example, many synonyms related to truth/lies were identified: these are, for example, DISINFORMATION, HALF-TRUTH, NOT RELIABLY TRUTHFUL (AC: Table 7), UNTRUE (AC: Table 8), SPIN DOCTOR (BC: Table 10), DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation], NEISTINIT [untrue] (SC: Table 11), IZBEGAVATI ISTINU [avoid the truth], (Table 12).

Synonymy is related to another important notion, the blocking principle. Allan (2001: 111–112) explains that synonymy is not prohibited, but it is constrained. If a word already exists to express a meaning, another word should not be constructed unless there is a good reason for doing so. Cann (2011: 461), relying on relevance theory, explains that different synonyms exist because they lead to different inferential effects. Also, in litotes, for example, the denial of one adjective can implicitly deny other synonymous adjectives. For example, the negation of the adjective FRIENDLY in *It wasn’t always friendly* implicitly denies the truth of *It was benevolent (benign, peaceful, non-racist, non-sexist)*. In this way, although direct negative connotations are avoided, the inferential path leading to negative connotations is open:

(4) JAKE TAPPER: Is she [Mary Landrieu] suggesting that the voters of Louisiana are racists and sexists?

SEN. AMY KLOBUCHAR (D-MN): I don't think so at all, Jake. [...]

I think when you listen to her language there, she was talking about the past. She was talking about the fact, not just in the south, but the United States, given that African-Americans and women couldn't even vote in the past, that it wasn't always friendly.

(Klobuchar: Mary Landrieu “was talking about the past”, 31 October 2014.)

As far as the types of synonymy are concerned, first of all, it is a well-known fact that absolute synonymy is a rarity, and that there are many types of close synonyms (Cruse 2004: 154–157). Absolute synonymy is rare because it is difficult to find examples of words that have absolutely the same meaning in all contexts, and these cases have not been found in the corpus. In connection with this, Dragičević (2007: 245) notes that if strict criteria are applied, only *termini technici* can survive as synonyms; thus, we can make the basic distinction between absolute and relative synonymy, which can further be elaborated into scales of different types of synonyms. One of the types of relative synonymy Cruse (2004: 155–157) speaks about is propositional synonymy, which is defined by means of entailment. Propositional synonyms are the ones that can be interchangeable if truth-conditional properties are not damaged (this subtype of synonymy should not be confused with synonymy as a relation between sentences, or the so-called paraphrase). As further suggested, differences in the meanings of propositional synonyms involve one or more aspects of non-propositional meaning, which are a) differences in expressive meaning, b) differences in stylistic meaning, and c) differences of presupposed field of discourse. The author concludes that propositional synonyms are most frequently used in fields related to emotive significance, like taboo areas (or veiling euphemisms), where a graded set of terms is possible on the euphemism-dysphemism scale. Also, they appear in relation to different contexts, with differing significance and implications (Cruse 2004: 156). Here, a caveat should be added: the criterion of truth-conditionality is not unquestionable because, when implications are changed, the truth or falsity of the proposition may not hold.

Another type of relative synonymy is near-synonymy, and near-synonymy is the category where we can put concealing synonyms. This type is different from propositional synonymy, but it is not clearly different from non-synonymy. As regards truth-conditionality, Murphy (2003: 147) describes near-synonyms as synonyms whose senses are not exactly the same because their contributions to sentential truth-conditions differ; still, they share a common sense to the extent that something described by one such synonym can be described by the other as well. For example, the concealing euphemism DISINFORMATION is used to avoid negative implications of LIE:

(5) But is even this modified, more realistic vision of democracy in action still relevant?

Or has our political system been so degraded by misinformation and disinformation that it can no longer function?

(Krugman: Moment of truthiness, *The New York Times*, 15 August 2013)

Identifying common descriptive features that are still more salient (compared to their differences) to call a synonym a synonym is not an easy job, especially when it comes to identifying a near-synonym as a concealing euphemism. At the same time, these shady areas of similarities and differences offer great potential for creating concealing euphemisms. Cruse (2004: 157) specifies the differences that do not destroy synonymy, and in this research, these differences are used in the identification of concealing near-synonymous euphemisms.

1. Adjacent position on a scale of degree; concealing euphemisms related to truth/lies, such as DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation] (Table 11), indicate that speakers treat the truth and lies as a matter of degree. With all these concealing euphemisms that stretch, exaggerate, avoid and walk miles away from the truth, it is really necessary to reconsider what the truth and lies are in public discourse.
2. Adverbial specializations of verbs; near-synonyms can be used to explain a word already used (Cann 2011: 461). In this corpus, adverbial specializations are classified as troponyms. For example, WATCH (BC: Table 9, SC: Table 11) is used as a concealing euphemism for SPY. However, although SPY is identified as a troponym of WATCH, these two words can also be near-synonyms;
3. Aspectual distinctions in adjectives: CALM: PLACID (the example is taken from (Cruse (2004: 157))).
4. Differences of prototype centre; for example, UNREPORTED (AC: Table 7) (which does not prototypically have to include criminal and moral issues) for SECRET or ILLEGAL (which prototypically includes criminal and moral issues).

Murphy (2003: 137–138) argues that words can be similar in two ways. First, they can have more attributes in common, such as denotation (which would be the most relevant attribute), connotation, register, etc. Also, they can be similar in that they match more closely one of these attributes (all others being equal, or all others being disregarded). To begin with, we could say that synonyms must share their denotation, but even this is debatable. Sometimes it is notoriously difficult to specify denotation:

It would be no less of a mistake to say that no lexemes have denotation, or that denotation is irrelevant in lexico-semantics, than it is to say that all lexemes must have denotation. [...] We live in the world and are ourselves part of it; and we use language, not only to describe the

persons, things and situations in the physical world and the world of social activity with which we interact in our daily life, but also to control and adjust to these persons, things and situations in a variety of ways. The descriptive function of language, important though it is, is not the sole function of language, or even the most basic. (Lyons 1977: 212)

Words can be meaningful even if they do not have their referent, like the names related to myths (Vidanović 2008: 20). Also, words can have obscure denotation and reference, like, for example, NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centers] (SC). The only thing we could say regarding its denotation is that INFORMAL POWER CENTER denotes a social actor, and, as the name suggests, a powerful social actor whose identity is unknown.

As far as connotations are concerned, they are subjective (unlike denotation, which strives for objectivity), so when a concealing euphemism (which has more neutral connotations) is used, it may indicate that the speaker has a neutral attitude towards a situation/thing denoted (e.g. AC: DISINFORMATION → LIE). The role of connotation, however, is more complex: there are two types of changes of connotational meaning, the pejorative and the ameliorative changes, and concealing euphemisms belong to the second type. Sperber, H. (1914, 1923) and Van Ginneken (1911–12, 1912–13) exemplify the change in meaning triggered by a change in connotations with the metaphors used by soldiers in World War I: a machine gun was called A SEWING MACHINE or A COFFEE GRINDER (discussed in Geeraerts (2010: 20). The objective similarities between a machine gun and these objects are part of the metaphorical meaning transfer, but the emotive effect is more important. The domestic objects such as a sewing machine and a coffee grinder bring positive connotations, which at the same time, removes negative connotations.

Another important property related to synonymy and concealing euphemisms is the direction of comparison. For example, we can say that SECRET is more similar to UNREPORTED than UNREPORTED to SECRET; this means that synonymy is not a symmetrical relation. Following this, we can use UNREPORTED instead of SECRET, but not always (not in all contexts) SECRET in place of UNREPORTED. Concealing euphemisms can thrive on this lack of symmetry, which, again, emphasizes the role of context in determining euphemistic meanings. The lack of symmetry also allows synonyms to be treated as hyponyms in some cases (Murphy 2003: 140) (the relation of synonymy to hyponymy is seen in relation to a position on a scale of degree/gradience/prototypicality). In fact, near-synonyms can be defined as “fuzzy” co-hyponyms, where near-synonyms are frequently co-hyponyms with overlapping senses (Murphy 2003: 167).

In addition to the classification of synonyms discussed in the preceding section, Dragičević (2007: 251–252) presents another classification made by Vtov (1998): 1) semantic, 2) stylistic and 3) semantic-stylistic synonyms; this classification also highlights the complexity of synonymy. From the point of view of componential analysis, the first group of synonyms refers to the relation of two lexemes and more than two lexemes that have one common arche-seme, and the majority of lower-ranking semes which are also identical. If the primary senses of lexemes are synonymous, we speak about true semantic synonyms. If the primary sense of one lexeme is synonymous with the secondary sense of another lexeme, this is ideographic semantic synonymy. Take, for example, WATCH, whose more specific, sense coincides with the primary sense of SPY. The second group of synonyms refers to stylistic synonyms, the ones that are stylistically marked in comparison to neutral synonyms, and, otherwise, they have the same meaning. It has already been pointed out that concealing euphemisms tend to blur the distinction between marked and unmarked euphemisms, so this stylistic difference would have to be analyzed with regard to the use of language in public discourse. Finally, the third group includes both semantic and stylistic differences, and it is the group of synonyms that would best house concealing euphemisms, which can be seen as both semantic and stylistic choices. Dragičević (2007: 253) also speaks about contextual synonymy as the most prevalent type of synonymy, where either the primary sense of one synonym matches with the secondary sense of another synonym, or there is a possibility to connect two words into synonyms via their secondary senses<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>39</sup> Dragičević (2007: 254, 268) even speaks about an attempt to even measure the degree of semantic closeness of synonyms, polysemy and even oppositeness in meaning. Ivanova (Иванова) (1982) reports about the formula put forward by Berežan (Бережан):  $V \rightarrow 2c : (a+b)$ ;  $V$  is the coefficient of the semantic relation,  $c$  is the number of the identical senses of the two compared lexemes,  $a$  is the number of the senses of one lexeme and  $b$  is the number of the senses of the other lexeme. The formula cannot be absolutely reliable as it is not easy to give a precise number of different senses. Regardless of this, the formula leads to the conclusion that the more general a lexeme is (the lexeme that can have a euphemistic meaning), the more senses it can have, and, consequently, the lower the degree of semantic closeness (on condition that another compared direct non-euphemistic lexeme has only one sense). This may be the explanation for the use of vague general terms as concealing euphemisms, as the closeness with direct words is more difficult to determine.

#### 4.3.2.4. Meronymy

Meronymy is the part-whole and the whole-part relationship (the relation between the partonym/meronym and the holonym, or has-a relation), which follows the formula: X is a meronym of Y, when the following applies: X and the other parts of a Y, or the parts of a Y include the Xs (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 136–139, Murphy 230). Meronymy and hyponymy are different types of inclusion; meronymy is a type of inclusion where a partonym is not a kind but a part of a holonym. For example, BATTLE (AC: Table 8) and COMBAT (BC: Table 10) are meronyms for WAR (the relation is given in the WordNet lexical database), and they can be concealing euphemisms for WAR:

(6) [...] Third, America identified the lack of freedom in the Middle East as a principal cause of the threats coming from the region. We concluded that if the region continued on the path it was headed – if another generation grew up with no hope for the future, and no outlet to express its views – the Middle East would continue to simmer in resentment and export violence.

To stop this from happening, we resolved to help the region steer itself toward a better course of freedom and dignity and hope. We're engaged in a battle with the extremists that is broader than a military conflict, and broader than a law enforcement operation.

(President Bush's speech to the Saban Forum, 05 December 2008)

(7) And we have made clear, given the plans for Afghan forces to lead their own operations by 2014, that UK involvement in combat in Afghanistan will come to an end by the year after that.

(Hague: Foreign Secretary's speech, Birmingham, 06 October 2010)

A lexeme can be both a hyperonym and a holonym due to polysemy (Dragićević 2007: 293–294). Also, Dragićević (2007: 298) argues that holonyms and meronyms can be contextual synonyms (e.g. the above-mentioned example). However, if we take into account that concealing euphemisms, and language in general, are meant to be used in context, this restrictive *only* need not be that restrictive.

#### 4.3.2.5. Polysemy

A large part of a language's vocabulary is polysemic, which means that many lexical items have a range of different meanings (Crystal 2008: 373–374). As discussed in Section 2.5.7.5., polysemy raises many different issues, such as: are all different senses of a polysemous word lexically stored, or only some senses are stored, and what is the relation between pragmatic inference and polysemy (Falkum 2009: 28)?

In this corpus analysis, polysemy is divided into regular polysemy, the umbrella term that includes sets of words that behave lexicographically in a very similar way (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 139), and a specific subgroup of polysemy which includes metaphors and metonymies. In this corpus, we examine regular polysemy in relation to other sense relations, such as hyponymy and meronymy (see the comments that follow the Tables 7–12). For example, ACTION is polysemous, and one of the senses is MILITARY ACTION, which is a hyperonym for WAR. The word BATTLE is also polysemous, and one of the senses relates BATTLE as a meronym with the holonym WAR. The analysis of these relations proves that concealing euphemisms thrive on the possibilities language offers us to escape precision and directness. First of all, regular polysemy exists in cases where the relationship between different readings is recurrent in a range of lexical items and can be predicted on a semantic basis. Cruse (2004: 111), for example, speaks about categories which have binary subdivisions, where only one subdivision has a name; this is the trigger for the superordinate term to develop a more specific meaning to fill the gap. This suggests that hyperonymy/hyponymy are closely related to polysemy. The interrelatedness of polysemy, hyperonymy/hyponymy and meronymy is also seen in autohyponymy (a word has a general and a contextually restricted sense), automeronymy (a more specific reading is a sub-part), autosuperordination (the more restricted sense has a contextually more general sense) and autoholonymy (the part has a contextually related meaning of the whole) (Cruse 2004: 108–110). As far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, we examine the relation of autohyponymy, which is the relation of a general sense to its more restricted sense, and autoantonymy, the relation of opposite senses. These are, for example, MEMORY → BAD MEMORY (autohyponymy) (AC: Table 7), MORALITY→IMMORALITY (autoantonymy) (BC: Table 9), KVALIFIKOVANOST [competence] → NEKVALIFIKOVANOST [incompetence] (autoantonymy) (SC: Table 12). To make this clear, we provide the context for the first example:



(8) More than 44 years after Kerry first set foot in the southeastern Asian country, Kerry walked along the Mekong Delta discussing his memories of the war as well a message about the growing threat of climate change.

(Associated Press: Secretary of State John Kerry returns to Vietnam for speech about environmental issues, *Daily News*. 15 December 2013).

Here the explicit mention of negative modifiers that could be used with the word MEMORIES is absent; the context makes it clear that the word is related to war in Vietnam, therefore, the word is negatively connoted. Dragićević (2007: 270) uses the term *enantiosemy* (enantiosemy), which refers to the relation between polysemy and antonymy, where a polysemantic unit can have two opposing senses.

Polysemy includes metaphors and metonymies, and in this corpus analysis, metaphors and metonymies are treated as a separate group. When metaphors and metonymies are used, a matter-of-fact tone is replaced with words and expressions that have poetic effects. Metaphor is considered to be the least systematic polysemy, and of all metaphors, the most systematic ones are the basic metaphors which are so common that they are not felt as metaphors any more. The classification of different types of metaphors is borrowed from Geeraerts (2010: 34), following Waag (1908): metaphors based on similarities of shape and appearance, metaphors based on functional similarities, metaphors relating to space and quantity, metaphors related to sensory domains, corporeal and cognitive phenomena, metaphors based on similarities of structural position, metaphors relating space and time. Here are some of the examples of metaphors used as concealing euphemisms:

(9) RHETORICAL COTTON CANDY → EUPHEMISM (AC: Table 8, functional similarity):

But weren't you also a little curious if it was a terrorist attack? And so none of this really adds up. And it's so frustrating every time we have to hear a rhetorical cotton candy, perfect way to describe it.

(Powers<sup>40</sup>: Why can't the Obama administration "just tell the truth" About Benghazi?  
3 February 2014)

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<sup>40</sup> Kirsten A. Powers was Deputy Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Public Affairs in the Clinton administration from 1993-1998. Today, she is a political analyst ([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirsten\\_Powers](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirsten_Powers)).

(10) STAY AFLOAT → SURVIVE FINANCIALLY (BC: Table 10, functional similarity):

Those who do well whatever the weather. I'm talking about families like yours treading water, working harder and harder just to stay afloat. For Labour, this election is about you.

(Miliband: Leader's Speech, Manchester 23 September 2014)

(11) PODMAZATI [grease] → PODMITITI [bribe] (SC: Table 11, functional similarity):

Da bi došli do građevinske dozvole, neimari moraju da odreše kesu. Ne samo što regularno treba da plate razne saglasnosti i takse, već mitom valja "podmazati" i službenike i to najviše one u lokalnim samoupravama.

(Spalević: U Srbiji bez mita nema građevinske dozvole, *Večernje novosti*, 12. decembar 2014.)

[To obtain a building permit, builders have to push the boat out. Not only do they have to pay regular licences and excise taxes, but it is also good to "grease" office workers, most frequently the ones who work in the local self-government.]

[Spalević: In Serbia, it is impossible to obtain a building permit without bribery, *Večernje novosti*, 12 December 2014.]

(12) ISPUMPATI (PUMP OUT) → UKRASTI (STEAL) (SC: Table 11, functional similarity):

Otkrili smo da Elezović ima stan u Beču od oko 80 kvadrata. Nalazi se u širem centru Beča, a otkrili smo kada smo počeli detaljno da proveravamo Elezovića, kao i njegovu ulogu u poslovanju Fonda za kapitalne investicije i Razvojne banke Vojvodine odakle je ispumpan ogroman novac.

(Blagović: Opet muljao: Dušan Elezović sakrio stan u Beču! *Kurir* 13. jul 2013.)

[We have discovered that Elezović owns a flat in Vienna, approximately 80 sqm big. It is in the wider central part of Vienna, and this was discovered when we started checking up on Elezović in detail, his role in the Capital Investment Fund and the Development Bank of Vojvodina, where a huge amount of money was pumped out. ]

[Blagović: Financial shenanigans again: Dušan Elezović hides a flat in Vienna! 13 July 2013]

Other examples of metaphorical extension include: BE MILES AWAY FROM THE TRUTH (BC: Table 9), THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS (BC: Table 10), ZAMAZIVATI OČI [pull the wool over someone's eyes] (SC: Table 11), SIVA EKONOMIJA [grey economy], ETNIČKO ČIŠĆENJE [ethnic cleansing] (SC: Table 12). The last concealing euphemism shows

that even “the history of mass atrocity is awash with euphemistic rationalizations (Hagan and Haugh 2011: 178)”.<sup>41</sup>

Metonymy, unlike metaphor, is highly systematic. Metonymy (including synecdoche)<sup>42</sup> involves the relationship between two readings of a lexical item based on the relationship of contiguity between the referents of the expression (Geeraerts 2010: 27). Metonymy is not limited only to instances of spatial proximity, but to various domains, e.g. spatial, temporal, causal. Geeraerts (2010: 32–33) speaks about two major types of metonymical patterns: part for whole and whole for part. In line with Paul (1920), Nyrop (1913), Waag (1908), and Esnault (1925), he comes up with the following types of metonymies: spatial part and spatial whole, temporal part and temporal whole, location and located, cause and effect, subevent and complex event, characteristic and characterized entity, producer and product, container and contained, possessor and possessed, action and instrument, a piece of clothing and person, member entity and collection, controller and controlled, temporal container and contained, material and object, location and product, action and participant. Here are some of the examples of metonymies found in the corpus:

(13) NOT COME HOME → BE KILLED IN BATTLE (AC: Table 8, effect and cause):

Today we send our thoughts and prayers to all the men and women representing America in distant lands, and we pledge that we will never forget the brave souls who did not come home.

(Bush commemorates foreign policy achievements, 15 January 2009a)

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<sup>41</sup> In their paper “Ethnic Cleansing as Euphemism, Metaphor, Criminology and Law” the authors discuss ethnic cleansing as a rationalizing euphemism and an incriminating metaphor, the relation between ethnic cleansing and the term genocide, and the notion of intent as crucial to ethnic cleansing and genocide. Both ethnic cleansing and genocide are acts of terrorism which can hardly be defined in the way terrorism is usually defined, as “the violence perpetrated by groups against a government and its citizens (Herbst 2003: 167)”. Instead, as the author further explains, this definition of terrorism restricts the application of the term *terrorist* to a subnational, less powerful group, by means of which the interests of both the definer and the state in question are served (Herbst 2003: 167). Therefore, another term, “state-sponsored terrorism” is more adequate, as “referring to the use by a state of surrogate groups to do its terrorist bidding”, in accordance with political agendas (Herbst 2003: 168).

<sup>42</sup> Identifying semantic changes is not easy-going. Geeraerts (2010: 31) notices that synecdoche, for example, the part-whole relationship, can also be understood as specialization or generalization because the part-whole relationship exists at many levels, including subcategories of larger categories.

(14) POLITICS → POLITICIANS (BC: Table 10, product and producer):

I believe that more than any other politicians, Tony Blair and Gordon Brown are responsible for the breakdown in trust in our politics today.

(Cameron: A liberal Conservative consensus to restore trust in politics, 22 March 2007)

(15) RUKA (HAND, ARM) → OSVETA (REVENGE) (SC: Table 11, action and instrument; it can also be a metaphor for violence):

Raković: Euforija Hrvata: Četnici, stići će vas naša ruka! *Kurir*, 17.11.2012.

[Raković: Croats' euphoria: Chetniks, our hand/arm will get you! *Kurir*, 17.11. 2012]

Some concealing euphemisms classified as metonymies could at the same time be viewed as homonyms. These are VANISH→STEAL (AC: Table 7), DISAPPEAR→STEAL (BC: Table 9), NESTATI [disappear] → UKRASTI [steal]; IŠČEZNUTI [vanish] → BITI UKRADEN [be stolen] (SC: Table 11). The possibility to use homonyms as concealing euphemisms is discussed in Section 4.3.2.7.

#### 4.3.2.6. Antonymy

Antonymy, most generally speaking, refers to all types of semantic oppositeness, which includes various subdivisions (Crystal 2008: 28). That there is “a general human tendency to categorize experience in terms of dichotomous contrast (Lyons’s 1977: 277)” is the starting point for the argumentation that antonymy can be a tool for concealing meaning.

In the corpus, antonymy has been found to hold between nouns, verbs, adjectives and even multi-word units:

(16) GENIJALAN [ingenious] → GLUP [stupid] (SC: Table 12):

Došli su na vlast obećavši sve i svašta, da će pokrenuti Srbiju, 10 milijardi investicija, a sada je najnovije genijalno obećanje Beograd na vodi.<sup>43</sup>

(Đilas: Naprednjaci nude prazna obećanja, 07 mart 2014)

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<sup>43</sup> This is an example of irony, which the speaker uses to express an attitude of disapproval, i.e. criticism towards a proposition. Irony and the relation between irony and concealing euphemisms is discussed in Section 2.5.7.8.

[Having promised all sorts of things, they came to power; they promised to change Serbia, they promised 10 billions of investments, and now, the latest ingenious promise is Belgrade Waterfront.]

[Dilas: The Serbian Progressive Party makes empty promises, 07.03.2014]

(17) HUMAN LIFE → DEATH (BC: Table 10):

By contrast Andrew Mitchell and I work together just as Liam Fox and I work together as the closest of colleagues and we expect our departments to do the same, knowing as we do that using foreign and development policies to prevent conflict costs far less in human life and money than intervening in conflict when it is too late.

(Hague: Foreign Secretary's speech, Birmingham, 6 October 2010)

(18) LIBERATE → CONFINE (AC: Table 7):

When the American embassy in Kabul reopened in the beginning of 2002, Ryan Crocker was our first envoy. When we liberated Iraq and removed the thug Saddam Hussein from power in 2003, I sent Ryan to help lead the reconstruction efforts.

(George W. Bush, Bush Commemorates Foreign Policy Achievements, 15.01. 2009a)

(19) STABILISE → DESTABILISE (BC: Table 10):

Our troops are there to stabilise the country and enable a political settlement to be reached so that Afghanistan can be stable and we can be safe.

(Miliband: Leader's speech, Manchester 28 September 2010)

In synonymy, less relevant descriptive features, or non-diagnostic features are the ones that are different in two words. On the other hand, in antonymy, relevant diagnostic features are opposed, and they imply the absence-presence opposition of another quality expressed in the most relevant diagnostic feature. The absence-presence opposition can be taken as the most general formula underlying the oppositeness of meaning (Dragičević 2007: 274–275, 281).

For example, both STABILISE/DESTABILISE have the relevant diagnostic feature [BECOME DIFFERENT], but, the former implies [BECOME STABLE], and the latter implies [BECOME UNSTABLE]. When something is qualified as unstable, questions related to underspecificity of the diagnostic feature [STABLE] (and [UNSTABLE]) can be asked: Stable for whom? Stable in what sense? The answer to the first question is: the one who encodes meaning prefers to foreground the diagnostic feature [STABLE], and further specification depends on the context of use. Here, the context makes it clear that stabilization is related to

the topic of conflicts/war, so the opposite diagnostic feature [BECOME UNSTABLE], which is related to the lexeme WAR, becomes relevant in this context as well. The analysis of the recovery of non-euphemistic antonyms is re-examined in Section 4.4.3.2.

Antonymy is subdivided into four groups: complementary antonymy, polar antonymy, directional antonymy and converseness (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 141–144):

1. Complementary antonyms are non-gradable binary relations which imply a contradiction. The relation follows the rule: if it is not X, it must be Y and the other way round. This is a disjunctive pair/all-or-nothing logic (Murphy 2003: 194-196), which suggests that, as Cruse (2004: 163) humorously remarks, in complementary antonymy, there is no possibility of ‘sitting on the fence’. However, Cann (2011: 463) and Jones (2002: 23–24, 149) argue that complementarity and the traditional dichotomy of gradability/non-gradability cannot be an absolute, which is corroborated by the fact that it is easy to imagine contexts where non-gradable antonyms are graded.

For example, we identified the words/ multi-word units which show that truth and lies are gradable: HALF-TRUTH, NOT RELIABLY TRUTHFUL (AC: Table 7), UNTRUE (AC: Table 8), NEISTINIT [untrue] (SC: Table 11). All these lexemes have additional descriptive features different from the ones non-gradable antonyms have. For example, TRUTH has the diagnostic feature [TRUE] and [ABSENCE OF FALSE], and LIE has the diagnostic feature [FALSE] and [ABSENCE OF TRUE]. On the other hand, HALF-TRUTH, for example, has [TRUE] as its relevant diagnostic feature, but it has another relevant feature [PARTIAL], which implies that it does not have [ABSENCE OF FALSE], but it also has the feature [FALSE]. Therefore, HALF-TRUTH has diagnostic features that LIE has.

2. To further explain the relation between non-gradability and gradability, and the possibility to replace negative with less negative words, the notion of polarity is discussed. Polar antonyms are gradable, and, therefore, they can be used with modifiers, unlike complementary antonyms, which are resistant to gradability (this generalization about complementary antonyms, as shown, does not always stand the test of reality, but here, it is reintroduced to make a general difference between complementaries and polar antonymy). The relation treats X and Y as poles of the gradient, and follows the formula: if it’s X then it can’t be Y, and the other way round, but it can be somewhere in between (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 142). Also, gradables are in *contrary* opposition: *p* and *q* are in contrary opposition iff X is *p*, then it is not *q* (Lyons 1977), but, although the assertion of *p* is a denial of *q*, a denial of *p* does not lead to an assertion of *q* (Murphy 2003: 189). This would mean that if we say that something is EASY, it means that something is NOT DIFFICULT; by contrast, if we say that

something is NOT EASY, it does not follow that it is DIFFICULT. Something can be in-between easy and difficult, or, as Dragičević (2007: 273) argues, the negation of the adjective has a broader meaning (NOT EASY has a broader meaning than DIFFICULT), and can express neutrality or ambivalence in relation to that quality. This accounts for the presence of litotes in public discourse, and even non-gradable antonyms are used in such a way, which is in line with the position that context finally determines if an antonym is gradable or non-gradable. Dragičević (2007: 284), though, makes a difference between negated antonyms that are true antonyms, where she includes the antonym NEISTINIT [untrue], and negated antonyms that are not true antonyms, but the ones with unspecified meaning, and we could for example, include NESLAVAN (INGLORIOUS), in this group. In the corpus analysis, we identify this as *synonym-antonym interplay*; this term is based on the type of antonymy Dragičević (2007: 273–274) labels *sinoantonimija* (syno-antonymy). Finally, these differences between gradable and non-gradable antonyms could be avoided by introducing a group Cruse (1986) labels gradable complementaries (Murphy 2003: 196). Words can have two senses, one in complementary opposition, describing all-or-nothing states, and the other one in contrary opposition, allowing gradability.

Another important property of gradable antonyms is that they implicitly or explicitly invoke a standard for comparison, but it is not always clear what the standard is (Cann 2001: 462):

(20) FREER → LESS OPPRESSED (AC/ Table 8):

The United States honors Ryan C. Crocker for his courage, his integrity, and his unwavering commitment to strengthening our nation and building a freer and more peaceful world.

(George W. Bush, Bush Commemorates Foreign Policy Achievements, 15.01. 2009a)

(21) MORE RESPONSIBLE → LESS IRRESPONSIBLE (BC/ Table 10):

So we will reform our banks, making them more stable – by putting the Bank of England back at the heart of regulation and setting up an independent commission on bank structure, making them more responsible – by getting to grips with the bonus culture and most importantly, making them serve the real economy and not just themselves – by opening up credit lines to businesses.

(Cameron: Transforming the British economy: Coalition strategy for economic growth, 28 May 2010)

(22) PRAVEDNIJE→MANJE NEPRAVEDNO [MORE FAIRLY/LESS UNFAIRLY] (SC/Table 12):

Dosta mi je uslovljavanja MMF, sledeća vlada mora da poveća plate, da promeni poresku politiku, da se sredstva pravednije raspodeljuju, da investitorima otvori put za nova ulaganja.

(Ivica Dačić: Pomiriću dve Srbije, 3. maj 2012.)

[I'm fed up with IMF conditioning, the next government must increase salaries, change tax policies, distribute finances more fairly, and open the door to new investments. ]

[Dačić: I will reconcile two Serbias, 3 May 2012]

These antonyms can be used in the comparative and the superlative forms (they have been found in the corpus) (Cruse 2004: 164–165). The comparative form of both terms are *impartial* (they are pseudo-comparatives). This means that the comparative form does not presuppose that the term in the positive degree is applicable. For example, when we say that X is MORE MODERATE than Y, it is not presupposed that X is MODERATE, it can mean that X is LESS EXTREME. This feature of polar antonymy is related to *ad hoc* concept construction; the adjective MORE MODERATE is in need of enrichment because we can always ask *more moderate than what?* and come to the conclusion that a degree of moderate is actually a lower degree of extreme. In the corpus analysis, such examples are also identified as the *synonym-antonym interplay*; this term is based on the type of antonymy Dragičević (2007: 273–274) labels *sinoantonimija* (syno-antonymy).

Unlike polar antonymy, where both antonymous terms are impartial (pseudo-comparatives), Cruse (2004: 165-166) speaks about equipollent antonymy, which includes cases where both compared terms are committed (true comparatives). In other words, they presuppose the existence of a quality. For example, the comparative POORER in “[...]Oxfam spokesperson Emma Seery said more was needed to protect poorer countries [...], (Murphy: *The Independent*, 6 September 2013)” does not imply that someone is not poor (unless it is ironical). Here, POORER can be a distraction from a direct statement that those countries are poor (which can, of course, also be the reason for choosing euphemisms such as DISADVANTAGED, LEAST WELL-OFF, UNDERFUNDED, VULNERABLE, GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers]). In addition to polar and equipollent antonymy, there is another type of antonymy – overlapping antonymy. Here, one member of the pair is impartial (pseudo-comparative) and the other one is committed (true comparative), e.g. GOOD (impartial) /BAD (committed).



3. Directional antonymy (directional opposites, multiple incompatibility, multiple taxonomy) is most similar to non-gradable type of antonymy; it represents opposing poles on a shared axis (Cruse 1986: 223–231, 2004: 166–167, Jones 2002: 18–20, Murphy 2008: 142–143). These poles can be realized as directions (up–down, straightforward directions), counterparts (male–female), antipodals (top–bottom, extremes on an axis), reversives (appear–disappear, they denote movement in opposite directions, and they are all verbs). In this corpus, antipodals and reversives have been identified. For example, THE TOP (BC: Table 10), refers to the elite, and it implies and conceals the antipodal, THE BOTTOM, thus, a social distinction is made between the elite and the ones who are at the bottom. As for verbs, reversives focus on the change, and the way the action takes place is not important. What matters is the outcome of the action described by the verb. The euphemism DISAPPEAR in relation to the disappearance of finances is a good example; the manner of action is backgrounded, otherwise a direct word STEAL would be used.

4. Converseness/converses (Cruse 2004: 167–168, Jones 2002: 16–18), reciprocal antonymy or relational opposition is also viewed as a subtype of directional opposition, or even synonymy. The former is possible as they describe orientations in opposite directions, and the latter is possible as they both describe the same type of arrangement (A is above B, B is below A), and we cannot speak about degrees in relation to these antonyms (or gradability). Converseness is important, as it expresses a relation between members of a converse pair. Cruse's (2004: 167) examples are: *husband:wife*, *predator/pray*, *rapist: victim*, and, in this corpus, both members of the converse pair can be found, such as THE FEW: THE MANY, or, only one member of the converse pair can be found, such as THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS (THE RICH), and the other member (POOR) is implicitly invoked.

To sum up, antonymy in this research is approached from a corpus-based perspective, so the preceding classifications are related to the context of use. After all, the range of possible antonyms for a word increases when words are used in contexts (Murphy 2003: 174).

#### 4.3.2.7. Homonymy

Atkins and Rundell (2008: 280) state that dictionaries have traditionally made a difference between polysemy and homonymy. Most briefly stated, when a word is polysemous, it means that it has several different meanings, and homonyms are two lexical items which happen to have the same phonological form (Crystal 2008: 373–374). In Section

2.5.7.6. Prčić's (2008a: 293–298) classification of lexical adjustment processes includes complete homonymy, a type of unmotivated reconstruction, which occurs when two different unrelated meanings have the same phonological and graphological realizations. In this corpus, cases of homonymy have been found, so this relation should also be examined.

As Lyons (1977: 550–552) explains, polysemy and homonymy are two types of lexical ambiguity, easier to speak about in general terms than to define in terms of operational criteria. As he argues, one of the most common criterion to differentiate between these two types of lexical ambiguity is relatedness/unrelatedness of meaning, but the problem with this is that relatedness of meaning is a matter of degree and it very often depends on the intuition of native speakers. In this research, however, making a distinction between polysemy and homonymy is not regarded as a problem; it is actually a workable solution to the problem of the existence of homonymy that separates itself from polysemy in the language of concealing euphemisms. In that sense, Nerlich and Clarke (2003: 8–10), in accordance with Cowie (1982), (Lipka 1990), Gibbs (1994), Cruse (1995), accept polysemy as a graded phenomenon, involving contrastive and complementary polysemy (Weinreich 1966, Pustejovsky 1995). Contrastive polysemy includes homonyms: for example, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE can, depending on the context, be understood as HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE or MILITARY ACTION<sup>44</sup>. Complementary polysemy deals with related semantic aspects of the word: for example ACTION can be understood as ACTION in general, or MILITARY ACTION, which depends on the context of use <sup>45</sup>. Contrastive and complementary polysemy are illustrated with the given examples in the following extracts from the newspaper articles:

(23) HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE→MILITARY ACTION (BC/Table 9):

MPs had been recalled to vote on a motion on Thursday expected to sanction military action. Instead, after a Labour intervention, they will debate a broader motion calling for a “humanitarian response” [...] The move came just three hours after William Hague, the Foreign Secretary said it was “very important” for the UK not to leave it too long before launching strikes against Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

MPs will still debate and vote on a broader motion in the Commons on Thursday.

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<sup>44</sup> The multi-word unit HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE is analyzed in detail in Section 4.4.3.

<sup>45</sup> The authors argue that senses of a polysemous word can at any time change their status and generate new homonyms, which means that polysemy is based on the semantic-pragmatic interface and the synchronic-diachronic interface that can lead to semantic disharmony.

They will be asked to support the Government's motion which states that a "strong humanitarian response is required from the international community and that this may, if necessary, require military action that is legal, proportionate and focused on saving lives by preventing and deterring further use of Syria's chemical weapons."

(Dominiczak, Ross and Winnett: Cameron backs down on urgent Syria strikes, *The Telegraph*, 28.08.2013.)

(24) ACTION MILITARY → ACTION (BC/Table 7):

As Barack Obama awaits Congress's vote on Syria there is one man who could restore Britain's status as a key ally.

Barack Obama's decision to seek the approval of Congress before initiating international action against Syria has profound implications for both David Cameron and Ed Miliband.

Far from the President questioning the Prime Minister's judgment in allowing Parliament to have the last word on military action, he has decided to follow his example and give a similar role to senators and congressmen.

(Rifkin: Our reputation is in your hands, Mr Miliband, *The Times*, 02.09.2013.)

Here, it is important to make a difference between descriptive and diagnostic semantic features: the former includes all semantic features, and diagnostic features have a diagnostic role in determining the sense of a lexeme (Prčić 2008b: 50–68). In the first example, "humanitarian response" may "require military action", which means that, first of all, the denotation of HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE can change if it includes military action, and, therefore, the lexeme denoting such a response should be changed to match its denotation. If the descriptive feature [MILITARY] is added to the sense HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, the sense of the HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE also changes. The descriptive feature [MILITARY] differs from other descriptive features as it has a diagnostic role in determining the sense of the lexeme. Both the diagnostic feature [MILITARY] and the diagnostic feature [HUMANITARIAN] are diagnostic features, but they are unrelated, and are, therefore, separated, which is why they belong to different homonymous lexemes. As far as the second example is concerned, ACTION/MILITARY ACTION, it is an illustration of complementary polysemy. Both senses include the diagnostic features [DOING SOMETHING] [ACHIEVING A GOAL], so they are related.

In the corpus, another interesting example of homonymy is VANISH/STEAL, which appears in all three corpora. Two interpretations are possible, the first which treats the

relation VANISH/STEAL as a cause/effect metonymy, and the second as a homonymous relation. Both interpretations can be grounded in Rakova's (2003: 167) typology of lexical-conceptual relation: 1) one word – one meaning – one concept; 2) one word – several meanings – one concept; 3) one word – several meanings – several concepts (related); 4) one word – several meanings – several concepts (unrelated) (cf. Sperber and Wilson (1998a: 184–185), Section 2.5.7.5). The first and the fourth categories are the two ends of the continuum: the first includes unambiguous words, and the fourth category includes homonyms. The second category includes examples of verbal polysemy such as KEEP, CUT, OPEN, noun polysemy such as SLICE, and double-function adjectives (the ones used in both physical and psychological contexts) and the third category is inbetween polysemy and homonymy. The third category includes metaphors and metonymies. According to Rakova (2003: 167), the most frequent change is the movement from the third into the fourth category when meanings of a word stop being perceived as related. The concealing euphemism VANISH could be viewed as a borderline case between the third and the fourth category, or as belonging only to the fourth category, i.e. as a homonym.<sup>46</sup>

#### 4.3.2.8. Concluding remarks

The previous discussion of the lexico-semantic relations is important because it serves as the background for the analysis the lexico-semantic relations that follows in the next section. As not all concealing euphemisms given in the formal classifications (Tables 4, 5 and 6) can be found in the lexical database WordNet 3.1, the definitions and assumptions provided in the previous sections are also used as the guidelines in the analysis of the lexico-semantic relations between concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents.

#### 4.3.3. Results

The results of the lexico-semantic analysis are given in six tables, Tables 7–12. The results of the lexico-semantic analysis of the American corpus of concealing euphemisms found in newspaper articles and their non-euphemistic equivalents are given in Table 7, and the results of the lexico-semantic analysis of the American corpus of concealing euphemisms

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<sup>46</sup> This would not be an unprecedented categorization; similarly to this example, Zalizniak (2008: 218) cites Benveniste's (1954) revelation of, at that time, original connection between two meanings of the French verb VOLER – *to fly* and *to steal*, homonyms in contemporary French. Then she finds the same semantic shift in Russian, NALĚTČIK *robber*, derivative of LETET, *to fly*.

found in political speeches and their non-euphemistic equivalents are given in Table 8. Tables 9 and 10 show the results of the analysis of the British corpus of concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents, also separated into the corpus of the concealing euphemisms found in newspaper articles and those found in political speeches. Tables 11 and 12 show the results of the analysis of the Serbian subcorpus, again, separated into the relations relevant for the concealing euphemisms found in newspaper articles and their non-euphemistic equivalents, and for those found in political speeches and their non-euphemistic equivalents. The concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic counterparts are given in pairs, where the first word/multi-word unit is a concealing euphemism, and the second is the non-euphemistic equivalent, joined with an arrow. We use the abbreviations AC, BC and SC for the American, British and Serbian corpus.

As far as the American and British subcorpora are concerned, the lexico-semantic relations of hyperonymy/hyponymy, polysemy, troponymy, synonymy, meronymy, antonymy and homonymy are identified by means of the lexical database WordNet Search 3.1. In addition, we rely on the definitions and assumptions related to the lexico-semantic relations given in Section 4.3.2. As for polysemy, regular polysemy is separated from two special types of polysemy, metaphors and metonymies. Different types of metaphors and metonymies are taken from Geeraerts (2010: 32–35) (see Section 4.3.2.5). The specification of the types of metaphors and metonymies is given in the discussion that follows the Tables.

As far as the Serbian corpus is concerned, the above-listed lexico-semantic relations between the concealing euphemisms (identified in newspaper articles and political speeches) and their non-euphemistic counterparts (their more negatively connoted counterparts) are identified on the basis of the definitions and assumptions related to the lexico-semantic relations given in Section 4.3.2. Also, we rely on *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990) in the analysis of different senses of a word/head of the multi-word unit identified as the concealing euphemisms, which leads to the identification of the relation between the concealing euphemism and the non-euphemistic equivalent.

As far as the multi-word units are concerned, we analyze the relation between, on the one hand, the headword in the concealing euphemism and, on the other hand, the headword in the non-euphemistic equivalent. This does not apply to metaphors and metonymies.

We begin with the results of the analysis of the lexico-semantic relations in the American corpus, Tables 7 and 8, and the British corpus, 9 and 10. The results are followed by further subclassifications of all types of lexico-semantic between concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents.

TABLE 7: LEXICO-SEMANTIC ANALYSIS: AC/ NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

<b>LEXICO-SEMANTIC RELATIONS</b>	
<b>HYPERONYM – HYPONYM and TROPONYM</b>	
<b>NOUNS</b>	
CONSTRUCT (hyperonym)→ INCORRECT CONSTRUCT (hyponym)	
FIB (hyponym) →LIE (hyperonym)	
FICTION (hyponym) →FALSEHOOD (hyperonym)	
GIFT (co-hyponym) →BRIBE (co-hyponym)	
HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD (hyperonym) → BAD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD (hyponym)	
MEMORY (hyperonym) → BAD MEMORY (hyponym)	
SURVEILLANCE (hyperonym)→MASS SURVEILLANCE (hyponym)	
<b>VERBS</b>	
MISINFORM (hyperonym) → LIE (troponym)	
MISLEAD (hyperonym) → LIE (troponym)	
MONITOR (hyperonym) → SPY (troponym)	
TAKE (hyperonym) → STEAL (troponym)	
WITHHOLD (hyperonym) → KEEP TO ONESELF, HIDE (troponym)	
<b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN HEAD)</b>	
DOMESTIC SERVITUDE → SLAVERY (hyperonym of SERVITUDE)	
ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym)	
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAMME (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym)	
INTERROGATION POLICIES (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym)	
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY (hyperonym) → CRIME (hyponym of ACTIVITY)	
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY (hyperonym) → SECRET GOVERNMENT AGENCY (hyponym)	
PRIVACY ABUSE (hyperonym) → SPYING (hyponym of ABUSE)	
RACIAL PROFILING (hyponym) → RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (hyperonym)	
(20)	
<b>SYNONYMY</b>	
<b>NOUN</b>	
DISINFORMATION → LIE	
<b>ADJECTIVES</b>	
UNDERFUNDED→POOR	
UNREPORTED→SECRET	
(3)	

<b>REGULAR POLYSEMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUNS:</b> ACTION→MILITARY ACTION  SEQUESTRATION→SEIZING PROPERTY  USE →MANIPULATION</p> <p><b>VERBS:</b> FURLOUGH → DISMISS  PACIFY →DESTROY</p> <p><b>ADJECTIVES:</b> INCONSISTENT→UNFAIR  WRONGFUL →UNLAWFUL</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB HEAD):</b> EMPTY PROMISE → FALSE PROMISE  SACRIFICE ONE’S LIFE → DIE IN BATTLE</p>	(9)
<b>METAPHORS AND METONYMIES</b>	
<p><b>VERB:</b> VANISH →STEAL</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB HEAD):</b> BACKROOM DIPLOMACY → SECRET DIPLOMACY  BLACK SITE PRISON → SECRET PRISON FOR TORTURING  POLITICAL HAND → POLITICIAN  SLIPPERY FACTS → LIES  STRETCH THE TRUTH → LIE  SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES→ MILITARY FORCES</p>	(7)
<b>ANTONYMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUN</b>  CERTAIN→UNCERTAIN</p>	(1)
<b>SYNONYM/ANTONYM INTERPLAY</b>	
<p><b>NOUN:</b> HALF-TRUTH→LIE</p> <p><b>ADJECTIVES:</b> LOWER →LESS HIGH  STRICTER→LESS LENIENT  INACCURATE→FAULTY</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (ADJECTIVE, ADVERB AND NOUN):</b>  LESS DIRECT→ MORE INDIRECT; NOT DIRECT  LESS TRANSPARENTLY → MORE VAGUELY  LESS ACCOUNTABLE → MORE IRRESPONSIBLE  MORE MODERATE → LESS EXTREME  NOT A PATRIOT → NOT A TRAITOR  NOT RELIABLY TRUTHFUL → FALSE</p>	(10)

TABLE 8: LEXICO-SEMANTIC ANALYSIS: AC/ POLITICAL SPEECHES

<b>LEXICO-SEMANTIC RELATIONS</b>	
<b>HYPERONYM – HYPONYM and TROPONYM</b>	
<b>NOUNS</b>	
CONFLICT (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym)	
LEADERSHIP (hyperonym) → HEGEMONY (hyponym)	
PRETENSE (hyponym) → DECEPTION (hyperonym)	
PROBLEM (hyperonym) → <i>not identified</i>	
SURGE (hyperonym) → TROOP SURGE (hyponym)	
<b>VERBS:</b> FIGHT (hyperonym) → WAGE WAR (troponym)	
MISREPRESENT (hyperonym) → FALSIFY (troponym)	
MISSPEAK (hyperonym) → LIE (hyponym)	
<b>ADJECTIVE:</b> WEAKENED (hyponym) → WEAK (hyperonym)	
<b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN HEAD)</b>	
CONDUCT (hyperonym) → INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT (hyponym)	
HOME MORTGAGE CRISIS (hyperonym of CRISIS) → FORECLOSURE (hyponym of CRISIS)	
MILITARY ACTION (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym)	
MILITARY CONFLICT (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym) (13)	
<b>REGULAR POLYSEMY</b>	
<b>NOUNS</b>	
BATTLE (also a meronym) → WAR	
FIGHT (also a meronym) → WAR	
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT (ENGAGEMENT is also a meronym) → WAR	
<b>VERBS</b>	
SERVE → DO MILITARY SERVICE	
THREATEN → THREATEN TO CAUSE INJURY	
<b>ADJECTIVES</b>	
FALLEN → KILLED IN BATTLE	
FORTUNATE → RICH	
ILL-SERVED → ILL-SERVED BY THE GOVERNMENT	
TRUSTING → NAIVE	
<b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (VERB HEAD)</b>	
ECONOMIC CHALLENGE → ECONOMIC CRISIS	
OPEN THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM → SURRENDER (11)	



## METAPHORS AND METONYMIES

### NOUN

HAMMER → ARMY

NAIL → *not identified*

### MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB HEADS)

DEFENSE SPENDING → MILITARY SPENDING

GIVE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE

INNOCENT SHADINGS OF THE TRUTH → LIES

LOSE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE

LOSE A JOB → BE DISMISSED

MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE

MILITARY CAMPAIGN → WAR

NOT COME HOME → BE KILLED IN BATTLE

POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION, FRAUD → POLITICIANS' DYSFUNCTION, FRAUD

RHETORICAL COTTON CANDY → EUPHEMISM

SECURITY FORCES → ARMY

THE FEW → OLIGARCHY

(14)

### ANTONYMY

**VERB:** LIBERATE → CONFINE

(1)

### SYNONYM/ANTONYM INTERPLAY

### ADJECTIVES

FREER → LESS OPPRESSED

SAFER → LESS DANGEROUS

UNTRUE → FALSE

### MULTI-WORD UNITS (ADJECTIVE, ADVERB and NOUN):

MORE PEACEFUL → LESS HOSTILE

MORE SECURE → LESS INSECURE

NOT A PROPONENT → OPPONENT

NOT EASY → NOT DIFFICULT

NOT INADVERTENTLY → INTENTIONALLY

NOT FRIENDLY → HOSTILE

NOT PARTICULARLY FAIR → UNFAIR

NOT PRETTY → NOT UGLY

(11)

TABLE 9: LEXICO-SEMANTIC ANALYSIS: BC/NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

<b>LEXICO-SEMANTIC RELATIONS</b>	
<b>HYPERONYM – HYPONYM and TROPONYM</b>	
<b>NOUNS (AND COMPOUND NOUNS)</b>	
AIRSTRIKE (hyperonym) → BOMBING (hyponym of STRIKE)	
CONFLICT (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym)	
CRISIS (hyperonym) → WAR CRISIS (hyponym of WAR)	
EXPERIENCE (hyperonym) → NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE (hyponym)	
FEE (co-hyponym) → BRIBE	
IMPACT (hyperonym) → NEGATIVE IMPACT (hyponym)	
INFLUENCE (hyponym) → POWER (hyponym)	
MANAGEMENT (hyperonym) → BAD MANAGEMENT (hyponym)	
PAYMENT (hyperonym) → BRIBE (hyponym)	
SURVEILLANCE (hyperonym) → MASS SURVEILLANCE (hyponym)	
PERK (co-hyponym) → BRIBE (hyponym)	
RESPONSE (hyperonym) → MILITARY RESPONSE (hyponym)	
TALL TALE (hyponym) → LIE (hyperonym)	
<b>VERBS</b>	
DETAIN (hyperonym) → IMPRISON (troponym)	
MISREPORT (hyperonym) → LIE (troponym)	
MIS-SELL (troponym) → DECEIVE BY SELLING (hyperonym)	
PAY (hyperonym) → BRIBE (troponym)	
TAKE (hyperonym) → TAKE AS A BRIBE (troponym)	
SPEND (hyperonym) → SPEND WASTEFULLY (troponym)	
WATCH (hyperonym) → SPY (troponym)	
<b>ADJECTIVES</b>	
POORER (hyponym) → POOR (hyperonym)	
UNACCEPTABLE (hyperonym) → TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE (hyponym)	
<b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN HEAD)</b>	
ALL NECESSARY MEASURES (hyperonym) → <i>not identified</i>	
ARMED STRUGGLE (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym of STRUGGLE)	
CONTROVERSIAL INTERROGATION PROGRAMME (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym)	
ETHNIC PROFILING (hyponym) → ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION (hyperonym)	
FAR-FETCHED FIBS (hyponym) → LIE (hyperonym)	
FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES (hyperonym) → STEALING (hyponym of IRREGULARITIES)	(28)

<b>REGULAR POLYSEMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUNS:</b> ACTION → MILITARY ACTION</p> <p>ENGAGEMENT → WAR (ENGAGEMENT is also a meronym of WAR)</p> <p>FORCE → VIOLENCE</p> <p>INTERVENTION → INTERFERENCE</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN HEAD)</b></p> <p>MILITARY INVOLVEMENT → MILITARY ENGAGEMENT → WAR (ENGAGEMENT is also a meronym of WAR)</p> <p>(5)</p>	
<b>METAPHORS AND METONYMIES</b>	
<p><b>NOUN:</b> AUSTERITY → EXPENDITURE CUTS</p> <p><b>VERB:</b> DISAPPEAR → STEAL</p> <p><b>ADJECTIVE:</b> MISSING → STOLEN</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB)</b></p> <p>BE MILES AWAY FROM THE TRUTH → LIE</p> <p>CHEAP LABOUR → CHEAP WORKERS</p> <p>POLITICAL VALUES → POLITICIANS' VALUES</p> <p>SET THE ENTIRE REGION ABLAZE → START A WAR</p> <p>TAKE LIVES → KILL</p> <p>TAX HAVEN → TAX EVASION</p>	(9)
<b>ANTONYMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUN:</b> MORALITY → IMMORALITY</p>	(1)
<b>SYNONYM/ANTONYM INTERPLAY</b>	
<p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (ADJECTIVES):</b> LESS AFFORDABLE → MORE EXPENSIVE</p> <p>POORLY CONTROLLED → UNCONTROLLED</p> <p>SOFT JUSTICE → INJUSTICE</p> <p>UNCONSTRUCTIVE → DESTRUCTIVE</p> <p>UNDIPLOMATIC → RUDE</p> <p>UNPATRIOTIC → TREASONOUS</p>	(6)
<b>HOMONYMY</b>	
<p><b>MULTI-WORD UNIT (NOUN HEAD)</b></p> <p>HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE → MILITARY ACTION</p>	(1)

TABLE 10: LEXICO-SEMANTIC ANALYSIS: BC/POLITICAL SPEECHES

<b>LEXICO-SEMANTIC RELATIONS</b>	
<b>HYPERONYM – HYPONYM and TROPONYM</b>	
<b>NOUNS (AND COMPOUND NOUNS)</b>	
LEVEL (hyperonym) → LOW LEVEL (hyponym)	
MISINFORMATION (hyperonym) → LIE (hyponym)	
REALITIES (hyperonym) → HARSH REALITIES (hyponym)	
<b>VERB</b>	
TELL (hyperonym) → LIE (troponym)	
<b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN HEAD)</b>	
ALL THE OPTIONS (hyperonym) → <i>not identified</i>	
ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (hyperonym) → CRIME (hyponym of behaviour) (7)	
<b>SYNONYMY</b>	
<b>NOUN</b>	
SPIN DOCTOR → EUPHEMIZER	
<b>ADJECTIVES</b>	
DISADVANTAGED → POOR	
INADEQUATE → POOR	
UNENVIABLE → EMBARRASSING (4)	
<b>REGULAR POLYSEMY</b>	
<b>NOUNS</b>	
SPIN → INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY POLITICIANS	
COMBAT (also a meronym) → WAR	
MISSION → MILITARY MISSION	
SQUEEZE → RESTRICTED RESOURCES	
<b>ADJECTIVES</b>	
VULNERABLE → POOR	
DYSFUNCTIONAL → ABUSIVE (5)	

## METAPHORS AND METONYMIES

**NOUNS:** BANK → WEALTHY BANKERS

COUNTRY → PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT

DANGER → WAR

POLITICS → POLITICIANS

STATE → PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT

**VERBS:** POCKET → STEAL

**MULTI-WORD UNITS:** BLACK MARKET → ILLEGAL MARKET

GIVE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE

MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE

NARROWER HORIZONS → RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

POLITICAL SYSTEM → POLITICIANS

POWERFUL INTERESTS → POWERFUL PEOPLE'S INTERESTS

SIPHON OFF → STEAL

SOCIAL EXCLUSION → POVERTY

STAY AFLOAT → SURVIVE FINANCIALLY

STRONGER/WEAKER ECONOMY → RICHER/POORER COUNTRY → RICH/POOR COUNTRY

THE ARAB SPRING → REGIME CHANGE

THE BETTER-OFF (THE LEAST WELL-OFF) → THE WEALTHY (THE POOR)

THE ELITE FEW → OLIGARCHY

THE MANY → CITIZENRY

THE NEXT GREECE → IN DEBT

THE OTHERS → OTHER PEOPLE → THE RICH

THE TOP/THE FEW → OLIGARCHY

THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS → THE WEALTHIEST

(24)

## ANTONYMY

**VERB:** STABILISE → DESTABILISE; **MULTI-WORD UNIT (NOUN HEAD):** HUMAN LIFE → DEATH

(2)

## SYNONYM/ANTONYM INTERPLAY

**ADJECTIVE:** BETTER → LESS BAD

FAIRER → LESS UNFAIR

INSOLVENT → BANKRUPT

**MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND ADJECTIVE):** LESS SECURE → MORE INSECURE

MORE RESPONSIBLE → LESS IRRESPONSIBLE

MORE STABLE → LESS UNSTABLE

NOT GOOD ENOUGH → BAD

STEADY EROSION OF RESPONSIBILITY → IRRESPONSIBILITY

(8)

The first lexico-semantic relation analyzed in the corpus is hyperonymy-hyponymy. In the Tables, the concealing euphemism is identified as the hyperonym or the hyponym, so, the non-euphemistic equivalent is the related hyponym or the hyperonym. In the Tables 7, 8 and 9, concealing euphemisms can be either hyponyms or hyperonyms, and in Table 10, concealing euphemisms are only hyperonyms. Concealing euphemisms realized as hyponyms are more frequent in Tables 7 and 9, among concealing euphemisms from newspaper articles than in Tables 8 and 10. Also, the hyperonymy/hyponymy relation is more frequent than metaphors/ metonimies in Tables 7 and 9 (newspaper articles), whereas metaphors/metonimies are more frequent than hyperonymy/hyponymy in Tables 8 and 10 (political speeches).

The hyperonymy-hyponymy relation has been found to hold between nouns, verbs and multi-word units (with the noun as the headword); there is only one adjective related to hyponymy/hyperonymy in Table 8 (WEAKENED→WEAK), and two in Table 9 (POORER→POOR; UNACCEPTABLE → TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE). This confirms that hyperonymy/hyponymy is found mostly in nouns (here both single nouns and in multi-word units), quite a number of verbs (in this analysis the most frequent verb is the *mis*-verb) and in some adjectives (Atkins and Rundell 2008: 132, Griffiths 2006: 46, Murphy 2003: 221), as discussed in Section 4.3.2.2. The concealing euphemisms WEAKENED, POORER and UNACCEPTABLE are identified as the hyponyms suggesting a degree of the specified quality.

As far as the other concealing euphemisms (nouns, verbs and multiword units) are concerned, the lexico-semantic relation of hyperonymy/hyponymy can have the following subtypes in all corpora, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10:

- Hyperonymy/hyponymy identified in the database: FIB (hyponym) →LIE (hyperonym); FICTION (hyponym) → FALSEHOOD (hyperonym); RACIAL PROFILING (hyponym) → RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (hyperonym); SERVITUDE in DOMESTIC SERVITUDE (hyponym) → SLAVERY (hyperonym) (Table 7); CONFLICT (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym); PRETENSE (hyponym) → DECEPTION (hyperonym); MILITARY ACTION (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym); MILITARY CONFLICT (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym) (CONFLICT is polysemous, and one of its senses leads to the direct hyponym WAR) (Table 8); ARMED STRUGGLE (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym), BOMBING (hyponym of the headword) → AIRSTRIKE (in the database, the direct hyperonym of BOMBING is ATTACK, and ATTACK is synonymous with STRIKE), CONFLICT (hyperonym) → WAR (hyponym); ETHNIC PROFILING (hyponym) → ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION (hyperonym) (analogous with RACIAL

PROFILING → RACIAL DISCRIMINATION from Table 7); DETAIN (hyperonym) → IMPRISON (troponym); FAR-FETCHED FIB (hyponym) → LIE (hyperonym); INFLUENCE (hyponym) → POWER (hyperonym); PAYMENT (hyperonym) → BRIBE (hyponym) (Table 9);

Three more examples from Table 7 belong to this group: ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym); INTERROGATION POLICIES (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym); EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAMME (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym); one of the full hyponyms of the hyperonym TORTURE given in the database is PROLONGED INTERROGATION, so the first two identified concealing euphemisms are treated as variations of the hyponym PROLONGED INTERROGATION, and the third euphemism is treated as a type of torture.

- Contextual hyperonymy/hyponymy: this relation is not given in the lexical database, it is established by following the formula X IS-A-KIND-OF Y. For example, one of the many senses of MEMORY is “remembering”, and that particular sense can have the hyponymic sense BAD MEMORY/REMEMBERING BAD THING in a particular context. It can also be regarded as an instance of autoantonymy (see Section 4.3.2.5. that discusses this). Contextual hyperonymy/hyponymy does not have to imply the opposites GOOD and BAD: for example, X IS-A-KIND-OF Y can be exemplified by SURVEILLANCE → MASS SURVEILLANCE (Table 7):

(25) But Mr. Hentoff sees the surveillance state as a threat to free speech, too. About a year ago he went up to Harvard to speak to a class [...] It will have the effect of constricting freedom of expression. Americans will become careful about what they say that can be misunderstood or misinterpreted, and then too careful about what they say that can be understood. The inevitable end of surveillance is self-censorship.

(Noonan: What We Lose If We Give Up Privacy, *The Wall Street Journal*, 16.08.2013.)

Other examples of this relation in Table 7 are: CONSTRUCT → INCORRECT CONSTRUCT; HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD → BAD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD; OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY → SECRET GOVERNMENT AGENCY; PRIVACY ABUSE → SPYING. In Table 8, these are CONDUCT → INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT, HOME MORTGAGE CRISIS → FORECLOSURE; LEADERSHIP → HEGEMONY; MISSPEAK → LIE; SURGE → TROOP SURGE. In Table 9, these are EXPERIENCE → NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE; FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES → STEALING; CRISIS → WAR CRISIS; IMPACT → NEGATIVE IMPACT; MANAGEMENT → BAD MANAGEMENT; RESPONSE → MILITARY RESPONSE; SURVEILLANCE → MASS

SURVEILLANCE. In Table 10, these are LEVEL → LOW LEVEL, REALITIES → HARSH REALITIES. There are three hyperonyms for which hyponyms have not been identified: ALL NECESSARY MEASURES (Table 9), ALL THE OPTIONS (Table 10) and PROBLEM (Table 8).

- Inherited hyperonymy/hyponymy: ACTIVITY in ILLEGAL ACTIVITY is the hyperonym for WRONGDOING, and WRONGDOING is the hyperonym for CRIME (Table 7). In Table 9, TALL TALE is related to LIE: LIE is a direct hyperonym of the hyponym TALE, and the inherited hyperonym of TALL TALE (direct hyponym of TALE). In Table 10, BEHAVIOUR (ACTIVITY: ANY SPECIFIC BEHAVIOUR) in ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR is the inherited hyperonym of CRIME.
- Indirect co-hyponymy (“fuzzy” co-hyponymy, see Murphy (2003: 167), see Section 4.3.2.3): for example, one of the senses of GIFT (Table 7) is “something acquired without compensation”, whose direct hyperonym is ACQUISITION, and the indirect hyperonym is TRANSFERRED POSSESSION. The co-hyponym BRIBE also has TRANSFERRED POSSESSION as its inherited hyperonym BRIBE: the relation of inheritance is PAYMENT/ COST/ OUTGO/ TRANSFERRED PROPERTY/ POSSESSION. In Table 9, FEE is defined as “a fixed charge for a privilege or for professional services”, and it has the inheritance chain similar to BRIBE: FIXED CHARGE/CHARGE/COST/OUTGO/TRANSFERRED PROPERTY/POSSESSION, so FEE and BRIBE are both considered as inherited co-hyponyms of TRANSFERRED POSSESSION. The inheritance chain of PERK is BENEFIT/PAYMENT/COST/OUTGO/TRANSFERRED PROPERTY/POSSESSION, so it is also a co-hyponym of the hyperonym TRANSFERRED POSSESSION.

In addition to these types of hyperonymy/hyponymy, troponymy has been identified:

- Troponymy: MISINFORM→ LIE (troponym); MISLEAD (polysemous) → MISINFORM (one of the senses) → LIE (troponym); MONITOR→ SPY (troponym); TAKE → STEAL (troponym); WITHOLD → KEEP TO ONESELF (troponym) (Table 7); FIGHT (hyperonym) → WAGE A WAR (troponym); MISREPRESENT → FALSIFY (troponym) (Table 8); PAY→ BRIBE (troponym), WATCH → SPY (troponym); TAKE → TAKE AS A BRIBE (troponym); SPEND → SPEND WASTEFULLY (troponym); MISREPORT → LIE (troponym); MIS-SELL (troponym) → DECEIVE BY SELLING: MISREPORT has not been found in the database, so the relation



MISREPORT → LIE is identified by drawing the analogy between MISINFORM → LIE (Table 9); TELL → LIE (Table 10).

The second analyzed relation is synonymy. There are three examples in Table 7, DISINFORMATION → LIE, UNDERFUNDED → POOR, UNREPORTED → SECRET. These relations have not been found in the lexical database, but these words can be treated as synonyms in accordance with the definitions given in the database: DISINFORMATION is “deliberate dissemination of wrong information” and LIE is “a statement that deviates from or perverts the truth”; UNDERFUNDED is defined as “not having enough money” (the definition is taken from *Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries*, as it has not been found in the database) and one of the senses of POOR is “having little money”; UNREPORTED is “not reported, not made known”, and one of the senses of SECRET is “not open or public”. Also, these words can be identified as instances of near-synonymy in accordance with the discussion in Section 4.3.2.3, where Cruse (2004: 157) specifies the differences that do not destroy synonymy. For example, adjacent position on a scale of degree is exemplified by: DISINFORMATION → LIE (truth and lie are not absolutes) and UNDERFUNDED → POOR (UNDERFUNDED is LESS POOR). Differences in the prototype center can be exemplified by UNREPORTED → SECRET (UNREPORTED does not necessarily imply SECRET).

In Table 10, MISINFORMATION is a hyperonym to DISINFORMATION, which is a synonym for LIE; therefore, MISINFORMATION is also an indirect hyperonym for LIE.

In Table 10, synonymy is illustrated with SPIN DOCTOR → EUPHEMIZER, DISADVANTAGED → POOR, INADEQUATE → POOR, UNENVIABLE → EMBARRASSING. Firstly, SPIN DOCTOR is a neologism defined in the lexical database as “a public relations person who tries to forestall negative publicity by publicizing a favorable interpretation of the words or actions of a company or political party or famous person”, which pretty much explains what a person does when s/he uses a euphemism. In addition, SPIN DOCTOR has a different prototype center, as it has positive connotations carried by the word DOCTOR. In the lexical database, DISADVANTAGED is defined as “marked by deprivation especially of the necessities of life or healthful environmental influences”, and one of the senses of POOR is defined as “of insufficient quantity to meet a need”. In the database, INADEQUATE is a synonym for POOR, but the lexical database gives two synsets for this lexeme, so polysemy of INADEQUATE should also be taken into account. The same goes for UNENVIABLE → EMBARRASSING: UNENVIABLE has two synsets, and, in one of them UNENVIABLE is synonymous with EMBARRASSING. UNENVIABLE is less negative than EMBARRASSING.

The third relation we analyze in this section of the thesis is polysemy, which is divided into two subgroups, regular polysemy and the group that includes metaphors and metonymies. Regular polysemy can be divided into the following subgroups:

- Polysemy: ACTION → MILITARY ACTION; MILITARY ACTION is also a direct hyperonym for WAR; FURLOUGH (also a hyponym) →DISMISS (also hyperonym); SEQUESTRATION → SEIZING PROPERTY; USE → MANIPULATION, WRONGFUL →UNLAWFUL; EMPTY PROMISE → FALSE PROMISE; SACRIFICE ONE’S LIFE → DIE IN BATTLE (Table 7); SERVE → DO MILITARY SERVICE; THREATEN → THREATEN TO CAUSE INJURY, FALLEN → KILLED IN BATTLE (Table 8); ACTION → MILITARY ACTION; FORCE → VIOLENCE; INTERVENTION → INTERFERENCE (Table 9); MISSION → MILITARY MISSION; SQUEEZE→ RESTRICTED RESOURCES; SPIN → INTERPRETATION USED BY POLITICIANS (Table 10).
- Polysemy and meronymy: one of the senses of ENGAGEMENT (MILITARY ENGAGEMENT from Table 8; ENGAGEMENT from Table 9) is BATTLE, and BATTLE is a meronym of WAR. Two more examples have been identified, BATTLE and FIGHT (Table 8); one of their senses can be a meronym for WAR. Another example from Table 9 is MILITARY INVOLVEMENT: one of the senses of INVOLVEMENT is ENGAGEMENT, which leads to the meronym WAR via its sense BATTLE. In Table 10, this relation is illustrated with COMBAT → WAR.
- Occasion-specific senses (see Section 2.5.7.5. which deals with ad hoc concepts). Context is necessary to identify the non-euphemistic equivalent. These are cases when we ask questions like: What specifically do you mean? In what sense? Therefore, the non-euphemistic equivalents provided here are only possible non-euphemistic meaning specifications: INCONSISTENT (in what sense?)→ UNFAIR (in what sense?) (Table 7):

(26) The Transportation Security Administration is inconsistent in disciplining workers accused of misconduct, penalizing some with little evidence while not imposing minimum sanctions on others, an audit concluded.

(Plungis: TSA disciplines workers unevenly, report says, *The Washington Post*, 31.07.2013.)

Another example of this type of polysemy is PACIFY→ DESTROY (Table 7). In the database, one of the senses of pacify is “fight violence and try to establish peace”, so the alternative non-euphemistic equivalent DESTROY is viewed in relation to context.

Other examples of this type are: FORTUNATE → RICH, ILL-SERVED BY THE GOVERNMENT, TRUSTING→NAÏVE, ECONOMIC CHALLENGE → ECONOMIC CRISIS, OPEN THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM → SURRENDER (Table 8); DYSFUNCTIONAL → ABUSIVE, VULNERABLE → POOR (Table 10). Non-euphemistic senses are possible meaning specifications. They are all part of the corpus of political speeches.

The fourth type of relation includes metaphor and metonymies, subtypes of polysemy; the classifications of metaphors and metonymies rely on (Geeraerts 2010: 32–35). The metaphors include the following multi-word units in Table 7: POLITICAL HAND and POLITICIAN (metonymy and metaphor related to corporeal domain); SLIPPERY FACTS → LIES (metaphor related to corporeal phenomena, bodily experiences and actions) STRETCH THE TRUTH→LIE (metaphors related to cognitive phenomena: STRETCH can mean EXTEND physically, and EXTEND the scope or meaning of). The metonymies in Table 7 include: BACKROOM DIPLOMACY→SECRET DIPLOMACY (location and product); BLACK SITE PRISON → SECRET PRISON FOR TORTURING (location and product; it is also a metaphor related to the colour “black”); SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES → MILITARY FORCES (part and whole), VANISH →STEAL (effect and cause).

In Table 8, the metaphors include: HAMMER → ARMY (metaphor based on functional similarities), NAIL (metaphor based on functional similarities, the non-euphemistic equivalent has not been identified), INNOCENT SHADINGS OF THE TRUTH → LIES (metaphor based on sensory domains, SHADINGS is related to the visual domain), RHETORICAL COTTON CANDY → EUPHEMISM (metaphor related to functional similarities). In Table 8, metonymies include: GIVE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE (effect and cause); LOSE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE (effect and cause); LOSE A JOB → BE DISMISSED (effect and cause); MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE (effect and cause); MILITARY CAMPAIGN → WAR (subevent and complex event); NOT COME HOME → BE KILLED IN BATTLE (effect and cause); POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION, FRAUD → POLITICIANS’ DYSFUNCTION, FRAUD (product and producer); SECURITY FORCES → ARMY (part and whole) and THE FEW → OLIGARCHY (characteristic and characterized entity). The relation between THE FEW and OLIGARCHY is evident in the definitions the lexical database provides: THE FEW is “a small elite group”, and

OLIGARCHY is “a political system governed by a few people”. Therefore, this is an example of metonymy, a system characterized by the rule of a small elite group.

In Table 9, metaphors include: BE MILES AWAY FROM THE TRUTH → LIE (metaphor related to space); SET THE ENTIRE REGION ABLAZE → START A WAR (metaphor based on similarities in appearance). In Table 9, the metonymies include: AUSTERITY→EXPENDITURE CUTS (complex event and subevent); DISAPPEAR →STEAL (effect and cause); MISSING → STOLEN (effect and cause); CHEAP LABOUR → CHEAP WORKERS (product and producer); POLITICAL VALUES→ POLITICIANS’ VALUES (product and producer); TAKE LIVES → KILL (effect and cause); TAX HAVEN→TAX EVASION (location and product).

In Table 10, metonymies include: BANK → WEALTHY BANKERS (location and located people) COUNTRY → PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT (collection and member); DANGER → WAR (characteristic and characterized entity); GIVE LIFE→ BE KILLED IN BATTLE (effect and cause); MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE→ BE KILLED IN BATTLE (effect and cause); POCKET→ STEAL (piece of clothing and action); POLITICS→POLITICIANS (producer and product); STATE → PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT (collection and member); POLITICAL SYSTEM→ POLITICIANS (controlled and controller); SOCIAL EXCLUSION → POVERTY (effect and cause); STRONGER/WEAKER ECONOMY → RICH/POOR COUNTRY (characteristic and characterized entity); THE BETTER-OFF (LEAST WELL-OFF) → THE WEALTHY (THE POOR) (characteristic and characterized entity); THE MANY → CITIZENRY (characteristic and characterized entity); THE NEXT GREECE → IN DEBT (characterized entity and characteristic); OTHERS (OTHER PEOPLE) → THE RICH (whole nation and part of the nation, collection and members), THE TOP/THE FEW → OLIGARCHY; THE ELITE FEW→ OLIGARCHY (characteristic and characterized entity); THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS → THE WEALTHIEST (characteristic and characterized entity, also a metaphor based on functional similarities, where the broadest shoulders is the metaphor for support); POWERFUL INTERESTS → POWERFUL PEOPLE’S INTERESTS (product and producer).

Metaphors in Table 10 include: BLACK MARKET → ILLEGAL MARKET (metaphor based on sensory domains, SHADINGS is related to the visual domain); NARROWER HORIZONS → RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (metaphor based on corporeal and cognitive phenomena); SIPHON OFF → STEAL (metaphor based on functional similarities); STAY AFLOAT → SURVIVE FINANCIALLY (metaphor based on structural position). Finally, THE ARAB SPRING → REGIME CHANGE is both a metaphor (based on the transfer of similarities between SPRING and CHANGE) and a metonymy (temporal container and contained).

The fifth type includes antonymy. In Table 7, one case of antonymy has been identified: CERTAIN → UNCERTAIN. In Table 8, one example of antonymy is given LIBERATE → CONFINE. In Table 9, this is MORALITY → IMMORALITY. In Table 10, two examples of antonymy are given, HUMAN LIFE → DEATH and STABILISE → DESTABILISE. The possibility to use antonyms as concealing euphemisms is discussed in Section 4.3.2.6.

The sixth type includes examples of the synonym/antonym interplay. This relation is exemplified by the noun HALF-TRUTH related to LIE (Table 7), comparative adjectives and adverbs related to the non-euphemistic equivalents (both Tables) and the negated nouns and adjectives (both Table 7 and 8), known as litotes (understatement, meiosis) “a figure of speech in which there is a statement of the quantity, intensity, or seriousness of something that is less than what is objectively the case, for rhetorical effect (Cruse: 2006: 186)”. Litotes and concealing euphemisms are closely related, and for more details related to the relation between litotes and concealing euphemisms, see Section 4.3.2.6. In the following example, the comment made by McCain himself implies awareness of the underspecificity of meaning in negated nouns:

(27) And you can observe this approach even in the case of the senator from the state with more nuclear power plants than any other. Senator Obama says, “I am not a nuclear energy proponent.” I think that makes him a nuclear energy opponent, though he does have a knack for nuance and it’s not entirely clear.

(McCain: Speech on energy security and the economy, 18 June 2008)

In Table 9, this is illustrated with SOFT JUSTICE → INJUSTICE, and with comparative and negated adjectives: LESS AFFORDABLE → MORE EXPENSIVE; POORLY CONTROLLED → UNCONTROLLED; UNCONSTRUCTIVE → DESTRUCTIVE; UNDIPLOMATIC → RUDE; UNPATRIOTIC → TREASONOUS. In Table 10, the multi-word unit STEADY EROSION OF RESPONSIBILITY → IRRESPONSIBILITY illustrates the synonym/antonym interplay, and other examples of comparative and negated adjectives also illustrate this relation: BETTER → LESS BAD; FAIRER → LESS UNFAIR; INSOLVENT → BANKRUPT, LESS SECURE → MORE INSECURE; MORE RESPONSIBLE → LESS IRRESPONSIBLE; MORE STABLE → LESS UNSTABLE; NOT GOOD ENOUGH → BAD.

The last, seventh relation is that of homonymy. In Table 9, HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE is the concealing euphemism for MILITARY ACTION. This example is discussed in Section 4.3.2.7.

Finally, some of the concealing euphemisms from the American and British corpora, although they are not included in this analysis, are also used in Serbian public discourse:

AIRSTRIKE, THE ARAB SPRING, THE NEXT GREECE, INTERVENTION, SACRIFICE ONE'S LIFE, LOSE LIFE, LOSE A JOB.

In the next section, the results of the lexico-semantic analysis of the concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents are given in Tables 11 and 12. The results are followed by a further subclassification of the lexico-semantic relations:

TABLE 11: LEXICO-SEMANTIC ANALYSIS: SC/NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

<b>LEXICO-SEMANTIC RELATIONS</b>	
<b>HYPERONYM – HYPONYM and TROPONYM</b>	
<b>NOUNS</b>	
INCIDENT [incident] (hyperonym) → POKUŠAJ ATENTATA [attempted assassination] (hyponym)	
KRIZA [crisis] (hyperonym) → SIROMAŠTVO [poverty] (hyponym)	
MOGUĆNOSTI [possibilities] (hyperonym) → MOGUĆNOSTI KRŠENJA ZAKONA [possibilities to break the law] (hyponym)	
NEREGULARNOSTI [irregularities] (hyperonym) → NEZAKONITOSTI (hyponym) [illegal acts]	
POKLON [gift] (co-hyponym) → MITO [bribe]	
POMAGAČ [helper] (hyperonym) → SAUČESNIK [accomplice] (hyponym)	
PONAŠANJE [behavior] (hyperonym) → LOŠE PONAŠANJE [bad behavior] (hyponym)	
PREPISIVANJE [copying] (hyperonym) → PREPISIVANJE PRILIKOM POLAGANJA ISPITA [cheating in the written exam] (hyponym)	
ŽRTVA [victim] (hyperonym) → SOMEONE KILLED IN WAR [casualty] (hyponym)	
<b>VERBS:</b> IZOSTAVITI [fail to report] (hyperonym) → NAMERNO IZOSTAVITI [fail to report on purpose] (troponym)	
PRATITI [follow, watch] (hyperonym) → UHODITI [spy] (troponym)	
ŽIVETI [live] (hyperonym) → LOŠE ŽIVETI [live badly] (troponym)	
<b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN HEAD)</b>	
KORIGOVATI CENE [correct prices] (hyperonym) → POVEĆATI CENE [raise prices] (troponym)	
LOŠE MATERIJALNO STANJE [bad financial position] (hyperonym) → SIROMAŠTVO [poverty] (hyponym of STANJE [position])	
MEHANIZMI UBEDIVANJA [persuasion mechanisms] (hyponym) → MUČENJE [torture] (hyperonym)	
NEOVLAŠĆENO SE POSLUŽITI [use without authorization] (hyperonym) → UKRASTI [steal] (troponym of POSLUŽITI SE)	
NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] (hyperonym) → KRIMINAL [crime, hyponym of work] (hyponym)	
ORUŽANI SUKOB [armed conflict] (hyperonym) → RAT [war] (hyponym of conflict) (18)	
<b>SYNONYMY</b>	
<b>NOUN:</b> DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation] → LAŽ [lie]	
<b>MULTI-WORD UNIT (ADJECTIVE HEAD):</b>	
KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] → KRIMINALAC [criminal]	
SOCIJALNO UGROŽENI [socially endangered] → SIROMAŠNI [poor] (3)	

<b>REGULAR POLYSEMY</b>	
<p><b>VERB:</b> SPINOVATI [spin] → INTERPRETIRATI NA POŽELJAN NAČIN [interpret in a preferred way]</p> <p><b>ADJECTIVES:</b> DIVLJA [wild] → NELEGALNA [illegal]</p> <p>TUĐ [someone else's] → UKRADEN [stolen]</p> <p>ZAPOSTAVLJEN [neglected] → SIROMAŠAN [poor]</p> <p>ZLOUPOTREBLJEN → [abused] UKRADEN [stolen]</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNIT:</b></p> <p>ZAOBILAZITI ZAKON → [go round the law] → KRŠITI ZAKON [break the law] (6)</p>	
<b>METAPHOR AND METONYMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUNS:</b> DUGOVANJE [owing money] → KRAĐA [theft]</p> <p>RUKA [hand, arm] → OSVETA [revenge]</p> <p><b>VERBS:</b> GUBITI [lose] → KRASTI [steal]</p> <p>ISCURITI [leak out] → UKRASTI [steal]</p> <p>ISPUMPATI [pump out] → UKRASTI [steal]</p> <p>IŠČEZNUTI [vanish] → BITI UKRADEN [be stolen]</p> <p>NESTATI [disappear] → UKRASTI [steal]</p> <p>OŠTETITI [damage] → UKRASTI [steal]</p> <p>PODMAZATI [grease] → PODMITITI [bribe]</p> <p>PRELITI SE [spill over] → UKRASTI [steal]</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB HEADS):</b></p> <p>FABRIKOVATI ČINJENICE [fabricate facts] → LAGATI [lie]</p> <p>FISKALNA KONSOLIDACIJA [fiscal consolidation] → SMANJENJE PLATA I PENZIJA [salary /pension reduction]</p> <p>MUZIČKI DINAR [music dinar] → POREZ NA MUZIKU [music tax]</p> <p>POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will] → VOLJA POLITIČARA [politicians' will]</p> <p>ZAHVALITI SE NA SARADNJI [say thank you for the cooperation] → OTPUSTITI [dismiss]</p> <p>ZAMAZIVATI OČI [pull the wool over someone's eyes] → LAGATI [lie] (16)</p>	
<b>ANTONYMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUNS:</b> HIGIJENA [hygiene] → NEHIGIJENA [lack of hygiene]</p> <p>REGULARNOST [regularity] → NEREGULARNOST [irregularity]</p> <p>ZADOVOLJSTVO [satisfaction] → NEZADOVOLJSTVO [dissatisfaction]</p> <p><b>VERBS:</b> HRANITI [feed] → POISON [trovati] (4)</p>	
<b>SYNONYM/ANTONYM INTERPLAY</b>	
<p><b>ADJECTIVE:</b> NEISTINIT [untrue] → LAŽAN [false]</p> <p>NESLAVAN [inglorious] → SRAMAN [disgraceful]</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN HEAD):</b> NEGATIVNA EUFORIJA [negative euphoria] → PANIKA [panic] (3)</p>	



TABLE 12: LEXICO-SEMANTIC ANALYSIS: SC/POLITICAL SPEECHES

<b>LEXICO-SEMANTIC RELATIONS</b>	
<b>HYPERONYM – HYPONYM and TROPONYM</b>	
<p><b>NOUNS:</b> BEZBEDNOST [safety] (hyperonym) → BEZBEDNOST ZA ŽIVOT [life safety] (hyponym)            KORIŠČENJE [using] (hyperonym) → KRAĐA [stealing] (troponym)            POZICIJA [position] (hyperonym) → LOŠA POZICIJA [bad position] (hyponym)            SUKOB [conflict] (hyperonym) → RAT [war] (hyponym)</p> <p><b>ADJECTIVE:</b> OSIROMAŠEN [impoverished] (hyponym) → SIROMAŠAN [poor] (hyperonym)</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB HEADS)</b>            KORISTITI MIMO NAMENE [use inadequately] (hyperonym) → KRASTI [steal] (troponym)            NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres] (hyperonym) → <i>not identified</i> (7)</p>	
<b>SYNONYMY</b>	
IZBEGAVATI ISTINU [avoid the truth] → LAGATI [lie] (1)	
<b>REGULAR POLYSEMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUNS:</b> MANGUP [rascal] → KRIMINALAC [criminal]            ZAOSTAJANJE [lagging] → POVERTY [siromaštvo]</p> <p><b>VERBS:</b> IZMISLITI [make up] → LAGATI [lie]            TROŠITI [spend] → KRASTI [steal]            ZARAĐIVATI [earn] → BOGATITI SE [get rich]</p> <p><b>ADJECTIVES:</b> OZBILJAN [serious] → NEKORUMPIRAN [uncorrupted]            USPEŠAN [successful] → BOGAT [rich]            ZAVISAN [dependent] → KORUMPIRAN [corrupted]</p> <p><b>MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB HEADS):</b> NEMATI DOVOLJNO [not have enough] → BITI SIROMAŠAN [be poor]            ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have nots] → BOGATI I SIROMAŠNI [the rich and the poor]            PRAZNA OBEĆANJA [empty promise] → LAŽNA OBEĆANJA [false promise] (11)</p>	
<b>METAPHOR AND METONYMY</b>	
<p><b>NOUN (AND NOUN COMPOUNDS):</b> ETNIČKO ČIŠĆENJE [ethnic cleansing] → MASOVNI ZLOČINI [mass atrocities]            RUKOVOĐENJE [managing] → RUKOVODIOCI [managers]            RUPA [hole] → DEBTS [dugovi]            SIVA EKONOMIJA [grey economy] → IZBEGAVANJE PLAĆANJA POREZA [tax evasion]</p>	

STRANKA [party] → NEODGOVORNI KORUMPIRANI ČLANOVI STRANKE [corrupted party members]

VLAST [authorities] → LJUDI NA VLASTI [people who have the authority]

**VERBS:** CURITI [leak] → UKRASTI [steal]

ISISATI [suck out, siphon off] → UKRASTI [steal]

IZLAZITI [get out] → UKRASTI [steal]

**ADJECTIVE:** RASKUĆEN [squandered] → UKRADEN [stolen]

**MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN AND VERB HEADS):** ČVRSTA RUKA [firm hand] → DIKTATURA [dictatorship]

GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] → SIROMAŠNI [the poor]

IZMAKNUTI KONTROLI [avoid control] → IZMAKNUTI ZAKONU [avoid the law]

IZVRŠITI MOBILIZACIJU [call for mobilization] → IĆI U RAT [go to war]

JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force] → JEFTINI RADNICI [CHEAP WORKERS]

KOLEKTIVNA ŽRTVA [collective sacrifice] → RAT [war]

POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors] → POLITIČARI [politicians]

SLEGATI RAMENIMA [shrug your shoulders] → NE PREDUZIMATI MERE [fail to take measures]

ZAUSTAVITI FIZIČKI [physically stop someone] → UBITI [kill] (19)

### ANTONYMY

**NOUN:** KVALIFIKOVANOST [competence] → NEKVALIFIKOVANOST [incompetence]

**ADJECTIVE:**

GENIJALAN [ingenious] → GLUP [stupid]

ZADOVOLJAN [satisfied] → NEZADOVOLJAN [dissatisfied] (3)

### SYNONYM/ANTONYM INTERPLAY

**NOUN:** NEISKRENOST [insincerity] → LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness]

**ADJECTIVES AND ADVERBS:** BOGATIJA [richer] → MANJE SIROMAŠNA [less poor]

POLUJAVNO [half-publicly] → POLUTAJNO [half-secretly]

PRAVEDNIJE [more fairly] → MANJE NEPRAVEDNO [less unfairly]

SNAŽNIJE [more strongly] → MANJE SLABO [less weakly]

SREĆNIJA [happier] → MANJE NESREĆNA [less unhappy]

**MULTI-WORD UNITS (NOUN, VERB AND ADJECTIVE HEAD)**

NE TRAJATI PREDUGO [not last long] → TRAJATI KRATKO [last briefly]

NOTORNA NEISTINA [notorious untruth] → LAŽ [lie]

TEŠKO DOSTUPAN [hardly accessible] → NEDOSTUPAN [inaccessible] (9)

The analysis begins with the hyperonymy/hyponymy relation. The concealing euphemism is identified as the hyperonym or the hyponym, which means that the non-euphemistic equivalent is the related hyponym or the hyperonym. Concealing euphemisms realized as hyperonyms are more frequent than hyponyms in both Table 11 and Table 12. The hyperonymy/hyponymy relation is more frequent than metaphors/metonymies in Table 11, and it is less frequent than metaphors/metonymies in Table 12. In both Table 11 and Table 12 the non-euphemistic terms are most frequently related to stealing, the subtopic of the topic of corruption and crime.

There is only one hyponymous adjective, OSIROMAŠEN [impoverished] (hyponym) → SIROMAŠAN [poor] (hyperonym) (Table 12). As far as nouns, verbs and multi-word units are concerned, the following subtypes of hyperonymy/hyponymy have been identified:

- Hyperonymy/hyponymy that follows the formula IS-A-KIND-OF: in Table 11, these are: PREPISIVANJE [copying] (hyperonym) → PREPISIVANJE PRILIKOM POLAGANJA ISPITA [cheating in the written exam] (hyponym); ORUŽANI SUKOB [armed conflict] (hyperonym) → RAT [war] (hyponym); ŽRTVA [victim] (hyperonym) → SOMEONE KILLED IN WAR [casualty] (hyponym). In Table 12, this is SUKOB [conflict] (hyperonym) → RAT [war] (hyponym).

One more examples belongs to this group: MEHANIZMI UBEĐIVANJA [persuasion mechanisms] (hyponym) → MUČENJE [torture] (hyperonym). This example is similar to the examples from Table 7, ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym); INTERROGATION POLICIES (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym); EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAMME (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym).

- Contextual hyperonymy/hyponymy relation also follows the formula IS-A-KIND-OF, but the context leads to the recovery of the non-euphemistic item: in Table 11, these are: INCIDENT [incident] (hyperonym) → POKUŠAJ ATENTATA [attempted assassination] (hyponym); KRIZA [crisis] (hyperonym) → SIROMAŠTVO [poverty] (hyponym); MOGUĆNOSTI [possibilities] (hyperonym) → MOGUĆNOSTI KRŠENJA ZAKONA [possibilities to break the law]; NEOVLAŠĆENO SE POSLUŽITI [use without authorization] (hyperonym) → UKRASTI [steal] (troponym of POSLUŽITI SE); NEREGULARNOSTI [irregularities] (hyperonym) → NEZAKONITOSTI [illegal acts]; POMAGAČ [helper] (hyperonym) → SAUČESNIK [accomplice] (hyponym); PONAŠANJE [behavior] (hyperonym) → LOŠE PONAŠANJE [bad behavior]; LOŠE MATERIJALNO STANJE [bad

financial position] (hyperonym) →SIROMAŠTVO [poverty] (hyponym). In Table 12, these are: BEZBEDNOST [safety] (hyperonym) →BEZBEDNOST ZA ŽIVOT [life safety] (hyponym); POZICIJA [position] (hyperonym) → LOŠA POZICIJA [bad position] (hyponym). There is one multi-word unit whose non-euphemistic item has not been identified: NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres].

- Inherited hyperonymy/hyponymy: NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] (hyperonym) → KRIMINAL [crime] (hyponym) is similar to the example of inherited hyperonymy/hyponymy ACTIVITY → CRIME from Table 7.
- Indirect co-hyponymy (“fuzzy” co-hyponymy, see Murphy (2003: 167), see Section 4.3.2.3): in the dictionary *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990), POKLON [gift] denotes a thing that is given and a thing that is for free, and MITO [bribe] denotes money or other kinds of rewards given to someone usually for the purpose of doing someone a favour, most frequently in a dishonest way. They are, therefore, considered as co-hyponyms of TRANSFERRED PROPERTY.

In addition to these types of hyperonymy/hyponymy, examples of troponymy were identified:

- Troponymy: PRATITI [follow, watch] (hyperonym)→ UHODITI [spy] (troponym); KORIGOVATI CENE [correct prices] (hyperonym) →POVEĆATI CENE [raise prices] (troponym); IZOSTAVITI [fail to report] (hyperonym) → NAMERNO IZOSTAVITI [fail to report on purpose] (troponym); ŽIVETI [live] (hyperonym) → LOŠE ŽIVETI [live badly] (troponym). In Table 12, these are KORIŠĆENJE [using] (hyperonym) →KRAĐA [stealing] (troponym); KORISTITI MIMO NAMENE [use inadequately] (hyperonym) → KRASTI [steal] (troponym).

The second analyzed relation is synonymy. The first example is DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation] (Table 11), which *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990), identifies as the word borrowed from French, denoting deliberate dissemination of false information. DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation] is an example of a synonym which implies a change in a position on a scale of degree. The second example is KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] → KRIMINALAC [criminal] (Table 11). It is as an example of

changing a prototype centre: CRIMINAL is replaced with BUSINESSMAN. The third example is SOCIJALNO UGROŽENI [socially endangered] (Table 11), which has been identified as the synonym expressing a different (lower) degree on a scale of poverty in comparison with SIROMAŠNI [poor]. In Table 12, the multi-word unit IZBEGAVATI ISTINU [avoid the truth] → LAGATI [lie] is used. This is the synonym which implies a change in a position on a scale of degree, just like DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation].

The third type, polysemy, includes regular polysemy and the group that includes metaphors and metonymies. Regular polysemy can be divided into the following subgroups:

- Polysemy: SPINOVATI [spin] → INTERPRETIRATI NA POŽELJAN NAČIN [interpret in a preferred way]; DIVLJA [wild] → NELEGALNA [illegal]; ZAIBILAZITI ZAKON → [go round the law] → KRŠITI ZAKON [break the law] (Table 11); PRAZNA OBEĆANJA [empty promise] → LAŽNA OBEĆANJA [false promise] (Table 12).
- Occasion-specific senses (see Section 2.5.7.5. which deals with ad hoc concepts) derived on the basis of contextual implications. These are cases when we ask questions like: What specifically do you mean? In what sense?: These are all possible meaning specifications, the non-euphemistic term is not related to the euphemistic term in all contexts: TUĐ [someone else's] → UKRADEN [stolen]; ZAPOSTAVLJEN [neglected] → SIROMAŠAN [poor]; ZLOUPOTREBLJEN [abused] → UKRADEN [stolen] (Table 11); IZMISLITI [make up] → LAGATI [lie]; MANGUP [rascal] → KRIMINALAC [criminal]; NEMATI DOVOLJNO [not have enough] → BITI SIROMAŠAN [be poor]; ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have nots] → BOGATI I SIROMAŠNI [the rich and the poor]; OZBILJAN [serious] → NEKORUMPIRAN [uncorrupted]; TROŠITI [spend] → KRASTI [steal]; USPEŠAN [successful] → BOGAT [rich]; ZAOSTAJANJE [lagging] → POVERTY [siromaštvo]; ZARAĐIVATI [earn] → BOGATITI SE [get rich]; ZAVISAN [dependent] → KORUMPIRAN [corrupted] (Table 12).

The fourth type of relation includes metaphor and metonymies, subtypes of polysemy; the classifications of metaphors and metonymies rely on Geeraerts (2010: 32–35). In Table 11, these are the following metaphors: FABRIKOVATI ČINJENICE [fabricate facts] → LAGATI [lie] (metaphors related to cognitive phenomena); ISCURITI [leak out] → UKRASTI [steal] (metaphor based on appearance: money flow and water flow); ISPUMPATI [pump out] → UKRASTI [steal] (metaphor based on functional similarities); PODMAZATI [grease] → PODMITITI [bribe] (metaphor based on functional similarities); PRELITI SE [spill over]

→UKRASTI [steal] (metaphor based money flow and water flow); RUKA [hand, arm] → OSVETA [revenge] (metaphor based on functional similarities); ZAMAZIVATI OČI [pull the wool over someone's eyes] → LAGATI [lie] (metaphors related to sensory and cognitive domains).

Metonymies in Table 11 include: DUGOVANJE [owing money] →KRAĐA [theft] (effect and cause); FISKALNA KONSOLIDACIJA [fiscal consolidation] →SMANJENJE PLATA I PENZIJA [salary/pension reduction] (complex event and subevent); GUBITI [lose] →KRASTI [steal] (effect and cause); ISČEZNUTI [vanish] →BITI UKRADEN [be stolen] (effect and cause); NESTATI [disappear] →UKRASTI [steal] (effect and cause); MUZIČKI DINAR [music dinar] → POREZ NA MUZIKU [music tax] (dinar/part for tax/whole); OŠTETITI [damage] →UKRASTI [steal] (effect and cause); POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will] → VOLJA POLITIČARA [politicians' will] (producer and product); ZAHVALITI SE NA SARADNJI [say thank you for the cooperation] → OTPUSTITI [dismiss] (subevent and complex event).

In Table 12, metaphors include: CURITI [leak] →UKRASTI [steal] (metaphor based on the similarity between money flow and water flow); ČVRSTA RUKA [firm hand] →DIKTATURA [dictatorship] (metaphor related to the corporeal domain); ETNIČKO ČIŠĆENJE [ethnic cleansing] →MASOVNI ZLOČINI [mass atrocities] (effect and cause; also a metaphor); ISISATI [suck out, siphon off] →UKRASTI [steal] (metaphor based on functional similarities); RUPA [hole] → DEBTS [dugovi] (metaphor related to space and quantity); SIVA EKONOMIJA [grey economy] → IZBEGAVANJE PLAĆANJA POREZA [tax evasion] (metaphor related to sensory domain); SLEGATI RAMENIMA [shrug your shoulders] →NE PREDUZIMATI MERE [fail to take measures] (metaphor related to corporeal phenomena). Also, personification has been identified: IZLAZITI [get out] →UKRASTI [steal].

Metonymies in Table 12 include: GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] →SIROMAŠNI [the poor] (cause and effect); IZMAKNUTI KONTROLI [avoid control] → IZMAKNUTI ZAKONU [avoid the law] (product producer); IZVRŠITI MOBILIZACIJU [call for mobilization] → IĆI U RAT [go to war] (subevent and complex event); JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force] → JEFTINI RADNICI [cheap workers] (producer and product); KOLEKTIVNA ŽRTVA [collective sacrifice] → RAT [war] (effect and cause); POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors] → POLITIČARI [politicians] (controlled and controller, product and producer); RASKUĆEN [squandered] →UKRADEN [stolen] (effect and cause); RUKOVOĐENJE [managing] → RUKOVODIOCI [managers] (product and producer; action and participant); STRANKA [party] →KORUMPIRANI ČLANOVI STRANKE [corrupted party members] (collection

and member); VLAST [authorities] → LJUDI NA VLASTI [people who have the authority] (possessed and possessor); ZAUSTAVITI FIZIČKI [physically stop someone] → UBITI [kill] (effect and cause).

The fifth type includes antonymy. In Table 11, there are four cases of antonymy: HIGIJENA [hygiene] → NEHIGIJENA [lack of hygiene]; HRANITI [feed] → POISON [trovati]; REGULARNOST [regularity] → NEREGULARNOST [irregularity]; ZADOVOLJSTVO [satisfaction] → NEZADOVOLJSTVO [dissatisfaction]. In Table 12, these are GENIJALAN [ingenious] → GLUP [stupid]; KVALIFIKOVANOST [competence] → NEKVALIFIKOVANOST [incompetence]; ZADOVOLJAN [satisfied] → NEZADOVOLJAN [dissatisfied]. The possibility to use antonyms as concealing euphemisms is discussed in Section 4.3.2.6.

The sixth type includes examples of the synonym/antonym interplay. In Table 11, these are two negated adjectives, and one negated noun: NEISTINIT [untrue] → LAŽAN [false]; NESLAVAN [inglorious] → SRAMAN [disgraceful]; NEGATIVNA EUFORIJA [negative euphoria] → PANIKA [panic]. In Table 12, these are comparative adjectives and adverbs, negated nouns, and various multi-word units: BOGATIJA [richer] → MANJE SIROMAŠNA [less poor]; PRAVEDNIJE [more fairly] → MANJE NEPRAVEDNO [less unfairly]; SNAŽNIJE [more strongly] → MANJE SLABO [less weakly]; SREĆNIJA [happier] → MANJE NESREĆNA [less unhappy]; POLUJAVNO [half-publicly] → POLUTAJNO [half-secretly]; NEISKRENOST [insincerity] → LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness]; NE TRAJATI PREDUGO [not last long] → TRAJATI KRATKO [last briefly]; NOTORNA NEISTINA [notorious untruth] → LAŽ [lie]; TEŠKO DOSTUPAN [hardly accessible] → NEDOSTUPAN [inaccessible].

In addition, some Serbian concealing euphemisms presented in Tables 11 and 12 have corresponding concealing euphemisms in the English language which are not part of the British and American corpora in this research: ETNIČKO ČIŠĆENJE/ ETHNIC CLEANSING, FABRIKOVATI ČINJENICE/ FABRICATE FACTS, IZMISLITI/ MAKE UP, NOTORNA NEISTINA/ NOTORIOUS UNTRUTH, PODMAZATI/GREASE. These concealing euphemisms can be used as translation equivalents.

#### 4.3.4. Semantic fields and topics

In the previous section of the analysis, we analyzed concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic counterparts in terms of a network of paradigmatic lexico-semantic relations. In this part of the analysis, we classify concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents into lexical units that belong to different semantic fields. As several

interpretations of the notion of semantic field can be found in literature (Crystal 2008: 188), we adopt the one used in Hallidayan linguistics. In Hallidayan linguistics, the notion of field refers to a classification of registers in terms of subject-matter, such as, for example, the fields of religion, advertising etc. (Crystal 2008: 188). As already stated, concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents are related to the topics of conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis and surveillance. These major topics can further be classified into various subtopics; in many cases, the textual context is essential for determining where the word/multi-word unit belongs:

## CONFLICTS:

### SUBTOPIC/ STRUGGLE FOR DOMINANCE:

AC: HAMMER → ARMY; LEADERSHIP → HEGEMONY; NAIL → *non-euphemistic equivalent is not specified*; PROBLEM → *non-euphemistic equivalent is not specified*;  
BC: INFLUENCE → POWER

### SUBTOPIC/ POLITICAL CONFLICTS:

AC: BACKROOM DIPLOMACY → SECRET DIPLOMACY; MORE MODERATE → LESS EXTREME; NOT A PATRIOT → NOT A TRAITOR; NOT EASY → NOT DIFFICULT; NOT PRETTY → NOT UGLY; TRUSTING → NAIVE

BC: IMPACT → NEGATIVE IMPACT; UNDIPLOMATIC → RUDE

SC: GENIJALAN [ingenious] → GLUP [stupid]; KVALIFIKOVANOST [competence] → NEKVALIFIKOVANOST [incompetence]; PONAŠANJE [behavior] → LOŠE PONAŠANJE [bad behavior]; RUKA [hand, arm] → OSVETA; [revenge]; ZADOVOLJAN [satisfied] → NEZADOVOLJAN [dissatisfied]; ZAHVALITI SE NA SARADNJI [say thank you for the cooperation] → OTPUSTITI [dismiss]

### SUBTOPIC/ WAR:

AC: ACTION → MILITARY ACTION; BATTLE → WAR; CONFLICT → WAR; DEFENSE SPENDING → MILITARY SPENDING; FALLEN → KILLED IN BATTLE; FIGHT (n.) → WAR; FIGHT (v.) → WAGE WAR; FREER → LESS OPPRESSED; GIVE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE; LIBERATE → SUPPRESS; ILL-SERVED → ILL-SERVED BY THE GOVERNMENT



LOSE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE; MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE; MEMORY → BAD MEMORY; MILITARY ACTION → WAR; MILITARY CAMPAIGN → WAR; MILITARY CONFLICT → WAR; MILITARY ENGAGEMENT → WAR; MORE PEACEFUL → LESS HOSTILE; NOT COME HOME → BE KILLED IN BATTLE; OPEN THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM → SURRENDER; OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY → SECRET GOVERNMENT AGENCY; SACRIFICE ONE'S LIFE → DIE IN BATTLE; SAFER → LESS DANGEROUS; SECURITY FORCES → ARMY; SERVE → DO MILITARY SERVICE; SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES → MILITARY FORCES; SURGE → TROOP SURGE; THREATEN → THREATEN TO CAUSE INJURY

BC: ACTION → MILITARY ACTION; AIRSTRIKE → BOMBING; ALL NECESSARY MEASURES → *non-euphemistic equivalent is not specified*; ALL THE OPTIONS → *euphemistic equivalent is not specified*; ARMED STRUGGLE → WAR; COMBAT → WAR; CONFLICT → WAR; CRISIS → WAR CRISIS; DANGER → WAR; ENGAGEMENT → WAR; EXPERIENCE → NEGATIVE EXPERIENCE; GIVE LIFE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE; HUMAN LIFE → DEATH; MISSION → MILITARY MISSION; FORCE → VIOLENCE; HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE → MILITARY ACTION; INTERVENTION → INTERFERENCE (MILITARY INTERFERENCE); LESS SECURE → MORE INSECURE; MAKE THE ULTIMATE SACRIFICE → BE KILLED IN BATTLE; MILITARY INVOLVEMENT → WAR; POLITICAL VALUES → POLITICIANS' VALUES; RESPONSE → MILITARY RESPONSE; SET THE ENTIRE REGION ABLAZE → START A WAR; STABILISE → DESTABILISE; TAKE LIVES → KILL; UNACCEPTABLE → TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE; THE ARAB SPRING → REGIME CHANGE UNCONSTRUCTIVE → DESTRUCTIVE; UNPATRIOTIC → TREASONOUS

SC: ETNIČKO ČIŠĆENJE [ethnic cleansing] → MASOVNI ZLOČINI [mass atrocities]; IZVRŠITI MOBILIZACIJU [call for mobilization] → IĆI U RAT [go to war]; KOLEKTIVNA ŽRTVA [collective sacrifice] → RAT [war]; ORUŽANI SUKOB [armed conflict] → RAT [war]; SUKOB [conflict] → RAT [war]; ŽRTVA [victim] → SOMEONE KILLED IN WAR [casualty]

## CORRUPTION AND CRIME:

### CRIME:

AC: ILLEGAL ACTIVITY → CRIME; POLITICAL HAND → POLITICIAN; STRICTER → LESS LENIENT; WRONGFUL → UNLAWFUL

BC: ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOUR → CRIME; BLACK MARKET → ILLEGAL MARKET; DETAIN → IMPRISON; DYSFUNCTIONAL → ABUSIVE; MANAGEMENT → BAD MANAGEMENT; MIS-SELL → DECEIVE BY SELLING; SOFT JUSTICE → INJUSTICE; TAX HAVEN → TAX EVASION; UNENVIABLE → EMBARRASSING

**SC:** BEZBEDNOST [safety] → BEZBEDNOST ZA ŽIVOT [life safety] ; DIVLJA [wild] → NELEGALNA [illegal]; HRANITI [feed] → POISON [trovati]; INCIDENT [incident] → POKUŠAJ ATENTATA; [attempted assassination]; IZMAKNUTI KONTROLI [avoid control] → IZMAKNUTI ZAKONU [avoid the law]; KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] → KRIMINALAC [criminal]; MANGUP [rascal] → KRIMINALAC [criminal]; MOGUĆNOSTI [possibilities] → MOGUĆNOSTI KRŠENJA ZAKONA [possibilities to break the law]; NEGATIVNA EUFORIJA [negative euphoria] → PANIKA [panic]; NEREGULARNOSTI [irregularities] → NEZAKONITOSTI [illegal acts]; NE TRAJATI PREDUGO [not last long] → TRAJATI KRATKO [last briefly]; NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] → KRIMINAL [crime, hyponym of work]; POMAGAČ [helper] → SAUČESNIK [accomplice]; PREPISIVANJE [copying] → PREPISIVANJE PRILIKOM POLAGANJA ISPITA [cheating in the written exam]; REGULARNOST [regularity] → NEREGULARNOST [irregularity]; RUKOVOĐENJE [managing] → RUKOVODIOCI [managers]; SIVA EKONOMIJA [grey economy] → IZBEGAVANJE PLAĆANJA POREZA [tax evasion]; SLEGATI RAMENIMA [shrug your shoulders] → NE PREDUZIMATI MERE [fail to take measures]; ZAOBILAZITI ZAKON → [go round the law] → KRŠITI ZAKON [break the law]; ZAUSTAVITI FIZIČKI [physically stop someone] → UBITI [kill]

#### CORRUPTION:

**AC:** CONDUCT → INAPPROPRIATE CONDUCT: USE → MANIPULATION; INCONSISTENT → UNFAIR; LESS ACCOUNTABLE → MORE IRRESPONSIBLE; LESS DIRECT → NOT DIRECT; LESS TRANSPARENTLY → MORE VAGUELY

**BC:** BETTER → LESS BAD; MORE RESPONSIBLE → LESS IRRESPONSIBLE; MORE STABLE → LESS UNSTABLE; POLITICAL SYSTEM → POLITICIANS; STEADY EROSION OF RESPONSIBILITY → IRRESPONSIBILITY

**SC:** IZOSTAVITI [fail to report] → NAMERNO IZOSTAVITI [fail to report on purpose]; NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres] → *non-euphemistic term is not specified*; OZBILJAN [serious] → NEKORUMPIRAN [uncorrupted]; POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors] → POLITIČARI [politicians]; POLUJAVNO [half-publicly] → POLUTAJNO [half-secretly]; STRANKA [party] → NEODGOVORNI KORUMPIRANI ČLANOVI STRANKE [corrupted party members] ; VLAST [authorities] → LJUDI NA VLASTI [people who have the authority] ; ZARAĐIVATI [earn] → BOGATITI SE; [get rich]; ZAVISAN [dependent] → KORUMPIRAN [corrupted]

SUBTOPIC/ BRIBERY:

AC: GIFT → BRIBE

BC: FEE → BRIBE; PAY → BRIBE; PAYMENT → BRIBE; PERK → BRIBE; TAKE → TAKE AS A BRIBE

SC: POKLON [gift] → MITO [bribe]

SUBTOPIC/HUMAN RIGHTS:

AC: BLACK SITE PRISON → SECRET PRISON FOR TORTURING;  
DOMESTIC SERVITUDE → SLAVERY; ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUE → TORTURE; EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION PROGRAMME → TORTURE; HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD → BAD HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD; INTERROGATION POLICIES → TORTURE; NOT FRIENDLY → HOSTILE; RACIAL PROFILING → RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

BC: CONTROVERSIAL INTERROGATION PROGRAMME → TORTURE; ETHNIC PROFILING → ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION; MORALITY → IMMORALITY; NARROWER HORIZONS → RACIAL DISCRIMINATION; POWERFUL INTERESTS → POWERFUL PEOPLE'S INTERESTS

SC: ČVRSTA RUKA [firm hand] → DIKTATURA [dictatorship]; MEHANIZMI UBEDIVANJA [persuasion mechanisms] → MUČENJE [torture]

SUBTOPIC/ LYING:

AC: CONSTRUCT → INCORRECT CONSTRUCT; DISINFORMATION → LIE;  
EMPTY PROMISE → FALSE PROMISE; FIB → LIE; FICTION → FALSEHOOD;  
HALF-TRUTH → LIE; INACCURATE → FAULTY; INNOCENT SHADINGS OF THE TRUTH → LIES; MISINFORM → LIE; MISLEAD → LIE; MISREPRESENT → FALSIFY; MISSPEAK → LIE; NOT RELIABLY TRUTHFUL → FALSE, UNTRUTHFUL; NOT INADVERTENTLY → INTENTIONALLY; PRETENSE → DECEPTION; RHETORICAL COTTON CANDY → EUPHEMISM; SLIPPERY FACTS → LIES; STRETCH THE TRUTH → LIE;  
UNTRUE → FALSE

BC: BE MILES AWAY FROM THE TRUTH → LIE; FAR-FETCHED FIB → LIE;  
MISINFORMATION → LIE; MISREPORT → LIE; SPIN → INTERPRETATION GIVEN BY POLITICIANS; SPIN DOCTOR → EUPHEMIZER; TALL TALE → LIE; TELL → LIE

SC: DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation] → LAŽ [lie]; FABRIKOVATI ČINJENICE [fabricate facts] → LAGATI [lie]; IZBEGAVATI ISTINU [avoid the truth] → LAGATI [lie]; IZMISLITI [make up] → LAGATI [lie]; NEISKRENOST [insincerity] → LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness]; NEISTINIT [untrue] → LAŽAN [false]; NOTORNA NEISTINA [notorious untruth] → LAŽ [lie]; PRAZNA OBEĆANJA [empty promise] → LAŽNA OBEĆANJA [false promise]; SPINOVATI [spin] → INTERPRETIRATI NA POŽELJAN NAČIN [interpret in a preferred way]; ZAMAZIVATI OČI [pull the wool over someone's eyes] → LAGATI [lie]

#### SUBTOPIC/ STEALING:

AC: TAKE → STEAL; UNREPORTED → SECRET; VANISH → STEAL;

BC: DISAPPEAR → STEAL; FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES → STEALING; MISSING → STOLEN; POCKET → STEAL; POORLY CONTROLLED → UNCONTROLLED; SIPHON OFF → STEAL; SPEND → SPEND WASTEFULLY (STEAL)

SC: CURITI [leak] → UKRASTI [steal]; DUGOVANJE [owing money] → KRAĐA [theft]; GUBITI [lose] → KRASTI [steal]; ISCURITI [leak out] → UKRASTI [steal]; ISISATI [suck out, siphon off] → UKRASTI [steal]; ISPUMPATI [pump out] → UKRASTI [steal]; IŠČEZNUTI [vanish] → BITI UKRADEN [be stolen]; IZLAZITI [get out] → UKRASTI [steal]; KORISTITI MIMO NAMENE [use inadequately] → KRASTI [steal]; KORIŠĆENJE [using] → KRAĐA [stealing]; NEOVLAŠĆENO SE POSLUŽITI [use without authorization] → UKRASTI [steal]; NESTATI [disappear] → UKRASTI [steal]; OŠTETITI [damage] → UKRASTI [steal]; PODMAZATI [grease] → PODMITITI [bribe]; PRELITI SE [spill over] → UKRASTI [steal]; RASKUĆEN [squandered] → UKRADEN [stolen]; TROŠITI [spend] → KRASTI [steal]; TUĐ [someone else's] → UKRADEN [stolen]; ZLOUPOTREBLJEN [abused] → UKRADEN [stolen]

#### ECONOMIC CRISIS:

##### ECONOMIC CRISIS IN GENERAL:

AC: ECONOMIC CHALLENGE → ECONOMIC CRISIS; INSOLVENT → BANKRUPT; LOSE A JOB → BE DISMISSED; MORE SECURE → LESS INSECURE; NOT A PROPONENT → OPPONENT; POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION, FRAUD → POLITICIANS' DYSFUNCTION, FRAUD; WEAKENED → WEAK

BC: COUNTRY→ PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT; HOME MORTGAGE CRISIS  
→FORECLOSURE; LESS AFFORDABLE → MORE EXPENSIVE; LEVEL → LOW LEVEL;  
POLITICS→POLITICIANS; REALITIES → HARSH REALITIES; SQUEEZE→ RESTRICTED  
RESOURCES; STATE→ PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT; STAY AFLOAT → SURVIVE  
FINANCIALLY; THE NEXT GREECE→ IN DEBT

SC: HIGIJENA [hygiene] → NEHIGIJENA [lack of hygiene]; NESLAVAN [inglorious] →  
SRAMAN [disgraceful]; POZICIJA [position] → LOŠA POZICIJA [bad position];  
RUPA [hole] →DEBTS [dugovi]; SREĆNIJA [happier] →MANJE NESREĆNA [less unhappy];  
ZADOVOLJSTVO [satisfaction] → NEZADOVOLJSTVO [dissatisfaction]

#### SUBTOPIC/ THE POOR AND THE RICH:

AC: FORTUNATE → RICH; THE FEW → OLIGARCHY; UNDERFUNDED→POOR

BC: BANK → WEALTHY BANKERS; CHEAP LABOUR→ CHEAP WORKERS;  
DISADVANTAGED→POOR; INADEQUATE→POOR; NOT GOOD ENOUGH → BAD;  
POORER → POOR; SOCIAL EXCLUSION → POVERTY; STRONGER/WEAKER ECONOMY  
→ RICHER/POORER COUNTRY → RICH/POOR COUNTRY; THE BETTER-OFF (THE  
LEAST WELL-OFF) → THE; WEALTHY (THE POOR); THE ELITE FEW→ OLIGARCHY; THE  
MANY → CITIZENRY; THE OTHERS → OTHER PEOPLE → THE RICH; THE TOP/THE FEW  
→ OLIGARCHY; THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS→ THE WEALTHIEST;  
VULNERABLE→POOR

SC: BOGATIJA [richer] →MANJE SIROMAŠNA [less poor]; GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE  
[transition losers] →SIROMAŠNI [the poor]; JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force] →  
JEFTINI RADNICI [CHEAP WORKERS]; KRIZA [crisis] → SIROMAŠTVO [poverty]; LOŠE  
MATERIJALNO STANJE [bad financial position] →SIROMAŠTVO [poverty]; NEMATI  
DOVOLJNO [not have enough] →BITI SIROMAŠAN [be poor]; ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI  
NEMAJU [the haves and the have nots] →BOGATI I SIROMAŠNI [the rich and the poor];  
OSIROMAŠEN [impoverished] → SIROMAŠAN [poor]; SOCIJALNO UGROŽENI [socially  
endangered] →SIROMAŠNI [poor]; TEŠKO DOSTUPAN [hardly accessible] →NEDOSTUPAN  
[inaccessible]; USPEŠAN [successful] →BOGAT [rich]; ZAOSTAJANJE [lagging] →  
POVERTY [siromaštvo]; ZAPOSTAVLJEN [neglected]→ SIROMAŠAN [poor]; ŽIVETI [live]→  
LOŠE ŽIVETI [live badly]

### SUBTOPIC/ECONOMIC POLICIES:

AC: CERTAIN → UNCERTAIN; FURLOUGH → DISMISS; LOWER → LESS HIGH;  
NOT PARTICULARLY FAIR → UNFAIR; SEQUESTRATION → SEIZING PROPERTY

BC: AUSTERITY → EXPENDITURE CUTS; FAIRER → LESS UNFAIR

SC: FISKALNA KONSOLIDACIJA [fiscal consolidation] → SMANJENJE PLATA I PENZIJA;  
[salary /pension reduction]; KORIGOVATI CENE [correct prices] → POVEĆATI CENE [raise  
prices]; MUZIČKI DINAR [music dinar] → POREZ NA MUZIKU [music tax];  
POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will] → VOLJA POLITIČARA [politicians' will]; PRAVEDNIJE  
[more fairly] → MANJE NEPRAVEDNO [less unfairly]; SNAŽNIJE [more strongly] → MANJE  
SLABO [less weakly]

### SURVEILLANCE:

AC: PRIVACY ABUSE → SPYING; SURVEILLANCE → MASS SURVEILLANCE;  
WITHHOLD → KEEP TO ONESELF, HIDE

BC: SURVEILLANCE → MASS SURVEILLANCE; WATCH → SPY

SC: PRATITI [follow, watch] → UHODITI [spy]

The lexico-semantic analysis (Tables 7–12) and the topical classification of words and multi-word units show that the words/ multi-word units have different degrees of specificity, and that the classification of concealing euphemisms would not be possible without taking into account the context in which concealing euphemisms are used. In some cases, the degree of specificity is so low, that the non-euphemistic equivalent is not even specified, e.g. PROBLEM (AC). The specification/enrichment is the hearer's responsibility, who depends on contextual clues. In other cases, it is possible to identify a non-euphemistic equivalent, but, again, as a unit is highly polysemous, and the degree of specificity is low, it is not the speaker, but the context that the hearer relies on in his/her specification of meaning, e.g. TAKE → STEAL, USE → MANIPULATION (AC). The context can even lead us to the opposite meaning, e.g. STABILISE → DESTABILISE (BC), or even a homonym, e.g. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE → MILITARY ACTION (BC). As for metaphors and metonymies, their aim is to achieve/avoid specific contextual effects, rather than identify actors/actions. Finally, the

classification shows that adjectives, the basic and comparative degrees, and also negated adjectives (see Section 4.3.2.6), are notorious for their underspecificity and unspecified scope of meaning, so their enrichment depends on the topic discussed and the context of use. To sum up, both the lexico-semantic analysis and the topical classification of concealing euphemisms show that the identification of concealing euphemisms is not possible without the lexico-pragmatic analysis. The lexico-pragmatic analysis is given in Section 4.4.

#### 4.3.5. Conclusions

The previous analysis leads to the following conclusions:

- The identified concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents are structurally related. In other words, the speaker/author is in a position to encode meaning in a preferred way, but it is possible to identify alternative non-euphemistic encodings carrying more negative, non-euphemistic meaning by analyzing lexico-semantic relations.
- Lexico-semantic relations are mutually related (in all six Tables, in all six corpora). First of all, concealing euphemisms can be replaced with non-euphemistic equivalents, which means that concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents are contextual synonyms. In addition, the analysis shows that polysemy is closely related not only to synonymy, but also to hyperonymy/hyponymy, meronymy, troponymy, even antonymy. As for synonymy, the lexical database provides different synsets which are mutually related in polysemous relations. For example, the lexeme ACTION is polysemous, and one of its synsets/sense is MILITARY ACTION. As for hyperonymy/hyponymy, ACTION is polysemous, and one of its senses is MILITARY ACTION, which has its hyperonyms and hyponyms, and one of the hyponyms of MILITARY ACTION is WAR. Polysemy is closely related to meronymy/holonymy and troponymy as well: for example, the noun FIGHT is polysemous, and one of its synsets, BATTLE/CONFLICT/FIGHT/ENGAGEMENT is a meronym for the holonym WAR. At the same time, the verb TO FIGHT is polysemous, and one of its synsets, CONTEND/FIGHT/STRUGGLE has the troponym TO WAGE WAR. Finally, polysemy and antonymy are related via contextual hyperonymy/hyponymy. For example, MEMORY can mean BAD MEMORY, which can be identified as polysemy, or if the formula X IS-A-KIND-OF Y is followed, this is, at the same time, an example of autohyponymy and

autoantonymy. Autohyponymy and autoantonymy have been identified in all six corpora.

The synonym/antonym interplay is present in all Tables, i.e. all six corpora, American, British, Serbian, in both newspaper articles and political speeches.

- Concealing euphemisms do not necessarily undergo the process of *euphemism treadmill* (Pinker 2002: 212–213), or *x-phemistic recycling* (Allan and Burrige 2006: 243), the process of replacing a euphemism which becomes saturated with negative connotations with another euphemism. As concealing euphemisms can be words/multi-word units which can be identified as concealing euphemisms only in relation to specific contexts and in relation to certain topics, whereas, outside of those specific context, they have other senses, they can survive. As the lexico-semantic analysis shows, concealing euphemisms can be superordinate terms with very high levels of generality of meaning/ high levels of polysemy, they can be metaphors, metonymies, even antonyms and homonyms, so it is the hearer that saturates/enriches such a term with negative connotations in accordance with the contextual information, and the term/concealing euphemism itself is part of the lexical network, and therefore, it survives.
- Hyperonyms used as concealing euphemisms are more frequent than hyponyms used as concealing euphemisms (hyponyms together with troponyms). Tables 7 and 9 (American and British newspaper articles) have more hyponyms (hyponyms together with troponyms) than Tables 8 and 10 (American and British political speeches). In other words, there are more hyponyms (hyponyms together with troponyms) in the corpus of concealing euphemisms taken from newspaper articles than in the corpus of concealing euphemisms taken from political speeches. As far as Serbian newspaper articles and political speeches are concerned, the difference in the number of hyponyms is not significant. This shows that, as far as concealing euphemisms are concerned, a higher level of specificity can be expected in newspaper articles. In that sense, newspaper articles make concealing euphemisms more exposed.
- In Tables 7, 9, 11 (American, British and Serbian newspaper articles), there are more hyperonyms and hyponyms (hyponyms together with troponyms) than metaphors and metonymies, whereas in Tables 8, 10, and 12 (American, British and Serbian political speeches), there are more metaphors and metonymies than hyperonyms and hyponyms (hyponyms together with troponyms). As far as newspaper articles are concerned, this means that it is more likely to rely on a higher level of generality by



means of hyperonyms than on rhetorical effects by means of metaphors and metonymies. As far as political speakers are concerned, the tendency to rely on metaphors and metonymies, rather than hyperonyms, means that political speakers want to achieve specific rhetorical effects. This suggests that newspaper articles are closer to a matter-of-fact, unrhetorical tone.

- In Table 11 (Serbian newspaper articles), metaphors and metonymies are most frequently used to euphemize *stealing*. In Table 8 (American political speeches), metaphors and metonymies are most frequently used in relation to the topic of *war*. In Table 10 (British political speeches), metaphors and metonymies are most frequently related to the topic of economic crisis.
- Concealing euphemism can be occasion-specific senses. This emphasizes the role of context in determining non-euphemistic equivalents (non-euphemistic equivalents are results of weak implicature derivation). All corpora have such concealing euphemisms, and the non-euphemistic equivalents given here are only possible contextual specifications, which means that the euphemistic and the non-euphemistic term are not related in all contexts: Table 7: INCONSISTENT → UNFAIR; Table 8: FORTUNATE → RICH, OPEN THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM → SURRENDER, Table 9: ALL NECESSARY MEASURES → *not identified*; Table 10: ALL THE OPTIONS → *not identified*; VULNERABLE → POOR; Table 11: ZLOUPOTREBLJEN [abused] → UKRADEN [stolen] Table 12: USPEŠAN [successful] → BOGAT [RICH].
- The existence of occasion-specific concealing euphemisms emphasizes the role/responsibility of the hearer/reader in recovering non-euphemistic equivalents. This is discussed in the next section of the corpus analysis.

## 4.4. Lexico-pragmatic analysis

### 4.4.1. Introduction

The preceding lexico-semantic analysis was not without lexico-pragmatic intrusions. It was emphasized on numerous occasions that, when lexico-semantic relations are identified, we cannot disregard the influence of context. But what makes the lexico-pragmatic analysis in this section different from the previous lexico-semantic analysis is that it is based on the theoretical postulates proposed by relevance theory. Briefly summarized, we rely on the relevance-theoretic postulates in our analysis of the intersubjective (not only referential) dimension of language use, which includes pragmatic and epistemic aspects related to the speaker's and the hearer's presumptions and expectations in communication.

### 4.4.2. Pragmatic algorithm

Communication is not always cooperative, and this is especially true when speakers as Gómez (2009: 738) puts it, conceptualize forbidden realities by means of euphemisms. The possibility of using alternative euphemistic lexical conceptualizations is based on the possibility of adjusting the degree of explicitness of the encoded content, on the possibility of expressing or withholding information in accordance with the effects the speaker wants to achieve. The result of the hearer's pragmatic inferencing relies on the hearer's epistemic vigilance, which is adjusted in accordance with expectations/beliefs in the speaker's readiness to be explicit enough to give us adequate information.

There are two types of epistemic vigilance, vigilance towards the content and vigilance towards the source of information (Sperber et al. 2010: 369–371; 374–376) (see Section 2.5.7.3.). To identify a word as a concealing euphemism, both types of epistemic vigilance should be exercised. Vigilance towards the content increases if we are distrustful of the speaker as the source of information, but we may distrust the speaker because we believe that the encoded content is equivocal, vague and too loose to provide us with information we need. Vague content can mean vague commitment to the presumption of optimal relevance, which should ideally take into account both the speaker's and the addressee's cost-effect balance. However, in communication, the speaker's and the hearer's interests may not be the same, and the presumption of optimal relevance can suit only the speaker's preferences and interests. As the final goal of communication is cognitive efficiency, which means producing

knowledge, not false beliefs, the hearer should be careful about both inputs given by the speaker (here, inputs refer to language that could be identified as euphemistic) and outputs (processing of such language) of comprehension.

Here we propose the pragmatic algorithm that accounts for the mechanisms behind the speaker's use of concealing euphemisms and the hearer's communicative response, decoding and inference <sup>47</sup>:

#### A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

- 1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.
- 2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.
- 3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.
- 4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.
- 5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.
- 6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemitic encodings produce.

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<sup>47</sup> Following Sperber and Wilson (1998a) and Wilson and Sperber (2002), Carston (2002) proposes a model which explains pragmatic processes involved in understanding.

## B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

To illustrate how the pragmatic algorithm works, we analyze two types of concealing euphemisms. In accordance with the general formal classification into words and multi-word units, we first analyze the relation between a concealing euphemism realized as a single word, the concealing euphemism CONFLICT, included in the American, British and Serbian corpora, and its non-euphemistic equivalent WAR. The second analysis focuses on the relation between a concealing euphemism realized as a multi-word unit, the concealing euphemism NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] and its non-euphemistic equivalent KRIMINAL [crime], included in the Serbian corpora (and the corresponding multi-word unit ILLEGAL ACTIVITY in the American corpus). After these two analyses have been done, the results of the lexico-

semantic analysis will be analyzed in more detail in relation to the pragmatic algorithm in Section 4.4.3.

### CONFLICT → WAR (AC, BC and SC)

#### A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(28) AC: CONFLICT → WAR:

America did nothing to seek or deserve this conflict.

(Bush: President Bush's farewell address to the nation, 15 January 2009b)

(29) BC: CONFLICT → WAR:

He (Obama) might quietly hope that Congress votes no or, if it votes yes, that his Republican opposition will be forced to share the burden of entering an unpopular conflict.

(Author unknown/not found. Telegraph View: Our special relationship endures, *The Telegraph*, 31 August 2013)

(30) SC: SUKOB (CONFLICT) → RAT (WAR):

Američki državni sekretar Džon Keri izjavio je danas da nema izgleda da bi američki vojni udar na Siriju zbog upotrebe hemijskog oružja izazvao sukob sa Rusijom, jednim od ključnih saveznika sirijskog režima.

(Tanjug, Keri: Nema izgleda za sukob sa Rusijom zbog Sirije, *Blic*, 05.09.2013.)

[United States Secretary of State John Kerry announced today that the American attack on Syria caused by the use of chemical weapons was not likely to lead to conflict with Russia, one of the main allies of the Syrian regime.]

[Tanjug, Kerry: Conflict with Russia over Syria is not likely to happen, *Blic*, 05.09.2013]

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*. *Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention,

and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

In all three examples, the speaker gives information about the involvement in conflict.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.

The chosen encoding CONFLICT is a monomorphemic word which has many senses. It also has many synonyms related to different senses, such as STRUGGLE, BATTLE, FIGHT, ENGAGEMENT, DISPUTE, DIFFERENCE: different senses and synsets are taken from WordNet Search 3.1, some of which are the following:

CONFLICT:

S: (n) conflict, struggle, battle (an open clash between two opposing groups (or individuals))

S: (n) conflict (opposition between two simultaneous but incompatible feelings)

S: (n) battle, conflict, fight, engagement (a hostile meeting of opposing military forces in the course of a war)

S: (n) conflict (a state of opposition between persons or ideas or interests)

S: (n) dispute, difference, difference of opinion, conflict (a disagreement or argument about something important)

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

The relation between CONFLICT and WAR is seen in the synsets which identify CONFLICT as an open clash and a hostile meeting of opposing military forces, and in the synset which identifies WAR as the waging of armed conflict against an enemy:

CONFLICT

S: (n) battle, conflict, fight, engagement (a hostile meeting of opposing military forces in the course of a war)

S: (n) conflict, struggle, battle (an open clash between two opposing groups (or individuals))

WAR

S: (n) war, warfare (the waging of armed conflict against an enemy)

S: (n) war, state of war (a legal state created by a declaration of war and ended by official declaration during which the international rules of war apply)

If the speaker used the word WAR, the explicature and the implicated premises related to the word WAR (retrieved from encyclopaedic knowledge and textual context) would lead to implicated conclusions which would have extremely negative connotations. Let us take a closer look at one of the above-mentioned corpus examples in detail:

(28) AC: CONFLICT → WAR:

America did nothing to seek or deserve this war (not conflict).

Possible implicated premises and conclusions:

Premise: The USA is at war.

Premise: War is an armed conflict against an enemy.

Conclusion: The USA is in armed conflict against an enemy.

Premise: The USA is at war.

Premise: War is a legal state created by a declaration of war

Conclusion: The USA is in a legal state created by a declaration of war.

These are the implicatures and negative connotations, as well as possible political and legal consequences that the speaker can avoid by using the more general hyperonym CONFLICT instead of the more specific hyponym WAR.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The speaker believes that the hearer can recognize the relation between the concealing euphemism CONFLICT and the non-euphemistic equivalent WAR. CONFLICT and WAR are in the hyperonym-hyponym relation, so choosing a more general term does not mean that the speaker gives wrong information.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemistic encodings produce.

#### B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance. For the sake of clarity, we repeat the examples analyzed in relation to the speaker's perspective/encoding mechanism, and then we perform the analysis of the hearer's decoding mechanism and inference.

(28) AC: CONFLICT → WAR:

America did nothing to seek or deserve this conflict.

(29) BC: CONFLICT → WAR:

He (Obama) might quietly hope that Congress votes no or, if it votes yes, that his Republican opposition will be forced to share the burden of entering an unpopular conflict.

(30) SC: SUKOB (CONFLICT) → RAT (WAR):

Američki državni sekretar Džon Keri izjavio je danas da nema izgleda da bi američki vojni udar na Siriju zbog upotrebe hemijskog oružja izazvao sukob sa Rusijom, jednim od ključnih saveznika sirijskog režima.

[United States Secretary of State John Kerry announced today that the American attack on Syria caused by the use of chemical weapons was not likely to lead to conflict with Russia, one of the main allies of the Syrian regime.]

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*. *Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer. The hearer receives information about the involvement in conflict.



The encoding CONFLICT in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness needed to derive the explicature, and implicature derivation depends on the less negative encoding CONFLICT.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

Explicature and implicature derivation is problematic because the meaning of CONFLICT is too general. The hearer knows that CONFLICT has many different senses, and some senses are more negatively connoted than others. The hearer knows that other words can be used instead of CONFLICT.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

Let us again take a closer look at this process by examining the same example we analyzed in relation to the speaker's encoding mechanism:

(28) AC: CONFLICT → WAR:

America did nothing to seek or deserve this conflict.

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: POLITICAL SPEECH

TITLE OF SPEECH: President Bush's farewell address to the nation

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: Over the past seven years, a new Department of Homeland Security has been created. The military, the intelligence community, and the FBI have been transformed. Our Nation is equipped with new tools to monitor the terrorists' movements, freeze their finances, and break up their plots. And with strong allies at our side, we have taken the fight to the terrorists and those who support them. Afghanistan has gone from a nation where the Taliban harbored al Qaeda and stoned women in the streets to a young democracy that is fighting terror and encouraging girls to go to school. Iraq has gone from a brutal dictatorship and a sworn enemy of America to an Arab democracy at the heart of the Middle East and a friend of the United States. [...] The battles waged by our troops are part of a broader struggle between two dramatically different systems. [...]

While our Nation is safer than it was seven years ago, the gravest threat to our people remains another terrorist attack. Our enemies are patient and determined to strike again. America did nothing to seek or deserve this conflict. But we have been given solemn responsibilities, and we must meet them. We must resist complacency. We must keep our resolve. And we must never let down our guard.<sup>48</sup>

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: America is in conflict with terrorists (the information given in the speech assigns the meaning to the deictic word *this*)

America has troops in the conflict.

America has enemies and allies.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Different assumptions related to the concept *war*, and different information related to American involvement in wars (for example, the above-mentioned possible premises)

LOGICAL IMPLICATION: WAR is a specific type of CONFLICT. The hearer knows that CONFLICT has many senses, and in specific contexts, it can have descriptive features such as [MILITARY] [KILLING], which are diagnostic features of the lexeme WAR.

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: On the basis of the textual context, encyclopaedic knowledge and logical implications of the encoded concept CONFLICT, WAR is related to CONFLICT.

EXPLICATURE DERIVATION: The United States of America did nothing to seek or deserve the war with the terrorists. (WAR, not CONFLICT)

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<sup>48</sup> The entire speech has more than 1800 words, so here we give only the parts of the speech which provide more information about the conflict the speaker talks about.

NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] → KRIMINAL [crime] (AC)

A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(31) SC: NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] → KRIMINAL [crime]:

Firme u restrukturiranju su legla nezakonitog rada, a trenutno ih je 175 - kaže Knežević.

(Stjelja: Novac firmama – po partijskoj liniji, *Večernje novosti*, 05.07.2013)

[Companies undergoing restructuring breed illegal activity, and, at this moment, there are 175 of them – says Knežević]

[Stjelja: Money to companies – for party loyalty]

In the American corpus, the euphemism ILLEGAL ACTIVITY has been identified:

(32) AC: ILLEGAL ACTIVITY → CRIME:

[...] But the admission of illegal activity by a man who was once among Gray's most trusted political hands threatens to greatly complicate the mayor's pending decision on whether to seek a second term. Gray has denied any wrongdoing.

(Debonis and Marimow E.: Former Gray adviser admits to lying to FBI, lays out 'shadow campaign' workings, *The Washington Post*, 13 August 2013)

This concealing euphemism taken from the Serbian corpus is an example of the *mention* of an expression (see the difference between *use* and *mention* in Section 2.5.7.8.). In both newspaper articles and political speeches, quoting and reporting someone's words is a common occurrence. If the concealing euphemism is part of a quotation/reporting, its use is attributed to someone else. In this article, the euphemistic encoding is not the author of the article, but the person who the author mentions in the article.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*. *Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention,

and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The author gives information about cases of illegal activity.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.

The chosen encoding NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] is a multi-word unit. The headword is the neutral word RAD [work], and negative connotations are expressed by the modifier NEZAKONITI [illegal].

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

The following senses of the headword RAD, the adjective NEZAKONITI [illegal] and the noun KRIMINAL [crime] are taken from *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990)<sup>49</sup>:

RAD [work]

- conscious human activity aimed at achieving certain useful effect
- doing/ performing a job, task, action, activity
- moving, acting, functioning
- active influence
- product, piece of work
- type of profession, trade

NEZAKONITI [illegal]

- not in accordance with the law

KRIMINAL [crime]

- criminal activity including elements dangerous for society, criminal act, felony

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<sup>49</sup> The author of the thesis gives the translations of the senses taken from the dictionary.

The relation between NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] and KRIMINAL [crime] is seen in the negatively connoted modifier NEZAKONITI [illegal] and the non-euphemistic CRIME [kriminal]. The headword RAD [work] has neutral connotations.

If the speaker used the word KRIMINAL [CRIME], the explicature and the implicated premises related to the word KRIMINAL [CRIME] (retrieved from encyclopaedic knowledge and textual context) would lead to implicated conclusions which would have extremely negative connotations:

Possible implicated premises and conclusions:

Premise: People in companies undergoing restructuring breed crime (not illegal activity).

Premise: Crime is a violation of the criminal law.

Conclusion: People in companies undergoing restructuring violate the criminal law.

Premise: People in companies undergoing restructuring commit crime.

Premise: Crime leads to imprisonment.

Conclusion: People in companies undergoing restructuring go to prison.

These are the implicatures and negative connotations the speaker can avoid by using the less negatively connoted multi-word unit NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] instead of KRIMINAL [crime]. The multi-word unit consists of the hyperonym RAD [work] and the modifier NEZAKONITI [illegal], which describes actions that are not in accordance with the law, but these are not necessarily criminal acts that lead to imprisonment.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The speaker believes that the hearer can recognize the relation between the concealing euphemism NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] and the non-euphemistic equivalent KRIMINAL [crime]. Since NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] and KRIMINAL [crime] are in the hyperonym-hyponym relation, choosing a more general term does not mean that the speaker gives wrong information.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemistic encodings produce.

#### B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

As we now analyze the hearer's decoding mechanism and inference, we repeat the examples:

(31) SC: NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] → KRIMINAL [crime]:

Firme u restrukturiranju su legla nezakonitog rada, a trenutno ih je 175 - kaže Knežević.

[Companies undergoing restructuring breed illegal activity, and, at this moment, there are 175 of them – says Knežević]

(32) AC: ILLEGAL ACTIVITY → CRIME:

[...] But the admission of illegal activity by a man who was once among Gray's most trusted political hands threatens to greatly complicate the mayor's pending decision on whether to seek a second term. Gray has denied any wrongdoing.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer. In the examples, hearer receives information about cases of illegal activity.

The encoding NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of

explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness needed to derive the explicature, and implicature derivation depends on the less negative encoding NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work].

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

Explicature and implicature derivation is problematic because the meaning of NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] is too general. The hearer knows that NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] has many different senses, and some senses are more negatively connoted than others. The hearer knows that other words can be used instead of NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work].

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The process of interpreting the concealing euphemism is examined in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

NEWSPAPER HEADLINE: Stjelja: Novac firmama – po partijskoj liniji

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: - Firme u restrukturiranju su legla nezakonitog rada, a trenutno ih je 175 - kaže Knežević. - Oni, ne samo što prave direktne poslovne gubitke, nego ne plaćaju ni dobavljačima, niti plaćaju poreze i doprinose, a ni energente. I sve vreme ih država dotira. A u poslednje četiri godine koštale su državu, odnosno građane, oko 4,5 milijardi evra. I sve su u gorjoj situaciji nego kada su ušle u restrukturiranje.

[Companies undergoing restructuring breed illegal activity, and, at this moment, there are 175 of them – says Knežević. – They do not only make direct business losses, but they do not pay their suppliers, their taxes, contributions, sources of energy. And the state helps them all the while. And in the last four years, the cost to the state, i.e., citizens, has been around 4.5. billion euros. And the situation has been deteriorating since the process of restructuring began. ]

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT People in companies are involved in illegal work.

Illegal activity includes business losses.

Illegal activity includes tax evasion.

Illegal activity includes criminal acts.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Different assumptions related to the concept *criminal*, and different information to types of crime and types of law-breaking (see the above-mentioned possible premises).

LOGICAL IMPLICATION: kriminal [crime] is a specific type of NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work]. The hearer knows that there are many types of illegal work, and, in specific contexts, it can have descriptive features that combine to make different senses, some of which are felony, imprisonment.

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: On the basis of the textual context, encyclopaedic knowledge and logical implications of the encoded concept NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work] is related to KRIMINAL [crime].

EXPLICATURE DERIVATION: [People who work in companies undergoing restructuring breed crime] (not illegal work)

This is not the full explicature, as [people who work in companies], and [companies] are not fully specified. As we focus on concealing euphemisms only, not all words and phrases are analyzed here.

The previous analysis shows how the pragmatic algorithm accounts for the use of two types of concealing euphemisms, the single word and the multi-word unit, both of which are



hyperonyms used instead of non-euphemistic hyponyms. In Section 4.3., the analysis of the lexico-semantic relations between concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents shows that concealing euphemisms are not only hyperonyms, but in addition to hyperonymy, concealing euphemisms and their equivalents can be associated with other types of lexico-semantic relations. In the next section of the thesis, the pragmatic algorithm is related to other types of lexico-semantic relations analyzed in Section 4.3.

### 4.4.3. Pragmatic algorithm and lexico-semantic relations

#### 4.4.3.1. Introduction

In Section 4.3.4, the results of the lexico-semantic analysis show that concealing euphemisms can be related to different types of relations. Four major tendencies have been identified. Firstly, Tables 7–12 show that hyperonyms used as concealing euphemisms are more frequent than hyponyms (together with troponyms) used as concealing euphemisms. By means of hyperonymy, the speaker broadens meaning, so the hearer narrows down/derives a more specific sense on the basis of the encoded one (see Section 2.5.7.6). Secondly, hyponyms (together with troponyms) used as concealing euphemisms are more frequent in the corpus of newspaper articles than in the corpus of political speeches. Thirdly, Tables 7–12 show that, in the corpus of newspaper articles, hyperonymy/hyponymy is more frequent than the group that includes metaphors and metonymies, and in the corpus of political speeches, metaphors and metonymies are more frequent than hyperonymy/hyponymy. Metaphors and metonymies are specific types of polysemy; they can be treated as examples of imposed narrowing (Noveck and Spotorno 2013), or they can be treated as broadening and loose use of language, where a word is used to convey a more general sense than the encoded one. Metaphors can be used in propositions to serve only as a vehicle for implicature derivation (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 231–237), and this idea is tested in this section. Fourthly, concealing euphemisms can be related to occasion-specific, ad hoc concepts, or the pragmatically derived (non-lexicalised) concepts, the meaning of which can be inferred on the basis of the encoded (lexicalized) concept (Carston 2002: 322) (see Section 2.5.7.5). For example, the following non-euphemistic terms are pragmatically derived; they are related to the context of use, and they are not necessarily euphemistic in other contexts: INCONSISTENT

(→UNFAIR), VULNERABLE (→ POOR), the verb PACIFY (→DESTROY) the multi-word unit OPEN THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM (→SURRENDER).

#### 4.4.3.2. Analyses

In this section, the pragmatic algorithm is related to different types of lexico-semantic relations given in Tables 7–12. The analysis of the hyperonyms analyzed in Section 4.4.2. is now followed by the analysis of one instance of troponymy, the troponym MIS-SELL (→ DECEIVE). Afterwards, the pragmatic algorithm is related to polysemy (MILITARY ENGAGEMENT → WAR), specific subtypes of polysemy, i.e. metaphor (NAIL) and metonymy (CHEAP LABOUR → CHEAP WORKERS), and, then, the pragmatic algorithm used in the analysis of synonymy (KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] → KRIMINALAC [criminal]), antonymy (STABILISE → DESTABILISE), synonym-antonym interplay (NEISKRENOST [insincerity]→ LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness]), and homonymy (HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE → MILITARY ACTION) .

#### MIS-SELL (troponym) → DECEIVE BY SELLING (hyperonym) (BC)

##### A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(33) BC: MIS-SELL → DECEIVE BY SELLING:

As FSA managing director Martin Wheatley gave the go-ahead for a compensation for small businesses mis-sold “absurdly complex financial products”, we heard the stories of three victims of the scandal.

(Author unknown/ not found: Swap mis-selling victims: The restaurateur, the electrical retailer and the shop owner, *The Telegraph*, 01 February 2013)

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*. *Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention,

and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The author gives information about a banking scandal.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.

The chosen encoding MIS-SELL is a polymorphemic word; it consists of the root word SELL, which is highly polysemous (it can have positive and negative connotations), and the negative prefix MIS. The verb SELL, which has neutral connotations, is the hyperonym of MIS-SELL:

SELL

S: (v) sell (exchange or deliver for money or its equivalent)

S: (v) sell (be sold at a certain price or in a certain way)

S: (v) sell (persuade somebody to accept something)

S: (v) deal, sell, trade (do business; offer for sale as for one's livelihood)

S: (v) sell (give up for a price or reward)

S: (v) sell (be approved of or gain acceptance)

S: (v) sell (be responsible for the sale of)

S: (v) betray, sell (deliver to an enemy by treachery)

MIS-

negative meaning, badly, wrongly

In Oxford Learner's Dictionaries, MIS-SELL means "to sell somebody something that is not suitable for their needs, for example by not giving them all the information they need." This definition does not state whether the act of mis-selling is done intentionally or not intentionally.

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

MIS-SELL

to sell somebody something that is not suitable for their needs, for example by not giving them all the information they need

DECEIVE BY SELLING/ DECEIVE

S: (v) deceive, lead on, delude, cozen (be false to; be dishonest with)

S: (v) deceive, betray, lead astray (cause someone to believe an untruth)

MIS-SELL is a specific type of negative action, which is morphologically related to the hyperonym SELL. However, as it is negatively connoted, it is also a troponym of the verb DECEIVE, which includes different troponyms denoting actions/practices whose aim is to cause someone to believe an untruth. In addition to being a troponym of SELL, MIS-SELL is a troponym of DECEIVE.

If the speaker used the word DECEIVE, the explicature and the implicated premises related to the word DECEIVE (retrieved from encyclopaedic knowledge and textual context) would lead to implicated conclusions which would have extremely negative connotations:

Possible implicated premises and conclusions:

Premise: People who own small businesses were deceived intentionally.

Premise: Intentional deception is a criminal act.

Conclusion: People who own small businesses are victims of a criminal act

Premise: Banks can intentionally deceive people.

Premise: Intentional deception is a criminal act.

Conclusion: Banks can commit criminal acts.

These are the implicatures and negative connotations the speaker can avoid by using the less negatively connoted polymorphemic troponym MIS-SELL.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The speaker believes that the hearer can recognize the relation between the concealing euphemism MIS-SELL and the non-euphemistic equivalent DECEIVE. The speaker chooses MIS-SELL as it does not specify whether the action is done intentionally or unintentionally.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemistic encodings produce.

#### B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30).

The hearer receives information about a banking scandal. The encoding MIS-SELL in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness needed to derive the explicature, and implicature derivation depends on the less negative encoding MIS-SELL. Whether the action is intentional or unintentional is not relevant for the hearer.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

The hearer knows that MIS-SELL is a troponym which has a specific negative meaning. The hearer knows that MIS-SELL can be related to other verbs which have negative meaning. SELL is not the only hyperonym of MIS-SELL.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The process of interpreting the concealing euphemism is examined in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

NEWSPAPER HEADLINE: Swap mis-selling victims: The restaurateur, the electrical retailer and the shop owner

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: As FSA managing director Martin Wheatley gave the go-ahead for a compensation for small businesses mis-sold "absurdly complex financial products", we heard the stories of three victims of the scandal.

The restaurateur: Shock in the bank statement

Top London restaurateur Sami Wasif, co-founder of Michelin-starred Chinese restaurant Hakkasan, has been at loggerheads with Royal Bank of Scotland since discovering the bank sold him an interest rate

swap that has cost him nearly £200,000 in extra payments. Mr Wasif was sold the swap in 2004 but only realised its existence eight years later after noticing payments in his bank account that he did not believe he had authorised. Since then, Mr Wasif has repeatedly complained to RBS about the swap and last November became a hero among other swap mis-selling victims after refusing to pay any more premiums to the bank until his situation is dealt with.

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: People who were deceived were compensated.

People who own small businesses were mis-sold financial products.

Sami Wasif was sold an interest rate.

Sami Wasif did not believe he had authorized the payment.

Sami complained about the extra payments.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Different assumptions related to the topic of *banking, fraud, financial transactions*. Encyclopaedic knowledge is highly important in providing assumptions about what constitutes a banking fraud. (see the above-mentioned possible premises)

LOGICAL IMPLICATION: The hearer knows that the verb MIS-SELL is a specific subtype of SELL, but it is also a specific subtype of DECEIVE.

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: On the basis of the textual context, encyclopaedic knowledge and logical implications of the encoded concept MIS-SELL, DECEIVE is related to MIS-SELL.

EXPLICATURE DERIVATION: As FSA managing director Martin Wheatley gave the go-ahead for a compensation for small businesses deceived (not mis-sold) “absurdly complex financial products”, we heard the stories of three victims of the scandal.

## MILITARY ENGAGEMENT → WAR (polysemy and meronymy) (AC)

### A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(34) AC: MILITARY ENGAGEMENT → WAR:

One of America's first military engagements as an independent nation was with the Barbary pirates.

(President Bush's speech to the Saban Forum, 05 December 2008)

1) Communication involves a communicative intention and an informative intention.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The speech is about American foreign policy and wars.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least effort strategy and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.

The chosen encoding MILITARY ENGAGEMENT is a multi-word unit. WordNet Search 3.1. gives the following information about the senses of MILITARY and ENGAGEMENT:

ENGAGEMENT:

S: (n) battle, conflict, fight, engagement (a hostile meeting of opposing military forces in the course of a war)

S: (n) date, appointment, engagement (a meeting arranged in advance)

S: (n) betrothal, troth, engagement (a mutual promise to marry)

S: (n) employment, engagement (the act of giving someone a job)

S: (n) engagement, booking (employment for performers or performing groups that lasts for a limited period of time)

S: (n) engagement, mesh, meshing, interlocking (contact by fitting together)

S: (n) engagement, participation, involvement, involution (the act of sharing in the activities of a group)

MILITARY

S: (adj) military (of or relating to the study of the principles of warfare)

S: (adj) military (characteristic of or associated with soldiers or the military)

S: (adj) military (associated with or performed by members of the armed services as contrasted with civilians)



ENGAGEMENT is highly polysemous, and the negative connotations are strengthened by the modifier MILITARY.

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

ENGAGEMENT:

S: (n) battle, conflict, fight, engagement (a hostile meeting of opposing military forces in the course of a war)

MILITARY:

S: (adj) military (of or relating to the study of the principles of warfare)

S: (adj) military (characteristic of or associated with soldiers or the military)

S: (adj) military (associated with or performed by members of the armed services as contrasted with civilians)

WAR:

S: (n) war, warfare (the waging of armed conflict against an enemy)

S: (n) war, state of war (a legal state created by a declaration of war and ended by official declaration during which the international rules of war apply)

Both MILITARY ENGAGEMENT and WAR have descriptive features [MILITARY] [OPPOSING FORCES], but WAR does not have any positive or neutral connotations.

If the speaker used the word WAR the explicature and the implicated premises] (retrieved from encyclopaedic knowledge and textual context) would lead to implicated conclusions which would have extremely negative connotations:

Possible implicated premises and conclusions:

Premise: American people were involved in more than one war.

Premise: War means armed conflicts against enemies.

Conclusion: American people were at war with many enemies in the past.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The speaker believes that the hearer can recognize the relation between the concealing euphemism *MILITARY ENGAGEMENT* and the non-euphemistic equivalent *WAR*. However, choosing a highly polysemous word does not mean that the speaker gives wrong information.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemistic encodings can produce.

#### B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making manifest a certain set of assumptions. The hearer receives information about American wars.

The encoding *MILITARY ENGAGEMENT* in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness needed to derive the explicature, and implicature derivation depends on the less negative encoding MILITARY ENGAGEMENT.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

Explicature and implicature derivation is problematic because the meaning of MILITARY ENGAGEMENT is highly polysemous, so it needs to be specified. The hearer knows that other words can be used instead of MILITARY ENGAGEMENT. Some senses are more negatively connoted than others.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The process of interpreting the concealing euphemism is given in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: POLITICAL SPEECH

TITLE OF SPEECH: President Bush's speech to the Saban Forum

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: From our earliest days as a nation, the Middle East has played a central role in American foreign policy. One of America's first military engagements as an independent nation was with the Barbary pirates. One of our first consulates was in Tangiers. Some of the most fateful choices made by American Presidents have involved the Middle East -- including President Truman's decision to recognize Israel 60 years ago this past May.[...]

To stop this from happening, we resolved to help the region steer itself toward a better course of freedom and dignity and hope. We're engaged in a battle with the extremists that is broader than a military conflict, and broader than a law enforcement operation. We are engaged in an ideological struggle. And to advance our security interests and moral interests, America is working to advance freedom and democracy as the great alternatives to repression and terror. [...]

There are still serious challenges facing the Middle East. Iran and Syria continue to sponsor terror. Iran's uranium enrichment remains a major threat to peace. Many in the region still live under oppression. Yet the changes of the past eight years herald the beginning of something historic and new. At long last, the Middle East is closing a chapter of darkness and fear, and opening a new one written in the language of possibility and hope. For the first time in generations, the region represents something more than a set of problems to be solved, or the site of energy resources to be developed. A free and peaceful Middle East will represent a source of promise, and home of opportunity, and a vital contributor to the prosperity of the world.

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: America has been engaged in a battle with  
extremists.

There are still serious challenges facing the Middle East .

Iran and Syria continue to sponsor terror.

Iran's uranium enrichment remains a major threat to peace.

The Middle East represents something more than a set of problems to  
be solved, or the site of energy resources to be developed

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Different assumptions related to the USA and its  
involvement in wars (see the above-mentioned possible  
premises).

LOGICAL IMPLICATION: WAR can be a type of MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: On the basis of the textual context, encyclopaedic  
knowledge and logical implications, MILITARY ENGAGEMENT  
can be related to WAR.

EXPLICATURE DERIVATION: One of America's first wars (not military engagements)  
as an independent nation was with the Barbary pirates.

NAIL → not identified (metaphor) (AC)

A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(35) But U.S. military action cannot be the only – or even primary – component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.

(Obama: America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one else will. 28.05. 2014)

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

Here the speaker speaks about U.S. leadership in terms of military power. The speaker uses the metaphor NAIL, which is an example of loose use of language, of non-literal resemblance. Metaphors are the source of weak implicatures, weakly manifest assumptions and weak communication

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.

The chosen encoding NAIL is a metaphor. The hearer takes over responsibility to recover assumptions related to the metaphor.

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

The hearer derives weak implicated premises and implicated conclusions related to the metaphor NAIL (retrieved from encyclopaedic knowledge and textual context). As the purpose of metaphors is not to make a set of assumptions manifest, it is possible for the hearer to derive implicatures not intended by the speaker.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The speaker believes that the hearer can recognize metaphor NAIL as a euphemistic encoding. The speaker only invites the hearer to derive explicatures and implicatures, and the informative intention remains hidden.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The informative intention is hidden.

#### B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The hearer receives information about U.S. leadership in terms of military power. The encoding NAIL communicates weakly manifest assumptions, so the hearer derives weak explicatures and implicatures.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer must choose Possibility 2. The speaker does not make a certain set of assumptions manifest; metaphors are examples of weak communication. The hearer relies on his/her own weakly derived explicature and implicatures.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

The speaker's informative intention succeeds in the sense that the speaker hides certain assumptions related to the encoding NAIL.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The process of interpreting the metaphorical encoding is given in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: POLITICAL SPEECH

TITLE OF SPEECH: America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't,  
no one else will

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: Here's my bottom line: America must always lead on the world stage. If we don't, no one else will. The military that you have joined is, and always will be, the backbone of that leadership. But U.S. military action cannot be the only – or even primary – component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail. And because the costs associated with military action are so high, you should expect every civilian leader – and especially your Commander-in-Chief – to be clear about how that awesome power should be used.

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: America wants leadership on the worldstage.

American military power is the backbone of its leadership.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Different assumptions related to the concept *nail*.

Different assumptions related to the concept *nail* and other  
concepts that have descriptive features that *nail* also has, such as  
[OBJECT OF HITTING] [HITTING HARD], [TARGET].

Different assumptions related to American involvement in wars.

LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS: no logical implications

Possible implicated premises and conclusions:

The USA does not think that every country is a nail.

Nail is the thing you hit hard.

The USA does not think that every country should be hit hard.

The USA considers some countries as nails.

Nails are targets for military attack.

The USA considers some countries as targets for a military attack.

POSSIBLE EXPLICATURE: Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every  
problem is a target for a military attack. (not nail).



CHEAP LABOUR → CHEAP WORKERS (BC) ) (metonymy)

NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force] → JEFTINI  
RADNICI [CHEAP WORKERS] (SC) (metonymy)

A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(36) BC: CHEAP LABOUR → CHEAP WORKERS:

A row over cheap labour imported into France from other EU countries is fuelling Euroscepticism and swelling support for the far-right National Front, a government minister said yesterday.

(Chazan: Cheap labour in France 'fuels far-right support', *The Times*, 23.11.2013.)

(37) SC: NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force] → JEFTINI  
RADNICI [CHEAP WORKERS]:

Mislim da to ugrožava ono što je naša, nažalost, ali je tako, jedna od retkih ili jedina komparativna prednost u ovom trenutku, a to je mogućnost da se na našoj teritoriji uz nešto jeftiniju radnu snagu i neke druge troškove proizvode određeni proizvodi i da je to zapravo tendencija koja nama ide u korist, a ne na štetu.

(Đurić: Đurić o Rističevićevom amandmanu, 29. januar 2013.)

[I think it jeopardizes something that is, unfortunately for us, but it is the way it is, one of the rare or the only comparative advantage at this moment, which consists in a possibility to produce certain products on our territory by employing somewhat cheaper labour force, and including some other expenses, which is actually a tendency that brings benefit, not harm.]

[Đurić: Đurić about Rističević's amendment, 29 January 2013]

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The topic is cheap labour.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy.

The chosen encoding LABOUR has many following synsets and senses (taken from WordNet Search 3.1), some of which are:

LABOUR:

S: (n) labor, labour, working class, proletariat (a social class comprising those who do manual labor or work for wages)

S: (n) labor, labour, toil (productive work (especially physical work done for wages))

The database shows that this word can refer to producers (labour as a working class) and product (labour, toil). The chosen encoding has negative connotations because it has the modifier CHEAP.

In Serbian, in the dictionary *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990) the headword of the encoding NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force], SNAGA [force] can also denote both producers and product<sup>50</sup>:

- ability to work
- validity
- organized group of people
- human body
- workers

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<sup>50</sup> The author of the thesis gives the translations of the senses taken from the dictionary.

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

The metonymic relation between CHEAP LABOUR and CHEAP WORKERS is highly accessible.

If the speaker used the encoding CHEAP WORKERS/ JEFTINI RADNICI, the explicature and the implicated premises related CHEAP WORKERS/ JEFTINI RADNICI would lead to implicated conclusions which would have extremely negative connotations:

Possible implicated premises and conclusions:

Premise: People are treated as cheap labour.

Premise: Cheap labour is a product.

Conclusion: People are treated as products.

Premise: People are treated as products

Premise: Products are not humans.

Conclusion: People are not treated as humans.

These implicatures are avoided by using CHEAP LABOR/ NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA instead of the more specific hyponym CHEAP WORKERS / JEFTINI RADNICI.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The metonymical relation is highly accessible; the speaker does not give wrong information.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemitic encodings produce.

## B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer. The hearer receives information about cheap labor.

The encoding CHEAP LABOR/ NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force] in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The less negative encoding CHEAP LABOR/ NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force] has highly accessible assumptions related to the encoded concept, and, in that sense, the hearer is satisfied with the degree of manifestness.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

The hearer knows that LABOR/SNAGA denotes both the producer and the product, but the hearer knows that other words can be used instead of LABOR. The metonymy CHEAP LABOR can be avoided, and the more explicit encoding CHEAP WORKER can be used, not vice versa.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The process of interpreting the metonymical encoding is given in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

NEWSPAPER HEADLINE: Cheap labour in France 'fuels far-right support'

TEXTUAL CONTEXT:

A row over cheap labour imported into France from other EU countries is fuelling Euroscepticism and swelling support for the far-right National Front, a government minister said yesterday.

Panicked by anger over rising unemployment and predicted gains by Marine Le Pen's party in European elections in May, President Hollande is trying to renegotiate rules allowing other EU nationals to work in France without paying its high social security charges.

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: Cheap labour was imported to France.

Cheap labour are EU nationals who will work in France.

Cheap labour denotes cheap workers.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Information related to the treatment of the working class.

LOGICAL IMPLICATION: no logical implications

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: Cheap labour denotes cheap workers.

EXPLICATURE DERIVATION: A row over cheap workers imported into France from other EU countries is fuelling Euroscepticism and swelling support for the far-right National Front, a government minister said yesterday. (cheap workers, not cheap labour).

KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] → KRIMINALAC [criminal]  
(SC) (synonymy)

A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(38) SC: KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] → KRIMINAL [criminal]:

Podsećamo, mediji su se bavili Mikićem i opisivali ga kao kontroverznog biznismena iz Kraljeva.

(Mališić: Ugrožen: Tominog savetnika obezbeđuje policija, ne zna se zbog čega, *Kurir*, 18. decembar 2013.)

[As a reminder, media reported about Mikić and described him as a controversial businessman from Kraljevo.]

[Mališić: In jeopardy: Toma's advisor under police protection, reasons unknown, *Kurir*, 18 December 2013]

This concealing euphemism taken from the Serbian corpus is an example of the *mention* of an expression (see the difference between *use* and *mention* in Section 2.5.7.8.). The author states that the encoding KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman], is the term taken from media.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The author gives information about a huge debt incurred by a controversial businessman.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's

least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.

The chosen encoding KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] is a multi-word unit. The headword is the neutral word BIZNISMEN [businessman], and negative connotations are expressed by the modifier KONTROVERZNI [controversial]. The noun BIZNISMEN [businessman], according to *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990) is the word taken from the English language, and it denotes a person who has a business, or a trader. The modifier KONTROVERZNI [controversial] denotes something that is debatable, something that causes controversy, something that is subject to debate, argument, disagreement.

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman]

- a businessman who causes controversy, debate, disagreement

KRIMINALAC [criminal]

- someone who commits crime, and crime denotes criminal activity including elements dangerous for society, criminal act, felony.

The relation between KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] and KRIMINALAC [criminal] is seen in the negatively connoted modifier KONTROVERZNI [controversial] and the non-euphemistic KRIMINALAC [criminal]. The headword BIZNISMEN [businessman] has neutral connotations.

If the speaker used the word KRIMINALAC [criminal], the explicature and the implicated premises related to the word KRIMINALAC [criminal] (retrieved from encyclopaedic knowledge and textual context) would lead to implicated conclusions which would have extremely negative connotations:

Possible implicated premises and conclusions:

Premise: The person mentioned in the newspaper is a criminal.

Premise: Criminals violate the criminal law.

Conclusion: The person mentioned in the newspaper violates the criminal law.

Premise: The person mentioned in the newspaper committed crime.

Premise: Crime leads to imprisonment.

Conclusion: The person mentioned in the newspaper should go to prison.

These are the implicatures and negative connotations the speaker avoids by using the less negatively connoted multi-word unit KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] instead of KRIMINALAC [criminal]. The speaker changes the prototype center, instead of talking about the criminal, the speaker talks about the businessman (see Section 4.3.2.3. which deals with synonymy).

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The speaker believes that the hearer can recognize the relation between the concealing euphemism KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] and the non-euphemistic equivalent KRIMINALAC [criminal], as the context provides more assumptions to make that relation. However, the euphemistic encoding achieves the effect of reducing negative connotations.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemistic encodings produce.



## B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer. In the examples, hearer receives information about cases of illegal activity.

The encoding KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness and the degree of manifestness. The hearer accepts the encoding KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] as the most adequate encoding.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

The hearer knows that other words can be used instead of KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman].

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The process of interpreting the concealing euphemism is given in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

NEWSPAPER HEADLINE: Ugrožen: Tominog savetnika obezbeđuje policija, ne zna se zbog čega

[In jeopardy: Toma's advisor under police protection, reasons unknown]

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: Podsećamo, mediji su se bavili Mikićem i opisivali ga kao kontroverznog biznismena iz Kraljeva. Mikićeva bivša firma „Trgomen“ navodno je ostala dužna „Putevima Srbije“ čak 22 miliona dinara, a ta dugovanja od 2005. Prema podacima Agencije za privredne registre, Mikić je pre nešto više od godinu dana formalno istupio iz pomenute firme, koja se bavila proizvodnjom i prodajom sanitarija za kupatila, nameštaja, drveta, građevinske i poljoprivredne mehanizacije.

[As a reminder, media reported about Mikić and described him as a controversial businessman from Kraljevo. Allegedly, Mikić's previous company "Trgomen" owes even 22 million dinars to "Roads of Serbia", and the debt has not been paid since 2005 until this day. According to the information obtained from Serbian Business Registers Agency, Mikić left the mentioned company a little more than a year ago; the company produced and sold bathroom sanitaryware, furniture, wood, construction and agricultural equipment. ]

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: Allegedly, Mikić's company owes even 22 milion dinars.

The debt has not been paid since 2005.

Mikić left the company.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Different assumptions related to the concept *criminal*, and different information to types of crime and types of law-breaking, and what constitutes a specific crime in legal terms (see the possible premises)

LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS: no logical implications

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: On the basis of the textual context and encyclopaedic knowledge the encoded concept KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] is related to KRIMINALAC [criminal].

EXPLICATURE DERIVATION: [As a reminder, media reported about Mikić and described him as a criminal (not controversial businessman) from Kraljevo.]

### STABILISE → DESTABILISE (BC) (antonymy)

#### A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(39) BC: STABILISE → DESTABILISE:

Our troops are there to stabilise the country and enable a political settlement to be reached so that Afghanistan can be stable and we can be safe.

(Miliband: Leader's speech, Manchester 28 September 2010)

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The speaker gives information about the involvement in war with Afghanistan.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral and positive connotations:

STABILISE:

S: (v) brace, steady, stabilize, stabilise (support or hold steady and make steadfast, with or as if with a brace)

S: (v) stabilize, stabilise (become stable or more stable)

S: (v) stabilize, stabilise (make stable and keep from fluctuating or put into an equilibrium)

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

The relation between STABILISE and DESTABILISE is the relation of antonymy. They both have the diagnostic feature [BECOME DIFFERENT], but STABILISE has the feature [STABLE], and DESTABILISE has the feature [UNSTABLE] (see Section 4.3.2.6.)

If the speaker used the word DESTABILISE, i.e. changed the meaning into “become different by becoming unstable” this would be an open confession of the harm done by the troops, and the implicatures would be absolutely negative.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer’s epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer’s epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

Here the speaker’s benevolence is questioned. If the concealing euphemism STABILISE and DESTABILISE can be exchanged in the speech, the speaker is not benevolent.

6) The speaker’s final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemitic encodings produce.

## B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

BC: STABILISE → DESTABILISE: Our troops are there to destabilise (not stabilise) the country and enable a political settlement to be reached so that Afghanistan can be stable and we can be safe.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*. *Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The hearer receives information about the involvement in war with Afghanistan. The encoding STABILISE in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness and a set of assumptions made manifest with the encoding STABILISE.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

Assumptions made manifest in the context make the hearer relate these contextual assumptions with the encoded concept STABILISE.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The hearer's interpretation of the encoding is given in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: POLITICAL SPEECH

TITLE OF SPEECH: Leader's speech, Manchester 28 September 2010

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: Our troops are there to stabilise the country and enable a political settlement to be reached so that Afghanistan can be stable and we can be safe.

I will work in a bi-partisan way with the government to both support our mission and ensure Afghanistan is not a war without end.

But just as I support the mission in Afghanistan as a necessary response to terrorism, I've got to be honest with you about the lessons of Iraq.

Iraq was an issue that divided our party and our country. Many sincerely believed that the world faced a real threat. I criticise nobody faced with making the toughest of decisions and I honour our troops who fought and died there.

But I do believe that we were wrong. Wrong to take Britain to war and we need to be honest about that.

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: Afghanistan should not be a war without an end.

Troops are in Afghanistan to make Afghanistan stable.

The speaker supports the mission/war in Afghanistan.

Britain was at war with Iraq.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Different assumptions related to the concept *war*, and different information related to UK involvement in wars.

LOGICAL IMPLICATION: STABILISE is the opposite of DESTABILISE

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: On the basis of the textual context, it is possible to derive the following implicated conclusion:  
War brings destabilization.  
Britain and Afghanistan are at war.  
Britain and Afghanistan are destabilized.

EXPLICATURE DERIVATION: Our troops are there to destabilise (not stabilise) the country and enable a political settlement to be reached so that Afghanistan can be stable and we can be safe.

NEISKRENOST [insincerity] → LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness] (SC) synonym/antonym  
interplay

A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

(40) SC: NEISKRENOST [insincerity] → LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness]:

Borba za evropsku titulu, kako to neki kažu, i strah da će je SNS preuzeti jeste osnovan i realan. Osnovan je na neiskrenosti DS i njenih koalicionih partnera da se izbore sa osnovnim problemima koji nas mogu kvalifikovati za društvo evropskih naroda.

(Tabaković: Dr Jorgovanka Tabaković, 17.06.2011.)

[The fight for the European title, as some people say, and the fear that the Serbian Progressive Party will take it is well-grounded and realistic. It is based on insincerity of the Democratic Party and its coalition partners in relation to confronting the basic problems, which can make us eligible to belong to the European nations.]

[Tabaković: Dr Jorgovanka Tabaković, 17.06.2011.]

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The speaker gives information about the failure of the economic and social policies of the Democratic party.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one which can express different degrees of negativity.

In the dictionary *Rečnik srpskohrvatskoga književnog jezika* (1967/1990), NEISKRENOST [insincerity] means absence of sincerity, deceitfulness, hypocrisy, the quality of not being real, true.

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

The relation between NEISKRENOST [insincerity] and LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness] is the relation of degree. The opposite term ISKRENOST [insincerity] is negated instead of using the term which is absolutely negative LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness], which is defined as a tendency to use lies.

If the speaker used the word LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness], and the implicatures would be absolutely negative.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.



The speaker resorts to gradability, and avoids the absolutely negative term DECEITFULNESS.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemistic encodings produce.

#### B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*.

*Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer. The hearer receives information about the failure of the economic and social policies of the Democratic party.

The encoding NEISKRENOST [insincerity] in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness and a set of assumptions made manifest with the encoding NEISKRENOST [insincerity].

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral,

positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

The hearer knows that other more negatively connoted encoding can be used instead of the encoding NEISKRENOST [insincerity]. The use of this more negatively connoted encoding relies on the belief that TRUTH and LIES are absolutes, not gradable values.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

Here, the encoding LAŽLJIVOST [deceitfulness] can be used as a synonym of NEISKRENOST [insincerity], and as the antonym of ISKRENOST [insincerity], the antonym which does not only imply the absence of sincerity, but primarily the presence of deceitfulness.

#### HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE → MILITARY ACTION (BC) (homonym)

##### A) THE SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE: ENCODING MECHANISM

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance:

##### (41) BC: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE → MILITARY ACTION:

They will be asked to support the Government's motion which states that a "strong humanitarian response is required from the international community and that this may, if necessary, require military action that is legal, proportionate and focused on saving lives by preventing and deterring further use of Syria's chemical weapons." (Dominiczak, Ross and Winnett: Cameron backs down on urgent Syria strikes, *The Telegraph*, 28 August 2013).

This concealing euphemism taken from the Serbian corpus is an example of the *mention* of an expression (see the difference between *use* and *mention* in Section 2.5.7.8.). The concealing euphemism is part of a quotation, its use is attributed to someone else.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*. *Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The speaker gives information about the involvement in a military attack on Syria.

3) How the concealing euphemism is encoded: the speaker knows that concepts can be encoded with different words, and that the hearer needs to invest effort in explicature and implicature derivation, which depends on the speaker's level of explicitness and the hearer's least-effort strategy. The chosen encoding is the one with neutral or less negative connotations.

The chosen encoding HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE is a multi-word unit that has positive connotations. The headword RESPONSE is highly polysemous, and its senses have neutral connotations, and the modifier HUMANITARIAN has absolutely positive connotations. Different senses and synsets of the two words are taken from WordNet Search 3.1, some of which are the following:

RESPONSE:

S: (n) response (a result)

S: (n) reaction, response (a bodily process occurring due to the effect of some antecedent stimulus or agent)

S: (n) answer, reply, response (a statement (either spoken or written) that is made to reply to a question or request or criticism or accusation)

S: (n) reception, response (the manner in which something is greeted)

S: (n) response (the manner in which an electrical or mechanical device responds to an input signal or a range of input signals)

HUMANITARIAN

S: (adj) human-centered, human-centred, humanist, humanistic, humanitarian (marked by humanistic values and devotion to human welfare)

S: (adj) humanitarian (of or relating to or characteristic of humanitarianism)

4) The speaker believes/knows that there is a relation between the euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings, but, in order to hide and/or avoid undesired cognitive effects, the speaker uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE and MILITARY ACTION have completely different senses. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE does not have descriptive features such as [weapons], [enemy], [killing]. MILITARY ACTION has absolutely negative connotations.

5) The speaker has beliefs about the hearer's epistemic vigilance. The speaker does not ascribe a high degree of epistemic vigilance to the hearer. Even if the hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding, the hearer cannot prove that the speaker is not benevolent, and can simply be taken as incompetent.

The speaker's benevolence is questioned. If HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE and MILITARY ACTION can be exchanged in the speech, the speaker is not benevolent. The speaker makes manifest the assumptions that achieve desired contextual implications.

6) The speaker's final aim: the communicative and the informative intentions succeed. The speaker imposes euphemistic encodings which produce cognitive effects different from the ones non-euphemitic encodings produce.

#### B) THE HEARER'S PERSPECTIVE: DECODING MECHANISM AND INFERENCE

1) General principle: in accordance with the Second Communicative Principle of Relevance, the utterance/sentence carries with itself (as an act of ostensive communication) a presumption of its optimal relevance.

2) Communication involves a *communicative intention* and an *informative intention*. *Communicative intention* refers to informing the audience of one's own informative intention, and the *informative intention* refers to informing the audience of something (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 29–30), to making a certain set of assumptions manifest to the hearer.

The speaker receives information about the involvement in a military attack on Syria. The encoding HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE in the sentence/utterance should maximize cognitive effects.

3a) Possibility 1: The hearer assumes that the speaker is competent and benevolent, and the hearer accepts the concealing euphemism as the word which has the most adequate degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The hearer's epistemic vigilance does not shift to sophisticated understanding, and the search for relevance ends. The speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed.

The hearer is satisfied with the level of explicitness and a set of assumptions made manifest with the encoding HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE.

3b) Possibility 2: The hearer's epistemic vigilance shifts to sophisticated understanding. The hearer believes that the speaker adjusts the degree of explicitness and uses general, neutral, positively or less negatively connoted euphemistic encoding in order to avoid undesired cognitive effects. The hearer does not accept the concealing euphemism as the word which has the highest degree of explicitness in accordance with the speaker's abilities and preferences. The speaker's informative intention does not succeed. The search for relevance continues.

Assumptions made manifest in the context make the hearer test the interpretive hypotheses related to the encoding HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE.

The hearer brings descriptive features of the euphemistic encoding into connection with the non-euphemistic encoding prompted by the type of discourse and the context where the concealing euphemism is used. The euphemistic shell made of positive and neutral connotative features breaks, and less neutral and more negative connotative features change the encoding.

The process of interpreting the encoding is examined in the following section:

TYPE OF DISCOURSE: PUBLIC DISCOURSE

GENRE: NEWSPAPER ARTICLE

NEWSPAPER HEADLINE : Cameron backs down on urgent Syria strikes

TEXTUAL CONTEXT: The Americans were consulted before Mr Cameron's decision was announced and senior White House officials are said to have made it clear that they "respect the British Parliament".

The move came just three hours after William Hague, the Foreign Secretary said it was "very important" for the UK not to leave it too long before launching strikes against Bashar al-Assad's regime.

MPs will still debate and vote on a broader motion in the Commons on Thursday.

They will be asked to support the Government's motion which states that a "strong humanitarian response is required from the international community and that this may, if necessary, require military action that is legal, proportionate and focused on saving lives by preventing and deterring further use of Syria's chemical weapons."

INFORMATION FROM THE TEXT: William Hague said it was important for UK not to wait

too long before launching strikes on Syria.

MPs debate whether to strike or not.

MPs will be asked to support a humanitarian response.

Humanitarian response may require military action.

ENCYCLOPAEDIC KNOWLEDGE: Information related to UK involvement in wars, and

the particularly war with Syria. Assumptions related to the encoded concept HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE.

LOGICAL IMPLICATIONS: no logical implications

IMPLICATED CONCLUSION: On the basis of the textual context, it is possible to derive the

following implicated conclusion:

The encoding HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE has additional descriptive features [military], [action]. HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE has another sense, different in descriptive features from the original one, so it is a homonym.

#### 4.4.3.3. Conclusions

The previous pragmatic analyses of the relations between euphemistic and non-euphemistic encodings show that verbal manipulation can be defined as adjusting the degree of explicitness in accordance with the contextual effects the speaker wants to achieve or avoid. By doing so, the speaker can choose which assumptions should be manifest and highly accessible for the hearer. On the other hand, the hearer has two possibilities. If satisfied with

a degree of explicitness and a set of assumptions the speaker makes manifest by using a word/multi-word unit, the hearer's search for relevance ends, and the speaker's communicative and informative intentions succeed. This means that the speaker, in addition to making a certain set of assumptions manifest, avoids making manifest other assumptions. However, the hearer may not be satisfied with the speaker's degree of explicitness, which prompts testing other interpretive hypotheses, which may not be highly accessible, but they lead to relevant contextual implications.

The lexico-semantic and pragmatic analyses show that, in public discourse, the concealing euphemism is the type of encoding that thrives on inherent undeterminacy and indeterminacy of language use, which both call for epistemic vigilance towards the content. Underdeterminacy is illustrated in the pragmatic analysis of overspecificity of the encoded content (e.g. CONFLICT, which can also be considered as a genus expression which has less negative connotations than its subordinate non-euphemistic word WAR), unspecified scope of elements (e.g. STABILISE has the distinctive feature [stable], which implies the questions: stable/stabilise in what sense, stable/stabilise for whom?). Indeterminacy is illustrated with the pragmatic analysis of the metaphor NAIL, an example of weak communication. The final result of weak communication is the derivation of weak implicatures which may not be part of the speaker's informative intention, which makes metaphors ideal for concealing. The metaphor NAIL can also be considered as an occasion-specific, ad hoc meaning construction, as the specific concept expressed by the encoding NAIL is pragmatically inferred.

The pragmatic analyses show that, in order to recover non-euphemistic equivalents, the hearer must take into account the context and discourse where the concealing euphemism is used. This also means that polysemy and homonymy must be taken into account because some analyzed words/multi-word units are concealing euphemisms in certain context and discourses, and in some other contexts, they are not concealing euphemisms (e.g. CONFLICT, STABILISE, NEISKRENOST [insincerity], which are polysemous words, and HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, which is ambiguous). On the other hand, some multi-word units are concealing euphemisms both in and out of context, such as KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman]. The awareness of the relation between concealing euphemisms and the context and discourse where concealing euphemisms are used is the awareness of the necessity to be epistemically vigilant towards the source of information.

## 4.5. Discursive strategies

### 4.5.1. Introduction

In this part of the thesis, we give examples of concealing euphemisms used as social actor and social action representations. Social actor and social action representations are seen as discursive strategies aimed at imposing representations of the world which can become part of “taken-for-granted background knowledge (Fairclough 1995: 28)”. Linguistic structures are not inherently manipulative; what makes them manipulative are humans who act on their goal-directed intentions (Chilton 2011: 180–181)<sup>51</sup>. As Chilton suggests, making the hearer form a thought or a belief about certain aspects of reality is an example of such manipulative intentions, and discursive strategies (as verbal action) can achieve the goal of changing the hearer’s representation of social and physical reality. This is especially important in critical discourse analysis, which studies the relation between language and social/political power, which comes from people who are in positions to construct social realities, identities, actors and actions, and also hide them by using specific discursive strategies.

### 4.5.2. Analysis of discursive strategies

Table 13 provides examples of concealing euphemisms (used as social actor and social action representations) from the American and British corpora (AC and BC), and Table 14 provides examples from the Serbian corpus (SC). Tables 13 and 14 include both the strategies for social actor representation given in Table 2 in Section 2.6.3.1., and the strategies for social action representation given in Table 3 in Section 2.6.3.2 based on Van Leeuwen (2008: 23–74). The names of strategies are typed in italicized letters, and concealing euphemisms, examples of strategies, are typed in uppercase letters. Strategies for social actor representation include two major types of social actor representation, *impersonalization* and *personalization*. *Impersonalization* is further classified into *abstraction* and *objectivation*, and *personalization* is further classified into *indetermination* and *determination*. Strategies of social action representation include three major types, *deactivation*, *deagentialization*, *abstraction*. Further subtypes of both social actor

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<sup>51</sup> Chilton (2011: 180) mentions another strand of evolutionary psychologists who argue that the origin of language and social intelligence itself are essentially “Machiavellian manipulation (Knight 1998: 73)”.



representation and social action representation given in Tables 2 and 3 are also given in Table 13 and Table 14. The Tables are followed by comments:

TABLE 13: AC and BC/ STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL ACTOR AND SOCIAL ACTION REPRESENTATION

<b>SOCIAL ACTOR REPRESENTATION</b>
<p><b><i>IMPERSONALIZATION</i></b></p> <p><i>abstraction</i>: AC: SURGE, POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION BC: POLITICAL SYSTEM, POLITICS, STATE</p> <p><i>objectivation</i> (four types):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>spatialization</i>: BC: COUNTRY, TAX HAVEN, BLACK MARKET</li> <li>• <i>utterance autonomization</i>: AC: DISINFORMATION, AC and BC: MISINFORMATION</li> <li>• <i>instrumentalization</i>: AC: HAMMER, NAIL; BC: CHEAP LABOUR</li> </ul>
<p><b><i>PERSONALIZATION</i></b></p> <p><i>indetermination</i>: BC: OTHERS</p> <p><i>determination</i> (four types):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>differentiation</i>: AC: THE FEW; BC: THE TOP/THE FEW, THE MANY, THE BETTER-OFF/THE LEAST WELL-OFF, THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS</li> <li>○ <i>categorization</i> (three types): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>functionalization</i>: BC: SPIN DOCTOR</li> <li>▪ <i>identification</i> (three types): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>classification</i>: AC: THE FEW BC: THE TOP/THE FEW, THE MANY, THE BETTER-OFF/THE LEAST WELL-OFF, THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS</li> <li>• <i>relational identification</i>: AC: NOT A PATRIOT, NOT A PROPONENT; BC: THE BETTER-OFF/THE LEAST WELL-OFF, THE TOP/THE FEW, THE MANY</li> <li>• <i>physical identification</i>: /</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ <i>appraisalment</i>: AC: NOT A PATRIOT, NOT A PROPONENT; BC:THE BETTER-OFF/THE LEAST WELL-OFF</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ <i>association</i>: AC: THE FEW BC:THE TOP/THE FEW, THE MANY, THE BETTER-OFF/THE LEAST WELL-OFF</li> </ul>

**SOCIAL ACTION REPRESENTATION****DEACTIVATION**

*objectivation:* AC: BLACK SITE PRISON BC: TAX HAVEN, BLACK MARKET

*descriptivization:* AC: DOMESTIC SERVITUDE; BC: CHEAP LABOUR

**DEAGENTIALIZATION**

*eventuation:* AC: LOSE LIFE, LOSE A JOB, VANISH  
BC: DISAPPEAR, MISSING, SIPHON OFF

*naturalization:* AC: VANISH

BC: DISAPPEAR, MISSING

**ABSTRACTION**

*generalization:* AC: ACTION, ILLEGAL ACTIVITY, MISINFORM, MISLEAD, TAKE, CONFLICT, LEADERSHIP, MILITARY ACTION, MILITARY CONFLICT, MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, MISREPRESENT, MISSPEAK, THREATEN

BC: CRISIS, ACTION, AUSTERITY, INTERVENTION, SURVEILLANCE, IMPACT, MANAGEMENT, CONFLICT, PAYMENT, WATCH, MISREPORT, FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES, take ALL NECESSARY MEASURES, MISSION, MISINFORMATION, TELL

*distillation:* AC: (tell a) FIB, (receive a) GIFT, FURLOUGH, WITHHOLD, RACIAL PROFILING, MILITARY CAMPAIGN

BC: FEE, CONTROVERSIAL INTERROGATION PROGRAMME, ETHNIC PROFILING, (tell) FAR-FETCHED FIBS, FORCE, INFLUENCE, MIS-SELL

TABLE 14: SC/ STRATEGIES FOR SOCIAL ACTOR AND SOCIAL ACTION REPRESENTATION

<b>SOCIAL ACTOR REPRESENTATION</b>
<b><i>IMPERSONALIZATION</i></b>
<p><i>abstraction</i>: POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will], POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors], RUKOVOĐENJE [managing], STRANKA [party], VLAST [authorities], NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres] GUBITNICI <u>TRANZICIJE</u> [transition losers]</p> <p><i>objectivation</i> (four types):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>instrumentalization</i>: RUKA [hand/arm] (metaphor for revenge), ČVRSTA RUKA [firm hand] JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force] NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force]</li> <li>• <i>somatization</i>: RUKA [firm hand]</li> </ul>
<b><i>PERSONALIZATION</i></b>
<p><i>indetermination</i>: /</p> <p><i>determination</i> (four types):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>differentiation</i>: ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots]</li> <li>○ <i>categorization</i> (three types): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ <i>functionalization</i>: POMAGAČ [helper], KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman]</li> <li>▪ <i>identification</i> (three types): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>classification</i>: GUBITNICI <u>TRANZICIJE</u> [transition losers] ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots]</li> <li>• <i>relational identification</i>: ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots]</li> <li>• <i>physical identification</i>: /</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ <i>appraisalment</i>: MANGUP [rascal], GUBITNICI <u>TRANZICIJE</u> [transition losers]</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ <i>association</i>: ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots]</li> </ul>
<b>SOCIAL ACTION REPRESENTATION</b>
<b><i>DEACTIVATION</i></b>
<p><i>objectivation</i>: GUBITNICI <u>TRANZICIJE</u> [transition losers], SIVA EKONOMIJA [grey market]</p> <p><i>descriptivization</i>: JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force]</p>

<b>DEAGENTIALIZATION</b>
<p><i>eventuation</i>: GUBITI [lose], NESTATI [disappear], ISCURITI [leak out], IŠČEZNUTI [vanish], PRELITI SE [spill over], CURITI [leak], IZLAZITI [get out], ISISATI [siphon off]</p> <p><i>naturalization</i>: NESTATI [disappear], ISCURITI [leak out], IŠČEZNUTI [vanish], PRELITI SE [spill over], CURITI [leak]</p>
<b>ABSTRACTION</b>
<p><i>generalization</i>: KRIZA [crisis], MOGUĆNOST [possibility], NEREGULARNOST [irregularity], INCIDENT [incident], KORIGOVATI CENE [correct prices], ŽIVETI [live], PRATITI [follow, watch], HRANITI [feed], IZOSTAVITI [fail to report], <u>ZLOUPOTREBLJEN</u> NOVAC [<u>abused</u> money], NEZAKONITI RAD [illegal work], SUKOB [conflict], KORISTITI MIMO NAMENE [use inadequately]</p> <p><i>distillation</i>: OŠTETITI [damage], <u>TUĐ</u> NOVAC [<u>someone else's</u> money], MEHANIZMI UBEDIVANJA [persuasion mechanisms], TROŠITI [spend]</p>

Before different types of strategies are discussed, it is important to note that the same concealing euphemisms (word/multi-word unit) can illustrate more than one strategy. This means that a particular word can achieve different kinds of contextual effects. For example, GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] illustrates three strategies, *abstraction*, *classification* and *appraisal*. TRANSITION, not humans, is seen as the cause of economic downturn, and therefore, this is an example of *abstraction*. Also, GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] are seen as a class of people, so this is an example of *classification*, and, this class of people is evaluated negatively, therefore, this is an example of *appraisal* as well.

Table 13 begins with the examples of two strategies of *impersonalization*, the strategies of *abstraction* and *objectivation*. One of the examples of *abstraction* is SURGE (AC):

(42) SURGE → TROOP SURGE:

With less than three months to go before the election, a lot of people are still trying to square Senator Obama's varying positions on the surge in Iraq. First, he opposed the surge and confidently predicted that it would fail. Then he tried to prevent funding for the troops who carried out the surge.

(McCain's speech to the VFW convention, 18 August 2008)

Here, we see that the surge is carried out by the troops, but when the single lexeme SURGE is used, the social actor is deemphasized. Another example of *abstraction* is POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION (AC), used instead of POLITICIANS' DYSFUNCTION:

(43) POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION → POLITICIANS' DYSFUNCTION:

But we've also seen the effects that political dysfunction can have on our economic progress. (Obama's remarks on the budget sequester, 05 February 2013)

In the British corpus, *abstraction* is illustrated with similar examples: POLITICAL SYSTEM → POLITICIANS, POLITICS → POLITICIANS and STATE → PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT:

(44) One of the tasks that we clearly have is to rebuild trust in our political system. Yes that's about cleaning up expenses, yes that is about reforming parliament, and yes it is about making sure people are in control - and that the politicians are always their servant and never their masters.

(Cameron: General election victory speech, 11 May 2010)

(45) Strip away all of the sound and fury and what people across Scotland, England and Wales, across every nation of the United Kingdom are saying is that this country doesn't care about me. Politics doesn't listen. The economy doesn't work. And they're right.

(Miliband: Leader's speech, Manchester, 23 September 2014)

(46) Sceptical of the state, trusting people to make the most of their lives, confident about the possibilities of the future – this is liberalism.

(Cameron: A Liberal Conservative consensus to restore trust in politics, 22.03.2007)

In Serbian, similar examples are used: POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will], POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors]:

(47) POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will] → VOLJA POLITIČARA [politicians' will]:

Kada do korupcije dolazi zato što nema utvrđenih pravila, politička volja je potrebna da bi se propis sačinio i usvojio; kada je problem u lošem propisu, onda treba političke volje da se izmeni; kada je propis dobar, ali nema uslova za delotvoran nadzor, političku volju treba pokazati da se uslovi stvore.

(Nenadić: Politička volja i pravna država, *Blic*, 23 januar 2009.)

[When corruption is possible because there are no pre-determined rules, political will is necessary to determine and adopt regulations; if a bad regulation is a problem, then political will is necessary to change it; if it is a good regulation, but there is no efficient monitoring, political will is necessary to create conditions for that. ]

[Nenadić: Political will and the legal state, *Blic*, 23 January 2009)

(48) POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors] → POLITIČARI [politicians]:

Za mene je potpuno neverovatno da se čak i politički faktori direktno upliću u izbor patrijarha Srpske pravoslavne crkve.

[Vučić: BIA će utvrditi ko govori istinu, 14. januar 2010. ]

[In my opinion, it is absolutely incredible for political factors to interfere directly in the election of the patriarch of the Serbian orthodox church.]

[Vučić: Security Information Agency will find out who tells the truth, 14 January 2010]

In addition, in Serbian, *abstraction* includes RUKOVOĐENJE [managing], STRANKA [party], VLAST [authorities], NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres].

The second type of *impersonalization*, *objectivation*, can be realized in four ways: *spatialization*, *utterance autonomization*, *instrumentalization* and *somatization*. The metonymy COUNTRY (BC) can be used as a strategy of *spatialization* (this example, number 1, is also mentioned in Section 2.5.7.6.):

Strip away all of the sound and fury and what people across Scotland, England and Wales, across every nation of the United Kingdom are saying is that this country doesn't care about me.

(Miliband: Leader's speech, Manchester, 23 September 2014)

The metonymy COUNTRY can denote the government, Parliament, and, generally speaking, people in positions of power. The strategy another way to “background the identity and/or role of social actors (Van Leeuwen 2008: 47)”.

DISINFORMATION (AC) is an example of *utterance autonomization*, another strategy used to hide the social actor (this example, number 5, is also analyzed in Section 4.3.2.3.):

DISINFORMATION:

But is even this modified, more realistic vision of democracy in action still relevant? Or has our political system been so degraded by misinformation and disinformation that it can no longer function?

(Krugman: Moment of truthiness, *The New York Times*, 15 August 2013)

Here, instead of using the noun which denotes specific people who use DISINFORMATION or MISINFORMATION, the nouns DISINFORMATION and MISINFORMATION become independent from the human actor.

HAMMER, NAIL (AC), CHEAP LABOUR (BC), JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force] (SC), NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force] (SC) illustrate *instrumentalization*. These words represent social actors by means of metaphorical reference to the instrument used in performing/undergoing an action, e.g. HAMMER, NAIL, or they are identified as labour, CHEAP LABOUR, JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force] NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [somewhat cheaper labour force]. In the last example, the comparative form suggests that the speaker modulates the negative meaning of the adjective CHEAP by using the comparative form CHEAPER. By representing people as labour, the speaker can avoid qualifying people as cheap, and in that way, try to reduce negative meaning (this example, number 37, is also analyzed in Section 4.4.3.2):

Mislim da to ugrožava ono što je naša, nažalost, ali je tako, jedna od retkih ili jedina komparativna prednost u ovom trenutku, a to je mogućnost da se na našoj teritoriji uz nešto jeftiniju radnu snagu i neke druge troškove proizvode određeni proizvodi i da je to zapravo tendencija koja nama ide u korist, a ne na štetu.

(Đurić: Đurić o Rističevićevom amandmanu, 29. januar 2013.)

[I think it jeopardizes something that is, unfortunately for us, but it is the way it is, one of the rare or the only comparative advantage at this moment, which consists in a possibility to produce certain products on our territory by employing somewhat cheaper labour force, and including some other expenses, which is actually a tendency that brings benefit, not harm.]

[Đurić: Đurić about Rističević's amendment, 29 January 2013]

Impersonalization is also realized as RUKA [hand/arm], which is an illustration of both *instrumentalization* and *somatization* (the first example is also mentioned in Section 4.3.2.5, it is number 15):

SC: RUKA [hand/arm]

Raković: Euforija Hrvata: Četnici, stići će vas naša ruka! Kurir, 17. novembar 2012.

[Raković: Croats' euphoria: Chetniks, our hand/arm will get you! Kurir, 17 November 2012]

(49) SC: ČVRSTA RUKA [firm hand]:

Naš izbor i naša ponuda je vladavina prava a ne ljudi. Jake institucije, a ne čvrsta ruka.

(Dragan Đilas, Govor predsednika Demokratske stranke Dragana Đilasa na XVI radnoj skupštini Demokratske stranke, 17.03.2013)

[Our choice and our offer is the rule of law, not the rule of people. Strong institutions, not a firm hand.]  
[Dragan Đilas, the Democratic Party President's speech, the XVI Working Assembly of the Democratic Party, 17.03.2013.]

(50) AC: POLITICAL HANDS:

Prosecutors have not alleged that Gray (D) knew of the illicit happenings laid out in the Hawkins case or in previous prosecutions of campaign figures. But the admission of illegal activity by a man who was once among Gray's most trusted political hands threatens to greatly complicate the mayor's pending decision on whether to seek a second term. Gray has denied any wrongdoing.

(Debonis and Marimow E.: Former Gray adviser admits to lying to FBI, lays out 'shadow campaign' workings, *The Washington Post*, 13 August 2013)

This is the type of *objectivation* where the social actor is represented by means of reference to a part of the body (Van Leeuwen 2008: 47). This, as the author suggests, can achieve the effect and the impression of alienation of the social actor from the act itself. As RUKA [hand/arm] is used both metonymically and metaphorically, we cannot pinpoint exactly what the meaning of the lexeme is, so we can conclude that the word conceals both the action and the social actor behind the action.

In addition to the strategies of *impersonalization*, Tables 13 and 14 give examples of the strategies of *personalization*. There are two major types of *personalization*, *indetermination* and *determination*. *Indetermination* is illustrated with OTHERS (BC):

(51) OTHERS:

They believe the people who work hard, try and support their families and build a better future have been left behind, and the major parties work for others and not for them.

(Miliband: Britain needs real change, not false promises, 27 May 2014).

It is obvious that OTHERS is used to keep certain social actors anonymous, but, here these social actors, although not determined, are personalized and separated as a social group.

*Determination* (three subtypes: *differentiation*, *association* and *categorization*) differs from *indetermination* in that it has more descriptive features related to determining our



belonging to certain social groups and our acting as members of those groups. These strategies highlight the importance of analyzing concealing euphemisms in terms of implications related to belonging to certain social groups. For example, the use of THE FEW (AC and BC) (which can be identified with OLIGARCHS), an example of two strategies of *determination, differentiation* and *association*, implies the awareness of belonging to an association of people different from other groups, e.g. THE MANY:

(52) THE TOP/THE MANY:

So that's the reality in Britain today. It is a rebate for the top. It's rip-off for everybody else. It's a recovery for the top. It's a recession for everybody else.  
(Miliband: Leader's speech, Manchester, 2 October 2012.)

(53) THE FEW/THE MANY:

And that's why we can say today that it's this Party that is fighting for all those who were written off by Labour... it's this Party that's for the many not the few.  
(Cameron, Leader's speech, Manchester, 02 October 2013).

In the British corpus, other examples of differentiation have been found, THE BETTER-OFF/THE LEAST WELL-OFF (also examples of *association and categorization*), THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS (also an example of *categorization*)

As far *differentiation* is concerned, in Serbian, it is illustrated with ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots]:

(54) Jaz između onih koji imaju i onih koji nemaju nikad nije bio veći.

(Đilas: Govor na random delu XV Skupštine DS, 25.11.2012)

[The gap between the haves and the have-nots has never been bigger. ]

[Đilas: Speech at the working section of the 15th session of the Democratic Party Assembly, 25 November 2012]

In addition to *differentiation*, this is also an example *categorization* (i.e. *classification and relational identification*) and *association*.

*Categorization* is realized in three ways. Social actors can be identified in terms of functions they perform, by means of the strategy of *functionalization* (the first subtype of *categorization*), e.g. SPIN DOCTOR (BC), POMAGAČ [helper] (SC), KONTROVERZNI

BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] (SC). Social actors can also be represented by means of *identification* (the second subtype of *categorization*), by means of *classification* or *relational identification*. *Classification* is illustrated with THE FEW (AC and BC), THE BETTER-OFF, THE LEAST WELL-OFF (BC), THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS (BC), GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] (SC), ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots] (SC) and *relational identification* is illustrated with: NOT A PATRIOT (AC), NOT A PROPONENT (AC), THE FEW (BC) THE MANY (BC), ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots] (SC)). Finally, *categorization* can imply evaluating actors, or *appraisal* (the third subtype of *categorization*), such as NOT A PATRIOT, NOT A PROPONENT (AC), THE BETTER-OFF (BC), MANGUP [rascal] (SC), GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] (SC). *Categorization* is representation by means of which social actors can be seen in a less negative light: POMAGAČ [helper] → SAUČESNIK [accomplice], KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman], MANGUP [rascal] → KRIMINALAC [criminal].

Tables 13 and 14 give examples of the strategies used for social action representation: *deactivation*, *deagentialization*, and *abstraction*. The first subtype of social action representation includes *objectivation* and *descriptivization*, by means of which actions are represented as objects/entities, rather than ongoing processes. For example, *objectivation* is realized with TAX HAVEN (BC), BLACK MARKET (BC), SIVA EKONOMIJA [grey economy] (SC), GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] (SC) BLACK SITE PRISON (AC). Here, actions and actors involved in an activity are substituted with the place where the action happens. For example, BLACK SITE PRISON (AC) is a concealing euphemism for TORTURE:

(55) The Senate intelligence committee has produced, but refuses to make public, a 6,000-page report on the CIA's use of torture and the network of clandestine "black site" prisons the agency established under Bush.

(Robinson: Bush's legacy keeps getting worse, *The Washington Post*, 25.04.2013.)

In *descriptivization*, certain qualities are ascribed to social actors who perform certain actions: DOMESTIC SERVITUDE (AC), CHEAP LABOUR (BC), JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force] (SC). Although these *descriptivizations* carry negative connotations, they are used instead of even more negative terms like SLAVERY, JEFTINI RADNICI [cheap workers]. This means that euphemization itself is a matter of degree, it can reduce, but not erase negative connotations.

The second subtype of social action representation is *deagentialization*, which is realized as *eventuation* and *naturalization*. These strategies also backgrounds the presence of the human factor. They can both be used for the purpose of avoiding/denying responsibility for the actions and damage implied in the actions they describe. We start with the verb LOSE as an example of *eventuation*:

(56) LOSE A JOB/BE DISMISSED:

And when I talk with the people who come to rallies and events like this, very often it's with a bit of hesitation that they tell me they've lost their job, they've lost their health care; they can't afford to go to college.

(Clinton: Clinton's May 6 primary night speech, 6 May 2008)

The verb LOSE (AC) can be used with different objects: LOSE LIFE, LOSE A JOB, LOSE HEALTHCARE. *Eventuation* is illustrated with many verbs/expressions related to the topic of stealing, especially in the Serbian corpus. These are VANISH (AC), DISAPPEAR (BC), MISSING (BC), SIPHON OFF (BC), and some of the examples from the Serbian corpus are: GUBITI [lose], NESTATI [disappear] As the examples show, stealing can be represented by means of *eventuation* in all three corpora. *Naturalization* is also related to the topic of stealing in all three corpora, if stealing is represented as disappearing or flowing.

The third subtype of social action representation is *abstraction* realized as *generalization* (e.g. AC: TAKE → STEAL BC: WATCH → SPY, ALL NECESSARY MEASURES, SC: MOGUĆNOST [possibility] → MOGUĆNOST KRŠENJA ZAKONA [possibility to break the law]) and *distillation* (e.g. BC: FORCE → VIOLENCE; SC: OŠTETITI [damage] → UKRASTI [steal]). This is a strategy that can be used to dilute negative connotations by means of *generalizations*, and, by means of *distillations*, which purify negative connotations by highlighting less negative/positive qualities of an action.

### 4.5.3. Conclusions

The analysis of discursive strategies shows that choosing specific social actor and social action representations relies on choosing encodings/ words or multi-word units which have preferable descriptive features. These are not peripheral, but diagnostic features, whose replacement leads to the fundamental semantic changes, which imply changes in both the sense and denotation of lexemes. First of all, by means of *impersonalization*, humans are

dehumanized, i.e. they are characterized by the absence of the diagnostic feature [HUMAN], so humans can be represented as abstractions and objects. This can formally be represented as: *impersonalization*: [-HUMAN]. By means of *personalization*, the diagnostic feature [HUMAN] is not excluded, but the sense excludes single determination, and represents human actors as collective identities, and this can formally be represented as: *personalization*: [HUMAN] + [COLLECTIVE IDENTITY] [-INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY]. Also, *personalization* can be used for the purpose of representing social actors by relating them to what they do, or by evaluating them as positive or negative: AC: NOT A PATRIOT, BC: SPIN DOCTOR, SC: MANGUP [rascal]. Both *impersonalization* and *personalization* can be used as strategies of distancing oneself from the involvement and responsibility for actions done by particular social actors. In that way, these discursive strategies protect the speaker from the negative reactions that can be caused by uttering the dispreferred term that has the diagnostic features [HUMAN] and [INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY].

Speakers can also avoid undesirable diagnostic features in social action representations. The diagnostic feature [ACTIVATED ACTION] can be avoided by means of *deactivation*: *objectivation* and *descriptivization*, so this discursive strategy can formally be represented as: [DEACTIVATED ACTION]. This strategy can be used for the purpose of backgrounding actors who participate in those actions and representing actions as permanent. When the strategy of *deagentialization* is used, actors are not only backgrounded, but they are completely avoided either via *eventuation* or *naturalization*. This strategy can formally be represented as: [ACTIVATED ACTION] [-HUMAN AGENCY]. This strategy is most frequently used in relation to stealing in all three corpora, and particularly in relation to stealing in the Serbian corpus. By means of *abstraction*, social practices can be represented in such a way that they can be legitimized, or at least not delegitimized. This is done by means of *generalization* and *distillation*, which can formally be represented as [ACTION] [GENERAL QUALITY] and [ACTION] [DISTILLED HIGHLIGHTED QUALITY/QUALITIES]. To sum up, social action representations can be used to background the agent or avoid mentioning the doer of an action (*deactivation* and *deagentialization*) and to legitimize actions (*abstraction*). These are actions represented by means of concealing euphemisms, so in addition to being used as a means of avoiding negative connotations, concealing euphemisms can be used as a means of avoiding responsibility for the actions they denote and as a means of legitimizing social practices they describe.

The analysis shows that strategies of social actor and social action representation are employed in both English and Serbian public discourse. As far as *impersonalization* is

concerned, the multi-word unit with the modifier POLITICAL has been identified in all three corpora: AC: POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION, BC: POLITICAL SYSTEM, SC: POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will], POLITIČKI FAKTORI [political factors]. The following examples of *personalization* are examples of less formal language: AC: THE FEW, BC: THE TOP, THE MANY, THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS, SC: ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots] MANGUP [rascal], KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman]. This suggests that public discourse is subjected to informalization. As far as *deactivation* is concerned, CHEAP LABOUR/JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA is part of both Serbian and British corpora. *Deagentialization* is used in relation to the topic of *stealing* in American and British corpora, but it is most frequently used in relation to *stealing* in the Serbian corpus. *Abstraction* is used in relation to all topics in all three corpora.

#### 4.6. Concluding observations

The results of the corpus analysis show that different levels of analysis of concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents are mutually related. The formal classification, the starting point in the corpus analysis, shows that some words and multi-word units identified as concealing euphemisms are used in both English and Serbian public discourse.

The identified similarities in the way concealing euphemisms can be encoded led to another level of analysis, the examination of the lexico-semantic relations between concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic counterparts. This part of the analysis is important as it shows that concealing euphemisms, seen as preferred ways of encoding meaning, are structurally related to their alternative non-euphemistic dispreferred encoding. Lexico-semantic relations highlight the similarities or the differences between the concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic counterparts. More specifically, they relate concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic counterparts by means of inclusion (hyperonymy/hyponymy, hyperonymy/troponymy), sense extension (regular polysemy), similarity/identity (synonymy), non-literal resemblance (metaphor) and contiguity (metonymy). On the other hand, the concealing euphemism and the non-euphemistic term can be antonyms and homonyms.

The lexico-semantic analysis compared the lexico-semantic relations between concealing euphemisms and their non-euphemistic equivalents in six corpora, i.e. the analysis focused on the American, British and Serbian corpora consisting of the examples from both newspaper articles and political speeches. Three main tendencies were identified in the analysis (see Sections 4.3.4. and 4.4.3.1.): firstly, metaphors and metonymies (as a group) are more frequent than hyperonymy and hyponymy (taken as a group) in political speeches in the American, British and Serbian corpora; secondly, hyperonymy is more frequent than hyponymy in all six corpora, and thirdly, hyponymy is more frequent in newspaper articles than in political speeches in the American and British corpora, whereas the difference regarding the use of hyponyms in the Serbian corpora is not significant.

The next level of analysis, the lexico-pragmatic analysis, shows the possibilities the hearer has in identifying a word/multi-word unit as a concealing euphemism. This is the level of analysis in which the proposed pragmatic algorithm integrates the structural (lexico-semantic), interpersonal, lexico-pragmatic and epistemic considerations of meaning specification by integrating the speaker's encoding mechanism and the hearer's decoding/interpretation mechanisms. The algorithm shows that the hearer's epistemic evaluation of the speaker's degree of explicitness can prompt a further search for explicature and implicature derivation. It also shows that when a word/multi-word unit is enriched with more negative descriptive features, the relation between the concealing euphemism and the alternative non-euphemistic encoding is made. The context and type of discourse where the euphemism is used is highly important, as the context provides information for inference, and both the context and the type of discourse chosen for the analysis are specific sources of information.

The lowest degree of explicitness and manifestness is seen in metaphors, which can be regarded as the speaker's lack of benevolence to provide relevant information. For example, the metaphor NAIL is an ad hoc meaning construction, which means that the speaker transfers the responsibility for meaning interpretation to the hearer (and, in that way, hides the informative intention). The speaker's lack of benevolence is also highly probable when an antonym of a homonym is used. Even when the context makes manifest the relation between the concealing euphemism and the non-euphemistic counterpart, the speaker can still choose to use a metaphor, an antonym or a homonym instead of the non-euphemistic term. In that way, the speaker distances him/herself from the alternative dispreferred non-euphemistic term.

That the speaker is in a position to impose concealing euphemisms as preferred constructions of reality is seen in the analysis of different types of discursive strategies. Although the hearer can recognize the relation between the less negatively connoted euphemistic and the more or extremely negatively connoted non-euphemistic term, the very fact that the concealing euphemism is still used indicates that it is the speaker's preferred construction, and the dispreferred construction is avoided. The analysis of the strategies of social actor and social action representation shows that the diagnostic features [HUMAN] [INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY], [ACTIVATED ACTION], [HUMAN AGENCY] can be avoided. Also, specific actions can be represented in a desired way by relying on generalizations and distillations. This means that, by means of specific representations, not only can the speaker symbolically distance him/herself from non-euphemistic terms (as s/he does not use/utter them), but the speaker can also distance him/herself from the actors and actions denoted with those non-euphemistic terms.

Finally, the results of the lexico-pragmatic analysis and the analysis of discursive strategies can both be related to the notion of responsibility. Namely, the lexico-pragmatic analysis shows that the speaker (as a social actor) can encode content in such a way as to hide his/her informative intention and make the hearer responsible for explicature and implicature derivation. Both the lexico-pragmatic analysis and the analysis of discursive strategies show that it is possible, for example, to treat people as objects, rather than humans (e.g. LABOUR vs WORKERS in both English and Serbian), or to avoid explicit identification of the agent/doer of an action (e.g representations of *stealing* in both English and Serbian). The avoidance of the descriptive features [HUMAN] and [HUMAN AGENCY] is a symbolic way of distancing oneself from social actors and social actions denoted by non-euphemistic terms, which may imply that the public speaker also wants to dissociate him/herself from the issue of responsibility associated with explicitly mentioned social actors and social actions.

## 5. CONCLUSION

### 5.1. Overview of results

The topic of this thesis is the analysis of the use of concealing euphemisms in public discourse, the analysis of the use of words and multi-word units which can reduce the negative expressive force of the utterance/sentence. By performing the functional role of changing the illocutionary force, these words and multi-word units can be the speaker's tool for avoiding dispreferred and placing preferred representations in public discourse. Concealing euphemisms are, therefore, seen as a type of manipulative strategic communication in which the speaker's informative intention is hidden.

In the thesis, we focus on concealing euphemisms used in relation to two genres, newspaper articles and political speeches, and we focus on specific topics of discussion in newspaper articles and political speeches, the negatively connoted topics of conflicts, corruption and crime, economic crisis, and surveillance. All content words, nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs are analyzed, and multi-words whose headwords are nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs. The inclusion of all content words is necessary because one of the main aims of the thesis is to show that, in specific contexts, all content/lexical words can be used as concealing euphemisms. The identification of concealing euphemisms is possible if they are related to non-euphemistic equivalents, which can replace concealing euphemisms in the same context. Our ability to recognize a concealing euphemism, therefore, is not our recognition of a specific lexical word. In order to explain what it is that makes a word/ multi-word unit a concealing euphemism, we start with the formal classification, but we go beyond the level of formal classification, and include three levels of analysis, the lexico-semantic analysis, the lexico-pragmatic analysis, and the analysis of discursive strategies.

The lexico-semantic analysis showed that concealing euphemisms and non-euphemistic terms are mutually defining as their senses are paradigmatically related. This makes it possible for the speaker to choose the encoding that does not have the highest degree of explicitness, specification and richness to perform the function of a concealing euphemism in a specific context. The speaker can rely on the following mechanisms:

- Instead of using a specific term, the speaker can use a genus expression, a superordinate term, which is not only a replacement of a hyponym with a hyperonym, but also a replacement of a more specific with a more polysemous term, which brings together hyperonymy and polysemy. This happens with nouns, verbs, multi-word



units, in all six corpora (American, British and Serbian corpora, both newspaper articles and political speeches), for example: AC: TAKE → STEAL BC: WATCH → SPY, SC: PRATITI [follow, watch] → UHODITI [spy]. Genus expressions can be so general in meaning that precise denotation is not easy to identify, even in context: AC: PROBLEM (Table 8), BC: ALL NECESSARY MEASURES (Table 9), ALL THE OPTIONS (Table 10) SC: NEFORMALNI CENTRI MOĆI [informal power centres] (Table 12).

- The speaker can choose a word/multi-word unit that expresses a position on a scale of degree different from the position that a non-euphemistic term would express, and thus the speaker avoids the terms that express absolute degrees of something. Firstly, this can be done by means of hyponymous or hyperonymous adjectives in all three corpora: AC: WEAKENED (hyponym) → WEAK (hyperonym) (Table 8), BC: POORER (hyponym) → POOR (hyperonym); UNACCEPTABLE (hyperonym) → TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE (hyponym) (Table 9); SC: OSIROMAŠEN [impoverished] (hyponym) → SIROMAŠAN [poor] (hyperonym) (Table 12). Secondly, this can be done by means of choosing specific hyponyms in all three subcorpora, for example: AC: FIB (hyponym) → LIE (hyperonym) (Table 7) (the absolutes TRUTH – LIE are thus relativized); PRETENSE (hyponym) → LIE (hyperonym) (Table 8); CONTROVERSIAL INTERROGATION PROGRAMME (hyponym) → TORTURE (hyperonym) (Table 9); MEHANIZMI UBEDIVANJA [persuasion mechanisms] (hyponym) → MUČENJE [torture] (hyperonym) (Table 11). Thirdly, this can be done by means of synonyms, in all three corpora, American, British and Serbian, e.g. AC: DISINFORMATION → LIE UNDERFUNDED → POOR (Table 7); BC: UNENVIABLE → EMBARRASSING (Table 10); SC: DEZINFORMACIJA [disinformation] → LAŽ [LIE], SOCIJALNO UGROŽEN [socially endangered] → SIROMAŠAN [poor] (Table 11). Fourthly, this can be done by means of the synonym/antonym interplay. This can be done by using negated nouns (litotes), comparative and negated adjectives, negated adverbs and/or their corresponding phrases in both genres in all three subcorpora, e.g.: AC: NOT A PATRIOT → NOT A TRAITOR, STRICTER → LESS LENIENT, LESS TRANSPARENTLY → MORE VAGUELY (Table 7); AC: FREER → LESS OPPRESSED, NOT INADVERTENTLY → INTENTIONALLY (Table 8); BC: LESS AFFORDABLE → MORE EXPENSIVE, UNCONSTRUCTIVE → DESTRUCTIVE (Table 9); BC: FAIRER → LESS UNFAIR; NOT GOOD ENOUGH → BAD (Table 10); SC: NEISTINIT [untrue] → LAŽAN [false] (Table 11); SC: POLUJAVNO [half-publicly] → POLUTAJNO [half-secretly]; NOTORNA NEISTINA [notorious untruth] → LAŽ [lie] (Table 12).

- The speaker can change descriptive features considered as prototypical in certain words. This can be done by choosing a specific synonym, e.g. AC: UNREPORTED → SECRET (Table 7) (UNREPORTED does not necessarily mean SECRET); BC: SPIN DOCTOR → EUPHEMIZER (the descriptive features related to the word DOCTOR elevate the status of the person) (Table 10); SC: KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [controversial businessman] → KRIMINALAC [criminal] (CRIMINAL becomes a BUSINESSMAN) (Table 11).
- The speaker can use a highly polysemous term, and can also use metaphors and metonymies, whose purpose is achieving specific effects, not precision and specification.
- The relation between a concealing euphemism and a non-euphemistic term can be an ad hoc relation derived on the basis of contextual implications. These are cases when we ask questions like: What specifically do you mean? In what sense? The derivation of ad hoc occasion-specific senses are the hearer's responsibility.
- It is possible for the speaker not only to replace a word with another one which has different non-diagnostic features, but also to replace a word with another one which has opposing diagnostic features, in other words, to use an antonym. These cases were identified in all six corpora: AC: LIBERATE → CONFINE (Table 8); BC: MORALITY → IMMORALITY (Table 9); STABILISE → DESTABILISE (Table 10); SC: HRANITI [feed] → TROVATI [poison] (Table 11); KVALIFIKOVANOST [competence] → NEKVALIFIKOVANOST [INCOMPETENCE] (Table 12).
- The speaker can even add incompatible diagnostic features, and use a homonym, for example BC: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE → MILITARY ACTION (Table 9).

The lexico-semantic analysis identified several tendencies. Firstly, hyperonyms used as concealing euphemisms are more frequent than hyponyms used as concealing euphemisms (hyponyms together with troponyms) in all six subcorpora (American, British and Serbian corpora subdivided into two corpora, the one which includes examples from newspaper articles, and another one that includes examples from political speeches). Secondly, hyperonyms and hyponyms are more frequent than metaphors and metonymies in newspaper articles (in American, British and Serbian subcorpora), and metaphors and metonymies are more frequent in political speeches (in American, British and Serbian subcorpora). Thirdly, in the Serbian corpus, metaphors and metonymies are most frequently related to *stealing*, and in

the American corpus, they are most frequently related to *war*. In the British corpus, metaphors and metonymies are most frequently related to the topic of *economic crisis*.

The lexico-semantic analysis shows that the identified less-negatively connoted concealing euphemisms are related to more negatively connoted non-euphemistic terms, but this is not enough to explain how concealing euphemisms are identified in specific contexts. This is the aim of the lexico-pragmatic analysis, which subsumes the lexico-semantic analysis, but, in addition to adopting the interrelatedness of less negatively and more negatively connoted expressions, it includes the pragmatic, interpersonal and epistemic aspects of communication. We propose the pragmatic algorithm, which shows that the recognition of concealing euphemisms is the result of inferencing that includes the structural (lexico-semantic), pragmatic and epistemic levels of analysis.

The lexico-pragmatic algorithm is based on relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), the pragmatic approach that takes into account both cognitive and communicative aspects of language use. The first cognitive principle of relevance explains that human cognition is aimed at maximizing relevance, and achieving the best possible cost-effect ratio. The second communicative principle of relevance explains that every act of ostensive communication carries with itself a presumption of optimal relevance in accordance with the communicator's abilities and preferences. In relation to this, communication is an epistemic interaction, in which the hearer evaluates the speaker's degree of benevolence and competence, which can lead to the hearer's acceptance or rejection of the information the speaker gives.

The pragmatic algorithm shows that both the speaker and the hearer are epistemically vigilant. The speaker believes/knows that the hearer can modulate the degree of epistemic vigilance, but the hearer can still hide behind the presumption of optimal relevance. This means that even if the degree of explicitness is not accepted by the hearer, and incompetence can be obvious, the lack of benevolence cannot always be proved. As far as the hearer is concerned, s/he can choose to believe the hearer and accept the speaker's degree of explicitness and manifestness as the most adequate in a specific context. Another possibility is given in the algorithm: prompted by the context and discourse, the hearer can test other interpretive hypotheses and identify the relation between the concealing euphemism and the non-euphemistic term.

The pragmatic algorithm illustrates that the speaker can opt for stronger or weaker communication, and thus make him/herself more or less responsible for the information s/he gives. Metaphors are the prime examples of weak communication, by means of which the

speaker transfers the responsibility for explicature and implicature derivation to the hearer, and the informative intention is hidden. Metaphors are also closely related to ad hoc concept construction, occasion-specific meaning derivation.

Ad hoc concept construction is not only related to metaphors; occasion-specific senses are closely related to polysemy, and metaphor is only one specific type of polysemy. For example, the euphemistic adjective INCONSISTENT (AC: Table 7) is related to the non-euphemistic adjective UNFAIR, but this is a possible meaning specification in a specific context. The hearer can add diagnostic features and enrich the euphemistic adjective to make it closer in meaning to the adjective UNFAIR. In that way, INCONSISTENT has a new sense, but this occasion-specific sense is still not part of the lexical database, i.e. the lexical database does not give information about the relation between the adjectives INCONSISTENT and UNFAIR.

The pragmatic algorithm shows that the speaker is not always ready to use the non-euphemistic term. For example, although the concealing euphemism STABILISE (British corpus) can easily be related with the non-euphemistic antonym DESTABILISE in the given context, the speaker opts for the euphemistic term (see Section 4.4.3.2). Also, the speaker can attribute the use of a specific concealing euphemism to other sources; for example, the author of the article where the euphemism KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN [CONTROVERSIAL BUSINESSMAN] (Serbian corpus) is used states that this euphemism is used by media (see Section 4.4.3.2). The author of the article, therefore, only mentions the concealing euphemism, and its use is attributed to someone else. In this way, the speaker distances herself from the concealing euphemism.

The lexico-semantic analysis and the lexico-pragmatic algorithm show that words and multi-word units can be taken as concealing euphemisms in certain contexts, which means that, in some other contexts, they do not have to be taken as concealing euphemisms. The *euphemism treadmill* (Pinker 2002: 212–213), therefore, does not always work, as concealing euphemisms are not only semantically marked euphemistic terms which in time become saturated with negative connotations. They can be words and multi-word units that have different senses, lexicalized and non-lexicalized, and it is the context and communicators that saturate them with positive/less negative connotations.

In addition to the lexico-semantic and the lexico-pragmatic analyses, the corpus analysis includes the analysis of social actor and social action representation which are proposed by Van Leeuwen (2008: 23–74). The speaker is regarded as a public actor who imposes certain representations of reality in public discourse. On the other hand, the lexico-

semantic and the lexico-pragmatic analyses are seen as the hearer's tool for exposing the relation between concealing euphemisms and non-euphemistic terms. The analysis includes two types of social actor representation, *impersonalization* (*abstraction* and *objectivation*) and *personalization* (*indetermination* and *determination*), and three types of social action representation, *deactivation*, *deagentialization* and *abstraction*. The results show that these strategies/specific representations are encodings which have (or lack) specific descriptive features. Also, the results show that speakers use less formal/ informal language in their social actor and social action representations: AC: THE FEW, BC: THE TOP, THE MANY, THOSE WITH THE BROADEST SHOULDERS, SC: ONI KOJI IMAJU I ONI KOJI NEMAJU [the haves and the have-nots] MANGUP [rascal], GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers].

Examples of *impersonalization* and *personalization* were identified in all three subcorpora, American, British and Serbian. *Impersonalization* is a strategy used to represent humans as abstractions or objects, i.e. the diagnostic feature [HUMAN] is missing. These are, for example: *abstraction*: AC: POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION, BC: POLITICAL SYSTEM, SC: POLITIČKA VOLJA [political will]; *objectivation*: AC: HAMMER, BC: CHEAP LABOUR, SC: JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA/ NEŠTO JEFTINIJA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour force/somewhat cheaper labour force]. *Personalization* is the strategy where the diagnostic feature [HUMAN] is not excluded, but, human actors are either represented in terms of collective identities, or as actors whose social roles are more positively evaluated, for example: AC: NOT A PATRIOT (instead of the opposite term TRAITOR); BC: SPIN DOCTOR (instead of EUPHEMIZER, or even LIAR), SC: KONTROVERZNI BIZNISMEN (instead of CRIMINAL).

As far as social action representations are concerned, examples of *deactivation*, *objectivation* and *descriptivization* were identified in all three corpora. When these strategies are used, the speaker chooses to represent actions by foregrounding/backgrounding specific descriptive features. By means of *deactivation*, social actors involved in social actions can be backgrounded, for example, AC: BLACK SITE PRISON (*objectivation*), DOMESTIC SERVITUDE (*descriptivization*), BC: TAX HAVEN (*objectivation*), CHEAP LABOUR (*descriptivization*), SC: GUBITNICI TRANZICIJE [transition losers] (*objectivation*), JEFTINA RADNA SNAGA [cheap labour] (*descriptivization*). When the strategy of *deagentialization* is used, human agency is excluded from representations. In all three subcorpora, American, British and Serbian, *stealing* can be *deagentialized*: the verb DISAPPEAR (AC and BC)/ NESTATI [disappear] (SC) are examples of *deagentialization*, both *eventuation* and *naturalization*. Finally, examples of *abstraction*, both *generalization* and *distillation*, were identified in all three corpora.

The approach that includes the lexico-semantic analysis, the lexico-pragmatic analysis and the analysis of discursive strategies is the interpretive account of meaning construction that can expose and demystify the possibilities for language manipulation. The interpretive stage of critical discourse analysis can benefit from relevance theory, as relevance theory gives insight into the cognitive and communicative aspects shared by all language users and social actors. In other words, it is not possible to discuss unequal relations of power reflected in language use without taking into account the cognitive and communicative aspects of language use.

## 5.2. Theoretical and practical implications

The proposed integrated account of meaning construction which can be used in the interpretive stage of critical discourse analysis (CDA) has important theoretical implications regarding the possibilities for combining socially and cognitively oriented approaches to studying language use. This thesis shows that critical discourse analysis can rely on cognitive theoretical frameworks in its attempt to demystify unequal relations of power reflected and reproduced in language use. Actually, one of the main objections against CDA is its lack of attention to the human mind (Chilton 2005: 19–52). The theoretical background to this research makes it clear that both coordination and manipulation are guided by certain principles (differently viewed), and that the social aspect of communication is inherent to language use. CDA embraces this idea, and it is rooted in “social theory of a particular type and on linguistics of a particular type”; however, what exactly do we do when we connect the sociopolitical and the linguistic domains (Chilton 2005: 21–22)? Chilton argues that it is necessary to introduce the cognitive aspect into critical discourse analysis: if we use language to construct the social world and social identities, it is necessary to focus on the minds of the interacting individuals where these constructions are made (Chilton 2005: 23–24).

As stated, Chilton (2011: 180–181) argues that linguistic structures are not inherently manipulative/competitive; what can make them manipulative are humans who act on their goal-directed intentions. As the author suggests, making the hearer form a thought or a belief about certain aspects of reality is an example of such intentions, and on a larger scale, these are strategies (larger plans of verbal action) which have the final goal of changing the hearer’s representation of social and physical reality. All this is important, as CDA studies the relation between language and social/political power, and power is not an abstract notion, it

comes from people who are in positions to construct and change social realities, identities, actors and actions, and also hide them by using specific discursive strategies.

The speaker can use discursive strategies in accordance with the effects s/he wants to achieve, but the hearer is equipped with epistemic vigilance, which activates the metarepresentational ability (Sperber 1994a: 60), the ability to relate representations with other representations, and in that way check whether the speaker should be trusted. Sperber (1994a: 60–61) suggests that this metarepresentational ability has the function of naïve psychology, which implies the discussion of the notions crucial to human behavior, such as belief, desire, intention. Therefore, the notion of metarepresentational ability can also be linked with CDA, as it can give insight into how language can be used for the purpose of maintaining and reproducing desirable social relations. Speakers/language users may have certain beliefs about reality, but, at the same time, we can have desires that other people should believe or desire something (Sperber 1994a: 60). Constructing mental representations of information is one thing, and another equally important thing is that we produce public representation, information for other people in accordance with our own desires.

The gap between mental and public representations, mental and public lexicon, means that it is possible for us not to come clean in communication. This is especially important in public discourse. Fairclough (1989: 49) argues that mass-media discourse is characterized by the power relations which are often not clear and there are reasons for seeing these power relations as hidden. First of all, mass media discourse (online political speeches and newspaper articles belong to mass media discourse) is not face-to-face discourse, because the producer and the interpreter do not interact directly. Moreover, we do not have direct access to events represented in mass media. We usually do not have direct access to what we are told in mass media, so, as Fairclough (1989: 49) explains, the media product (in this research, online newspaper articles and political speeches), comes in-between producers and interpreters/consumers as a commodity (Fairclough 1989: 49). Another difference between face-to face discourse and mass media discourse is that there is no immediate feedback that interpreters can give to producers. Mass media targets mass audience, which, in fact, means that producers do not know exactly know which groups constitute such a diverse audience. For members of the audience, this means that they should find a way to relate to the fact that they are addressed not as an individual, but as a collective mind.

Speakers want the audience to believe them, they would not address the audience just for the sake of it, so the notion of belief is most closely related to the notion of credibility. The information given cannot be the information that discredits the speaker, so the speaker

must evaluate which effects are produced by specific encodings. In order to preserve the image of credibility, the speaker can choose representations that make him/her look credible.

In that sense, specific discursive strategies of social actor and social action representation can be used to maintain the image of credibility and avoid face-damaging situations. However, it is possible for the hearer to relate a low degree of explicitness with the speaker's intention to hide certain assumptions that could be relevant for the hearer. This can then be regarded as a strategic avoidance of forms that have a higher/high degree of explicitness.

In relation to this, the motivation behind the use of concealing euphemisms can be studied in more detail in relation to politeness theory (Brown and Levinson 1978/1987), which studies the use of language appropriate in specific social settings. Concealing euphemisms can be analyzed as face-preserving acts, which, in specific social context are used to avoid possible face-threatening situations (negative public image, loss of authority, credibility). Differences in genres could also be examined, such as differences in the use of concealing euphemisms between quality press and tabloids, or differences in the use of concealing euphemisms between political speeches and quality press. Cognitive approaches to politeness can also be explored.

To sum up, socially oriented theories can benefit from cognitive insights, and by combining the social and the cognitive, the potential to explain and demystify mass media manipulation and verbal manipulation in general increases. Also, the notion of epistemic vigilance highlights the benefits epistemic considerations can give to the study of language use in general, and to the study of language use in specific types of discourses, such as mass media discourse.



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Изјављујем да је докторска дисертација, под насловом

EURHEMISMS IN ENGLISH AND SERBIAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE/

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Аутор дисертације: Милица Радуловић

Потпис аутора дисертације:



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Име и презиме аутора: Милица Радуловић

Наслов дисертације:

EUPHEMISMS IN ENGLISH AND SERBIAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE/

ЕУФЕМИЗМИ У ЈАВНОМ ДИСКУРСУ НА ЕНГЛЕСКОМ И СРПСКОМ ЈЕЗИКУ

Ментор: проф. др Биљана Мишић Илић

Изјављујем да је штампани облик моје докторске дисертације истоветан електронском облику, који сам предао/ла за уношење у **Дигитални репозиторијум Универзитета у Нишу**.

У Нишу, 30.08.2016.

Потпис аутора дисертације:

Милица Радуловић



Универзитет у Нишу

### ИЗЈАВА О КОРИШЋЕЊУ

Овлашћујем Универзитетску библиотеку „Никола Тесла“ да, у Дигитални репозиторијум Универзитета у Нишу, унесе моју докторску дисертацију, под насловом:

EUPHEMISMS IN ENGLISH AND SERBIAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE/

ЕУФЕМИЗМИ У ЈАВНОМ ДИСКУРСУ НА ЕНГЛЕСКОМ И СРПСКОМ ЈЕЗИКУ

Дисертацију са свим прилозима предао/ла сам у електронском облику, погодном за трајно архивирање.

Моју докторску дисертацију, унету у Дигитални репозиторијум Универзитета у Нишу, могу користити сви који поштују одредбе садржане у одабраном типу лиценце Креативне заједнице (Creative Commons), за коју сам се одлучио/ла.


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У Нишу, 30.08.2016.

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Примљено : 07. 04. 2016.			
ОРГ. ЈЕД.	Бр.	Износ	Вредност

NASTAVNO-NAUČNOM VEĆU  
FILOZOFSKOG FAKULTETA U NIŠU

Odlukom Nastavno-naučnog veća Filozofskog fakulteta u Nišu na sednici od 23. marta 2016. godine imenovani smo za članove Komisije za ocenu i odbranu urađene doktorske disertacije. Nakon stručne i naučne analize priložene teze, Komisija podnosi Nastavno-naučnom veću Filozofskog fakulteta u Nišu sledeći

IZVEŠTAJ

o oceni doktorske disertacije urađene na engleskom jeziku pod naslovom *Euphemisms in English and Serbian Public Discourse (Eufemizmi u javnom diskursu na engleskom i srpskom jeziku)* kandidatkinje **mr Milice Radulović**, višeg lektora na Departmanu za anglistiku Filozofskog fakulteta u Nišu.

**Pregled strukture doktorske disertacije**

Doktorska disertacija *Euphemisms in English and Serbian Public Discourse* kandidatkinje mr Milice Radulović izložena je na 291 stranici i sadrži pet poglavlja: *Introduction* (Uvod) (str. 12–30), *Theoretical background* (Teorijski okvir) (str. 31–108), *Methodological framework* (Metodološki okvir) (str.109–115), *Corpus Analysis* (Analiza korpusa) (str. 116–255) i *Conclusion* (Zaključak) (str. 256–264). Rad sadrži i apstrakte na srpskom i engleskom jeziku, bibliografiju od 327 jedinica (str. 265–291) i 14 ilustrativnih tabela.

**Analiza doktorske disertacije**

Predmet ove doktorske disertacije je teorijsko-empirijsko istraživanje kojim su opisani i analizirani leksički eufemizmi u javnom diskursu na engleskom i srpskom jeziku, a koji se koriste za prikrivanje stvarnog stanja stvari u svetu sa ciljem manipulacije i uticaja na javno mnjenje.

U najopštijem smislu, eufemizmi su jezičko sredstvo za smanjivanje ekspresivne snage iskaza, čija je upotreba motivisana uverenjem da direktna, tj. ortofemistična ili disfemistična reč, fraza ili rečenica, može prouzrokovati neprijatnost, uvrediti sagovornika ili mu čak naneti neku štetu. U skladu sa funkcijama u diskursu, oni se mogu podeliti na one koji imaju za cilj prekrivanje (engl. *veiling*) i one koji imaju za cilj prikrivanje (engl. *concealing*) (Luchtenberg 1985: 24). Prva grupa eufemizama uglavnom pripada sferi religijskih i društvenih tabua. Drugu



grupu čine eufemizmi kojima se namerno izbegava eksplicitno referiranje na određene pojave, predmete ili ljude sa ciljem manipulacije javnosti u svrhu modelovanja percepcije događaja u društvu. Upravo je ova druga kategorija, eufemizmi prikrivanja, bila predmet ove doktorske disertacije.

U *Uvodu* su definisani predmet, metode, korpus i ciljevi istraživanja. Nakon specifikacije predmeta istraživanja, a to su eufemizmi prikrivanja u javnom diskursu na engleskom i srpskom jeziku, dat je i kratak istorijsko-kritički pregled različitih shvatanja i definicija eufemizama, sa posebnim osvrtom na razliku između eufemizama uopšte i eufemizama koji služe za prikrivanje, i na distinkciju između pojmova eufemizama, eufemizama prikrivanja i političke korektnosti.

U drugom poglavlju, koje je podeljeno na šest teorijskih potpoglavlja, obimno je predstavljen teorijski okvir teze, koji odgovara kompleksnosti teme i istraživanja. Najpre je dat pregled postojećih istraživanja eufemizama a zatim širi teorijski okvir u kojima su razmatrani pojmovi retorike, stilistike i retoričnosti, i njihov značaj za proučavanje eufemizama, koji su, u literaturi, primarno posmatrani kao retoričke i stilističke figure. Širi lingvistički okvir za ovo istraživanje kandidatkinja je našla u Sapir-Vorfovoj teoriji jezičke relativnosti, na osnovu koje se može pretpostaviti da je verbalna manipulacija inherentna jeziku. Za neposredni teorijski lingvistički okvir za istraživanje kandidatkinja uzima pragmatiku. Predstavljena je prvo grajsovska varijanta sa ključnim pojmom principa kooperacije i njegovim značajem za ispitivanje latentne strateško-manipulativne komunikacije, a zatim je detaljno predstavljena teorije relevancije, sa postulatima koji predstavljaju osnov za istraživanje. U poslednjem potpoglavlju teorijskog uvoda, kandidatkinja predstavlja teorije analize diskursa i naročito kritičke analize diskursa, s obzirom da je predmet teze upotreba eufemizama u javnom diskursu.

U trećem poglavlju predstavljen je metodološki okvir istraživanja, detaljnije su predstavljeni pristupi i metode navedeni u uvodu, a detaljno je predstavljen i elektronski semantički leksikon WordNet 3.1., koji je korišćen za utvrđivanje i analizu leksičko-semantičkih odnosa u korpusu na engleskom jeziku.

Najznačajnije i najobimnije poglavlje teze je četvrto, *Analiza korpusa*, koje je podeljeno u šest potpoglavlja. U tezi je primenjena metoda kvalitativne analiza korpusa koji se sastoji od po sto eufemizama skrivanja, identifikovanih u korpusu američkog, britanskog i srpskog jezika. Svaki od ovih korpusa podeljen je na dva manja korpusa, korpus eufemizama preuzetih iz novinskih članaka i korpus eufemizama preuzetih iz političkih govora. Teme novinskih članaka i političkih govora su konflikti, korupcija i kriminal, ekonomska kriza i nadzor. Ove teme mogu imati veoma negativne konotacije, tako da se očekuje da je moguće dovesti u vezu upotrebijenu reč/izraz koji ima pozitivnije konotacije sa drugom neupotrebijenom reči/izrazom koji ima negativnije konotacije u istom kontekstu.

Kandidatkinja je izvršila formalnu, leksičko-semantičku, leksičko-pragmatičku i diskursno-strategijsku analizu korpusa, kako bi objasnila stvaranje eufemističkog značenja u javnom diskursu, koje je na kraju povezala sa intepretacijom u svetlu kritičke analize diskursa.

U prvom delu analize, eufemizmi iz tri korpusa klasifikovani su na osnovu formalno-strukturnih kriterijuma, a izvedena su i zapažanja o sličnostima i razlikama u tri korpusa.

Drugi deo analize predstavlja leksičko-semantičku analizu. Pod time se podrazumeva analiza leksičko-semantičkih odnosa između eufemizama skrivanja i njihovih neeufemističnih ekvivalenata: hiperonimija/hiponimija, polisemija, meronimija, sinonimija, čak i antonimija i

homonimija. Korpus je podeljen u šest manjih celina; naime, poredi se upotreba eufemizama iz američkog, britanskog i srpskog korpusa, kao i upotreba eufemizama iz novinskih članaka i političkih govora. Rezultati leksičko-semantičke analize pokazali su nekoliko tendencija: 1) hiperonimi su frekventniji od hiponima u svih šest korpusa; 2) hiponimi su frekventniji u američkom i britanskom korpusu koji je sačinjen na osnovu primera preuzetih iz novinskih članaka, dok u srpskom nije uočena ta razlika; 3) hiperonimi i hiponimi su brojniji od metafora i metonimija u američkom, britanskom i srpskom korpusu koji se sastoji od primera koji su preuzeti iz novinskih članaka; drugim rečima, više je metafora i metonimija u američkom, britanskom i srpskom korpusu koji se sastoji od primera preuzetih iz političkih govora. U vezi sa obrađenim temama gde su najčešće korišćene eufemistične metafore i metonimije, utvrđeno je da je to tema krađe u srpskim novinskim člancima, tema rata u američkim političkim govorima i tema ekonomske krize i razlike između bogatih i siromašnih u britanskim političkim govorima.

Treći segment analize predstavlja leksičko-pragmatička analiza, koja se bavi mehanizmima za enkodiranje značenja i mehanizmima za interpretaciju značenja i prepoznavanje manipulacije. Da bi se ova analiza sprovedla, sačinjen je pragmatički algoritam na osnovu teorije relevancije (Sperber and Wilson 1995 et al.). Pragmatički algoritam integriše strukturne (leksičko-semantički nivo), interpersonalne, leksičko-pragmatičke i epistemičke aspekte specifikacije značenja, i na taj način pokazuje da govornik manipuliše nivo eksplicitnosti i manifestnosti u komunikaciji; s druge strane, slušalac može prepoznati manipulaciju ako se *epistemička budnost* (engl. *epistemic vigilance* (Sperber 1994, Sperber et al. 2010)) podigne do nivoa koji će pokrenuti testiranje više interpretativnih hipoteza sve dok se ne postignu zadovoljavajući kontekstualni efekti. Pragmatička analiza pokazuje da se u javnom diskursu verbalna manipulacija pomoću eufemizama skrivanja zasniva na jezičkoj pod-determinaciji (pododređenosti) i neodređenosti, koje zahtevaju epistemičku budnost prema iskazanom sadržaju. S obzirom na to da pragmatički algoritam pokazuje da su kontekst i tip diskursa suštinski važni za identifikaciju odnosa između eufemizama skrivanja i neeufemističnih alternativa, slušalac treba da pojača epistemičku budnost i prema izvoru informacija. Ovo znači da slušalac preuzima odgovornost za izvođenje eksplikatura i implikatura.

U poslednjem segmentu analize korpusa, kroz okvir kritičke analize diskursa, kandidatkinja je analizirala kako se eufemizmi skrivanja mogu upotrebiti kao diskurzivne strategije za različito predstavljanje društvenih aktera i radnji (Van Leeuwen 2008). Primeri svih analiziranih strategija pronađeni su u američkom, britanskom i srpskom korpusu. Neke od uobičajenih strategija predstavljaju impersonalizacija, kolektivizacija i apstrakcija kada su u pitanju akteri radnje, a deaktivacija, deagentivizacija i apstrakcija kada su u pitanju same radnje. Pomoću navedenih strategija izbegavaju se negativni načini predstavljanja društvenih aktera i radnji, a pitanje odgovornosti, pa čak i pitanje morala se ignorišu.

Zaključno, peto poglavlje, sastoji se od dva dela. U prvom su sumarno prikazani rezultati višestruke analize korpusa, dok drugi deo razmatra implikacije za dalja istraživanja, kako empirijske tako i teorijske prirode.

### **Vrednovanje doktorske disertacije**

Doktorska disertacija *Euphemisms in English and Serbian Public Discourse* kandidatkinje mr Milice Radulović predstavlja rezultat teorijski dobro osmišljenog i empirijskih

pedantno sprovedenog korpusnog istraživanja, urađenog na osnovu obimne relevantne kritički proučene i komentarisane literature, kako bi se postavile hipoteze i kompleksan analitički okvir.

Predmet istraživanja su leksički eufemizmi u engleskom i srpskom javnom diskursu, tj. reči i izrazi čija je funkcija skrivanje značenja u smislu ublažavanja negativne ekspresivne snage iskaza/rečenice, kao i u smislu postizanja efekta skrivanja nepoželjnih i plasiranja poželjnih konstrukcija realnosti. Polazeći od teze da je upotreba eufemizama specifični oblik manipulacije jezikom, kandidatkinja je ispitala i potvrdila osnovnu hipotezu da se identifikacija eufemističkog značenja zasniva na mogućnostima da se identifikuje odnos između eufemizama prikrivanja i ne-eufemističnih ekvivalenata koji mogu da zamene te eufemizme u istom kontekstu. Oslanjajući se na teorijski okvir leksičke semantike, pragmatike i posebno teorije relevancije, kao i kritičke analize diskursa, kandidatkinja je pokazala mehanizme enkodiranja i interpretacije eufemizama, kroz integrisan pristup koji obuhvata leksičko-semantičke, leksičko-pragmatičke i diskursno-strategijske aspekte konstrukcije značenja.

Dovodeći u vezu teorijski okvir i analizu primera verbalne manipulacije iz korpusa, kandidatkinja je pokazala da teorija relevancije ima potencijal za razotkrivanje manipulacije kao načina postizanja ili izbegavanja određenih kontekstualnih efekata. Takođe, pokazano je da se kvalitativna analiza primera iz korpusa zasnovana na teoriji relevancije može povezati sa interpretativnom fazom kritičke analize diskursa, koja u jeziku vidi sredstvo za perpetuiranje nametnutih uverenja. Analiza pokazuje da se interpretativna faza kritičke analize može dovesti u vezu sa kognitivnim aspektima jezičke upotrebe, čime se može objasniti ne samo kako govornik u javnom diskursu može delovati jezikom, već i kako se kognitivni i društveni aspekti jezičke upotrebe mogu integrisati za potrebe analize verbalne manipulacije.

Disertacija *Euphemisms in English and Serbian Public Discourse* kandidatkinje mr Milice Radulović urađena je u skladu sa ciljevima postavljenim u obrazloženju i sadrži sve neophodne elemente. Empirijsko istraživanje je zasnovano na analizi korpusa koji je promišljeno odabran i dobro organizovan za ovu vrstu istraživanja. Na osnovu kombinacije teorijskih pristupa za ispitivanje eufemizama i komunikacije, kandidatkinja je napravila originalni analitičko-deskriptivno-klasifikacioni model, kao i model pragmatičkog algoritma kojim se analizira kognitivno-komunikativni mehanizam enkodiranja i interpretacije eufemizama prikrivanja u javnom diskursu. Na planu kontrastivne analize engleskog jezika (američki i britanski korpus) i srpskog jezika, pokazano je da uprkos izvesnim leksičkim razlikama ne postoje suštinske kontrastivne razlike ni na leksičkom, ni na kognitivno-komunikativnom planu između engleskog i srpskog jezika.

Značaj ove disertacije prvenstveno leži u tome što, uprkos brojnim postojećim istraživanjima eufemizama, javnog diskursa i fenomena manipulacije u verbalnoj komunikaciji, ona predstavlja inovativnu i kompleksnu kombinaciju više lingvističkih teorija, sa originalnim analitičkim i interpretativnim modelom, koji je relevantan ne samo za empirijsku obradu podataka i interpretaciju rezultata, već se došlo i do kritičkih teorijskih uvida koji su predloženi u diskusijama rezultata.

#### **Zaključak i predlog komisije:**

Na osnovu date analize doktorske disertacije *Euphemisms in English and Serbian Public Discourse* kandidatkinje mr Milice Radulović, Komisija zaključuje da se radi o tezi sa

jasno definisanim predmetom, metodama i ciljevima istraživanja, koje je teorijski dobro utemeljeno sintetičkom kombinacijom teorijskih pristupa i originalnim analitičkim modelom, a empirijski dosledno izvedeno sa kvalitativno i kvantitativno precizno obrađenim i komentarisanim rezultatima istraživanja, da je tekst logično i pregledno izložen i da teza u potpunosti zadovoljava predviđene standarde.

Komisija predlaže Nastavno-naučnom veću Filozofskog fakulteta u Nišu da prihvati ovaj Izveštaj i da kandidatkinji mr Milici Radulović odobri javnu odbranu doktorske disertacije pod naslovom *Euphemisms in English and Serbian Public Discourse*.



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Doc. dr Maja Vukić, docent  
Filozofski fakultet, Niš

U Nišu i Kragujevcu, 5. aprila 2016. godine